Asked by Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb To ask Her Majesty’s
Government what proposals they have for the use of facial
recognition technology in security and policing. Baroness Jones of
Moulsecoomb (GP) My Lords, I congratulate noble Peers on
their fortitude and stamina in being here today. My partner and I
have to get to Dorset for our 20th...Request free trial
Asked by
-
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what proposals they have
for the use of facial recognition technology in security
and policing.
-
(GP)
My Lords, I congratulate noble Peers on their fortitude and
stamina in being here today. My partner and I have to get
to Dorset for our 20th anniversary party—it would not be
the same without us; our guests would probably miss us—and
it is hard enough for me to be here. I also express my
utmost gratitude to Silkie Carlo and the NGO Big Brother
Watch, who have supported me and others in preparing for
this important debate.
I have asked questions about this issue before but the
answers were not satisfactory. I have therefore brought
this debate before the House simply because I believe that
the use of automated facial recognition technology
represents a turning point in our civil liberties and human
rights in the UK. It has barely been acknowledged anywhere
that this could be a problem, and that is the reason for
today’s debate.
If used appropriately, I do not doubt that it will provide
many opportunities and ways to solve crimes, just as DNA
research has done over the past few decades. However, we
are currently faced with an unregulated and frankly
terrifying mess, which uses data illegally and
disproportionately interferes with our fundamental human
rights. The current system—or, more correctly, the lack of
a current system—means that there is no law, no oversight
and no policy regulating police use of automated facial
recognition. The limited trials that we know about have
shown that it can be completely ineffective and potentially
discriminatory.
The truth is that we are being watched all the time. People
have had concerns about CCTV for some time but now it is
beginning to recognise and identify us. The purpose of
today’s debate is to understand how much we are being
watched and automatically identified. I want to know how
that is being governed—if it is being governed at all—and
what legislative frameworks need to be put in place to
properly regulate facial recognition.
In response to today’s debate, I call on the Government to
do two things. First, they should place an immediate ban on
police forces using automated facial recognition with
surveillance cameras. The reasons for this will become
clear during my speech. Secondly, I call on the Government
to automatically remove the thousands of images of
unconvicted individuals from the police’s custody image
database. I will come back to this, but it is nearly six
years since a court ruling said that the current system is
illegal, so I am not sure how we are still using it.
Automated facial recognition uses technology to identify
people in real time against pictures stored in a database.
South Wales Police has been leading on its deployment and
testing in the UK, funded by a £2 million grant from the
Home Office. It has used it at a whole range of sports
events, concerts and shopping centres. The Met police has
also used facial recognition technology at a number of
events, including Remembrance Sunday and the Notting Hill
Carnival. Very little information has been released to the
public on the accuracy and reliability of these tests, but
the anecdotal evidence from police using it at Notting Hill
Carnival was that they had 35 false positives, with only
one positive match. Some five people were asked to prove
their identity to the police, having been flagged up on the
computer, all of whom turned out to be innocent. Big
Brother Watch itself saw two people identified by the
computer, the problem being that the computer had matched
them with the police records of two men.
It is not looking like a great start. The Government cannot
stand idly by while allowing this intrusion into
individuals’ rights and identities. Big concerns about
equality issues arise from this technology, particularly
the risk of misidentifying people of colour, who are
already disproportionately affected by policing tactics. If
these concerns turn out to be correct, that will be another
legal challenge in the pipeline.
If the public are ever to trust the use of this technology,
it must be subject to the highest standards. We need the
results of these tests to be made public and subject to
rigorous scrutiny. As far as I can tell, there is
absolutely no legal or regulatory framework governing how
the police use automatic facial recognition. I hope the
Minister can give me a straight answer on that. At the
moment, it seems the Government are letting police forces
get on with it as an operational matter. This is clearly
not just an operational matter. We have rules about road
signs, speed cameras and gathering evidence, so why would
we not have rules about how they use something as
potentially intrusive as facial recognition? There is a
regulatory gap here that must be filled.
I am very concerned that this technology is being used with
a database full of illegal images of innocent people—I
include myself in that number. It seems that the facial
recognition technology is using the police national
database, which contains tens of thousands of people who
were never charged or convicted of an offence. It is six
years since the High Court ruled that the policy of
retaining the mugshots of innocent people was unlawful, but
the police still do it and they still upload them to the
police national database. The Government’s solution in 2017
was to allow individuals to write to the police, asking to
be deleted. That is just not good enough. My pictures will
be on the database, along with those of hundreds of other
people who have been arrested at peaceful, perfectly lawful
protests and never charged with an offence. So will people
whose charges were dropped, were wrongly accused or were
found not guilty by a jury of their peers. No one chooses
to have their photograph taken by the police; it is
extracted under coercion.
The burden should be on the police to delete those images
of everyone who has not been found guilty of an offence. I
ask the Minister whether the Home Office will take
immediate steps to automatically delete those images of
every single innocent person from the police national
computer and prevent the database being used for facial
recognition until it no longer contains innocent people.
Will she also inform the House whether other sources of
personal images, such as driving licence and passport
databases, are available for use by the police and the
security services?
I turn my attention to the security services and, in doing
so, I extend my respect and gratitude to the NSA
whistleblower Edward Snowden—a true hero of our times.
Among his revelations was a GCHQ programme called Optic
Nerve. It is alleged that millions of innocent people were
spied on through their webcams to experiment with facial
recognition. Parliament has since passed laws that make
bulk surveillance and interception lawful, so it seems that
we are moving towards more, rather than less, of this kind
of mass surveillance. I would appreciate the Minister
informing the House about the security services’ use of
facial recognition technology, and ask her not to hide
behind the cloaking words of “national security”. I am not
asking for details; I am asking for process.
There are very real concerns about the use of mass
surveillance and facial recognition technology; we are
moving into the kind of territory that even George Orwell
could not have imagined. Whistleblowers such as Edward
Snowden are being persecuted, when we should really be
offering them political asylum for their heroism in
exposing these nefarious, illegal schemes. We must look
hard at this issue now; millions of pounds of taxpayers’
money are already being spent on deploying such systems in
south Wales, London and beyond. I do not want us to come
back to this in a few years’ time only to be told, “The
police have invested far too much money already for us to
start making changes”.
It is easy to write this issue off by saying that it is not
about privacy because everyone has their face out in public
anyway, but that is to look at it from the wrong end. Our
faces are now being used like fingerprints and DNA, but the
difference is that our faces are so obvious and public that
it makes the intrusion into our private lives all the
greater. If the police were taking our fingerprints and DNA
at sports events, carnivals and remembrance parades, it
would cause great discomfort and concern. We should be no
less discomfited and concerned about their automatically
scanning and identifying our faces.
It occurred to me that we could perhaps use this technology
ourselves, here in this House. We could have a facial
recognition camera over the doors so that we would not have
to be given a little tick by doorkeepers. Perhaps the
Minister would like to consider that and see whether
Members of the House like it.
I reiterate my call on the Government immediately to ban
the use of automatic facial recognition and to clean the
police national computer of all images of innocent people.
1.16 pm
-
(Con)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of
Moulsecoomb, on securing this debate, although I wish we
had more time to discuss this important subject. In
addition to drawing your Lordships’ attention to my
interests in police technology as set out in the register,
I should mention that, from 1983 to 1996, I was responsible
as a Home Office official for the provision of scientific
and technological support to the police forces of England
and Wales. My remit extended to biometric technologies such
as automatic fingerprint identification systems and the
forensic application of DNA technology.
It is worth noting in the context of today’s debate that
the original and most important work on the application to
the criminal justice system of both these technologies,
fingerprints and DNA, was done in this country, more
particularly in the laboratories of the Home Office, which,
sadly, have since almost disappeared.
The role that both these technologies play in the criminal
justice system is not simply to support the prosecution. Of
course, they help the police to identify suspects and
secure convictions, but they also prevent miscarriages of
justice by identifying the innocent and thus eliminating
them from further investigation—that was the certainly the
case with the first use of DNA in Leicester, when someone
who had confessed to a double murder was shown to be
innocent and released. In the United States, DNA testing
has saved the lives of hundreds of wrongly convicted people
sitting on death row—this is thanks to the Innocence
Project, started in 1972 by two young New York lawyers when
they heard about the use of DNA technology in this country.
The same will be true, of course, for facial recognition
technology. Although it is still at a very early stage of
development as far as its use in the criminal justice
system is concerned, I have no doubt that it will
eventually be accepted by the police and the courts as a
quick and reliable method for eliminating the innocent from
suspicion as much as for identifying and convicting the
guilty. We are still a long way from that position.
Unlike both fingerprint technology and DNA, there are no
international or even national standards for the
application of facial recognition technology to the
criminal justice system. These standards for international
co-operation, which took years to develop for both
fingerprints and DNA, allow data relating to these
technologies to be transmitted across national borders
easily and without loss of integrity, so that someone
arrested in California can be identified as wanted in
Catalonia immediately—police would know immediately in
California without any great effort. In addition to these
technical standards, a whole set of other standards has
been developed in order to enable the courts to feel
confident about accepting an identification based on the
use of fingerprints or DNA.
None of this infrastructure of standards is yet in place in
relation to facial recognition. This does not mean that
facial recognition technology is not yet useful in fighting
crime and preventing terrorism today. It simply means that
much more work needs to be done urgently to enable it to
realise its full potential in the criminal justice
system—for example, so that the courts accept facial
recognition evidence as confirming identity. One of the
tasks which has to be tackled urgently is to improve the
quality of the main source of raw material for facial
recognition; namely, the millions of private CCTV cameras
all over this country. Too many of these cameras are poorly
maintained, if maintained at all, badly sited and capture
images at a very low resolution. This work should be taken
forward with determination and speed. One way of doing this
might be by building on the important work done by the
Surveillance Camera Commissioner, established under the
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
This is a matter for the Government. The simple message I
would like my noble friend the Minister to take away from
today’s debate is that, without national and eventually
international standards and guidelines, the use of facial
recognition technology will fail to realise its full
potential in the criminal justice system. More
significantly, without such standards, this technology
could lead to miscarriages of justice, which in turn could
lead to a loss of confidence in the technology and a loss
of trust in the criminal justice system as a whole.
1.22 pm
-
(Lab)
My Lords, first I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady
Jones.
-
(Con)
I apologise to the noble Lord but he will have seen in the
Companion, at paragraph 4.32,
“it is considered discourteous for members not to be
present for at least the opening speeches”.
The noble Lord was not present for the opening speech, so I
wonder whether he should reconsider his decision to take
part in the debate.
-
My Lords, as I was about to say, it is frankly not good
enough for government Whips to arrange for a notice to be
sent out by email at 12.51 pm to say that a debate is about
to start. If there has been any discourtesy it has been
from the government Whips to myself. If the noble Baroness,
Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, , are content, I will say
just two or three words—I do not see the noble Lord rising
to his feet.
First, as I say, I apologise to the noble Baroness for not
having heard her speech, but having known her for quite a
number of years I can guess the tone and nature of her
remarks. I start from the premise that, by and large,
facial recognition techniques are extremely valuable to the
police and security services and, as a consequence,
extremely valuable to the general population. I read of a
case only this week in which somebody had been extradited
from one side of the world to the other because the facial
recognition system at a point of entry had picked up that
this person was on a database and wanted for multiple
murders in another country. I think that taking such people
out of circulation and giving them the opportunity to be
tried properly is good. I suspect that the noble
Baroness—although, as I say, for reasons beyond my control
I did not hear her speech—argued that these very powerful
techniques should be more closely regulated. My simple
point is that these techniques are extremely powerful but
they are out of the bag, the train has left the station, or
whatever metaphor you want to use to express it.
The Chinese website Alibaba has introduced a system whereby
you can smile to pay. That is China, which is different, of
course, and I am not aware that any similar system is being
adopted in the UK or in other western countries, but that
technique is there and it is only a matter of time before
non-state actors start to use these techniques far more
widely than is currently the case. I just wonder whether we
want to have a regulatory system that ties the hands of the
police and security forces behind their back under such
circumstances when those techniques are available. Of
course there should be a regulatory framework, but if there
is, it should apply universally. I leave it to the
Government to work out how they would enforce such a
regulatory framework in other sectors.
My final point is specifically for the Minister and will
perhaps be more in tune with something that the noble
Baroness may have said. I would be interested in the
Minister telling us what arrangements are being made for
the storage of the data collected by the police and
security agencies. Has she put in place a system whereby
those databases are held within the United Kingdom on
servers that are solely within the United Kingdom and by
contractors that do not have written into the small print
of their contracts arrangements that would enable them to
copy that material elsewhere? Before the noble Lord, Lord
Young, stands up, I would be grateful for her answer.
1.26 pm
-
(LD)
My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of
Moulsecoomb, for initiating this debate.
“I also wanted a framework for governance and oversight,
which I think is so important in this area. We need the
public to trust that what we are doing is clearly legal …
why we are using biometrics, and for what purpose”.
Those are not my words, but the Minister’s words to the
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee on 6
February this year. However, for facial recognition
technology collection use and storage, that is not what is
in place and is what we have not got. There is no
legislation, codified regulation or independent oversight
and therefore public trust will be diminished.
The first issue is the framework for governance. In
reality, there is none. There might be a few scattered
papers, but there is no combined, clear, legal governance
framework for the use of facial recognition technology by
UK police forces. In fact, the Biometrics Commissioner said
it is a postcode lottery with inconsistent use, retention,
searching and taking of first facial imagery. What we have
at the moment is a make-it-up-as-you-go-along approach or
“do as you want as long as you don’t get caught”. That is
what is happening and why this issue gained prominence with
the public in 2012 when somebody took the Metropolitan
Police to court. That is where this started in 2012, and
the use of facial recognition technology is still
unregulated and non-legislative, with no independent
oversight.
I say to the Minister that we are on the road to another
court case and, based on the judgment in 2012, my guess is
that the Government will probably lose. The letter written
by the Minister on 30 November to the chair of the Science
and Technology Committee states that a decision to deploy
facial recognition systems is a police operational matter.
Of course it is, but it should be within a framework of
legislation and regulation, the same as other operational
requirements of the police. For example, Durham
Constabulary is now using body-worn cameras to create a
database of troublemakers. That is totally against the
principles of data protection and the spirit of not using
this type of technology as an intelligence gathering tool.
As there is no legal status, there are no proper
regulations and no independent oversight and Durham
Constabulary is getting away with it.
Pippa King, from Biometrics in Schools, made an extremely
good FoI request in January this year. It is telling that
out of 32 forces that responded, 27 could not provide any
national or local guidance for the use of biometric facial
recognition technology—27 out of 32. In addition, 32 out of
32 had not done a privacy impact assessment. Five stated
that the Home Office has a PIA and they were using that.
Has the Home Office done a PIA on the police use of facial
recognition technology? If so, when did it share the
assessment with police forces and where is it public? There
is no body with oversight powers or independent checks—none
whatever. Particularly in light of the fact, it is really
important that many people on the database will have no
idea that they are on it. They may have been to a train
station, a pop concert or a memorial service. When will the
Government look at giving power to an independent oversight
body with the power of sanction to check that the police
are using this technology correctly?
I end with the Minister’s own words. “These things are
potential monsters”, she said at the same meeting, “which
is why the Government need to be absolutely clear why they
are collecting this data and for what purpose”. When will
the Minister bring forward regulations and when will an
independent oversight body be appointed?
1.31 pm
-
(CB)
My Lords, I join in congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady
Jones, on this debate and draw attention to my interest, as
declared in the register, as an adviser to Facewatch Ltd.
I think we would be making a mistake if we were to
overemphasise the risks of this technology, given that it
provides so many opportunities. Like the noble Lord,
, I was an
official in the Home Office in the 1990s, albeit at a much
more junior level, and was responsible for VIP protection
policy. In that context, I was continually bombarded by
supposed facial recognition companies about the value of
their products. Broadly speaking, they did not work.
However, today the situation has changed: these systems are
starting to work and the pace of development, particularly
of data analytics and machine learning, means that they
will get better quickly over the coming period. As a
result, the sort of criticisms we have seen from Big
Brother Watch, including that they do not work, may or may
not be true today, but I am confident that they will not be
true within the next few years.
By way of anecdote, I was going into a building the other
day. There was a facial recognition system at the door,
which immediately and accurately identified me, and was
able to do it on the basis of a 12 year-old photograph
taken from the internet. This is not just about police
custody records: you can do it without any of that stuff,
and a lot of people are doing so in the private sector. We
are moving from promise to reality, and I suspect that
within a few years, facial recognition systems—of course
there are a lot of different technologies here—will
probably be better at identifying individual human faces
than we are ourselves, and we would be foolish in my view
to deny ourselves the potential benefits of that
technology.
I draw attention particularly to the opportunities in
counterterrorism here, given my own background. Your
Lordships only need to imagine the value of being able to
confidently identify individuals checking in for airline
flights, for instance, irrespective of what particular
documentation they happen to be using on that day or what
identity they might have been using. I can remember in my
previous career watching individuals applying for asylum
who found that their asylum application was turned down and
therefore went on to their second or third application
using different identities. We are in a position
potentially to get over those sorts of problems using this
technology.
The opportunities for identifying hostile reconnaissance
activity are also very important. The attacks that we saw
last year at London Bridge and Borough Market were very
likely preceded by reconnaissance activity. One can
envisage facial recognition technology being able to
identify that in advance and enable pre-emptive action to
be taken. Particularly on the terrorism side, we already
know the faces of most of those who would like to attack
us. We have them on record, so to be able to identify their
hostile activities in advance is a very valuable
intelligence tool. I am talking here about using it for
intelligence purposes rather than evidential purposes,
although it may be that we will come on to that once
appropriate procedures and standards have been installed.
In regard to everyday crime, this also offers us real
opportunities. Given the pressure on police budgets, we
should welcome anything that makes policing more effective
and efficient, rather than viewing it with deep suspicion.
The same applies to potential victims: transport operators,
shopkeepers and entertainment providers should be able to
use this technology to protect themselves, their businesses
and their clients. This will, in my view, add to the public
good.
I look forward to clarity from the Home Office on its
biometrics strategy, but I very much hope that it draws an
appropriate balance, which encourages the use of facial
recognition technology for the public good while providing
a proportionate degree of regulation over it. We should not
smother innovation, and it is important that any oversight
or accountability mechanism for this does not become too
bureaucratic or process heavy in such a way as to provide a
disincentive to use the systems. It is also important that
this should not become a bonanza for the lawyers.
1.36 pm
-
The Lord
I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb,
for this debate. My guess is that most of us see some very
useful ways in which this technology can be used, but many
people are also concerned that it may have other uses as
well, which they are less keen on. I speak as someone who
has little knowledge of the actual technology, of
modern-day policing or indeed of the complex legal issues
involved, but I have taken the trouble to talk to a number
of people over the last week to ask them of their awareness
of this technology. I was very struck by the fact that
hardly anybody I spoke to realised what was already going
on. Some were horrified, some were puzzled and every one of
them had questions and worries. As a minimum, we need to
have the time—I hope that the Government will give much
more time than a very limited short debate—to look at this
important area, which touches on fundamental human
freedoms, human rights and a whole range of issues about
the sort of society we want and how we relate to one
another.
In these sorts of debates, we often trade off fear. There
is the trade-off fear of, “We’ve got terrorists coming, and
therefore we’ve got to do something”, but if we take that
line, everybody would be permanently tagged and we would
all be linked up to computers and so on. None of us wants
that. On the other side are people who have some real
worries, which I think are justified by past evidence
showing that sometimes when Governments and businesses
collect data, they do not use it for the originally
intended reasons. When I started talking with a number of
people, those were the stories raised immediately: there
was talk of Edward Snowden and of the collection of data by
GCHQ and so on. This is the material that is kicking
around. We have a duty to have a proper debate so that we
start to understand and make conscious decisions on how we
wish to collect and use information, so that we can plan
for it rather than, as it appears at the moment, simply
being overtaken by a lot of experiments.
We need this debate because as with, for example, many of
those ethical issues that we debate in your Lordships’
House, we should not leave it just to the specialists and
experts. This is a democratic issue about what it means to
be a citizen—about what our rights but also our
responsibilities are. How do we balance the state’s right
to collect and use data? How do we balance the rights of
businesses, when there are stories of plans being made so
that, when we walk into shops, we will be identified so
that we can be specifically targeted with certain sorts of
products based on our customer profile? Do we want that
sort of intrusion? We need to have that type of debate now.
I ask the Minister: when will Her Majesty’s Government
create a proper space for us to have a more leisurely
debate? Will the Government bring forward some sort of
draft code, and indeed probably legislation, so we can
begin to try to tease out how we want to use this
technology? I totally concede the point, which has already
been made, that in some senses we are already being
overtaken by what is going on. When are we going to have an
independent commissioner to look over this area, as we have
commissioners for other areas, so that we can have the
confidence that there is accountability is built into our
national life?
1.40 pm
-
(Con)
My Lords, we are very lucky that we have people like the
noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and organisations such as Big
Brother Watch. In some ways, I start from the same premise
of the requirement that fundamental human rights have
within democracy. However, I quite quickly come to a
different fork. I would illustrate that fork by suggesting
that it depends on which country you live in. If, for
example, you live in—to take the ultimate—North Korea,
or—to take the intermediate—perhaps Russia or Venezuela, it
is rather different to living in a European country, or at
least most European countries, and many other countries in
the world. For me, that is a practical and philosophical
distinction. I describe it as the “two Ts”: T for tyranny
and T for terrorism. I do not happen to believe that we in
this country are faced with potential tyranny, let alone
have tyranny already, but we all know that we are faced
with terrorism and other forms of organised crime. That is
what makes it essential that we use the implements that are
available to protect us.
As I said at the start, I have sympathy for the general
need to conserve our liberties. Indeed, I would even
suggest that I have a minor credential in that: along with
other noble friends in this House, I have been in the
advance of trying to limit and check the use of powers of
entry into premises without warrant, of which there have
been far too many. We have a lot of our people on our side
over this, and the committee that looks at statutory
instruments now keeps a close eye on that.
However, we need to make the fullest use of all the
techniques available not just to keep a check on terrorism
and crime but for the proper organisation of the state. I
shall like to use my remaining two minutes to say that what
is really needed is that the state is aware of who its
citizens are, which at the moment it is not. What is
needed, therefore, is some form of proper identification. I
do not believe in identity cards; still less do I believe
in identity cards with biometrics, because biometrics on
identity cards can be used fraudulently by terrorists or
criminals who, with modern technology, can put their own
biometrics on them and therefore appear to be any person
that they represent themselves to be.
What we need are national identity numbers. Surely we can
have no objection to this. We need our biometrics, whatever
the best biometrics are, to be stored within the Government
centrally and securely, not on bits of paper scattered
around. They should be online and available to those people
who should have them. In that way, we would have one
number, a national identity number, instead of the current
plethora of numbers, so many of which have been devalued by
being misused, such as national insurance numbers, national
health numbers, HMRC numbers and passport numbers. I was
amazed that the noble Baroness was concerned about
photographs on passports; of course they are available to
the police. It is essential for our national security that
those who need to know, as the jargon goes, have access.
I hope the Government will reconsider their repeated
refusal to introduce national identity numbers and look at
this system, which would make a huge difference to the
administration of our public services, social services and
National Health Service and guard better our national
security.
1.45 pm
-
(CB)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of
Moulsecoomb, for initiating this debate. Your Lordships may
wonder why I am speaking in it. It is true that my interest
in facial recognition is more linked to medicine in
identification and progression of disease, but that is not
why I am speaking today. I am speaking because of another
interest, which is that my university, the University of
Dundee, has a strong forensic science department, analysing
all aspects of biometrics for both crime detection and
human identification. I am also chairman of the Science and
Technology Committee of your Lordships’ House, which
conducted a brief seminar on the use of forensic science in
the detection of crime and elsewhere, and may well conduct
a more detailed inquiry on the subject.
Facial recognition comes under the purview of the Forensic
Science Regulator, which is not a statutory authority, but
also the Biometrics Commissioner and the CCTV commissioner.
Research in this area is therefore very police-needs
driven, and a commercial element has therefore crept into
software provision. Three areas of work have lately raised
questions about facial recognition. The first relates to
so-called super-recognisers. This concerns research out of
Greenwich, and although there is strong evidence to suggest
that some people are indeed better at recognising faces
than others, there is some evidence that they are not the
golden bullet that everyone hoped for.
A second issue concerns the ethics associated with
retention of images when the person has either been
released without charge or been found innocent of charges.
Facial images are taken routinely in custody, and at
present, as has been mentioned, there is no mandate for
them to be deleted from the police national computer. This
may come in due course, but the suggestion that someone may
have to apply to have their images deleted cannot be
satisfactory.
The third is linked, and is about using faces of known
persons of interest when scanning crowds to find those
individuals. As has been mentioned, this was employed at
the Notting Hill Carnival and more recently at one of the 6
Nations rugby matches. The police state that widespread
awareness notices are used in such places, that they check
only against faces that they are looking for, and that no
others are stored. This is an issue of questionable ethics
and is currently under discussion, with the issue of covert
versus overt collection of faces highly relevant.
We need to: define clear legal roles for collection of
data; limit the type and amount of data stored and
retained; limit storage to only one biometric in a single
database, not all biometric data; define clear rules for
the storing and sharing of data; impose strict security
procedures to prevent improper access and data compromise;
use mandatory notice procedures when technology such as I
mentioned is used at Notting Hill and on other crowds—clear
notices that the technology is being used—and define and
standardise audit trail accountability and independent
oversight of the use of data. I hope that the Minister will
comment on that.
1.49 pm
-
(LD)
My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of
Moulsecoomb, for raising this very important issue. As she
says, there is no law, policy or oversight on facial
recognition. As my noble friend said, there is no
framework for common governance across the UK in terms of
the way in which the police use this technology.
I agree with the noble Lords, and , that
there are some very exciting and potentially extremely
positive uses for this technology, but it has to be
regulated. It cannot just be a free-for-all. As the noble
Lord, , said, clearly
there will be legitimate reasons for the use of facial
recognition. In terms of “smile to pay”, I can pay using my
phone where my phone recognises my face. Thankfully I do
not have to smile because I am not usually smiling when I
have to dole out money.
One of the worrying anecdotes we have heard this afternoon
from the noble Lord, , was the
fact that when he went to a particular place, the camera
recognised him from a picture on the internet. We are not
just talking about innocent people being arrested who have
never been charged, given a caution or been convicted, and
that database being used potentially by the police to
identify people who are at, say, a demonstration. There is
also the potential for using internet images, passport or
driving licence photographs. At the moment there is nothing
in law or regulation to stop the police integrating those
databases—if the Government allow the police to use them—to
identify people.
People will say—I am sure the noble Lord, , will
say it—that the police and security services have no
interest in following everybody around. But the noble
Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, at the same time as
being a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, was
also on its database of extremists without good cause—I am
sure. So she could be followed around by these cameras. We
really have to ask questions about what is going on. The
noble Lord, , said that the
train has left the station. It may have done, but it is
time the Government got in control of this runaway train.
I have four brief points. There is an urgent need for
regulation and oversight of the police use of facial
recognition. It cannot be right that the policy on this use
of technology is left to the police alone to decide for
themselves. There is an urgent need to examine what
databases are used in conjunction with facial recognition.
I will not repeat all the arguments that we have heard from
a number of noble Lords about the custody image database,
and the fact that images of innocent people are being held
potentially illegally on such databases. As I say, there is
a potential for completely innocent people who have just
applied for a passport or a driving licence, or even people
who for some reason are in the public eye whose images are
on the internet, being used in conjunction with police and
facial recognition technology.
Something that has not been covered in as much detail is
the fact that much machine learning, including automated
facial recognition algorithms, tend to be discriminatory—in
this case disproportionally misidentifying women and black
faces as there are fewer black people and many fewer women
on custody image databases from which the automated system
learns.
Without regulation and oversight there is the potential for
Nineteen Eighty-Four to become a reality, albeit 34 years
later than originally envisaged. Will the Minister
acknowledge that there are genuine and reasonable causes
for concern and reassure the House that the Government are
urgently looking into these issues?
1.54 pm
-
(Lab
Co-op)
My Lords, first, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of
Moulsecoomb, for tabling this Question for Short Debate
today. As other noble Lords have said, this is a very
important matter and I hope we can come back to it in a
much longer debate—maybe even as part of a government Bill
as it is a very important issue. It is certainly time that
we considered the issues of facial recognition technology
today in relation to security and policing. As this is a
short debate and I have no additional time for my
contribution, I shall not respond in detail to the points
other noble Lords have made, although I shall make some
reference to them in my remarks.
The first duty of government is to keep its citizens safe,
and the types of crimes being committed today and the role
of computing—the internet, cybercrime, terrorism and so
on—has changed dramatically. If you look back to the 1980s,
or the 1960s or 1970s, completely different crimes were
being committed; that is just a matter of fact. Technology
itself has also provided the vehicle for these new forms of
crimes to be committed—things that we would never have
heard of when I was growing up. So it is important that we
are able to use this technology to bring the perpetrators
of these crimes to justice.
As many noble Lords have said, the challenge is for both
government and Parliament to set the right balance between
ensuring that the police and security services have the
right tools, with the appropriate safeguards, to keep us
safe and, on the other hand, to protect people’s personal
liberty and privacy. That is the basic balance and the
challenge for us all; it comes down to that. When she
responds to the debate, I am sure the Minister will set out
clearly what safeguards are in place at the moment, how the
Government strike the right balance and, particularly, what
arrangements they have in place for holding facial images.
It has been suggested that there are no government
arrangements in place. How will the Government ensure that
they review that, and how will they do it as other
technologies come into force and become more sophisticated?
I am conscious that there other technologies are
potentially in the marketplace that can recognise you
through your voice and other images. As these become more
sophisticated and more widely used, how will we make sure
that we strike that proportional balance and get that
right? That is a very important issue for us all. I hope
that the Minister can address those points, and
particularly the points that the noble Baroness, Lady
Jones, raised. As I said, the issue is about keeping us all
safe with the appropriate safeguards in place.
My noble friend highlighted how
powerful these tools are. As he says, they are out of the
bag—I think we all accept that now. These things are
changing by the day. He then went on to make another
important point about the issue of databases and how they
are held. That is the important issue: who holds the
databases? Are they held by the police or the security
services, or are they held by third parties? What right to
people have to use them? Can they be copied and used for
other means? We need to make sure that those things are
regulated and we get them right.
The noble Lord, , made the
important point about the need for national and
international technological standards in facial
recognition. He talked about DNA and fingerprinting, which
again is very important. I agree with his point about the
fact that there are all these cameras around and their
quality can vary dramatically, from very grainy images to
very detailed images. So it is also important that we get
the standards correct so that they can be used to protect
us.
The noble Lord, ,
highlighted the important role that these technologies play
in the fight against terrorism, for the security services.
I fully support the use of such technologies in that
respect but, again, we should always ensure that they are
used with the appropriate safeguards. The right reverend
Prelate the set that
point out in terms of the debate that we need. I talked at
the start of my remarks about data: what it is, what we
have and how we protect it. We need to come back to the
issue at a later date, but I shall end my remarks there.
1.58 pm
-
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of
Trafford) (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for that and thank the
noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for bringing
forward this debate on a very important issue, now and in the
future. I start by stressing the importance the Government
place on giving law enforcement the tools it needs to prevent
terrorism and cut crime. However, it is also important to
build public trust in our use of biometrics, including the
use of facial images and facial recognition technology.
Biometric data is of critical importance in law enforcement,
and various forms and uses of biometric data have an
increasingly significant role in everyday life in the UK.
However, the technology is of course changing rapidly. The
noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about gait analysis
technology, voice technology and other types of technology
that are rapidly emerging. We are committed to producing a
framework that ensures that organisations can innovate in
their use and deployment of biometric technologies, such as
facial recognition, and do so, crucially, in a transparent
and ethical way. Noble Lords have talked about ethics in this
as well. Maintaining public trust and confidence is
absolutely key; achieving this involves a more open approach
to the development and deployment of new technologies. We
remain committed to ensuring that our use of biometrics,
including those provided to law enforcement partners, is
legal, ethical, transparent and robust.
In answer to the point made by the noble Lord, , we will
publish the Home Office biometrics strategy in June this
year, as I outlined to the Science and Technology Committee.
The strategy will address the use of facial recognition
technology. There is ongoing work to implement last year’s
custody images review, which provides a right to request
deletion, and we are planning improvements to the governance
of police use of custody images and facial recognition
technology.
Automatic facial recognition, or AFR, is a rapidly evolving
technology with huge potential, as the noble Lord, Lord
Evans, and others powerfully illustrated. There have been
some suggestions that there is no guidance on police use of
AFR. The Home Office has published the Surveillance Camera
Code of Practice, which sets out the guiding principles for
striking a balance between protecting the public and
upholding civil liberties. The noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and
Lord Evans, and the right reverend Prelate the all pointed
this out, as did others. Police forces are obliged under the
Protection of Freedoms Act—POFA—to have regard to this code.
Similarly, the Information Commissioner’s Office has issued a
code of practice, which explains how data protection
legislation applies to the use of surveillance cameras and
promotes best practice. However, to address the point of the
noble Lord, , we believe that more can
be done to improve governance around AFR and we are
discussing options for doing this with the commissioners and
the police. I am very pleased to see the really good practice
already being followed in this area, such as the work being
done by South Wales Police, which I will go into in a bit
more detail in a few minutes. We are working to ensure that
this is consistently applied across all areas by tightening
up our oversight arrangements of AFR.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and others
talked about the retention of custody images and whether that
was illegal, following the 2012 High Court ruling. The noble
Lord, , also alluded to this. The
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 gives police the power
to take facial photographs of anyone detained following
arrest. The regime governing the retention of custody images
is set out in the Code of Practice on the Management of
Police Information and statutory guidance contained in the
College of Policing’s authorised professional practice. The
Police Act 1996 requires chief officers to have regard to
such codes of practice. In addition, the Information
Commissioner and Surveillance Camera Commissioner promote
their respective codes of practice.
Following the custody images review, people who are not
subsequently convicted of an offence may request that their
custody image be deleted from all police databases, with a
presumption that it will be unless there is an exceptional
policing reason for it to be retained, such as if an
individual has known links to organised crime or terrorism.
Assuming that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has links to
neither—
-
Not yet.
-
Not yet—you heard it first at the Dispatch Box. I suggested
some months ago that the noble Baroness should request that
her image be removed. I am assuming that she has now done so
and that, therefore, it is in the process of being removed.
But the police should automatically review all the custody
images of convicted people that they hold, in line with
scheduled review periods set out in the College of Policing’s
Authorised Professional Practice to ensure that they retain
only those that they need to keep.
On the point about illegality suggested by a couple of noble
Lords, the court did not rule that there was an issue with
applying facial recognition software to legitimately retained
images. Following the CIR, we are clear that unconvicted
people have the right to apply for the deletion of their
image, with a presumption in favour of deletion. However, the
police, as I said, have the right to retain an image in the
cases that I outlined.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, , talked about oversight.
This is a very good question which was brought out by the
Science and Technology Committee. Noble Lords also talked
about the Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group. In line with
the recommendations of the triennial review of the Home
Office science bodies, the Biometrics and Forensics Ethics
Group’s remit has been extended to cover the ethical issues
associated with all forensic identification techniques,
including, but not limited to, facial recognition technology
and fingerprinting. The Government are exploring the
expansion of oversight of facial recognition systems. They
are also seeking to establish an oversight board to enable
greater co-ordination and transparency on the use of facial
recognition by law enforcement. Noble Lords will not be
surprised to hear that we are consulting with stakeholders
such as the NPCC, the Surveillance Camera Commissioner, the
Information Commissioner and the Biometrics Commissioner.
Noble Lords mentioned two specific instances: Notting Hill
and the South Wales police. I think that I have time to talk
about both events. In 2016-17, when facial recognition
technology was piloted at the Notting Hill Carnival, the
Metropolitan Police published this on its website. This is in
line with the fact that it is a pilot and that it is
important that police let people know about it. The public
were informed that the technology involved the use of
overt—not covert—cameras, which scan the faces of those
passing by and flag up potential matches against a specific
database of custody images, and that the database had been
populated with about 500 images of individuals who were
forbidden to attend the carnival, as well as individuals
wanted by police who it was believed might attend the
carnival to commit offences. I must stress that this system
does not involve a search against all images held on the
police national database or the Met systems. The public were
also advised that if a match was made by the system, officers
would be alerted and would seek to speak to the individuals
to verify their identity, making arrests if necessary. I
think that it was the noble Lord, , who talked about
mismatches with BME people, even between men and women. That
goes back to the point that this is evolving technology and
in no way would it be used at this point in time other than
in a pilot situation.
South Wales Police took a very proactive approach to
communications in its pilot. In addition to the more formal
press briefing notices, it used social media in the form of
YouTube and Facebook to explain the technology to the public
and publicise its deployment—and, most importantly, it
published the results. In its publicity, South Wales Police
has been very aware of concerns about privacy and has
stressed that it has built checks and balances into its
methodology to make sure that the approach is justified and
balanced. It consulted the Biometrics Commissioner, the
Information Commissioner and the Surveillance Camera
Commissioner, all of whom are represented on the South Wales
Police automatic facial recognition strategic partnership
board, and gave them the opportunity to comment on the
privacy impact assessment that was carried out in relation to
the pilot. This resulted in a very positive press response to
the pilot. The force also published a public round-up of six
months of the pilot on its Facebook page.
I will go on now to the PIA, which links to that point. The
noble Lord, , asked about the
Government doing a privacy impact assessment. I can confirm
that the Home Office biometrics programme carried out privacy
impact assessments on all of its strategic projects to ensure
that they maximised the benefits to the public while
protecting the privacy of individuals and also addressed any
potential impact of data aggregation.
The noble Lords, Lord Harris and Lord Kennedy, asked about
arrangements for the storage of images. The Police National
Database is based in the UK. Images are taken from custody
systems run by each police force and then loaded on to the
PND.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked whether passport and
driving licence photos were available to police. They are not
used by the police when deploying facial recognition
technology. They may be used under specific conditions for
other policing purposes.
I thank noble Lords once again for their participation in
this debate and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.
|