Extracts from Westminster Hall debate on UK Amphibious Capability - Nov 21

Wednesday, 22 November 2017 07:15

Ruth Smeeth (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Lab):...The 1981 review, “The United Kingdom Defence Programme: The Way Forward” advocated a reduction in the quantity of Royal Navy ships and a refocusing of the remaining resources towards Europe. Just a few years later, the Falklands war highlighted the continuing need for both our naval strength and a global outlook... Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con):...As we all know, in 1982, when the Falklands crisis blew up...Request free trial

Ruth Smeeth (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Lab):...The 1981 review, “The United Kingdom Defence Programme: The Way Forward” advocated a reduction in the quantity of Royal Navy ships and a refocusing of the remaining resources towards Europe. Just a few years later, the Falklands war highlighted the continuing need for both our naval strength and a global outlook...

Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con):...As we all know, in 1982, when the Falklands crisis blew up from almost nowhere, it was only because we still had our carriers and their Sea Harrier aircraft and the amphibious assault ships, Fearless and Intrepid, that we were able to mount an opposed amphibious assault and successfully recapture the Falkland Islands. No doubt very many intelligent people wrote very articulate staff papers that contributed to the 1981 review and a great deal of intellectual energy was put into the argument that we could do without these ships—but they were all wrong. Maintaining that amphibious capability should be an important part of our national armoury, and NATO’s as well, so what is to be done?

Phil Wilson (Sedgefield) (Lab):...The point of amphibious capability is to land where the enemy is not. The idea that the Government think that we, as an island nation, should be cutting that capability seems absurd. Combined with the scrapping of HMS Ocean, it would severely impact our amphibious capability to enter a war zone by sea. Not just that; it would affect not only our warfighting but our humanitarian work. The first task of HMS Ocean back in the 1990s was a humanitarian task in the Caribbean when there was a hurricane in Honduras, and as we know it was deployed just a couple of months ago in the Caribbean once again. The amphibious capability has been used at least 10 times since the second world war. It was used in Korea, in Suez and then in the Falklands. As has been mentioned, in 1981 our amphibious capability was again under threat. Just think: if we did not have that capability in 1982 when the Argentinians invaded the Falklands on 2 April, where would we be now?

Leo Docherty (Aldershot) (Con):...That lesson from 1982 still stands today. The simple lesson from the Falklands conflict was that when projecting power from a carrier force, we cannot rely on helicopters alone. That was cogently encapsulated in a book, “No Picnic”, which was written by the commander of 3 Commando Brigade, Major General Julian Thompson. In fact, he also highlighted it more recently in a letter to The Daily Telegraph on 28 October. He wrote the letter with Captain Michael Clapp, who was the commander of the amphibious task group in the Falklands, and I will quote from it because it is entirely pertinent. They reject the notion that today, we would be able to project power from a carrier by a helicopter force alone. They considered it back then, but

“rejected it on the grounds that we did not have air superiority, or enough helicopters to land enough troops and their supporting artillery in sufficient strength, in the time required, to fight off counter-attacks by the Argentine army. The only way to achieve a quick enough build-up was by landing craft. The landings were opposed on the ground by very few enemy troops. The main opposition came from the Argentine air force. Had we attempted major helicopter moves in daylight, the Argentine fighters would have had a turkey shoot among our helicopters.”

That lesson still stands today...

Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP): I thank the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North (Ruth Smeeth) for bringing this issue to the House. I declare an interest as a former Ulster Defence Regiment soldier and Territorial Army soldier for 14 and a half years. Our armed forces are unquestionably the best in the world; we are second to none. As much as I respect our allies the Americans and Australians, among other nations, it is clear that our brave boys and girls top the table in ability and training. Our abilities and capability act as a deterrent to those who might consider undermining our authority. The Falklands war lasted 74 days and 255 British armed forces personnel died. We were attacked on 2 April and responded by 5 April. We had the capacity to re-route ships and personnel to an area that had no plan in place for an unexpected invasion of a Crown colony...

Mrs Sheryll Murray (South East Cornwall) (Con):...It is essential that we continue to have an amphibious transport dock facility within our Royal Navy if we are to show that we have the ongoing capability to defend our islands and lands. We need only look back, as my colleagues have said, to the two Fearless-class landing platform docks during Operation Corporate. The Falklands war showed how important those ships are, as well as showing any potential aggressor that we have the capability to strike back, making our current Albion class an essential part of our conventional deterrents. The landing platform docks Fearless and Intrepid both played an important role in the landings at San Carlos during the Falklands conflict. Indeed, it was on Intrepid’s deck that the surrender ending the conflict was signed. It was also one of the warships used to imprison Argentine prisoners of war.

Those ships also have an important role to play as command facilities. The 1982 HMS Fearless was fitted with modern satellite communication equipment, and during the Falklands conflict, it hosted the staff of amphibious force commander Commodore Michael Clapp and the commanding officer of 3 Commando Brigade, Brigadier Julian Thompson, and his staff. The ships have uses beyond conflict. They are well suited, as has been mentioned, to providing humanitarian aid and relief work. The capacity of our landing platform docks can save lives too...

Robert Courts (Witney) (Con):...Even if we had the V-22 Ospreys that the Americans have, we would still need the heavy-lift capability that can only be given by taking heavy equipment across by water. Apart from anything else, in a contested environment, we would keep our carriers as far offshore as we could, as in the Falklands war. If we were to lose that capability, there would be unintended consequences. Our relationship with the US marine corps is extremely close, as hon. Members who have served actively will confirm, and it serves side by side with the Royal Marines. At a time when the United States, Spain, Italy and Australia are all investing in amphibious capability, losing it would make it very difficult for us to remain a global player and a NATO partner and to stand alongside our allies.

We have been here before with the 1981 review and what happened in the Falklands. We do not need to learn those lessons all over again; history provides them for us. The unique capability provided by those ships and the marines will not be replaced by a combination of carriers and Chinooks. Our status as a NATO partner, an ally and a country that projects its influence around the world is crucial. If Britain withdraws from its ability to project force on an amphibious basis around the world, we will wake up in a different country. That decision would have epoch-making consequences and we ought to step away from it.

Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab):...Since the end of the second world war, our amphibious capability has been used more than 10 times in military action, from Korea and Suez to the Falklands and Sierra Leone. As my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) noted, it has also been used to great effect in humanitarian efforts, including recently in Operation Ruman in the Caribbean. The Royal Marines have been in almost continuous operation in 30 different campaigns. There were pressures to remove our amphibious capability after our withdrawal from east of Suez in the 1970s and early 1980s, but common sense has always prevailed.

Let us not forget that our amphibious shipping and the Royal Marine command brigade were crucial in liberating the Falkland Islands—a point made well by the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) and in the powerful speech of the hon. Member for Aldershot (Leo Docherty). After the Falklands war, it was agreed that the UK needed to maintain a minimum amphibious force, but since the 2010 SDSR we have seen gradual reductions in capacity...

To read the whole debate, CLICK HERE