Armed Forces: Capability Motion to Take Note 2.58 pm Moved by
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen That this House
takes note of the future capability of the United Kingdom’s armed
forces in the current international situation. Lord Robertson of
Port Ellen (Lab) My Lords, let me...Request free trial
Armed Forces: Capability
Motion to Take Note
2.58 pm
Moved by
-
That this House takes note of the future capability of the
United Kingdom’s armed forces in the current international
situation.
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(Lab)
My Lords, let me start by paying just a moment of tribute
to Lord Lyell, who died yesterday. He was the secretary of
the All-Party Defence Group and a formidable and energetic
supporter of Britain’s Armed Forces. He will be greatly
missed by the House and by many of those whom he met.
This is a very timely debate—never more so to those of us
who watched yesterday’s press conference in New York. On a
distinguished panel last year, I was asked what I believed
was the greatest threat to the safety and security of our
country. I considered some of the immediate and looming
challenges and threats, some of which are pretty
formidable: the migration flows that have suddenly ended up
on our shores; the spread of religious experience extremism
and jihadi violence plumbing new depths of savagery; a
restive and resurgent Russia; a rising China; and the
disruption by North Korea. Add to that fragile and failed
states spreading mayhem across borders, international
conflicts, climate change, cyber warfare and the global
proliferation of lethal technology and weapons. On top of
all that, there is the rise and dominance of organised
crime, population growth, pandemics and financial
instability.
That is a pretty formidable cocktail of trouble for us to
face. However, my answer to the question of what was the
greatest threat is actually different: it is ourselves. We
are our own worst enemies. We are short-sighted,
penny-pinching, naively optimistic, complacent and
ostrich-like to the way in which the world has become
interconnected and more fragile, unpredictable and
incendiary. We are grossly unprepared and underresourced to
meet the challenges of the coming years. These threats are
potent and deadly, and some of them are very urgent.
At the end of the Cold War, I made a speech at Chatham
House in which I coined what was to be a much-quoted phrase
when I said that there had been a “bonfire of the
certainties”. The fall of the Berlin Wall had unleashed a
flood of optimism that had made Kremlinologists redundant
overnight and robbed us of the albeit dangerous
manageability of the Soviet/West confrontation. Some were
even rash enough to say that it was the “end of history”.
All of us took a substantial peace dividend and defence
budgets were cut radically over the next five years. I
believe we are now seeing another bonfire, this time of the
post-Cold War certainties. In doing so, we have left
ourselves vulnerable and, in many ways, unready. If we look
at the way in which we have responded to this new world of
regional conflicts, violent civil wars and other violent
manifestations of the turmoil that I have already listed,
we see that it hardly measures up to the scale of what
faces us.
If anyone doubts my contention that we are our own worst
enemy, just let them look at the debate in both Houses of
this Parliament on 29 August 2013. The President of the
United States had drawn a red line on President Assad using
chemical weapons on his own people in a conflict that was
already tearing his own country apart and spreading to
every part of the Middle East and beyond. Consequently,
when the sarin gas attacks on civilians were confirmed,
President Obama rightly decided that a military attack
should be mounted to degrade President Assad’s war machine.
Our Prime Minister at the time agreed, said he wanted to
join this wholly justified action and recalled Parliament
in order to put it to the House of Commons. The Commons,
with my own party playing an opportunistic and disgraceful
part, refused to give permission for the UK to join the
response to the hideous chemical attacks on civilians.
The Prime Minister, having been defeated on an issue of
grave military consequence, not only did not resign, which
you would have thought in all honour he should have done,
but instead swiftly closed off the possibility of even
reconsidering the decision. It did not need John Kerry, the
outgoing US Secretary of State, to remind us of this last
week and lay the blame for President Obama’s retreat from
his red lines on the British House of Commons on that
August day. We all already knew it and we must all share
the responsibility, even those of us who supported the
government position, for the carnage that followed. Tears
for Aleppo will never be enough. I love my country. I care
about its future and the safety of our people in a very
troubled world. That is why I am ashamed that that night
this Parliament, where I have served for 38 years, did what
it did. As events have spiralled into horror since then,
with a line coming directly from that vote, my shame turns
to anger.
Now, in eight days’ time, we will have President Donald
Trump as the leader of the western world—the Donald, with
his Mexican wall, with new protectionism and isolationism,
with his serious questioning of NATO solidarity, with a
belief in torture and with Lieutenant-General Michael Flynn
as his key security adviser. Perhaps we do not actually
need more enemies in the world today.
We in this country have Brexit. Going against the grain of
history, our country is about to embark on a tortuous
journey, with no known destination, that will absorb
people, time and talent and will suck the energy out of our
political system just as the challenges to Europe come
crashing in on us. Our influence on our European neighbours
will dramatically and inevitably diminish. Although they
will still need our military, as Europe finds Trump’s
America turning away we will find it difficult to take the
lead that we usually claim. Reports this week that
Britain’s claim to the Deputy SACEUR position has been
challenged by France are just the latest evidence of that
slipping influence. Our Foreign Office, the soft-power arm
of government, at the same time as bearing the burden of
maintaining our influence in the rest of the world, will be
eclipsed by the Brexit vortex as its budget, already
smaller than the budget for the US Embassy in Baghdad, will
come under renewed pressure.
In our crazy complacency we seem quite oblivious to the
fact that the relative peacefulness of the world today, as
we look over a new precipice, has been achieved by our
nuclear deterrent and by our institutions and processes,
which require diplomacy, intelligence, involvement and,
crucially—when it is required and at the end of the
line—decisive interventions. Where will the space be left
for all that as we paddle through the treacle of
dismantling 40 years of integration?
What confirms again that we are our own worst enemy is the
attitude to spending on defence and security. Yes, I agree
with and welcome the fact that we are spending the NATO
target of 2%; we are right in many ways to crow that we are
among the few who do. That is good so far as it goes, but
we should wait for a moment. After all, have we stretched
the definition of 2% to get there? Are we not confusing
percentages with capabilities? Who can doubt, as well, that
the Brexit devaluation of the pound will now have a serious
effect on the defence budget? I hope that the noble Earl
the Minister will tell us how much it is estimated that
blow will cost his department.
In 1997-98, as Secretary of State for Defence, I led the
strategic defence review with, among others, my noble
friend Lord Reid. It radically remodelled and modernised
our post-Cold War forces. In the preface to the review, I
said that post-Cold War problems,
“pose a real threat to our security, whether in the
Balkans, the Middle East or in some trouble spot yet to
ignite. If we are to discharge our international
responsibilities in such areas, we must retain the power to
act. Our Armed Forces are Britain’s insurance against a
huge variety of risks”.
That is as true today as it was when I wrote it. The
question is whether we in this country have properly
retained that power to act. Some doubt will be cast on that
by the distinguished speakers who will speak after me in
this debate.
The Minister will undoubtedly tell us at the end of the
debate that there is formidable hardware in the pipeline,
from Trident to the carriers that were the centrepiece of
my 1998 review. The question remains, though: is it enough
to meet the challenges we are facing when so many of them
are urgent and so potent?
My worry is that we are sleepwalking into a potential
calamity. My depressing catalogue of threats, after all,
does not even take account of what I said in 1998 of
trouble spots yet to ignite. As I wrote those words, we
could not have foreseen the conflict the very next year in
Kosovo, the attacks of 9/11, the implosion of Syria, the
whole of the Arab spring and, indeed, the rise of
Daesh/ISIS. We have today a crisis of optimism—hoping for
the best and failing to prepare for the worst.
You might legitimately ask, having heard my gloomy
assessment and warning, what we should be doing. Here are
just a few of my thoughts. First, we must retain and
protect our own defence industrial base. That alone gives
us some real control in the UK. At the same time, we must
encourage and participate in joint projects with our
European NATO allies. European contributions to NATO are
not just limited by financial shortcomings but by wasteful
duplication, and we must continue to press our NATO allies
to boost spending and capabilities. If they—and we—did
that, we might help expand the growth in our economies.
Secondly, we must continue to promote our values and
principles on the world stage. We must defend NATO as the
cornerstone of our national and collective defence and tell
the people of this country, and indeed the wider world, how
essential the alliance remains. Article 5, where an attack
on one is an attack on all, is not a choice; it is a solemn
obligation. Anybody who questions it questions the whole
basis of collective security. Our communication policy on
this whole issue is, frankly, pathetic.
Thirdly, we must be aware of and act on the dangers
inherent in the present confrontation between Russia and
the West. Without the tripwires and warning arrangements of
the Cold War, we are in grave danger of making a mistake or
a miscalculation with potentially catastrophic results.
Our much-reduced military is still among the very best in
the world. Our diplomats have few peers internationally.
Our intelligence services are relied on by most of the free
world. It is now time for our Government to recognise the
dangers to Britain and to live up to their high standards.
Never in my lifetime was bold and courageous leadership
more necessary and more urgent.
-
(Con)
My Lords, before we hear from my noble friend Lord King, I
remind the House that this is a time-limited date with
Back-Bench speeches limited to four minutes. Timing is
particularly tight, so I entreat Peers to wind up
immediately when the clock displays four minutes.
3.13 pm
-
(Con)
My Lords, I think I can say to my noble friend Lord Younger
that no Member of this House taking part in this debate is
unaware of the restriction he has just put on it. They
deeply regret it as well. It is very disappointing that the
House has not had an opportunity for more time on this
debate on such an important issue very commendably launched
by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. We say this House should
draw on its wisdom and experience. I see in the Chamber at
present four former Defence Secretaries and three former
Chiefs of the Defence Staff, all of whom—expect for the
noble Lord, Lord Robertson—will be limited to four minutes
for their contributions. I have probably lost a minute
already by this intervention.
I broadly support a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord
Robertson, has said. The House of Commons Defence Committee
in its report said:
“The world today is at its most dangerous and unstable
since the end of the Cold War”.
I recognise that the Government face severely limited
resources and an extremely difficult situation, inheriting
what I think is a pretty unbalanced procurement programme.
As a result, we have some impressive capabilities coming
forward and, as long as nobody attacks us before 2025 or
2030, we will be in good shape to meet them. I do not want
to be too cynical about this, but there is a real imbalance
in the resources and the capabilities we have at present.
, the chairman of
the Defence Committee, said that the last time we faced a
combination of a threatening Russia and a growing terrorist
threat was in the 1980s. I notice the proportion of GDP we
spent on defence was about 5% then. While we pat ourselves
on the back and say we must stick to 2% and make sure we do
not go below it, it is important to draw that illustration.
I was much criticised when I conducted “Options for Change”
for daring to reduce our Armed Forces to 350,000 men in
uniform. As I look at the 144,000 that are now indicated as
our present strength, you will understand that I have great
concerns.
I also have great concerns about the present programme. The
noble Lord, Lord Robertson, already mentioned the problems
of the Brexit exit—the effect on the currency and what that
might mean on the cost of £12 billion of overseas
procurement. I also look, as all Defence Secretaries have,
at “efficiency savings” and wonder how they are actually
always going to be achieved.
President Putin’s reassertion of Russian interests in many
parts of the world and what seems to be a pretty dangerous
undercover media operation at the moment, which may be
seeking to destabilise some of the Russian minorities in
the Baltic countries, illustrate a major problem there.
Some noble Lords may have heard a Polish Minister on the
“Today” programme this morning welcoming the 10,000
American troops who have just moved into Poland. On their
very border there are 100,000 Russian troops exercising in
a fairly provocative manner at present.
I want to make a few final points. I hope sincerely that
President Putin and his colleagues realise how easily
accidents can happen with mobilisations and provocations
and how easily conflict can start. We do not have to have
the memories of the First World War and our memories of the
Second World War where war started by accident involving
the wrong people at the wrong time that was not meant to
happen. I take that factor very seriously.
I have two further points. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson,
mentioned what has added to the Russian reassertion of its
interests: the problems of ISIS and the total
destabilisation of the Middle East. Added to that now we
have Brexit and the new President Trump. On Brexit, I hope
that there is no question that the sensible co-operative
arrangements that currently exist, such as on anti-piracy
off the coast of Somalia, will continue. It is in our
national interest and in the interests of our European
friends and partners because they need some of our
capabilities. I hope those undertakings and operations will
go ahead, Brexit or not, without interruption and without
too much legal argument about whether they should now be
permitted.
The key point I want to make, which was well made by the
noble Lord, Lord Robertson, is that the key to our defence
is NATO. While we were concerned about certain comments
from President-elect Trump, I am encouraged by the further
remarks he has made in his conversations with our Prime
Minister. I also hope that the appointment of General
Mattis may reinforce support for NATO. That is the core of
our defence and, if I have one thing to say today in the
lavish time allotted to me by the noble Viscount, Lord
Younger, it is that we must ensure that, through all these
instabilities, the importance of NATO and support for it
are fully maintained at the present dangerous time.
3.19 pm
-
(Lab)
My Lords, Russia, a superpower in nuclear terms, is
massively investing in military capability, yet with the
financial clout of Italy. Its economy is on a war footing:
something has to give. There are its actions in Crimea and
Ukraine, and now threats to the Baltic states and
cyberattacks in Estonia, France, Turkey, Ukraine and the
USA. There is aggressive intrusion into NATO air space and
near misses. Russian nuclear submarines are threatening our
SSBNs. Why is Russia doing all this? Putin is a
revisionist, believes in spheres of influence and
understands hard power. His loose talk of the use of
nuclear weapons is a particular concern. We must strain
every sinew to understand him and keep open a dialogue.
There is instability in the Middle East. It is difficult to
identify a country that is not in turmoil—Syria, Iraq,
Yemen and Libya—and countries such as Jordan, Turkey,
Lebanon and Egypt are under severe strain. The flexing of
muscles by Iran and Turkey, as regional powers; the
Sunni/Shia divide; Russia’s recent success as a key power
broker—where will this all go?
The threat of terrorism, grown as a result of events in the
Middle East, is not at present existential, but should
terrorists ever get hold of improvised nuclear devices or a
lethal virus, all that changes. Afghanistan is still at
risk of collapse. Stability in nuclear-armed Pakistan is
still a cause for concern. In Korea, will the US allow Kim
Jong-un to develop a functioning ballistic nuclear-tipped
missile able to strike the US? I doubt it very much. What
then?
China is threatening freedom of navigation in the South
China Sea, there is the Senkaku Islands stand-off with
Japan and the re-emergence of the Taiwan issue. That is all
made more worrying by the stalling of China’s economy. As
the largest European investor in that region, with
responsibility for global shipping, can we ignore it?
Then there is cyber. The growing reliance of our society
and military on the internet entails lots of
vulnerabilities that were not foreseen. The Russian
takedown of a French television station, had it been a
bomb, would have been an act of war, but nations do not
know how to respond as there are no international
agreements. All I would say is that some rather naive
politicians in the Treasury think this means that we can
save money on defence; it actually means that we will have
to spend more.
In the face of these threats—and there are others—what have
the Government done? They have shown staggering complacency
and self-delusion, when it is quite clear to experts and
lay men that defence needs more resources. When in
coalition, they reduced our military capability by 30%, and
our forces remain underfunded. There is minimal new money.
It is in theory being produced by efficiencies. The HCDC
has pointed out the creative accounting in the 2% of GDP
spent on defence, the figure that the Government gave.
Spending on pensions does not win wars, and the 2% of GDP
is not the target but the very minimum that any NATO nation
should spend. Our nation should spend more.
Having robust defence forces makes a war involving our
nation less likely. If a small conflagration in a distant
part of the world developed into a war that threatened our
national survival, the best welfare provision, National
Health Service, education and foreign aid programmes in the
world would be as nothing. Preventing war, and defending
our nation and people if it happens, are more important
than any other government spending priorities. If Ministers
get defence wrong, the nation will never forgive them. The
costs in blood and treasure are enormous. The Government
have a choice of whether we spend what is required to
ensure the safety of our nation, dependencies and people or
not. At present, I believe they are getting the choice
wrong.
The US military and, to a lesser extent, ours, have
together ensured that there has been no world war for more
than 70 years. The US now expects us and others to step up;
it is right that we do so. It is no use the Government
pretending otherwise. There is not enough money in defence.
In particular, notwithstanding the Defence Secretary
calling this the year of the Navy, the Navy has too few
ships to do what the nation expects. Our great nation has
effectively only 11 escorts fully capable of operations,
which is a national disgrace. Delays in ordering the Type
26 frigate have led to the ordering of extra, highly
overpriced offshore patrol vessels to fill the Clyde yard
with work, because there is an agreement that we will
subsidise the yard whether ships are being made at all or
not.
However, I congratulate the Government on their commitment
to the deterrent successor programme, but I and many others
believe that the capital cost of the programme should be
met from the central contingency fund. Does the noble Earl
agree?
The really good news in defence is the new aircraft
carriers, welcomed and eagerly awaited by the US and our
other allies. The Government must purchase enough Sea
Lightnings to have the squadrons on board. I was very
surprised to see articles in the papers recently about
mothballing the second carrier and the date for the “Queen
Elizabeth” slipping. I end by asking the noble Earl to
confirm that the “Prince of Wales” will be completed and
operated concurrently with the “Queen Elizabeth”, and that
HMS “Queen Elizabeth”, will sail in March for sea trials
and enter Portsmouth for the first time before the summer,
as previously stated by the Defence Secretary?
3.23 pm
-
(LD)
My Lords, it is a privilege to follow such well-informed
speeches as the three that have launched the debate. In
particular, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Robertson,
on introducing the debate. He spoke with great sincerity
and sometimes considerable passion.
As I remember, Phileas Fogg had 80 days to go around the
world; four minutes will not allow me any kind of tour
d’horizon, so I will confine myself to a number of
propositions that underpin my views on defence. Some have
already been hinted at in the debate
First, Russian ambition will be emboldened by the military,
political and diplomatic success it has enjoyed in Syria.
Some months ago, the noble Earl who will respond to the
debate expressed reservations when I described some
behaviour and achievement on the part of Mr Putin as being
game and first set. I hope he will excuse me if I say that
it is not that any more: it is game, set and match in
Syria.
The transatlantic alliance is essential for the security of
Europe and for the United Kingdom, whether we are inside or
out of the European Union. Every effort must be made to
convey to the new Administration in the United States that
it is not just Europe’s interest that is served by that
relationship but that of the United States as well. I
believe that the United States would be more likely to be
persuaded in the way I suggested if every European member
of NATO were urgently to achieve the minimum—as has been
pointed out—target of 2% of GDP per annum on defence
spending.
In the face of Russian ambition, Europeans can no longer
get defence on the cheap. It is an interesting reflection
that whereas the term “burden-sharing” used to be used when
one went to Washington, the assessment of Europe’s
contribution is now expressed in—shall we say—more
trenchant and less suitable terms for this debate.
Proposals for a European army in the circumstances are not
credible, because they would inevitably create duplication
and divert necessary expenditure from the main thrust of
NATO. If European members want to increase their
contribution to NATO, they can best do so—again, this was
hinted at by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson—by adopting the
principles of force specialisation, interoperability and
common procurement. Remember, it is not how much you spend,
it is how you spend it. It is necessary that NATO—and
Europe, given some of the remarks that have come out of the
United States—is able to provide a full spectrum of
capability.
Two developments ought to attract our attention most
particularly. The first is the deployment by Russia of
nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad. The second is the
report that Russian generals have now endorsed the use of
battlefield nuclear weapons—eerie echoes, one might think
of the Cold War. These developments, in my judgment,
underline beyond question the conclusion that deterrence is
best provided by both conventional and nuclear means, all
as set out in NATO’s strategic concept.
3.28 pm
-
Lord (CB)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the independent-minded
noble Lord, . The
Royal Air Force that I had the privilege to lead in the
mid-1980s was close to 100,000 personnel and more than 30
combat squadrons. Today’s Chief of the Air Staff has a
force of less than a third of that in personnel, and a
quarter in squadrons. Yes, airframes and perhaps even
people are more capable than their predecessors, but with
such small numbers, they lack a key fighting quality:
resilience in combat against other than a very poorly
equipped or incapable foe.
The Army and the Royal Navy have faced similar reductions
in the past 30 years in their musclepower. What, then,
should the Armed Forces be expected to do? Rule out
unforeseen operations of the scale or intensity fielded in
1982 to recover the Falklands, or in 1991 to throw the
Iraqis out of Kuwait? Indeed, enduring operations on the
scale of those in Iraq and Afghanistan are no longer
feasible without strong Allied involvement. Even the more
limited scale of offensive operations now in hand, mainly
by the RAF, is stretching the human side of this activity.
Brexit adds a new dimension for the Armed Forces. We must
surely maintain the many excellent military-to-military
contacts we enjoy with forces in Europe and North America.
The increasing vision of trade with Commonwealth and
overseas partners should be matched by greater contact with
their military units.
A good start was the recent visit by RAF Typhoon aircraft
to Malaysia, Japan and South Korea, and by the successful
Red Arrows displays in the Middle East and China. These
deployments demonstrated operational reach and logistic
support over thousands of miles. They made many new
contacts and were widely noted and appreciated.
What is the bottom line? We lack strength in numbers. We
are not well placed to deal with an inevitable unforeseen,
least of all against a capable foe. The more independently
minded we become, the more capability we need in a
dangerous world. Surely the two must go together.
The first choice in threat resolution has to be soft power,
whether by diplomatic, economic or other non-military
means. But success in such endeavour will surely be
strengthened if it is backed by well-found hard power. We
do it for the ultimately adverse scenario with the nuclear
deterrent. We need more conventional hard power for the
rest.
3.31 pm
-
(Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Robertson
for bringing forward this debate today and to my noble
friend and colleague Lord West for his machine-gun delivery
of detailed points crammed into four minutes. I would
prefer to lob the odd artillery shell—I will reduce the
number to four—in order to speak more slowly.
The first is the situation in which we find ourselves in
the world. My noble friend Lord Robertson admirably
outlined it: a revanchist Russia asserting itself
politically and diplomatically as well as militarily; the
Middle East partially undergoing radical transformation and
partially in war and turmoil; in the Far East, China
flexing its muscles; a complete sea change in the
battlefield through international terrorism—asymmetric
warfare has already occurred; and cyberwarfare and hybrid
warfare, updated versions of PSYCH-OPS on a global scale,
which are being deployed by Russia in particular but also
by others. That is the situation.
I am not one of those who believe that we can respond to
all of that merely by military means or by arms—of course
not—but they are an essential component of any
comprehensive response. Yet, as has been said, we are now
below critical mass in numbers, power and range of
capabilities. The Army is at its smallest since the
Napoleonic era, and even targets for the number of trained
personnel are not being met. I was surprised that the
Government’s response was not to increase the numbers but
to redefine what was meant by “trained”—which rather begs
the question about the capability behind it.
In the Navy, our surface fleet has halved, even in the
period since my noble friend Lord Robertson and I were at
the Ministry of Defence. A very unfair comparison is
sometimes made in the form of the old cliché that we have
more admirals than we have ships. It is unfair because the
service produced by our admirals goes well beyond the
number of our surface fleets, but it illustrates where we
are now. We have 19 in our surface fleet, possibly 11 at
any given time in operational terms, and 35 admirals.
Arithmetically, that is not quite double the number of
ships, but then of course admirals do not have to be
regularly refitted—at least most of them do not. So we
effectively have half the number in our surface fleet as we
have admirals. Similarly in the RAF, as the noble and
gallant Lord, Lord Craig, pointed out, we have between five
and seven operational squadrons, compared to 30 to 35 only
20 to 30 years ago.
Thirdly, at the bottom of this is finance. Let us leave
aside whether the efficiency savings quite properly pointed
out by the noble Lord, Lord King, can ever be achieved, and
let us leave aside even the £700 million cost of the fall
in the value of the pound. The truth is that our spending,
including our contribution to NATO, has been subject to
what I can only kindly call “creative accountancy”—cooking
the books. We are now including in the 2% a substantial
amount of wages and pensions. I recall that when a Belgian
official was explaining to Andrew Neil, the well-known
commentator, how 80% of their budget went on pensions, he
said, “What you have to understand is that we really don’t
have an Armed Forces; we have a very well-defended pension
scheme”. I abhor the prospect of that thin end of the wedge
being used. I am not suggesting that our expenditure on
wages and pensions is anything like that of Belgium, but it
is very worrying indeed—and the leadership after Brexit
must come into question.
My final point is unashamedly political. It would be easy
and very tempting for the Minister in response to point to
the shambles of the leadership on defence.
But I know that he is too big a man to do that—I say that
hopefully. I hope that he will be wise enough not to do it
for this reason: one can accept that while accepting that
almost everyone who will speak here from every side of this
House has a long-standing commitment to sound defence and
the defence of this country. So first, I ask the Minister
with a political P to bear that in mind.
Secondly, I understand that there will always be the normal
robust exchanges with the Treasury, but there have been
occasions in our history—I was part of one of them with my
noble friend Lord Robertson—when our whole defence team was
so concerned about the situation that we said to the
Treasury, “Thus far and no further—because otherwise you
will have to do it without any of the Defence Ministers”. I
congratulate the Minister on what he has done so far and
hope that he will bear those last two points in mind when
it comes to future discussions with his colleagues.
3.36 pm
-
(CB)
My Lords, I, too, welcome the discussion opened by the
noble Lord, Lord Robertson. In my meagre four minutes, I
will address merely one issue that has come to the fore
recently: the notion of a European army—a European military
capability, because of course it would have to have the
other sorts of capabilities.
Brussels has made no secret of its wish to set up its own
joint headquarters, which would oversee, and presumably in
due course command, the shared military assets provided by
member states. Details about the wider development of that
force are few, but the argument is that it would enable the
Union to be taken more seriously as an international force.
Rather more worryingly, it has also been suggested that our
agreeing to support the setting up of such a capability
could be the price we pay for access to the single market
in our Brexit negotiations. Britain’s contribution to any
European force is seen as essential for such a capability
to be convincing. Apart from the French, we all know that
the other EU member states simply do not have the resources
or capabilities necessary. I know that the Government are
currently opposed to the notion of a European army and I
very much hope that they will continue so to be.
First, the development of the force is unclear, but the EU
has a track record of getting increasing jurisdiction over
its instruments and it is highly probable that, ultimately,
Brussels would control the military assets of member
states, rather than member states retaining the authority
to decide whether they wish to involve themselves in a
particular EU security initiative. As a nation, we must
retain absolute control over all our Armed Forces. Such
powers should never be ceded to anyone. That does not mean
that we cannot take part—there have been some very
successful examples, including EUFOR in the Balkans and
security operations tackling people-smuggling gangs in the
Mediterranean and piracy in Somalia. Those are entirely
satisfactory.
Secondly, as has already been discussed, we are seeing the
not unexpected re-emergence of Russia as a formidable
military neighbour of the European Union. But if Europe
were to rely solely on the contribution of European member
states to defend their interests, it is unlikely they would
be able to summon the resources necessary to deter
President Putin, who makes no secret of his ambitions for
greater influence in the Baltics and eastern Europe.
Moreover, the very establishment of a so-called European
army could well be perceived in Moscow as a threat to
Russian security interests and a sign of a more aggressive
European posture. This is the last thing that we need in
the coming decade.
Thirdly, the establishment of a fully-fledged joint
operational headquarters would consume considerable
resources. Senior officers would have to be contributed by
member states, with all the necessary and expensive
infrastructure to support them and their families. In 2008
the EU as a whole spent more than €200 billion on defence.
By 2013 the sum had dwindled to €170 billion and all
analysts reckon that it will soon shrink to about €150
billion. In the face of such declining resources, creating
yet another major EU structure simply does not make sense.
To imagine that European nations would be more prepared to
increase their defence expenditure for a European military
capability when they have shown a collective reluctance to
meet the 2% target for their NATO capabilities seems wildly
optimistic. But, of course, unless they did so there is no
way that that the Union could be taken more seriously as an
international force.
Fourthly, and most fundamentally, by establishing its own
command structure, the EU would be setting itself in direct
competition with NATO, with the duplication of a structure
that works well already and has shown itself to be
adaptable. Why on earth would we want to replicate it? We
have a situation—others will no doubt talk about it well—in
which we are suffering from inadequate military
capabilities, inadequate financial resources, inefficient
use of defence expenditure and limited defence industrial
capabilities. Surely we do not want to compound the problem
by going to Europe. I ask the Minister to ensure that we
stick very firmly by our non-support for the European army
and that any suggestion that it could be a bargaining tool
in our Brexit negotiations is killed dead.
3.41 pm
-
(Con)
My Lords, realising the need for brevity, I must begin by
thanking the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for his admirable
speech. I will make just one point. I endorse the
initiative by NATO to move battalion-size battle groups
into each of the three Baltic states and Poland. It is a
sign that NATO has, to a limited extent, roused itself in
posting around 1,000 personnel in those four countries. I
certainly welcome today’s movement of United States troops
into Poland, where they will take the lead, with Romania,
in one of those four battle groups.
I am concerned that the deployment in the Baltic states
will not come earlier than the spring. Is it not possible
to hurry up that deployment, particularly of the United
Kingdom-led force—with France and Denmark—in Estonia? This
is urgent. There is a period ahead of us when the United
States Administration, under the new President, will
take—as the custom is—until the spring before the political
appointments are made. Therefore, there will be a period of
uncertainty.
We are all concerned—many noble Lords have spoken about
this—at the continued aggressive attitude of Russia, which
threatens the NATO powers. Following its outrageous
behaviour in Georgia, the Crimea and Ukraine, it has
relentlessly threatened the eastern border of NATO. It was,
I think, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, who
referred to the large number of Russian troops along the
border, the continued illegal overflight and incursions and
the build-up of military resources, particularly nuclear
weapons, in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.
Mr Putin will no doubt use his usual posturing to claim
that the NATO four-nation battle groups are threatening
Russia. He is, as we know, a master of disinformation, but
I cannot understand how he might argue that this purely
defensive move—which it is—can be construed as threatening
Russia. Certainly 1,000 troops in each of the Baltic
countries and Poland could hardly be suggested to be an
invasion force. What the four battle groups will be is a
warning trigger that any incursions by the Russian
military, or even their “little green men”, will clearly
trigger the Article 5 arrangements and all the consequences
of that. I believe that Mr Putin must realise that any
repetition of his Ukraine adventures in the territories of
NATO members will lead to an immediate, full-hearted
response. Surely this admittedly small but very important
disposition of troops will cause Mr Putin to hesitate. He
would fail to do so at his peril.
3.45 pm
-
(Lab)
My Lords, I am very conscious that I am speaking after a
number of people who have much more knowledge of the
defence of this country and of defence internationally than
I have. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Robertson for
what was an excellent start to this debate. The only area
to which I wish to address my remarks at the moment is
cyberwarfare. However, before I come on to that, in
relation to the conventional defence industries, we are
awaiting an industrial strategy from the Government. It is
critical that we take into account, within that strategy,
the very significant effect of the defence industries in
the economy of this country. It is something people
frequently forget, particularly when they criticise
expenditure on defence.
I was very much aware of the reference by my noble friend
to the
fact that cyber is not the cheap option for defence—indeed,
an increased investment in cyberwarfare will probably mean
an increase in the defence budget—but I echo my noble
friend Lord Robertson in saying that we are in danger of
sleepwalking to calamity. That is particularly true of
cyberwarfare. Just a few feet along the corridor, in the
House of Commons, during the Second World War, democracy
was threatened when bombs were dropped on the Houses of
Parliament. Indeed—let us be honest about it—the allied
bombings in mainland Europe were aimed at critical
infrastructure.
The critical infrastructure of this country is so
vulnerable that within minutes this Parliament could be
brought to an end and this country to a complete halt,
because our world is now so interconnected, so
networked—from our heating systems to our communications,
hospitals and transport. A clever cyberbrain could bring
all of them to an end immediately. It is critical to
understand that, particularly in the light of the very
powerful words of my noble friend Lord Robertson about the
situation in Syria. We have seen what has happened to
Aleppo: brought to its knees—decimated—by bombing, over a
period of months and years. The same consequences could
follow the use of cyberwarfare.
My fear is that we are not investing enough in our cyber
capabilities. Our enemies undoubtedly are, and there is
evidence of their interest in cyber. We need to raise our
game. We need to address skill shortages in certain areas.
Many commercial cyber businesses can throw huge amounts of
money at attracting the most talented, skilled people in
cyber. They are expensive. We must make sure that they are
part of the defence of our nation.
We have talked today about the decline in the numbers of
our armed forces. I am not suggesting that we replace the
troops on the ground with cyber capability: they must be
complementary. How much better could we do, however, in our
defence capabilities in the south Atlantic, for example, if
we had a more sophisticated cyber capability alongside the
garrison? Would we need a garrison in the south Atlantic if
we had a more advanced cyber capability?
This country has ethics and morals around the operation of
our defensive, and offensive, capabilities. There are
ethical issues around the use of cyber as a tool of war or
defence. You can cause chaos in a city by cutting off the
power supply to hospitals and air traffic control—to any
aspects of modern life. We need to ensure that we have that
ethical debate as well as the concrete debate about how we
fund our cyber capabilities. I hope that in doing so we get
ahead of the game. We have heard about the decline in
numbers in our defence forces. We see the threat to NATO
and from Brexit. This is another threat, but because it
does not involve great vessels, aeroplanes or anything that
we can touch, and because it is complicated, we tend to
forget about it. We cannot afford to do so.
3.50 pm
-
(LD)
My Lords, I draw the attention of the House to my entries
in the register of interests. I congratulate the noble
Lord, Lord Robertson, on securing this debate and his
excellent speech, and many other noble Lords on their
speeches, including the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell of
Coatdyke.
The threat to world peace has been vividly described, and
we have far too little invested in defence. I was surprised
to read in the Times of 6 January 2017 an article by
Deborah Haynes with the headline, “Navy battling to save
£500 million after bungled deal for ships”. I would
describe the article as authoritative because it included
much detail and quoted a former First Sea Lord. There was
speculation that one option was to cut the size of the
Royal Marines. The noble Earl, along with the Secretary of
State, are political members of the Defence Board. Both of
them know that recruiting and retention for the Royal
Marines, despite the high standards required, is excellent.
They know that the Royal Marines need core manpower
strength to fulfil many of the specialist roles with which
they are tasked. They also know the uniquely high
proportion of badged members of UK Special Forces that is
drawn from the Royal Marines and the uniquely high
proportion of marines who pass the arduous selection
process.
My noble friend Lord Slim, a great man, who knows more than
most about these things, has often reminded the House that
if you require Special Forces troops you need a sufficient
pool of talent to recruit them from. The same is true of
the other specialist troops drawn from the corps, not least
the mountain and arctic warfare specialists. As the noble
Baroness, Lady Liddell of Coatdyke would be interested to
know, we also have our own cyberforce, drawn from highly
intelligent members of our corps.
There is insufficient time to list the other vital tasks
performed by the Royal Marines, other than the main one:
manning the 3rd Commando Brigade. I very much hope that the
noble Earl, and the Secretary of State, will not permit any
cuts to the corps. It would be deeply destructive to punish
success and destabilise the morale of one of the few
fully-manned formations of the highest quality in UK
defence—and, for that matter, elsewhere.
I have little time left but I ask the noble Earl to confirm
that if there are barracks closures—and that is likely—new
state-of-the-art barracks will be built in suitable
locations with all the necessary communications, computer,
fitness and other important facilities, and with proximity
to challenging training areas. Will there be wide
consultation with the chain of command before any final
decisions are taken?
Finally, I understand that the new aircraft carriers will
be able to take a commando unit with all attached ranks,
weapons and helicopters. I understand that they will have
all the necessary command communications and control
systems that are crucial for amphibious operations. Is
there currently a plan to replace the landing craft
capability of the assault ships—the landing platform docks?
That role is currently provided by HMS “Bulwark” and HMS
“Albion”. If we as a country desire expeditionary
capability, we must have the specialist and best troops to
do the job.
3.54 pm
-
(CB)
My Lords, like many other noble Lords, I congratulate the
noble Lord, Lord Robertson, on his admirable introduction
and thank him for tabling this important debate. Inevitably
with such a predictably large number of speakers and the
four-minute time limit, there is little that is new or
unknown that anyone can add, but I hope that the
aggregation of some common concerns will have impressed
itself on government.
Quite apart from being an old soldier, I must declare an
interest as a member of the Joint Committee on the National
Security Strategy, and I would like to begin my
contribution from that viewpoint.
Like many other members of the Joint Committee, I had hoped
that government would have learned its lesson from the
disastrous 2010 SDSR, which contained so many imponderables
and loopholes. Naively perhaps, we hoped that hints that
the 2015 SDSR would follow and be based on a national
security strategy would result in just that, because in
logic other requirements, such as the comprehensive
spending review, could have been based on the national
security strategy as well. But no, they were published
simultaneously, and I submit that 23 June 2016 rendered
both out of date.
Many factors have to be taken into account when planning
the defence of the United Kingdom, on which the
capabilities of our Armed Forces must be based—not least
partnership arrangements with neighbouring countries. Until
23 June, these were with fellow members of the European
Union, but now bilateral arrangements will have to be made
with each. It is true that some are members of NATO, but
its continued existence, in its current US-reliant form,
must be in doubt after 20 January, as the noble Lord, Lord
Robertson, and others have pointed out. It is also true
that all are members of the OSCE, but since the early 1990s
in former Yugoslavia this has not featured on the military
horizon.
In thinking about the current inadequacies in each of our
Armed Forces, which other noble Lords have spelled out in
some detail, I could not help casting my mind back to the
options for change exercise in 1991, to which my noble and
gallant friend Lord Craig referred. As Adjutant-General, I
was responsible for implementing the reduction in the size
of the Army by a third over three years, from 156,000 to
104,000. Our key worries about implementing the requirement
can be encapsulated in two words—uncertainty and
sustainability. Uncertainty coloured our thinking about
force structure, in the context of the lessons of the first
Gulf War, which included the inadequate size of infantry
battalions, not having been assimilated, and the emerging
requirement to provide contingencies to peacekeeping
operations and post-conflict reconstruction.
Sustainability coloured our thinking about the ratio
between cuts to teeth or tail. Noble Lords will therefore
appreciate that we wondered whether we were being required
to make a jump too far, in isolation of consideration of
the current international situation. To jump to today,
plans to cut the Army yet further, to 82,000, were made
before 23 June, and I submit that that needs to be
rethought in the light of the changed international
situation.
Of course resources are the key, and we all know that there
is unlikely to be any more money. I have mentioned before
in this House that Field-Marshal Carver, whose military
assistant I was once privileged to be, had two definitions
of the word “affordability”—can you afford it, and can you
afford to give up what you have to give up in order to
afford it? One of my main reasons for calling for a review
of both the national security strategy and SDSR 2015 is to
enable an affordability test to be carried out on the
capabilities of the United Kingdom Armed Forces planned
before 23 June 2016 to determine whether they are
appropriate in current and future international situations.
3.59 pm
-
(Lab)
My Lords, I draw the attention of your Lordships’ House to
the interests I have declared in the register. I act as an
adviser and consultant to Lockheed Martin here in the
United Kingdom. I start by associating myself with the
words of my noble friends Lord Robertson, Lord West and
Lord Reid, and those of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, and
the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, all of whom I agree
very strongly with.
I believe that the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security
Review is a more coherent and impressive strategy and
framework than the 2010 document, which, as we all know,
was largely designed to make painful and difficult cuts in
the capability, capacity and strength of the UK Armed
Forces. The most important element in the 2015 strategy is
the Government’s very welcome and positive commitment to
ensuring that the United Kingdom and our Armed Forces are
able to contribute large-scale expeditionary and amphibious
war-fighting capabilities against a technologically
equivalent power. That is a very important commitment and
aspiration. But, as we all know, herein lies the rub: even
though that capacity and capability are vital for Britain’s
long-term strategic goals, after several years of cuts to
our defence forces we are trying to deploy and maintain
that capability with pitifully few platforms and too few
trained and deployable personnel.
If one looks at the strategy that the Government have set
out—consciously and deliberately limiting salary increases
to our Armed Forces—at a stroke, it made the work of the
pay review body superfluous. They are restricting the
important elements that will attract and recruit the people
we want at a time when wage growth is significant and
employment is high, so there is a very serious problem
here. We have too few platforms and too few people who are
readily deployable and trained.
In the time I have, I will make two or three points. Some
have been made by noble Lords but it is worth dwelling on
them. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, was the first
to mention the importance of attrition. As far as I can
see, no allowance at all is made in the strategy for any
attrition of our key weapons and platforms. In times of
peace that may be fantastic, but at times of war it is not
such a clever strategy—particularly if, heaven forbid, we
found ourselves pitted against a technologically equivalent
power; that is not an impossibility.
Of the three armed services, my real concern today is the
Royal Navy. The Royal Navy is under the greatest pressure
of all the three services and has been cut disastrously to
below a sustainable level, both in platforms and in people.
I do not dispute for a second that the Type 45 destroyers
and the Type 26 frigates will be much more capable
platforms, delivering much more kinetic power. But there is
one problem: they can only be in one place at a time, and
we simply do not have enough platforms, particularly if we
have to prepare for the possibility of the carrier battle
groups. The Queen Elizabeth class ships would have to be
defended entirely by Royal Navy assets. I think we are
going to struggle to do that, and it is critical that the
Government address that point.
The RAF is already is already operating flat out on its
existing missions. The air police work in the Baltics, in
Syria and in Iraq, and provide quick-reaction aircraft in
the Falklands. Those are all fairly modest operations, and
I do not see any spare capacity there at all. Although I
strongly welcome General Carter’s new focus on deploying
the Army at divisional strength with new strike brigades,
no provision at all seems to be made in SDSR 2015 regarding
where the air defence role is going to come from. Our
Rapier forces are fully committed to defending the
Falklands. Pulling them out of there would send a very
unfortunate signal.
There is more work to be done. I do not think the strategy
is complete. Of course, Ministers will have to make a very
difficult set of decisions about resources. But the bottom
line is simply this: these are the most dangerous times
since the end of the Cold War. We are taking more risks
with the defence of the United Kingdom than we reasonably
ought to be taking.
4.04 pm
-
(Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson,
for introducing so ably this important debate today. I
speak with some trepidation as, like the noble Baroness,
Lady Liddell, I do not have the level of experience in
defence of many others who are taking part in this debate.
I begin by paying tribute to the many outstandingly brave
men and women who serve in our Armed Forces. Through visits
with the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme, I have had the
privilege of seeing the extraordinary level of service they
provide for our country.
It is important to acknowledge the commitment that this
Government have made to spend 2% of GDP annually on
defence—one of only five NATO countries to do so last year.
The significant new investment in defence equipment is also
to be welcomed, as is the pledge not to reduce the overall
size of the regular Armed Forces. However, I also
understand that there is some concern over what exactly
should be included in defence spending and whether there
are enough resources for the spending commitments that have
been made, and I worry whether any shortfall will lead to
further cuts.
We live in a dangerous and unstable world today with
conflict in many countries, as we have already heard from
other noble Lords. A consequence of this turmoil has been
the refugee crisis; the UN estimates that there are
approximately 65 million refugees across the world today,
more than at any time since World War II, with thousands
trying to come to Europe. It is hard to know exactly how
wars will be fought in the years to come. As we have
already heard, Russia again seems to be a threatening
presence, and several hundred of our troops will join the
NATO exercise in Estonia—our largest long-term deployment
to a Russian neighbour since the end of the Cold War—to
ensure our preparedness for a conventional war. Meanwhile,
terrorism and cyberwarfare are two of the biggest threats
we now face.
The year 2015 saw the formation of the 77th Brigade, as the
MOD realised that,
“the actions of others in a modern battlefield can be
affected in ways that are not necessarily violent”.
When one looks at how effectively Daesh has utilised social
media, the importance of this specialist work cannot be
overestimated. Our forces need to have all the tools to
counter complex threats. Perhaps now more than ever, our
Armed Forces must ensure a good understanding of other
cultures. They are already deployed in more than 40
countries across the world in a range of roles, including
building relationships and detecting early vibrations in
order to help prevent conflict. Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya
have taught us lessons about the dangers of failing to
understand how our interventions will impact on a country.
It is the people in the Armed Forces who are so important.
Thus it is imperative that we recruit and retain the right
people. That can be challenging. The previous cuts to the
Armed Forces created insecurity, and in today’s competitive
world, industry can pay much higher salaries for those with
technology skills and the engineers that we so crucially
need. Are we able to recruit the people we need? Should
more be done to attract reservists and support their
employers? Most importantly, we need to keep the best. We
must ensure that we look after those who serve, and their
families, well. We rightly have a duty of care towards
them.
I and other noble Lords debated the Armed Forces covenant
in your Lordships’ House earlier this week. Perhaps we
should do more to recognise the strain that military life
places on families. It is with the support of their
families that our military are able to do their jobs, and
we in turn need to do all we can to support them and make
their lives easier. Tomorrow’s future warfare is hard to
predict in such a fast-changing and interconnected world.
We must ensure that defences are in place to protect the
UK, through adequate resources, a flexible approach to
warfare and personal support for those who serve and their
families.
4.08 pm
-
(Lab)
My Lords, I join with others in thanking my noble friend
Lord Robertson for this debate today and for introducing
such wide-ranging coverage of issues that we face. I was
not at all surprised that he included personnel in that. As
the very new chairman of the Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body,
I was called in by the first Defence Secretary of the new
Labour Government to be told that the staging of the pay
award by the Tory Government that had caused so much
demoralisation in the Armed Forces for several years was
going to stop. Whatever the review body recommended, our
Armed Forces would get—and the Labour Government honoured
that agreement right the way through.
On the personnel that we have and the capability of our
Armed Forces, we can have the best policies in the world,
get a real 2% defence budget, make the changes and invest,
but unless we have the continuation of professional Armed
Forces personnel, backed and supported by their families,
we will not succeed. Part of the worldwide reputation our
Armed Forces have for their professionalism, talent and
whatever they bring wherever they go is because we have
this concordat.
The Armed Forces have their covenant, which is welcome and
has been improved over the past few years, and they have
the Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body, which is independent.
There is a report due out shortly but I looked at its
report from last year and it makes worrying reading. I
looked at the previous three as well and they make
incrementally worrying reading.
What do Armed Forces personnel and their families see?
They—and I—see a Prime Minister who has been in office for
nearly a year and has not made one major speech on
international security or defence. How are they supposed to
feel about that when so much of our security as a nation
depends on them and their ability? Many of them see the 2%
as smoke and mirrors. They do not understand why pensions
should be included in defence spending. An accountant may
be able to argue that but you will never convince our
people, or many of us in the Chamber today, that that is
spending on defence equipment and personnel. They saw last
year the announcement by the Government that from 2016, for
four years, the maximum pay award they will get year on
year will be 1%. Our Armed Forces people are not slow off
the mark; they know what is going on and in evidence to the
review body they asked why that should be imposed on them
when the very people who are imposing it—MPs—are getting
more than 1%. Yet we expect our Armed Forces to continue to
give the commitment that they have given.
The review body is independent. It has been respected by
Governments across the piece. Yet in 2010, and again last
year, the Treasury quite arbitrarily, without reference to
the review body, cut the commitment bonuses—the commitment
to go and do the job. It is in the report. It makes
worrying reading indeed. Just 14% of our Armed Forces think
that morale is high. If that were a company, it would be
looking at itself and at what it could do to improve it.
Just 36% were satisfied with their lifestyle and
remuneration package. Just under half of them were
dissatisfied with the impact on their partner’s career.
Many partners have to put their career in abeyance when
their Armed Forces partner is serving.
Paragraph 2.14 of the report was one of the most worrying
aspects. The review body said:
“One of the most powerful messages … was that personnel
were losing trust in their employer”—
the MoD, the Government. So I ask the Minister: do the
Government intend to maintain the 1% for the next four
years? If they do, do they not agree that that will affect
recruitment and retention? Will the impact that the drop in
the value of the pound—£1.50 the night of Brexit; £1.20
last night—will have on the MoD budget have to be met out
of the MoD budget?
-
My Lords, as I am in charge of time management, I make a
further strong entreaty that remaining speeches must
conclude as the clock reaches four minutes.
4.13 pm
-
The (CB)
My Lords, we all know that this issue has huge significance
for the UK as we approach a new US Administration. As a
layman, I am as concerned as anyone that NATO itself may be
reconfigured under a new US President. The litmus test may
well be in countries such as Ukraine. Even outside the EU,
I believe we should remain true to the doctrine of EU
enlargement and maintain the closest possible links with
eastern Europe, Georgia and the Baltic states.
The prevention of war, our security and even the
containment of migration are just as important for our
Armed Forces as the ability to engage directly in conflict.
I would like to make the case for the UK’s increasing
involvement in peacekeeping, specifically in the UN and EU
missions in conflict states. The 2015 SDSR vision describes
a United Kingdom with “global reach and influence”, and it
is right that we see the wider context of our defence
policy. The strongest argument for increasing the UK’s role
in UN and EU peacekeeping is the need to strengthen the
international protection of civilians in civil war. A
pressing example of this is in South Sudan, where we have
committed up to 370 personnel to UNMISS. Training in the
protection of civilians and in combatting sexual violence
is now the priority following massacres and rapes that have
prompted investigations and have caused aid agencies such
as Christian Aid and Oxfam considerable concern.
Peacekeeping activity has one material advantage over the
deployment of conventional forces. In certain areas such as
the CSSF, the new version of the joint Conflict Pool, it
can draw on the international aid budget. That indeed is
one justification for keeping that budget above 0.7% of
GNI.
Our security already depends on global co-operation, but is
security taking over from conflict prevention? There are
signs that Downing Street is taking a greater interest in
the uses of the CSSF for reasons of security. I mentioned
the containment of migration. The EU’s Khartoum process in
north Africa is one diplomatic response to migration
currently favoured by the FCO. This programme cultivates
closer relations with Sudan and even tighter border
controls along some of the continent’s longest frontiers. I
am not sure that the programme will work, for all sorts of
reasons—although the UK is currently chairing the process.
What about the EU CSDP missions in the Mediterranean, the
sub-Sahara and the Horn of Africa? In the past 10 years, we
have taken part in 11 EU missions, including Operation
Sophia and Operation Atalanta, which were notable
achievements. These are programmes to which we subscribed
troops, personnel and resources successfully. Will the
Minister confirm that our participation will continue at
least on a voluntary basis?
The commitment to South Sudan doubles the number of
personnel assigned to UN-mandated operations, but this must
be seen in context. The numbers are well below the
thousands committed under John Major’s premiership in the
1990s. After the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, our
Armed Forces, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson, said,
are already developing a more subtle approach to defence
policy through the use of smaller, irregular, specialised
detachments that might be used in peacekeeping.
Finally, I hope that we shall stand by our friends in the
Balkans, whatever our relations with the EU. Will the
Minister confirm that our commitments to the programmes in
Kosovo and Ukraine and to the monitoring mission in Georgia
will continue? In defence, as in trade, we should not
neglect our current partnerships in the search for new
horizons.
4.17 pm
-
The Lord Bishop of Portsmouth
My Lords, agree with it or not, Brexit was a decision to
determine our own path. This debate requires us to consider
critically whether we have the capacity to determine our
own strategic path in the realm of defence and security.
The extent of our global reach must reflect our economic
and strategic interests as well as our security and
military concerns in these changing times, which now make
these considerations, as one analyst has put it,
“supercharged”.
My anxiety is that there is a gap, if not sometimes a gulf,
between rhetoric about our concerns and ambitions on the
one hand and our constrained capability on the other. For
example, not long ago the Foreign Secretary declared that
we are “back east of Suez”. It is true that the Gulf and
Asia are regions of growing global importance, and this
country has new defence centres in Dubai and Singapore. We
have some Army presence in Oman and joint training with
Singapore after 70 years of this co-operation with only the
US. A naval support facility has opened in Bahrain and the
new aircraft carriers will have what is called “a presence”
in the Pacific.
We may welcome and applaud the strategic intent but our
capacity to sustain and resource effective presence and
capacity remains limited. Our only garrison in Asia, in
Brunei, is funded by the Sultan. We have small quantities
of advanced, expensive equipment, of which the new carriers
are the most obvious example, but sparse support capacity.
In a navy of 19 surface vessels, an effective carrier group
needs most of the deployable capacity. My spellchecker has
substituted “deplorable capacity” for my intended words
“deployable capacity”. The iPad technology seems to know a
thing or two. We are talking not only about defence and
security capacity. Intelligence, influence, diplomacy and
trade considerations are part of our strategic reach and so
affected by financial limitations.
This is surely the time to recognise the opportunities open
to us, as well as the threats, and with realism to
reconsider our ability to resource needs and ambitions. I,
with others, including my colleague the right reverend
Prelate the , who regrets the
necessity for his late withdrawal from the debate, have
already suggested a new SDSR that addresses a global
situation so changed in a short time. Peace in Europe and
US commitment to NATO are no longer reliable bases for our
policy. We must surely conclude that, as we see a more
assertive Russia to the east and a new American President
questioning the orthodoxy we have long accepted.
I am not proposing a crude attempt at empire restoration,
but rather a recognition of opportunity and need for us to
resource new partnership and leadership roles. I need
hardly add, too, that increased defence spending would move
us beyond the mere preservation of an industrial base by
stimulating innovation, employment, morale and prosperity
in regions that have suffered most from
deindustrialisation. Our words, aspirations and actions
must be much more consistent.
4.22 pm
-
(Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson,
for introducing his debate. I remind the House that I might
still technically have an interest.
I return to just one issue that I raised at our last
defence debate about the need for a large-scale overseas
deployment exercise. That is where a division with at least
two brigades is moved along a land line of communication of
at least 500 kilometres and then the two brigades are
manoeuvred around the area of operations. In other words,
how do we know that our aspiration to be able to deploy at
divisional level against a peer opponent is realistic?
Computer-simulated or assisted exercises are no substitute.
The British Army’s deployment on Exercise Saif Sareea in
2001 significantly improved the outcome of Operation Telic
1. Vital lessons were learned about equipment capability
and hygiene in desert conditions.
We still have a fabulous officer corps and we should be
proud of them. However, while they may be experienced in
very difficult and complex operations, they are not
experienced in large-scale deployments, moving brigades
around the area of operations. That is a serious weakness.
Unlike many Armed Forces, we maintain a comprehensive
capability and can deal with most threats. Most
importantly, our capabilities are balanced—a strength that
many overlook or are unaware of. But, to be a bit
Rumsfeldian, there are known weaknesses, of which the staff
are aware and are taking a known, calculated risk. The
maritime patrol aircraft would be a good example. The risk
has now become so unacceptable that something has been done
about it. But there are also unknown, or at least
unacknowledged, weaknesses. I hope your Lordships will
forgive me if I forget about the sexy G3 stuff and produce
a boring and, I hope, fictitious G4 example. I do not know
whether my illustrative example is real, but neither does
the Minister.
Take, for instance, a rough-terrain container handling
truck. This equipment is absolutely mission-critical to the
logistic operation. It is very low population, especially
in theatre, it is expensive and it requires specialist
equipment to move it around because it is rather large and
awkward, but it is not immune to breakdown or operational
attrition. How can we be sure that we have enough of this
equipment and other types of specialist equipment,
especially if we have not tested its capability in
realistic conditions on exercise? It may well be that an
SO1 somewhere is well aware that we have too few, but
perhaps, given that there are two spare ones in depot, no
one really listens to the problem. It is unfortunate to
experience serious logistic problems on a deployment
exercise, but an absolute disaster on an operation. How can
we be sure that our logistics work if we do not test them
realistically?
Yes, such exercises cost money, but not very much compared
to the positive effect and benefits. If we do not
demonstrate the capability to deploy at large or even
medium scale, we still have the cost of having that
capability but without our opponents being deterred by our
conventional capability or our friends feeling that they
need our capability. We do not necessarily need to deploy
in strength in, say, the Baltic states if we can
demonstrate that we are able to deploy a potent capability.
Therefore I hope my noble friend will tell me that I am ill
informed if I believe that the forthcoming Exercise Saif
Sareea in the Middle East is to be a pathetic battle group
rather than a proper medium-scale deployment.
4.26 pm
-
(Lab)
My Lords, when the military capacity of a nation or an
alliance of nations becomes demonstrably inadequate, then
it serves not as a means of defence but as an encouragement
to the ambitions of its potential adversaries. Britain’s
military capacity is utterly inadequate to meet the threats
that are posed to us and our European allies by an
expansionist Russia. We have allowed our Armed Forces to
decline because for many years following the demise of the
Soviet Union we failed to perceive any major threats to our
security and that of our allies.
Nowadays, Vladimir Putin’s expansionist policies are posing
a threat to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania. Such expansionist policies were pursued by
Russia at the end of the Napoleonic era, when it annexed
what are now Ukraine, Finland, Belarus, Poland and
Lithuania. However, on Russia’s withdrawal from
participation in the First World War, the Bolsheviks, who
were eager for peace, signed away these possessions to
Germany and its allies in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. A
main agenda of post-revolutionary Soviet Russia was to
regain these lost territories. By the end of the Second
World War, it had achieved most of this and made further
acquisitions in eastern Europe. Most of these gains were
ceded at the end of the Soviet era.
I am recounting this history because it explains the
desires and intentions of Putin’s regime, which aims at
regaining lost territories and re-establishing Russian
imperial hegemony. A factor that affects the Baltic states
is the presence of large numbers of ethnic Russians. There
is preponderance of ethnic Russians in the northern part of
Estonia, close to the Russian border. Notwithstanding their
allegiance to Estonia, these people could provide a ready
pretext for a Russian annexation.
Wedged between Poland and Lithuania is the Russian enclave
of Kaliningrad, previously known as Königsberg and once
part of East Prussia, which nowadays has an exclusively
Russian population. The Baltic Germans of East Prussia, who
were the pre-war population, were expelled en masse at the
end of the war. Kaliningrad is now a heavily fortified
Russian base containing nuclear-capable Russian missiles
and probably much else besides of which we should be
fearful.
NATO is committed to defending the sovereignty of the
Baltic states. Britain has contributed 500 combat troops to
the region, to which it has also consigned four Typhoon
jets for periods of four months in the year. At any one
time, only two of these jets are operational. This
provision, together with the lesser contributions of our
NATO allies, does not constitute a realistic deterrent.
If the US were to disengage from NATO, as Donald Trump
proposes that it should, then Britain would be expected to
become a natural leader of the alliance. We are
ill-equipped for such a role. The leader of the Labour
party has proposed that, rather than sending troops to
defend the borders of the Baltic States, we should aim at
mutual demilitarisation. There could be no greater
encouragement to Russia to pursue its territorial
ambitions.
4.30 pm
-
(CB)
My Lords, not one member of the UK Armed Forces was killed
in operations in 2016, thankfully. It was the first time
since 1968 that no one had died, although sadly there were
deaths on exercises. And yet, as the noble Lord, Lord
Robertson, said with crystal clarity in his brilliant
opening speech—and I thank him for leading this debate—the
challenges that we face globally are, in his words, a
“bonfire of certainties”.
The head of the Defence Select Committee, , said that the last
time this country faced a threatening Russia as well as a
major terrorist campaign, the UK invested between 4.3% and
5.1% of GDP in defence. A measure of just how low our
expectations have fallen is that here we are celebrating
the minimum of 2%, and there are debates about how this 2%
is measured. He suggests that 3% would be a much better
level of spending. Does the Minister agree?
General Sir Richard Barrons, retired head of the UK’s Joint
Forces Command, said that we are “dangerously squeezed” in
manpower. Can the Minister confirm that there is a
shortfall of 22% in our Maritime Reserves and 12% in the
Army Reserves? As far as the Defence Medical Services are
concerned, we no longer have military hospitals and what
exists now is within the Queen Elizabeth Hospital
Birmingham—attached to the University of Birmingham medical
school, where I am proud to be chancellor of the
university. There is a shortage of medical doctors being
recruited, retained and motivated. Such undermanning has
led to a reliance on Reserve Forces, which are also
underrecruited. Can the Minister confirm this? This
negatively impacts our capability.
Sir Richard Barrons also said in 2016 that the UK and its
NATO allies had,
“no effective plan for defending Europe from a Russian
attack because of splits in the alliance”.
He said that, while Russia could,
“deploy tens of thousands of troops into NATO territory
within 48 hours, backed by warplanes and ships”,
NATO would take “months” to do that.
Professor Malcolm Chalmers of RUSI has said that the
overall capability in defence and diplomacy has been
severely restricted after Brexit. As we have heard before,
RUSI also said that the position we have held as number 2
in NATO for more than 60 years could be transferred to
another EU member to retain links to the EU. Can the
Minister give his view on that?
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Walker, spoke about the EU
army. We have had the best of both worlds being part of the
European Union. We are not in Schengen, we are not in the
euro, and we are not into any further integration. There is
no way we would have been into an EU army; it would have
been a bridge far too far. And yet, we have to acknowledge
that the peace for the last 70 years has not been because
of NATO alone; it has been because of the existence of the
European Union and NATO.
We are the fifth largest economy in the world—we were the
fifth largest economy in the world, but because of the
uncertainty the world sees before we leave the EU and the
devaluation of the pound, we are no longer fifth. India has
overtaken the UK as the fifth largest economy in the world
and will soon overtake the UK as the fifth largest defence
spender as well.
Can the Minister say whether we are doing enough in
furthering defence collaboration with universities,
particularly with regard to innovation and research? At
Birmingham we have a defence club. The noble Lord, Lord
West, has spoken there and the CGS General Sir Nick Carter
will be speaking there next week. Collaboration would help
with our strategic thinking and with our defence
manufacturing base. Manufacturing is still 10% of our GDP;
we must not lose that. The 2010 SDSR was
negligent—thankfully, the 2015 one was much better—as 2010
was all about means before ends.
I conclude on the covenant. We have had a debate on the
covenant. The covenant is wonderful; it is the promise that
we make as a people to our Armed Forces for the service and
sacrifice that they make. But are we doing enough to
publicise the covenant within the Army family, within the
troops, within the families, within the veterans and, most
importantly, with the public so that we never take the
Armed Forced for granted?
Finally, we are a strong soft power. We have oodles of soft
power, but that soft power is no good without the hard
power. The combination of those two makes Britain not a
superpower, but definitely a global power, and we must
never lose that.
4.35 pm
-
(Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Robertson for his
excellent introduction to this debate. I also take another
opportunity to thank him for his particularly distinguished
and longstanding service to this country and the
international community in the roles he has fulfilled. If
we are paying tributes, it is also right to take the
opportunity of this debate to put on record, without
qualification, our appreciation and gratitude to all our
service men and women and their families.
I have never been persuaded that percentages are a good
estimate of what is necessary and how things ought to be
done. It seems to me that we have to analyse very toughly
what the real threats and dangers are in the uncertain
future ahead, and then ask ourselves what we must do for
ourselves in that situation and for the collective
effort—the UN, NATO and the rest. That analysis is the
starting point. What are the real threats, dangers and
issues we face and what is necessary to meet them? We then
have to face up to the issue of cost. Of course, a stable,
secure and inclusive society in Britain is very much part
of our longstanding defence.
I suppose I have to declare an interest in that, way back
in the 1970s, I was Minister for the Navy, and I take a
particular interest in it. I am totally persuaded that in
the uncertain future ahead, the ability to deploy widely
across the world with independent operating platforms is
essential. Such platforms need the equipment and personnel
to operate from them. What is perhaps a challenge is that
the immense costs of our two carriers as currently planned
could end up as a trap, because we could become so
inflexible that we are not able to respond quickly and
adequately to the real issues that confront us. Hence, the
saga with the Type 45 destroyers is absolutely deplorable,
because of course they are essential to the defence effort.
I will just say this as well. We have been talking about
the essential availability of personnel and equipment, and
it is irresponsible and wicked to send our service men and
women into action unless we are confident about the ability
to provide the necessary quantity of personnel and
equipment. We also have a special duty of care and
responsibility to look to the young people we recruit. We
know that a disproportionate number of the young people
going into the armed services are going into the infantry
and that the attrition level in the infantry is higher than
in any other part of the services. We must take that point
very seriously indeed. We have spent hours in this House
debating the care of children and our responsibility to
them, and these people are very often children. We have a
duty of care and a responsibility to them, just as great as
to anyone in society as a whole.
4.39 pm
-
(Con)
My Lords, first, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Robertson,
for his brilliant speech. A key factor that he commented on
is that percentages are meaningless. I am fed up hearing
about this famous 2%—it is the capabilities that really
matter. We had such a debate on 8 December. I re-read the
whole of the debate, which I had the honour to lead. Much
of it has been reiterated today. The noble Lord, Lord King,
brought up an issue that we spoke about before, and I
checked it out. Given that the key factor of government
following the Prime Minister’s kissing the Queen’s hand is
defence of the realm, it is absolutely ludicrous that we
have only had two hours of debate on this issue. I checked
with the Library and there has not been an open debate in
government time on this subject, with no time limit, in
anybody’s living memory. That is ridiculous and I ask the
Minister for that to be considered. Leaving myself to one
side, we have here so much experience and knowledge, and in
these dangerous times it is ludicrous that we do not have
such a debate.
This is a wealthy country. On the idea that somehow we have
not got the moneys and we ought to cut back, it depends how
we want to allocate it, which has been talked about. In
practice, of course, it could be allocated. The Treasury
does not have the last word about what does or does not
happen, any more than a finance director does in a company.
Following noble Lords’ comments earlier, if we get it
wrong, the public will never forgive us. I would put it
more strongly than that. If we get it wrong and the
leadership gets it wrong, that would be criminal, to use a
strong word—the idea that we cannot possibly have that sort
of support. Having said that, with courageous
leadership—and it is up to No. 10 and others to take note
of what we have talked about today—it can certainly be
done. We have said before that we need more moneys.
Unquestionably, the real figures are such that to meet even
the present programme we need at least another £2 billion a
year. Could it be found? Of course it could, if, as I said
before, it was said to the chiefs, “I want us to go on to a
war footing tomorrow morning”. Of course, they would do a
marvellous job, as I have said before, but we would be
putting them in a pretty difficult position.
I ask the Minister whether we can have a major debate in
due course. I will not go on; I have said it all before and
many noble Lords have said it today. There should be a
major debate on these subjects, in the interests of the
realm.
4.42 pm
-
(Lab)
My Lords, I congratulate and pay tribute to my noble
friend, Lord Robertson, on a masterly introduction to and
analysis of the current situation. It was a fitting
beginning to a very interesting debate. The noble Lord,
Lord Sterling, and I were both founding members of the
Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. A few
months ago that Committee reported and said that the Armed
Forces,
“will not be able to fulfil the wide-ranging tasks
described in the NSS & SDSR 2015 … with the
capabilities, manpower and funding”,
allocated. Doubtless, in half an hour’s time, the Minister
will tell this House that the Government spend so much
money that we are the fifth largest defence spender on the
planet and that we are one of only five NATO members that
spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. Both of course are
true; but a number of Members of this House, over the last
hour, have indicated that the 2% figure is not really what
it seems. As we know, it includes £820 million on war
pensions, £400 million on our United Nations peacekeeping
missions and £200 million for pensions for retired Ministry
of Defence civilian staff. For the very first time, it
includes spending on the single intelligence account and on
one-off items that cannot be counted towards the 2% in
years to come.
On top of that, it should be seen in the context of
so-called efficiency savings, which the noble Lords, Lord
King and Lord Reid, both referred to earlier, which are the
most nebulous things in government accounting. It is not
surprising to me that the Defence Committee of the House of
Commons said that this was “shifting the goalposts”, my
honourable friend , the shadow Secretary of
State for Defence, called it a “sleight of hand” and my
noble friend Lord Reid today has called it “creative
accountancy”. It is fiddling the figures a little, I
suppose, and I would be interested in the Minister’s
response on those points.
The 2% figure should not be a target: it should be a
minimum. That is the importance of it. In The House
magazine back in the autumn, this was written: “It was a
Labour Government who committed to the 2%, and a Labour
Government who were a founding member of NATO—every time
Labour have been in government, they have taken a
responsible view of defence”. Those words were written by
the current Conservative Secretary of State for Defence. He
was of course right and, despite the rather daft musings of
people in my leader’s office, I am sure that my noble
friend will also confirm
that this responsible view of defence is the view of the
.
4.45 pm
-
(CB)
My Lords, speaking as I do towards the end of a long list
of wise and knowledgeable contributors to this debate, I
run the risk of having little new to add and merely
repeating what has already been said with such eloquence by
others. But there is one important point that bears
additional emphasis because it is all too often
forgotten—or, if remembered, it is usually paid only lip
service. Throughout the history of warfare, surprise has
been one of the most critical factors in achieving success.
This may seem a statement of the obvious, but we should
bear in mind that our opponents and potential enemies also
recognise the importance of this dictum and, not
unnaturally, they will usually seek to surprise us. They
will also, if they are sensible, try to attack us where we
are weakest. We should therefore not expect to be able to
predict the location, timing or nature of any future
conflict.
Most past wars have surprised us to some degree, and we
have found ourselves inadequately prepared for the demands
that they make on us. This is not, or at least not
entirely, because of a lack of planning or foresight. The
future is to a degree not only unknown but unknowable, and
no amount of horizon scanning or scenario planning can make
up for that. I am not suggesting that such activities are
unnecessary; there are after all many facets of future
conflict that can and should be subjected to careful
analysis and for which we should prepare. One such example
is the increasing importance of the cyber domain, to which
several speakers have already referred, and on which I will
merely say I entirely agree with them.
However, we run the risk of persuading ourselves that
because we have new challenges we can forget about old
ones. Just because the cyber domain is such a promising
field for our enemies does not mean that we will never
again face a violent attack in the physical world. It does
not mean that our use of airspace above the battlefield
will never again be contested or that antisubmarine warfare
is a thing of the past. None of these, or similar,
propositions is safe. We must prepare for the future as
best we can, but we must also prepare to be surprised.
There is, however, an answer to this conundrum. The most
important capabilities that we will need in our Armed
Forces in the years ahead are the ones that have served us
so well in the past: agility and adaptability. In this
context, agility is our ability to use existing systems in
new and innovative ways, and adaptability refers to the
process of altering those systems quickly in order to meet
the unexpected and unforeseen.
The design and production lead times for weapon platforms
are long, and we have to do our best to match them with
future needs. At the same time, we must recognise that
something will come along that will surprise us, and make
allowances for this. We therefore need a broad spectrum of
capabilities that can be adapted rapidly to meet new
challenges as they arise and as they are recognised, and
the agility of mind, of doctrine and of training to employ
our capabilities as the situation demands, not just as we
have done in the past.
Finally, and as has been said frequently during this
debate, all of this requires investment—in equipment, in
research and development, in industries on which we rely
for our adaptability, and in our people. We are currently
doing a little better in this regard, but still not well
enough; there are danger signs on the horizon. The noble
Earl the Minister will no doubt point rightly to the
quality of our forces. Quality is indeed more important
than quantity, provided that we have lots of it. In this
uncertain and dangerous world there can be no greater
priority for the Government than matching our defence
investment to the high level of risk that we face.
4.50 pm
-
(LD)
My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for
the opportunity to engage in this discussion about the
future. I also acknowledge the work that our Armed Forces
carry out on our behalf, away from home and here in the UK,
day in and day out, with little or no complaint or
question. We also need to thank their families who are
their rock and their support. As a team, they are the best.
The picture is not particularly rosy. The current
international situation is becoming less stable and
predictable. The post-Cold War global order may be at risk.
Institutions such as NATO and the EU are weaker and global
threats to the UK are increasing. Russia has re-emerged as
a conventional and strategic antagonist. Right now all eyes
are on the US, but the President-elect needs to be our ally
and we should be his.
Unconventional terrorist threats continue, requiring
international co-operation. In addition, climate change and
mass migration are growing issues, which may effectively be
tackled only multilaterally. Within this context, our Armed
Forces do not currently have the capability to address the
range of threats. Spending is down across NATO and the UK
conventional Armed Forces are the smallest in the P5—and,
of course, there is the Brexit factor to consider, which
reduces our buying power.
Technologically and in terms of equipment, we do not
necessarily hold an advantage. To ensure that the UK is
able to insure itself in an unstable world, while promoting
stability, trade and liberal values overseas, we must do
everything possible to preserve and build our alliances and
international institutions, while re-evaluating current
defence policy in light of fast-changing global
circumstances. New strategies should be developed to stay
ahead of adversaries, not a commitment to fighting
yesterday’s war.
In a globalised world, the UK Armed Forces will need the
ability to deploy rapidly and take quick and parallel
action across the globe. There is also a need to have
sufficient conventional capabilities to be able to respond
to any situation without having to resort to nuclear
deterrence—short of course of the threat of nuclear attack.
The rise of hybrid warfare, cyberattacks on western
interests and large-scale online assaults on allied
nations’ systems mean that cyberspace should be considered
an additional, non-kinetic strategic space. Informational
systems and institutions must develop resilience against
cyberattacks and the effects of anti-satellite warfare.
Lawfare—the strategy of using law rather than traditional
means to achieve an operational objective—is likely to be
used more prominently.
On a more specific level, the UK must retain the ability to
respond to any Russian attempt to test NATO’s commitment to
Article 5 defence of the Baltics and other allied countries
and interests in a resolute but proportionate way. To
preserve the domestic and global economy, the UK must have
the ability to ensure safe and open trading routes across
the global commons, especially in the South China Sea and
the Arabian Gulf.
The challenges faced by the UK are global, and require
close co-operation with allies. These include the ongoing
threat of foreign-initiated and foreign-inspired domestic
terrorism, global terrorism, the migrant and refugee
crises, climate change, and countering piracy. UK
deployments of the early 21st century have largely been
asymmetrical conflicts, with elements of peacekeeping,
counterterror and nation building. UK defence policy may
have focused on specialising in this operational
environment at the expense of other capabilities. It should
be reassessed in the light of future conflicts and not only
in the light of counterterror operations.
In 2015, our defence spending was equivalent to about £46.5
billion, or 2.05% of GDP. In 2015-16, 56,860 UK Armed
Forces members were deployed around the world. In April
2016, the number of regulars was 151,000, with 84,000
reserves—the smallest force of the UNSC P5. This was a
reduction on the previous year.
Just before Christmas, General Sir Richard Barrons produced
a private memorandum for the Secretary of State for Defence
criticising the state of UK defence policy. Some of the key
criticisms were that the MoD was working to “preserve the
shop window” while critical technical and logistical
capabilities had been “iteratively stripped out”. Sir
Richard said that there was no military plan to defend the
UK in a conventional conflict. He wrote:
“Counter-terrorism is the limit of up-to-date plans and
preparations to secure UK airspace, waters and territory …
There is no top to bottom command and control mechanism,
preparation or training in place for the UK armed forces”,
to defend home territory. I would add that recruitment is
sluggish at best, in particular in specialists and
engineers, both regulars and reserves. I would expect the
MoD to be defensive about the letter, but I am sure that
many will see a grain or two of truth in it.
So what might the future look like? We should by then have
cemented our defence relationships with key EU states, for
security as much as defence. The challenges faced by the UK
are global and require close co-operation with allies.
These include the ongoing threat of foreign-initiated and
foreign-inspired domestic terrorism, global terrorism and,
as I mentioned, the migrant and refugee crises and
countering piracy. More specifically, the UK must retain
the ability to respond to any attempt to test NATO’s
commitment to Article 5 defence of the Baltics or other
Allied countries.
When the 2020 SDSR team sits down to start its planning, it
will need to look at our defence policy in the light of
possible future conflicts—which I have highlighted—and not
only in the light of counterterror operations. With a
clearer idea of our economy in the post-EU world, there may
be a need to review our expenditure commitments in 2015
against the pressure to spend more.
What could be done to mitigate some of these issues?
Investment in research and development. Falling behind
adversaries in terms of numbers or spending may be fine if
the UK is ahead technologically but will be a disaster if
it is outnumbered and outgunned. The US invests a huge
amount of money in its defence research programmes. We need
to increase our work in conjunction with both universities
and the private sector. The defence industry should become
a sizeable part of the soon-to-be-published industrial
strategy.
Perhaps we should consider less future spending on
enormously expensive pieces of equipment. Our adversaries
have only to knock out one, with comparatively cheap
munitions, to hurt us enormously. We should spend more on
equipment and forces prepared for a range of scenarios up
to and including large-scale mobile warfare. Alliances for
intelligence need to be secured. We need to review and
increase cyber defences and technologies. This will help to
deter our opponents and ensure that military forces can be
deployed with maximum effect and efficiency. We still need
more efficient procurement. The UK has smaller physical
capabilities than comparable countries but spends more
money on defence.
We were top of the soft power league both in 2010 and 2015.
This position was deserved and in our current situation is
no bad thing, but we need to use our diplomatic and soft
power wisely to ensure that our allies take defence
seriously. Collective self-defence is cheaper and more
secure than all the alternatives.
5.00 pm
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(Lab)
My Lords, like others, I must commend my noble friend
for
securing this debate and for the manner in which he
introduced it.
The title of the debate is most apt and highly relevant in
today’s world. Change is sweeping the globe. People’s
long-held views are changing, populism is in the ascendency
and many political predictions have turned out to be false.
However, in defence terms, we have always to be ready for
any eventuality. We may be drawn into a conflict tomorrow
and need to question whether we are prepared. I would like
to spend a few minutes painting a picture of our defence
capability as I see it.
My noble friend Lord Reid pointed out that we now have an
Army smaller than the one we put in the field against
Napoleon. The Navy has just 19 escorts, six of which have
propulsion problems. We have no aircraft carriers and will
have none until early 2020s. There are currently only seven
RAF fighter squadrons, but two of those exist only by
extending the life of the Typhoon until 2040. More, in an
Answer to a Question from my noble friend , the Government revealed
that a third of our Typhoon and Tornado aircraft are in
long-term maintenance and unable to fly. We have no marine
patrol aircraft while the Russians increase their submarine
activity around our seas. There is an overdependence on
recruiting reservists and, despite millions being spent on
recruitment, targets for all three services have been
missed. Morale is poor. Fifty-four per cent of service
personnel are dissatisfied with service life. This is made
worse for the Army. A report by the National Audit Office
on accommodation stated that poor housing was affecting
morale, recruitment and retention.
The failings that I have identified are not the
responsibility of our Armed Forces but rather the
consequences of the Government’s policy of cuts,
mismanagement and poor forecasting. I am sure that the
Minister will dispute this, but the concerns and criticisms
expressed across the House cannot be ignored and will not
go away.
One thing that we can all agree on in this House it is that
the service men and women in our Armed Forces are committed
professionals and the best in the world. They are the best
trained, the most highly motivated and very effective at
what they do. But we have to make sure they remain so. That
means that we have to make sure that our Armed Forces are
adequately funded.
Two challenges face us: more investment and better use of
current resources. Without that investment, we will not
meet the challenges posed to NATO, the challenges posed by
Russia—which has invested millions in modernising her
weaponry—and the challenges posed by the growing sea power
of China, not to mention the terrorist threat.
NATO remains the bedrock of our defence and is essential
for ensuring the security of Britain and our allies at a
time of increased global instability. Notwithstanding spin
doctors, that is the official policy of the . So I welcome the
Government’s commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence.
However, I have to stress that that is a minimum spend.
During the 13 years of the previous Labour Government, we
averaged a spend of 2.3% of GDP on defence.
The second challenge is better management of our resources.
HMS “Ocean”, essential to providing amphibious capability,
had a £65 million refit completed in 2014 only for the
Government to announce one year later that she would be
decommissioned in 2018. We will now spend £60 million
adapting one of our new carriers to perform its tasks. RFA
“Diligence” is our only at-sea repair ship. Between 2007
and 2015, the Government spent £44 million on refits only
to put the vessel up for sale last year. This is an
appalling waste of scarce defence resources. We have to
find more money for our Armed Forces, but we certainly have
to manage better the resources that we already have.
Since this Government took office in 2010, defence has
faced severe cuts. On these Benches, we think that that is
enough. From the ’s point of view, my
colleague, the shadow Defence Secretary, , has announced a major
review of defence spending. My noble friend Lord Murphy
spoke about the 2% spending on defence, referring to the
comments recently made by . I share her concern
that the present spending of 2% includes £825 million of
war pensions, £400 million on UN peacekeeping and an
estimated £200 million on pensions paid to retired civil
servants. She said:
“Pensions are very important but they in no way contribute
to … defence capabilities”.
Faced with a potential aggressor, how will the Government
use pensions to defend Britain? Perhaps, like some
latter-day Ethelred the Unready, they could use the
pensions to buy off the threat.
I conclude my remarks by raising one major concern, which
others around the House have also raised: the threat posed
by a resurgent Russia—a Russia skilled in the use of
cyberwarfare, because warfare is what it is, and a Russia
that has one big and possibly critical advantage, as
pointed out in a Times article on 22 December, written by
Edward Lucas, in its President, Vladimir Putin. He wrote:
“Putin is decisive; we are not. He is willing to accept
economic pain; we are not. He is willing to break the
rules; we are not. He is willing to use force; we are not”.
I share Lucas’s concern that we may not be able to rely on
the United States to help defend us in the future.
President-elect Trump unsettles many of us—as he reassures
some who are not our friends—with his pronouncements about
Russia, NATO and the defence of Europe. In the past few
years we have seen the Russian willingness to create
problems and conflicts even on its own borders. The
Russians then suggest mediation to mitigate and divert
attention from the cause of the problem—Russian aggression
in the first place. When they propose mediation, we in the
West get excited because Russia appears to be co-operating
in providing a solution—a solution to a problem that they
created. We cannot secure world peace and security by
pretending that an aggressor is not an aggressor and hoping
that sanctions alone will be enough to prevent further
incursions.
We in Britain, NATO and the West have to make it clear that
the cost of aggression is a price too much to bear because,
like it or not, in order to deter we have to be able to
threaten. We are an island people with a proud history of
defending freedoms. We are an international trading nation
relying on keeping open the shipping lanes of the world to
our commerce. We are on the verge of a major shift in our
relations with our nearest neighbours in Europe. We face
major threats from terrorists who will commit acts of war
against our own people here in Britain. And we face
state-sponsored cyberattacks. The phrase “We face an
uncertain future” may be overused but, my God, it is most
relevant today.
I readily confess to making some party political points in
today’s debate because that is the right thing to do when
we have such clear differences between the Government and
Opposition, but I passionately believe that there is one
issue that unites us all in this House: we want to continue
to enjoy our freedoms and our British way of life. But to
do that we have to be prepared to invest more in our
defence.
5.08 pm
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe)
(Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson,
for tabling this Motion, and appreciate the obvious wisdom
that he brought to it. I also warmly thank all noble Lords
and noble and gallant Lords who have contributed to this
important debate so powerfully.
It has been said repeatedly in this House in recent times,
and it is undoubtedly true, that the world is a more
dangerous and uncertain place today than it has been for
many years. Despite encouraging advances, the threat from
Daesh remains substantial. Russia, as noble Lords have
said, continues to show its force through both conventional
and novel means. New theatres of conflict, most notably
cyber, demand new and complex capability. And the
transition to a new US Administration has been seen by some
as an opportunity to question, perhaps even attempt to
undermine, the role of the rules-based international order.
In the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic
Defence and Security Review, we wrote:
“The world is changing rapidly and fundamentally”.
We cannot claim to have foreseen the seismic political
events of the past 12 months, but we recognised the
uncertainty and volatility characterising our current era
and we conducted our analysis and reached our conclusions
accordingly. I align myself with the noble and gallant
Lord, , in this area: no
Government can predict the future, but we can prepare for
the unpredictable. The SDSR presents a clear plan for doing
precisely that.
I remind the House of the four most pressing challenges to
UK defence and security, as identified in 2015: first, the
increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and
instability; secondly, the resurgence of state-based
threats and intensifying wider state competition; thirdly,
the impact of technology, especially cyber threats; and
finally, the erosion of the rules-based international
order, making it harder to build consensus and tackle
global threats. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, rightly
warned us against complacency. We cannot be complacent
about recent developments in our strategic context, but I
am confident that this list of challenges is as accurate
today as it was just over a year ago, and that the plan we
have constructed to respond to them stands up to scrutiny.
In the context of enduring change and uncertainty, two
principles must be central to our response. First, we must
plan to be adaptable: the threats we face are varied and
diffuse, and we must be ready to respond rapidly and
effectively however and wherever they become manifest.
Secondly, we must strengthen and deepen our international
partnerships and alliances: now more than ever we must
place an international approach at the heart of all of our
defence and security plans. I will address both of these in
turn.
Noble Lords will by now be familiar with the vision set out
in the SDSR for Joint Force 2025. We start from the firm
foundation of already world-leading Armed Forces. In 2010,
however, the Government rightly optimised our forces around
the ability to conduct a single, medium-sized, enduring
operation, of the sort we were familiar with from Iraq and
Afghanistan. Today we face a wider range of more complex
tasks and more sophisticated potential adversaries. Joint
Force 2025 has therefore set us on a path towards Armed
Forces that are more agile, versatile and deployable than
ever before.
We cannot plan with certainty for a discrete type and size
of operation, so we must plan for flexibility. Joint Force
2025 will have the capability and skill mix required to
conduct a wide range of complex operations concurrently,
from deployments on the scale of the current counter-Daesh
mission to more specialist operations, support for
humanitarian assistance, and training and capacity-building
with international partners. Furthermore, at the heart of
Joint Force 2025 is the ability to deploy a highly capable
expeditionary force of around 50,000. That is a step change
in our ambition from the “best effort” deployment of 30,000
planned for in the 2010 SDSR. It will fully prepare us for
the most substantial challenges to our national security,
including a call to war fighting under NATO Article 5.
Increased agility and versatility increases our security.
It sends a powerful message of deterrence to our
adversaries, and lets our allies and partners know that we
are willing and able to tackle our shared problems side by
side. This point cannot be over-emphasised in the wake of
last year’s referendum. We may be exiting the European
Union, but—as I made clear in our defence debate before
Christmas—we are neither withdrawing from Europe nor
turning our back on the world. On the contrary, I assure my
noble friend Lord King, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, and
the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, that NATO will continue to
be at the heart of UK defence policy, and we will remain a
strong and influential European voice on the world stage.
That leads me to our second strategic imperative: the need
to strengthen and deepen our international partnerships and
alliances. In the SDSR, we wrote that our defence policy
and plans will be “international by design”. Our interests
are inextricably linked to global security and prosperity,
and we will continue to play a leading role in protecting
global stability. We cannot, and do not, hope to do this
alone. It is not just a policy choice but a necessity that
we become more deliberate in our international approach
across all defence activity. We will build an international
dimension into defence planning from the outset.
In practice, that means strong, strategic bilateral and
multilateral relationships. The noble Lord, , was right. This
begins with our closest allies—the United States, France
and Germany. The US remains our pre-eminent partner for
defence and security, and interoperability is at the heart
of our relationship. Building on the Lancaster House
treaty, we will further deepen our collaboration with
France on capability, operations, science and technology,
and counterterrorism. Germany shares our aspiration to
expand our partnership on defence and security, and we will
do so across all areas of defence.
But that is not where it ends. The UK will work to
strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships across
the globe. We will build and sustain alliances and
partnerships through a more comprehensive approach to
defence engagement, which is now a funded core task for the
Ministry of Defence. We will build and strengthen combined
international military formations, whether with NATO or
with partners and allies further afield.
I mentioned interoperability. That is being developed all
the time. NATO remains the key vehicle for maintaining an
integrated and interoperable military force, and we will
work with alliance members to train and exercise together,
and to share doctrine, tactics and procedures. We will also
continue to develop collaborative capabilities with our key
allies wherever there is an opportunity to share expertise
and cost in the development of new defence technology.
Taken together, and supported by the Government’s global
defence and diplomatic network, this will allow us to build
coalitions throughout the world in the pursuit of shared
interests and in support of the rules-based international
order.
Strengthening our Armed Forces and employing a
comprehensive international approach to defence is the plan
set out in SDSR 2015, and the Government stand by it.
However, a plan is nothing without action, so I shall just
outline briefly the significant progress that has been
made. First, the ambitious plans for Joint Force 2025 are
in train. The innovative 77th Brigade has reached initial
operating capability; work has now begun on the first
Dreadnought-class submarine; the first of our new aircraft
carriers, HMS “Queen Elizabeth”, will begin sea trials this
year; design and manufacture will begin on Crowsnest, the
early-warning system for the helicopters that will protect
the new carriers; RFA “Tidespring” will arrive in the UK in
the spring for customisation; the contract has been signed
to purchase nine P8 maritime patrol aircraft; and July 2016
saw the delivery of the RAF’s 14th and final Voyager
aircraft for air tanking and transport. We are already
delivering.
Internationally, we have also done a lot to demonstrate our
commitment to working with allies and partners. My noble
friend Lord King referred to the vulnerability of the
Baltic states, as did my noble friend and the noble
Viscount, . That is exactly
why we have agreed to deploy a battalion to Estonia in the
spring and an infantry company to Poland in support of the
United States, strengthening NATO’s enhanced forward
presence. We are also deploying UK fighter aircraft to
contribute to the NATO southern air policing task in
Romania.
I understand my noble friend proposing that we
should try to hasten the deployment of UK forces to the
Baltics. I was at the ARRC headquarters at Innsworth
yesterday and can reassure him that plans for the
deployment are well advanced. A careful judgment has been
made and it is felt to be well worth ensuring that our
forces are comprehensively trained and equipped prior to
deployment. I am sure that my noble friend would agree with
that.
It is not surprising that defence spending has formed a
major theme of this debate. A number of noble Lords
referred to the Government’s commitment to spend 2% of GDP
on defence in every year of this Parliament. We should not
downplay that; nor should we draw what appear to be very
easy comparisons. Comparing like with like is, I suggest,
flawed reasoning because the nature of defence spending
inevitably changes over time. In the past, we have reported
significantly more operational spend, such as during
operations in Afghanistan. That has changed. New threats
also require new spending. We have not historically
included any spend on cyber. Therefore, it is right that,
from time to time, like all NATO allies, we ensure that we
are capturing all appropriate spend, and I emphasise that
all adjustments are fully in accordance with NATO
guidelines.
The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, warned that we should not
confuse percentages with capability—and he is absolutely
right. He asked the right question: have we retained the
power to act? The SDSR laid out a clear and affordable
strategy for delivering one of the most capable armed
forces in the world, including an expeditionary force, as I
have said, of 50,000 by 2025; £1.9 billion in cyber
investment; new capabilities for special forces; and a
commitment to spending more than £178 billion on equipment
and equipment support—more than in previous plans.
I do not accept the accusation of creative accounting. I
will just say to the noble Lord, Lord West, that defence
spending is going up. When defence spending will increase
by £5 billion over this Parliament, it is nonsense for
anyone to suggest that there is no new funding. I hope that
my noble friend Lord Sterling, the noble Lord, Lord Murphy,
and others will be at least somewhat reassured to be
reminded of that figure.
The noble Lord, , the noble Baroness,
Lady Jolly, and other noble Lords spoke about manpower,
particularly that of the Army. It is true that ensuring
efficiency was a driver in force design in 2010, as it was
in 2015. However, strategic rationale was the primary basis
for the figure of 82,000 regular Army personnel. The figure
was based on an assessment of the type, frequency and
concurrency of tasks that the Army will be required to
conduct. Future Force 2020 described a move away from
enduring stabilisation and towards a more adaptable
posture. Joint Force 2025 builds on that principle,
increasing the adaptability of all the services, including
the Army.
The noble Lord, , rightly emphasised
the threat from Russia. We are not complacent about Russian
behaviour or capabilities. We remain fully committed to
NATO, as I have emphasised, and to our European partners,
with whom we will deter threats across a wide spectrum in
order to protect our people. NATO has developed a readiness
action plan that gives it the tools needed to respond to
short-notice or no-notice incidents in order to protect and
defend alliance territory.
I understand the call by the noble Lords, Lord West and
, for more platforms
for the Royal Navy. The Government share that desire. Not
only is our fleet set to grow for the first time since
World War II, but its high-end technological capabilities
will allow it to provide a better contribution and to
retain a first-class navy up to 2040 and beyond. We will
maintain a destroyer and frigate fleet of at least 19 ships
and look to increase that number by the 2030s, as has been
mentioned; and I am sure that we can all take pride in the
fact that the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carriers will be
coming into service.
The fleet will also be supported by a very capable and
renewed tanker fleet. A fleet of up to six offshore patrol
vessels will support our destroyers and frigates in
delivering routine tasks and will enhance our contribution
to maritime security and fisheries protection. I can
reassure the noble Lord, Lord West, that the in-service
date of the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier has not
slipped, and nor are there any plans for the Prince of
Wales, the second carrier, to be mothballed.
The noble Baroness, Lady Dean, criticised my right
honourable friend the Prime Minister and questioned her
interest in defence. I respectfully reject that criticism.
The Prime Minister has a close and abiding interest in
defence. Indeed, one of the visits she made as Prime
Minister was to the MoD headquarters to speak with the
service chiefs. She has also visited our service personnel
around the world, including recently on board HMS Ocean in
the Gulf.
My right honourable friend is also well aware of the need
to invest in security across the piece. That brings me to
the subject of cyber, which was rightly emphasised by the
noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, among others. Cybersecurity
is vital to defence. As she said, our adversaries present a
real and rapidly developing threat to our networks, systems
and platforms. We are enhancing our cyber defence
capabilities through the development of the Cyber Security
Operations Centre. As I also mentioned, £1.9 billion will
be invested in cyber across government over five years. We
are ensuring that our Armed Forces are able to project
power in cyberspace, are ready to assist in the event of a
significant cyber incident and can respond to a cyberattack
as they would to any other attack using whichever
capability is most appropriate. We are building a dedicated
capability to counterattack in cyberspace as part of our
full-spectrum capability. Defence is delivering this
capability in partnership with GCHQ through the national
offensive cyber programme.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Walker, rightly criticised
the concept of an EU army. I hope that I can reassure him
by saying that no one is seriously proposing that idea.
Despite the rhetoric and speculation that we have all read,
we have seen nothing to suggest that any major European
country wants an EU army. The joint letter published by the
ministries of defence of Germany, France, Italy and Spain
explicitly ruled that out, and we will continue to resist
any EU initiative that risks undermining or duplicating
NATO’s central role in European defence.
The noble Lord, , called for greater
collaboration with universities. I understand and agree
with his point. Our innovation initiative has included the
horizon-scanning unit known as IRIS, which will forge close
ties with the academic community.
My noble friend Lord Attlee asked about the robustness and
resilience of our logistics systems, the importance of
which he rightly stressed. I can reassure him that we have
the strategic base and associated enablers to underpin SDSR
25 and its wide capabilities. I will write him with an
answer to his question on exercise Saif Sareea.
The noble Lord, , raised several
issues relating to the Royal Navy. In terms of investment
and manpower, the Royal Navy attracted significant
investment as a result of the SDSR, as he well knows. With
regard to new assault ships, we currently have no plans to
commission any. On the matter of our use of landing craft,
HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark provide the capability needed to
deploy and sustain the lead commando group ashore, by air
and sea. They will remain in service until the end of the
next decade.
The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, raised issues of conflict
prevention and peacekeeping. I have mentioned the
Government’s intention to be international by design. That
is in no small part motivated by the principle of conflict
prevention: by working more closely with allies and
partners we strengthen our shared ability to prevent
conflict and ensure our own security. I can tell the noble
Earl that we are increasing our contribution to UN
peacekeeping operations in South Sudan, Somalia and Kosovo,
we are continuing to support CSDP missions, and we are
fully committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
My time is up. I shall write to those noble Lords whose
questions I have not addressed. I hope that it is clear
that the Government fully recognise the breadth and
severity of threats that face our country today. We know
that in this era of uncertainty we can take nothing for
granted. The approach that we have taken in the SDSR is the
right one for strengthening our defence and security, and
it is the one to which this Government are fully committed.
5.28 pm
-
It is difficult to mount any form of attack on the noble
Earl who is so gentle and so apparently reasonable that we
are all disarmed at the end. But there is a long-standing
belief that no plan survives the first engagement with the
enemy. Since the SDSR was published last year, we have had
the Brexit referendum, with profound implications for the
direction of British defence policy.
Secondly, Donald Trump has been elected as President of the
United States of America, with all the statements that he
has made about NATO undermining, in many ways, a lot of the
solidarity that is there. So there is a genuine reason for
looking at SDSR 2015, if only to look at the activities of
President Putin now that he is a major player in the Middle
East.
I asked a question in the middle of my speech which the
noble Earl may have missed. What will be the cost of the
devaluation on the defence budget? Perhaps he could write
to me.
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The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Stedman-Scott) (Con)
My Lords, the time allotted for this debate has now elapsed
and I must put the Question. The Question is that this
Motion be agreed to.
Motion agreed.
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