Delivered at the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of
Governors, March 2026.
"Chair,
The Director General's report describes an increasingly bleak
nuclear safety situation in Ukraine. Russia's ongoing attacks on
Ukraine's energy system remain the driving cause for this
deterioration.
As a direct result, Ukraine's nuclear facilities now face an
unprecedented level of risk far beyond anything foreseen in their
original design or safety planning.
These are not abstract dangers. The report documents repeated
damage to the grid infrastructure nuclear plants rely on to
remain safe — power lines, switching systems, and substations.
Agency teams reported grid instability, the disconnection of
multiple power lines, automatic reactor shutdowns, and forced
power reductions across all of Ukraine's operating nuclear power
plants (NPPs).
These attacks strike at the heart of nuclear safety. Electrical
substations and transmission nodes are not peripheral assets;
they are the critical interface that keeps cooling, monitoring
and safety systems powered.
Between October and February alone, Ukraine endured 21 waves of
air attacks on its substations.
The DG's report sets out the cumulative effect: destroyed
transformers, crippled switching systems, and substations
operating at the bare minimum of transit capacity. Repairs are
not keeping up with the pace of Russian destruction, despite the
heroic efforts of Ukraine's energy workers.
Every Russian strike against the grid chips away at nuclear
safety. The grid becomes a patchwork, unstable, and far more
likely to fail when reactors need it most. The situation is so
fragile that a single event — as seen on 31 January — can
simultaneously disconnect multiple power lines and trigger
automatic reactor protections across the country. Pretending this
is insignificant is simply not credible.
Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia NPP (ZNPP) illustrates the consequences.
Two more losses of off-site power occurred during the reporting
period, bringing the total since the conflict to twelve.
Emergency diesel generators were forced to take over – machines
designed for short-term backup, not repeated front line use.
At times Russia appears to understand this is an issue. As the
IAEA reports, Russia's so-called “licenses” require ZNPP's Units
1 and 2 to remain shut down until off-site power is stabilised.
Yet Russia continues to create the conditions that destabilise
off-site power. Even its own illegitimate documents contradict
its actions.
This Board's repeated calls for Russian restraint – including
most recently in January this year have not been heeded. Instead,
Russia has continued to display its contempt and allowed these
serious risks to increase - risks which Russia could remove by
ceasing its attacks.
We are now more than four years into Russia's invasion and four
years since its illegal seizure of ZNPP. It is imperative that
this Board strengthens its collective resolve and acts decisively
to uphold nuclear safety and security. We support the resolution
introduced by Canada and the Netherlands and urge all Board
members to vote in favour.
Thank you, Chair."
