Politico-Military Counsellor, Ankur Narayan, recalls
Russia's pattern of reassurance without transparency and refusal
to engage OSCE risk‑reduction mechanisms before its full‑scale
invasion of Ukraine - and calls on Russia to explain what
practical steps it is now prepared to take to reduce escalation
risks and prevent miscalculation.
Thank you, Madam Chair. The United Kingdom's approach in this
Forum is consistent: to hold each other to account against shared
OSCE commitments, such as calling for Russia to end its illegal
war of aggression in Ukraine. The UK has also used this Forum to
manage risks and prevent unintended escalation.
Last Summer, Russia's actions raised acute risks of
miscalculation, including through incursions into the airspace of
NATO Allies. In response, the UK used this Forum to ask Russia
clear, practical questions about responsibility, intent, and
steps to prevent recurrence. This was not for show. It was
because the FSC is one of the few places designed for precisely
these exchanges.
Our experience in early 2022 shows why escalation management
matters. On 26 January 2022, Russia briefed the FSC on a
voluntary basis about its joint “Union State” military exercise
with Belarus. Russia asserted: “The number of participants in the
exercise and the number of major weapon systems covered by the
Vienna Document 2011 do not exceed the threshold subject to
notification defined in it”.
When participating States continued to raise concerns in the
Forum, Russia did not engage constructively. On 2 February 2022,
Russia labelled concerns, about a “imminent Russian invasion of
Ukraine”, as “hysteria” and said: “Russia has stated at the
highest level that we have no plans to ‘invade' Ukraine.”
When participating States triggered the Vienna Document's
risk‑reduction provisions to reduce uncertainty and prevent
miscalculation about the extraordinary troop buildup, Russia was
absent from all the mandated meetings. Russia even sent an F41
notification during the joint FSC-PC to accuse Ukraine of
“deflecting the OSCE State members' attention away from an armed
solution of the internal Ukraine conflict”.
Madam Chair, that sequence is precisely the kind of behaviour we
cannot afford to see repeated. One, reassurance without
transparency. Two, voluntary briefing without meaningful
risk‑reduction engagement. And three, the use of parallel
messaging while not answering questions being raised through OSCE
mechanisms.
This is why the UK continues to approach the FSC as a forum for
practical escalation management, and why we will continue to ask
questions that require clear answers. In 2025, the UK framed our
approach in the same way when seeking clarification from Russia
on airspace incidents. We asked what its intent was if incidents
were deliberate, and what steps Russia was taking to prevent
recurrence. We are still awaiting responses.
Today, mindful of the risks demonstrated in early 2022, we ask
Russia a forward‑looking, practical question:
Looking ahead, what practical steps is Russia prepared to take
within the OSCE framework to improve transparency and reduce the
risk of miscalculation arising from large‑scale or prolonged
military activities?
If the Russian delegation requires time to consult with Moscow to
provide an accurate response, we encourage it to do so. Credible
escalation management depends on accurate and genuine answers.
And on a demonstrated willingness to use risk‑reduction
mechanisms in good faith. Thank you Madam Chair.
