Chief of the Defence Staff's RUSI speech

Air Chief Marshal, Sir Richard Knighton, Chief of the Defence Staff annual lecture at the Royal United Services Institute

I want to start this evening by paying tribute to my predecessor – Tony Radakin. When he gave his first RUSI lecture as CDS he had been in the job just 7 days.  I have at least had just over 100 to think about what I am going to say. 

In almost 4 years as CDS Tony faced a period of dizzying change and complexity.  Two sovereigns, 4 Prime Ministers, war in the Middle East and, of course, war in Ukraine.  Throughout it all he steered the chiefs and defence with remarkable energy, determination and optimism.  I don't think there is anyone in a British uniform who has done more to support Ukraine and keep it in the fight. 

Those who know me and Tony will know that we have different styles, but on many matters of substance and philosophy we agree. So while the Whatsapp messages will definitely be shorter and there'll be fewer of them, there is much of his work that I will continue.

As I prepared for tonight, I studied Tony's lectures and those of his predecessors. ChatGPT and CoPilot helped speed up the process.  There is definitely a formula!  A manifesto is often the first lecture in the series and then context – whether it is Covid, an integrated review or war in Ukraine – context drives the content.

And if you really want to make a splash, you need to say something unexpected or previously classified as Stu Peach found almost 10 years ago when he talked for the first time about Russia's targeting of undersea cables.

My good friend, Fabien Mandon, the French chief of defence, also found this last month when he said in his speech to regional mayors that if France falters because it is not ready to accept losing its children or to suffer economically … then it is at risk.

This evening, I have no desire to shock, and as I talk briefly about my priorities as CDS – of readiness, people and transformation – I don't think any of these will come as a shock. But I also want to zoom out and use this opportunity to contribute to the same debate as my French opposite number.

The SDR made clear that long-term success depends on reconnecting society with the Armed Forces and the purpose of Defence, supported by a national conversation. I want to play a part in that conversation by talking about the risks we face and what that might mean for the nation.

As my wife says to me, you lot always say the same thing about the world being more volatile and uncertain and the UK facing greater threats.  She's right.  But at the same time as people like me are saying that, I hear from friends, family and people I meet, that Russia isn't really going to invade, is it?

The argument I want to make tonight is for a more sophisticated explanation of the risks we face.  Deterrence – at least for NATO has been working, but the threats and risks are growing.  

For three decades, many did not have to think about the Armed Forces.  Peace was stable. Conflict was distant.  But that is no longer true.

I will argue that the situation is more dangerous than I have known during my career and the price of peace is rising.  Our response needs to go beyond simply strengthening our armed forces.  It needs a whole of nation response that builds our defence industrial capacity, grows the skills we need, harnesses the power of the institutions we will need in wartime and ensures and increases the resilience of society and the infrastructure that supports it.

And I will argue that this is not just a responsibility for our nation, but this is also a historic opportunity. An opportunity to build national resilience, to foster skills and opportunities for our young people and foster a sense of national pride and purpose that has characterised our nation in times of conflict. A new era for defence doesn't just mean our military and government stepping up – as we are – it means our whole nation stepping up.

And to do that we all need to contribute to that national conversation and bring these issues into the mainstream, just as our allies in many countries in Europe have done.  

So, let me start with that all important context. There is a lot of it about: from the potential for peace in Ukraine to US security strategy, and instability in the middle east to colonels trying to overthrow governments in Africa.  It's always the colonels you have to watch out for!

I last spoke here about a year ago when I gave the Trenchard Memorial Lecture.  And yes, I did talk about uncertainty, volatility and the UK facing greater threats.

Since then, some things have changed. As well as me getting a new job…, the Government has brought forward its commitment to spend 2.5% of GDP on defence to 2027, published the SDR and the Prime Minister has stood alongside his fellow NATO leaders and committed to spend 5% of GDP on defence and security by 2035.

So, I find myself in a position that none of my predecessors during my career have faced, looking at the prospect of the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the end of the Cold War. 

That commitment tells me that the risks, and some of the costs, are clear to our leaders and those of us who have devoted our working lives to these matters. 

There are also signs that awareness and interest are permeating further through society with industry and business increasingly recognising the real geopolitical shift and the threats and opportunities it brings.  A member of my team told me that Sir Richard Barrons recently spoke at a City law firm, to a standing-room-only audience of their clients and lawyers, all eager to hear about his review and his analysis of the threats we face.  Even 2 years ago I am not sure that we would have seen that.

Yet at the same time, 85 years since the end of the Second World War, almost 35 years since end of the Cold War - and 65 years this month since the last National Service call-ups - most people in this country have no direct experience of the Armed Forces.  Over the last 30 years we have all become less accustomed to thinking about strategic threats and the risk of conflict between nations because to the majority of the public it hasn't really mattered.

Plenty of commentators, particularly the defence correspondents here tonight are working hard to raise understanding and awareness. Deborah Haynes's excellent wargame podcast series is a great example of that, but often when the debate does enter the mainstream or make headlines it is reduced to binary questions: are we safe or not; is a certain percentage of GDP enough and when do we need to be ready for a Russian invasion? 

While simple, bold statements and timelines can act as a rallying cry, the reality is that it is more complicated than that.  Last year Tony explained that our analysts argue that “there is only a remote chance of a significant direct attack or invasion by Russia on the UK”.  “Remote” in this context, still means an up to 5 per cent risk, and that only refers to the UK.   The world's largest crowd-sourced forecasting site, Metaculus, suggests there is a 16% probability Russia and any NATO member state are in direct conflict before 2027.

To put this in context, over the weekend the bookies were saying that there is a 4% chance of Liverpool winning the Premier league.  So even saying the chances are remote does not mean the chances are zero.

My point is that none of us can say with any certainty what the absolute risk might be. And even though simple binary statements might be easy for people to engage with, they risk instilling panic or complacency. 

What really matters is the trend.  Are the chances of conflict growing?

And here, I think the evidence is clear that the trend, from Russia in particular, is worsening, and that is the key argument for action.

The excellent military education I have received over the years has taught me that threat is a combination of capability and intent. 

Let me start with capability, because that is easier to measure and see. 

The Defence Secretary has spoken powerfully about some of threats very recently, not least in the context of the Russian ship, the Yantar, and its targeting of our and our allies' critical national undersea infrastructure. 

It is worth highlighting that this is more than a problem for Europe. These cables are a direct connection between the US and the Europe – this is a threat to all of our security.  

Every day as Blaise from MI6 said today, the UK is subject to an onslaught of cyber-attacks from Russia and we know that Russian agents are seeking to conduct sabotage and have killed on our shores.  But Russia's hard power is growing quickly. 

Over the past twenty years, Russia has delivered significant defence reform and investment into what were weak and hollowed-out armed forces.  The Russian armed forces are now more than 1.1 million strong, consuming more than seven per cent of GDP, and around 40 per cent of government spending, which is a sum that has more than doubled over the past decade. 

While I have argued that Russia's campaign in Ukraine has, so far, been a strategic failure with NATO bigger, more united, stronger and spending increasing amounts on rearmament, we should be under no illusions that Russia has a massive, increasingly technically sophisticated, and now, highly combat-experienced, military. 

I have talked to Oleksander Syrski – the head of the Ukrainian armed forces - about the increasing capability of the Russian tactical leaders he sees and the narrowing of Ukrainian advantage in the use of drones as Russia has learned from the conflict. 

Russia is also developing new and destabilising weapons systems such as nuclear-armed torpedoes and nuclear-powered cruise missiles putting nuclear weapons in space.

So it is absolutely clear that Russia's hard power is something to fear, but what about Russia's intent to use it? 

The war in Ukraine and Russia's track record shows Putin's willingness to target neighbouring states, including children and civilian populations.

The Russian leadership has made clear that it wishes to challenge, limit, divide and ultimately destroy NATO.

In former President Medvedev's words, aspiring to “the disappearance of Ukraine and the disappearance of NATO – preferably both”. 

Despite these clear indications, I am not sure that we yet feel this threat in the UK as acutely as many of our allies in Europe.  As the philosopher Nietzsche said, where we stand depends on where we sit.

I spoke recently to the Danish ambassador here in the UK.  Over the past few years she has served in Estonia, then Sweden and now in London. She described how viscerally the threat was felt in Estonia.  And then how she saw the issue grow in prominence when she was in Sweden. Now she is in London she has observed that these discussions are generally confined to people like us here tonight.

So these arguments can cut through. It is clear to our allies that the risk to NATO and to the UK from Russia is growing. 

Europe as a whole has more than doubled its spending on defence procurement since 2020.  Germany expects to spend 3.5% of GDP on Defence by 2029.  Poland is already at 4.2%.  And we have seen just in the past few weeks France and Germany return to a form of national service.

In reality, other than proximity, the threat in the UK isn't really any different to the threat in Germany, for example. 

Unless we are able to raise awareness and stimulate the conversation with society about the risks, we can't expect the rest of government, society and industry to act or bear the costs.  

But this can't just be a conversation about risk. We also have to explain how we should respond.

Our objective must be to avoid war.

However we choose to define the cost, whether that is in lives lost, misery or economic impact – war is enormously costly. And I know I don't need to tell this audience…that while the price of peace may be rising, the cost of strong deterrence is still far, far less than the cost of war.

Looking back in Britain's history before and during conflict, we see that in 1936 the UK's spending on defence was 2.9 per cent of GDP.  By 1939 it was 9% and by 1945 that had risen to 52 per cent, with wartime borrowing not repaid until 2006. 

So deterrence should be, and is, at the heart of our strategy. But deterrence is hard to measure, and it is really hard to answer the question “how much is enough”? 

In fact, it is almost impossible to answer that question, except in hindsight.  But if we get it wrong the cost could be huge. 

I am super clear that our armed forces are our first line of defence, and we need to be ready to fight and win. 

But the cost of getting it wrong is not just going to fall on those in uniform.  The impact of failure will not be on some - hopefully hypothetical - future battlefield, but on the infrastructure and economy that underpins our broader national life and that of our allies. 

We have to prepare to protect ourselves from an array of real, physical threats of growing sophistication. 

That's why we need what the SDR refers to as “a whole-of-society approach to deterrence and defence”, under which we must “build national resilience to threats … of an armed attack, through a concerted and collective effort…”.

Deterrence is also about our resilience as a nation to these threats, it's about how we make ourselves a harder target and harness all our national power … from universities to energy infrastructure, and manufacturing industry to the NHS.

It's about our defence and resilience being a higher national priority for all of us. An ‘all-in' mentality. And that will require people who are not soldiers, sailors or aviators to nevertheless invest their skills – and money – in innovation and problem solving on the nation's behalf.

Informing the public is a good start, but this is also about actively building, or rebuilding, defence capabilities and the national infrastructure that underpins our resilience.

This needs to engage industry, business, finance, the professions and education.   These are the innovators, the enablers and their institutional foundations that history tells us we will rely in war.

When I was writing this speech, I was rightly challenged about what a whole of society response means in practice for those in government, but particularly for families and households across the country.

So, let me have a go at describing some of what this might mean.

First, it means more people being ready to fight for their country. Fabien Mandon was right.

This is not just about the Regular forces, which will grow.  The SDR also envisages a major increase in the number of Active Reserves and cadets. 

The Reserves are crucial, as they enable us to retain the skills of those who leave the Regulars, but are still ready to serve. 

They also give us access to a profile of qualifications and experience, including from the high-tech industries and professions, which are not readily available in the Regular forces. 

And the Reserves are ambassadors for Defence in families and workplaces that will often have no direct connection with the Armed Forces.

Next, we have to build the capacity in industry to meet the demands in the UK and of our allies to re-stock and re-arm.

That means we need more capital to flow in to defence industry. I keep being told that there is plenty of private capital looking for a place to make a return, but progress in building this capacity across Europe has been painfully slow.  Part of the solution will be long-term and stable commitments on defence spending – like we saw at this year's NATO summit – and opportunities for investors to make greater returns.

Building this industrial capacity also means we need more people who leave schools and universities to join that industry.

So, we need defence and political leaders to explain the importance of the industry to the nation, and we need schools and parents to encourage children and young adults to take up careers in the industry.

And we simply need more people to develop the skills the defence industry needs.  Like STEM, digital and project management.

We also need to harness the power of those institutions that will rely make the difference in war.  Just as I have seen in Ukraine, where the cleverest minds from Ukrainian universities and industry are manipulating and exploiting technology to solve specific tactical problems and overcome the numerical and economic advantages Russia enjoys.  

That means making sure that the totality of the government's huge research and development investment portfolio – not just that done in defence – is shaped by considerations of defence and security.  Making the IP generated available right across government.

It means building the pathways and partnerships from universities to industry to the front line - just as I saw earlier this year in Strathclyde, and as set out in the defence industrial strategy.

It also means, I think, a duty both in the public sector and in private industry, to consider resilience in our planning and decision making on infrastructure. 

This is partly what the Readiness Bill that the SDR described must do.

But put simply, this is about living up to the Prime Minister's statement at the London Defence Conference this year where he said that defence must be “the central organising principle of government.”

To bring these ideas to life, let me give you a couple of examples.

Last week the Royal Academy of Engineering and National Engineering Policy Centre, wrote a report on “Reviving Our Ageing Infrastructure”.  This is the same infrastructure that would be targeted in war.  As the report said, at the moment, the system is too fragile, with many key components dating back to the Nineteenth Century, with failure of one node having far-reaching impacts. Now, if you ‘Control+F' ‘defence', you'll see that the report mentions defence 37 times, but every single mention is only in the context of flood defences!

I am proud to be an engineer and to be a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering.  From the Bailey Bridge to the bouncing bomb, it was British engineering talent and ingenuity that helped save the nation.  Today the Academy's President and Fellows are doing great work to support defence and security. 

But even here, resilience in a defence and security context is still not at the forefront of our minds. We need to change that so that as we design and build the new electricity grid for example, we build it with resilience from attack in mind. 

Despite all the work there is to do, there are places where we are making progress across government. I am delighted this evening to talk about the new scheme with the Department for Education for the creation of Defence Technical Excellence Colleges. 

This scheme will see five colleges in England gain specialist status and receive major new funding to train people in the skills needed to secure new defence jobs and help deliver the ambition set out in the SDR and the Defence Industrial Strategy. Speaking tonight, I get the opportunity to announce that applications are now open for colleges to be part of the scheme. 

We will also support thousands of short courses, providing the versatility that they – and we – need.  This is part of a much broader £182 million skills package that also includes regional STEM initiatives aimed at school age students, and a new apprenticeship and graduate clearing system.

I hope that what I have said goes some way to explaining what a whole of nation response might mean in practice. But we should also be honest that perhaps the most obvious impact on all of us will be the cost of building this resilience. 

Sons and daughters. Colleagues. Veterans. …will all have a part to play. To build. To serve. And if necessary, to fight. And more families will know what sacrifice for our nation means.

That is why it's so important we do explain the changing threat and the need to stay ahead of it.

We should also emphasise that there are opportunities too.  The ‘defence dividend', as some have called it, is real.  Investment in transformational technology and integrating it into our already world-renowned armed forces offers the opportunity to lead the way in a new and emerging markets, creating jobs and wealth for the country.

Now, I am very conscious that my focus this evening has been on what we need to do beyond the armed forces. 

But I would not want you to think that I am shirking my responsibilities as the head of the armed forces!

As I have said, I am clear that the country's first line of defence is the armed forces.  We need to be ready to deter, fight and win, today and tomorrow.

The SDR has given us our orders.  As it says, we are in a new era of threat and that demands a new era for UK Defence.  We need to end the hollowing out of our armed forces and lead in a stronger and more lethal NATO. 

It is this analysis that drives my 3 priorities of readiness, people and transformation.

Readiness is about our training, our stockpiles and simply how quickly we can respond. How we operate the force and how we demonstrate to our adversaries that we are ready, are major contributions to deterrence. 

And as to people, they are critical to the UK's operational “edge”.  Right now we don't have enough, and we know we will need new skills over time.

So we will need to stay laser focused on retention and recruitment in particular. 

There are really good signs.  There were over 100 thousand applications to join the armed forces last year. 

Retention is also better, with exit rates lower than historic norms. I'm pleased to say that the latest figures, just a few weeks ago, showed that for the first time in four years, more people joined than left the forces over the past year.  Improvements in pay, housing, career management and training will all help continue that progress.

But at the heart of any fighting force, Regular or Reserve, is its leadership and the culture that flows from it. There is brilliant leadership at every level of the armed forces, but we know that we still need to do better.  We know we have let some of our own, like Gunner Jaysley Beck, down.  This is not just about the moral or ethical need to do better, it is fundamentally about operational effectiveness.  The changes we are making to leadership training, education, use of data, the sexual harassment survey, the service justice system and the KC review of our past cases are making a difference.  But this will require constant focus, energy and leadership across the services and from other leaders in defence to deliver lasting improvements.

My third and final priority is about the transformation of the force. This is about how we fight, how we adapt, how we learn and how we exploit new technology.  And how we do this quickly to give us an edge over our adversaries.

As the SDR puts it, “rapid advances in technology [are] driving the greatest changes in how war is fought for more than a century, [and] the UK must pivot to a new way of war”. 

This transformation is about building a world-leading integrated force that is digitally connected, that exploits the skills of our people and that blends a high-low mix – ie a mix of high-end platforms augmented by cheaper autonomous systems that deliver increased survivability and lethality and are rapidly scalable and more easily adapted. 

This is what the first sea lord talked about last week with the Atlantic Bastion concept.  It's how the Chief of the General Staff will deliver the multiple increases in lethality that he has promised.  And it's why the MOD announced today that in its first year of operation, our newly-formed UK Defence Innovation will invest over £140 million to push the pace of developing and scaling innovative uncrewed and counter-uncrewed systems - supporting dozens of British SMEs, micro-SMEs and universities in the process.

It's also why we must exploit the opportunities of AI. In war, superior intelligence – in planning, execution and tactics – can be the decisive factor – we cannot afford to be outperformed in intelligence wars.

The race to exploit new technology and integrate it into our fighting system is one we must win.

It is often said that necessity is the mother of invention. Understanding that necessity demands that we understand how the threat is changing.

So, as I finish, this brings me back to where I started and my conclusion that we need a more mainstream and sophisticated articulation of the threat and, most importantly, how the situation is becoming more dangerous. 

All of us here tonight can play a part in stimulating that conversation.

I know that those in the room care about the long-term security of the country and understand better than most the threat we are facing.

Our objective must be to avoid war, but the price of maintaining peace is rising.

Unless we can explain the risks, we can't expect decision makers in government or society more broadly to pay that price.

Our armed forces are the first line of defence.  My primary responsibility is to make sure the armed forces are ready to deter, fight and win – today, tomorrow and together with our allies.

What I tell our people is that what they do matters and it matters more now than it has done for a long time. 

I will focus relentlessly on our readiness, our people and our transformation to get the most out of what we have got and stay ahead of the threat.

But our security cannot be outsourced only to the armed forces.  We deter by being strong as a nation.  That requires a whole of society response.  The whole of Britain must step up.

We do need, as the Prime Minister said, defence to be the central organising principle of government.  I would add that it will become an increasingly central organising principle of society, too.

A new era for Defence, and a new era for Britain.

That will change the way we make decisions across government, and it might require difficult decisions on priorities.  But in the end our prosperity and wellbeing as a nation starts with security.

That's why we need a national conversation on defence and security and why I want us all to play a part in it.