Chief of the Defence Staff's RUSI Lecture 2024
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The Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin gave his annual
RUSI lecture on 4 December 2024. Perhaps unsurprisingly after three
years, there is a ring of familiarity to these RUSI Lectures. Back
at the start in December 2021 – I spoke about a renewed era of
state-on-state competition. I warned that the Russian forces
massing on the border with Ukraine posed a direct challenge to
global stability. By the following year, our worst-case
intelligence estimates had...Request free trial
The Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin gave his annual RUSI lecture on 4 December 2024. Perhaps unsurprisingly after three years, there is a ring of familiarity to these RUSI Lectures. Back at the start in December 2021 – I spoke about a renewed era of state-on-state competition. I warned that the Russian forces massing on the border with Ukraine posed a direct challenge to global stability. By the following year, our worst-case intelligence estimates had come to pass with the intensity of the fighting and the barbarity of Russian atrocities. Then last year, speaking in the wake of the attacks by Hamas on Israel, I spoke of the potential for volatility across the Middle East. Now here we are in 2024: reflecting on a conflict in the Middle East which has spread beyond Gaza and a war in Europe which has now passed the 1,000-day mark and grows even more intense. In October 2023 Russia launched 300 one-way attack drones beyond the frontline at Ukraine: in October this year the number exceeded 2,000. Sitting above this are the broader geo-strategic shifts, including the growing coordination between Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang. Now as you heard, I am known as an optimist. And I keep coming back to the advice I was once given by a wise general: the role of senior leaders at points of tension is to reassure the nation and stiffen its resolve. I've spoken before about how we should be reassured by our nation's strengths:
These are good reasons to be confident. But, tonight, I want to focus on the other part of my responsibility – to stiffen the nation's resolve. That requires me to speak plainly about the threats we face and the response required. My premise is as follows:
In their book, The Lessons of Tragedy, Hal Brands and Charles Edel pose the crucial question for all of us who have been fortunate to benefit from relative peace and rising prosperity since the Second World War: how do we invoke that sense of tragedy – and the need to act where necessary – without having to experience the tragedy that comes from war? Are we able to recognise one era has ended and another has begun? Do we understand what is at stake? And are we sufficiently motivated to respond? This year's most extraordinary development was the deployment of thousands of North Korean soldiers on the border of Ukraine. And the possibility of tens of thousands more to follow as part of a new security pact with Russia, which could involve the exchange of the most sensitive technology and expertise between Moscow and Pyongyang. Add to this the use of Iranian-supplied drones by Russian forces, and Russia's threats to arm the Houthis in direct retaliation for western support to Ukraine, and we are witnessing the world aligning into three groups. In one group are those authoritarian states seeking to challenge the global rules. In the case of Russia, it is because Putin believes in a historic fiction. In the case of China, it is seeking to reshape the rules around its own interests. And in the case of North Korea and Iran, it is to secure the survival of their regimes at any cost. In another group are the responsible nations of the world. Most are democracies. But it also includes the Gulf monarchies and others who are committed to partnership and to the maintenance of stability and security in the world. And the third group of countries are hedging and ducking between the two for maximum advantage, as we saw with the BRICS Summit in Kazan this October. Talk of world order may sound abstract. Rules and values can seem wishy-washy. And multi-lateral institutions may feel remote. But they are real. Their presence, and more so their absence, can be felt in a way that is immediate and visceral. The concept of sovereignty is real for the people of Ukraine, who are paying an extraordinary price in its defence. The value of deterrence, and collective security, is real for our allies in Eastern Europe - countries whose borders have been progressively shaped and reshaped by autocratic and expansionist powers and feel the proximity of Russia's aggression every day. The notion of freedom of navigation matters to those nations that faced food shortages due to Russia's actions in the Black Sea. Or to the merchant mariners in the Red Sea who are on the receiving end of Iranian-supplied missiles and drones. In contrast, Britain might feel safer. We do not face an existential threat like Ukraine or Israel. We do not share a land border with Russia, like Poland or our Baltic and Nordic allies. We are protected by our maritime geography and the strength in depth of an Alliance with a landmass stretching from the fringes of the Arctic to the Eurasian steppe. And yet we too are experiencing the consequences of a more unstable world in a way that is also very real. Our national airspace and territorial waters, our critical energy and digital infrastructure, and our public discourse have all been subject to interference. In cyberspace, the frequency of attempts on our networks continues to accelerate, driven both by rogue individuals and nation states. And we are seeing a Europe-wide campaign of arson and sabotage, characterised in and extraordinarily frank and open way by the heads of two of our intelligence agencies – as ‘a sustained mission to generate mayhem' and ‘beyond irresponsible'. But the impact of global instability is felt even more broadly. As consumers through the cost of living. As taxpayers, through the expense of energy subsidy. And low growth and stagnation across Europe as markets react to an increasingly uncertain world. The security outlook is more contested, more ambiguous and more dangerous than we have known in our careers. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the nuclear domain. The first nuclear age – the Cold War – was defined by two opposing blocs governed by the risk of uncontrollable escalation and the logic of deterrence. The second nuclear age was governed by disarmament efforts and counter-proliferation. But we are at the dawn of a third nuclear age which is altogether more complex. It is defined by multiple and concurrent dilemmas, proliferating nuclear and disruptive technologies, and the almost total absence of the security architectures that went before. From Russia we have seen wild threats of tactical nuclear use, large scale nuclear exercises and simulated attacks against NATO countries, all designed to coerce us from taking the action required to maintain stability. China's nuclear build up poses a two-peer challenge to the United States. Iran's failure to cooperate with the IAEA is a concern, and North Korea's ballistic missile programme and erratic behaviour presents a regional and, increasingly, a global threat. Nuclear non-proliferation has been one of the great successes of international security since the end of the Second World War but is now being challenged. It has been successful because of states that took their international responsibilities seriously, and those, like Britain and the United States, who were willing to extend their nuclear umbrella to allies and partners and guarantee their security. This must continue. The UK's nuclear deterrent is the one part of our inventory of which Russia is most aware and has more impact on Putin than anything else. This is why successive British Governments are investing substantial sums of money to renew both our submarines and warhead and to recapitalise our nuclear enterprise after decades of underinvestment, and this even though the real benefits won't be realised for another decade at least. Previously governments believed they were doing the right thing. Now they know they really are. This leads me to my second point, which is about rediscovering our confidence and self-belief. Because if we step back for a moment, we can see our strengths. A Europe and America that represents half the world's wealth versus a Russia that is facing economic and demographic decline. A NATO that spends more on Defence than Russia and China combined and is becoming even stronger. An international community that has responded to Russia's aggression with unprecedented cohesion and resolve. Meanwhile, from America, we've had the clarity of successive US Administrations on the need for NATO allies to step up and shoulder their fair share of the responsibility for European security. By and large, that is happening. European nations are spending $400 billion more on Defence today than they were a decade ago. The Strategic Defence Review currently underway will assess the capabilities required against the resource available which, as the government has repeatedly stated, will rise to 2.5%. Whatever, history shows us, it always shows us that the cost of defence and deterrence is always less than the costs that flow from instability and conflict. Ukraine offers a glimpse of this truism: at least a 1% hit on the global economy and increased inflation. The largest direct financial impact for the UK is not the additional £3 billion Defence gets for Ukraine, welcome though that is. It is the £75 billion energy subsidy to shield consumers from the cost of rising energy bills as a direct result of Russian aggression. Aggregated across Europe and the energy subsidy grows to nearly £700 billion. And, unlike subsidy, Defence investment delivers a perpetual return through wider governmental and societal value, by creating jobs and apprenticeships, underpinning strategic industries and exports, and fostering social mobility and cohesion at home. Aside from nuclear and some other broader costs, what Britain spends on conventional defence delivers a phenomenal return. 20,000 people, predominantly from the British Army, deployed in Europe this year for NATO's largest exercise in a generation. Two carriers at sea this autumn – one leading NATO forces in the North Atlantic. Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships and Royal Marines ready to evacuate British citizens from Lebanon. RAF jets striking Houthi targets in Yemen. Royal Navy destroyers shooting down missiles and drones in the Red Sea. A 24/7 intelligence operation, seamlessly integrated with Five Eyes partners, tracking global events, anticipating crises, countering disinformation, and offering strategic foresight to government. The second full year of Operation INTERFLEX with 50,000 thousand Ukrainian soldiers trained. The tenth year of operation SHADER against Isis in Iraq and Syria. The fifty-fifth year of Operation RELENTLESS delivering our nuclear deterrent on behalf of all NATO. We get as much – and in many cases more – from our defence budget than our peers and our adversaries. The lion's share is committed to Europe and NATO. The current UK laydown in the Indo-Pacific represents less than 5% of our total force structure. But it provides a foundational presence for strategic relationships, like AUKUS and GCAP, which will endure for 50 to 75 years. As we look to the SDR, we need to be clear-eyed in our assessment of the threat. And then we should be confident in that assessment to make the right policy decisions and investment choices. That includes recognising that there is only a remote chance of a significant direct attack or invasion by Russia on the United Kingdom. And that is the same for the whole of NATO. Russia knows the response would be overwhelming, whether conventional or nuclear. The strategy of deterrence by NATO works and is working. But it has to be kept strong and strengthened against a more dangerous Russia. That assessment about Russia is separate to actions short of war, where Russia is clearly active and eager to both challenge and undermine the international system – but whilst reckless and unacceptable, these threats are manageable and reflect the increasingly pariah status of Russia. Our unity, cohesion, economies can withstand this pressure. We should not fret nor buckle. In fact, all of this requires us to be not just on the front foot and to lead. It is also about recognising that security is more than just territorial defence. It's about safeguarding and strengthening our prosperity. It's about protecting our interests and values and our way of life. And it's about contributing to the stability of the international system in the broadest sense. This brings me to my third point: Defence Reform. We are still too slow. We are still too cautious. Too risk adverse. There is still too much hierarchy and process. Too much duplication and not enough prioritisation. I know I sound like a broken record. At least I'm consistent. And the truth is we haven't gone nearly fast enough to get after those things that I outlined back in December 2021. Part of this is unavoidable. The war in Ukraine and the politics of the Middle East have dominated. Things are busy. People are working hard. I am grateful to all our service personnel and our Civil Servants. But it is precisely because of the security outlook that exists today that the case for reform is even stronger than ever. We live in a world where Houthi insurgents can hold global maritime trade at risk with minimal resources. These disruptive threats demand a disruptive response. But that requires us to overcome the organisational inertia and bias to the status quo that pervades much of our system. Our response to Ukraine has demonstrated that the UK has all the ingredients for innovation: a world-class defence industry; a thriving tech sector; brilliant scientists at Dstl; and the best service personnel to bring it all together. Yet we have only been able to demonstrate pockets of innovation rather than the wholesale transformation we need. Where we have got it right is because we used an entirely different set of permissions which elevated speed and embraced risk so that we could help Ukraine. But when we try to bring this into the mainstream our system tends to suffocate the opportunities. So, should we consider a duality of systems? Whereby major projects and core capabilities are still delivered in a way that is ‘fail safe' – clearly the case for nuclear; but an increasing proportion of projects are delivered under a different system which is ‘safe to fail'? Safe to fail may require Defence to think and act much more like an investor. Willing to fund ten high risk, high potential, programmes in the knowledge that none out of ten may fail, but the one that succeeds will deliver a step change in capability. This feels much closer to the British way of warfare. We have rarely been about mass. We have always sought to achieve a competitive advantage through a blend of human and technological overmatch – or in other words, our edge. Every military needs an edge. That's how you defeat an enemy. In this sense, Russia is showing us how not to fight. And Israel, in its response to Iran, has shown us the disproportionate advantage of modern ways of fighting. I won't go into detail, but in October's retaliatory strikes again Iran, Israel used more than 100 aircraft, carrying fewer than 100 munitions, and with no aircraft getting within 100 miles of the target in the first wave, and that took down nearly the entirety of Iran's air defence system. It has destroyed Iran's ability to produce ballistic missiles for a year, and left Tehran with a strategic dilemma in how it responds. That is the power of 5th generation aircraft, combined with exquisite targeting and extraordinary intelligence. And that was all delivered from a single sortie! Contrast this with Russia and over 1000 days into the 3-day Special Military Operation: its air force rarely flies over Ukraine and uses crude glide bombs for devastating tactical effect but without creating nearly the same strategic and operational dilemmas. NATO enjoys enormous overmatch with Russia in every domain except nuclear. And the accession of Finland and Sweden, and spending increases in Poland, Germany and elsewhere, will extend these advantages even further, particularly in the land domain. The risk is that as NATO strengthens, it becomes monolithic, and loses the aptitude for the kind of agility and innovation that is an advantage for the west. Does SACEUR want an Alliance of 32 ‘mini me's? Or can we use NATO's size to be able to take more risk and constantly search for a winning edge. And for the UK, as well as placing ourselves ‘NATO First', in which areas might we be ‘First in NATO'? If Roly Walker aims to double the lethality of the British Army by 2027 and treble it by 2030, then we should support and encourage him to take those risks to achieve that leap. Because if he is successful, then we can replicate it across the Alliance, and it will be even more significant. If Ben Key is willing to allow the Royal Navy to experiment with wave gliders in the North Atlantic for a new method of surveillance or with Rich Knighton introduce hybrid maritime strike – operating jets and drones simultaneously – then we should push for those changes and be prepared to take the risk and even fail. And Jim Hockenhull wants Strategic Command to make the decisive leap to better use the data we have to prosecute 10x and 100x the number of targets we may need to strike. That is achievable. We keep going on about deeper stockpiles. But even our low stockpiles are greater than the number of targets we can currently generate. We are not world leading. But we can be. In all this striving and taking risk to do more and better, NATO will still be safe. It will still outmatch Russia by orders of magnitude across land, sea, and air. But it creates the opportunity to use our collective size and strength to constantly have a winning and ideally disruptive edge. This should be NATO's goal in every domain and capability. And the UK is uniquely placed to both play our part and look to lead the way. These are fascinating and exciting discussions for Defence. In a traditional bureaucracy these things rarely come to the surface. But the mix of political change and the security backdrop is energising the conversation and creating more opportunity. For me, this is what Defence Reform is all about.
With Sharon Nesmith, I want to shape the new Military Strategic Headquarters to drive this mission. But I can't do it alone. It needs to read into the DNA of the whole department. High performing organisations are those with absolute clarity about their purpose and use that to shape all they do. We need to be a department obsessed with making the nation secure at home and strong abroad. That's our true purpose. That's my priority for the year ahead - working with the Defence Secretary, Permanent Secretary, Service Chiefs and all those in Defence, in and out of uniform. By way of conclusion and returning to the dilemma posed by The Lessons of Tragedy about how societies can preserve peace and stability without the awfulness of war to have to create it:
I look forward to continue working with our brilliant military-civilian team to deliver this objective for the Government and for the Nation. Updates to this page |