France, Germany and the UK (E3) gave a joint statement to
the IAEA Board of Governors on Iran's implementation of its
nuclear commitments under the JCPoA
From: Foreign, Commonwealth
& Development Office and Delphine Hournau-Pouëzat,
French Permanent Representative to the IAEA, on behalf of E3
Delivered on: 4 June 2024 (Transcript of the speech,
exactly as it was delivered)
Chair,
On behalf of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, I thank
Director General Grossi for his latest report on Iran's nuclear
programme.
The E3 are very grateful to the Agency for the professional,
independent and impartial work of their team of inspectors and
for their objective reporting on Iran's nuclear programme. We
encourage the Director General to keep the Board informed of all
relevant activities and developments.
It is no surprise that the IAEA's report once again confirms that
Iran continues to escalate its proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities, moving even further from its JCPoA commitments. Much
of Iran's nuclear programme is unprecedented for a state without
a nuclear weapons programme.
Chair,
In the reporting period, Iran has continued enriching uranium far
beyond its JCPoA commitments. It now possesses 30 times the JCPoA
limit of enriched uranium and its stockpile of high enriched
uranium up to 60 % has continued to grow significantly. Iran now
has three IAEA significant quantities of highly enriched uranium,
which the IAEA defines as the approximate amount of nuclear
material from which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear
explosive device cannot be excluded. The DG also reports that
Iran continues to prepare for new enrichment capacities at the
Fuel Enrichment Plant, where new cascades of centrifuges could be
installed soon.
We recall previous IAEA reports of Iran's uranium metal-related
work. The production of Uranium metal is a key step for the
development of a nuclear weapon. We urge Iran not to undertake
this work again.
For years now, the Agency's JCPoA-related verification and
monitoring has been seriously affected by Iran's refusal to
implement its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPoA,
including Iran's decision to have all of the Agency's
JCPOA-related surveillance and monitoring equipment removed.
As a consequence, and as the DG reiterates in his report, the
Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the
production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows,
heavy water and UOC. The IAEA does not know, for example, how
many centrifuges Iran has and where they are located.
The DG notes that it has been more than three years since Iran
stopped applying its Additional Protocol. Iran has also not
reversed its decision to withdraw the designations for
experimented inspectors. All of these decisions made by Iran have
detrimental implications for the Agency's ability to provide
assurance of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
programme.
Chair,
The E3 have consistently worked towards a diplomatic solution. In
2022 Iran twice refused a negotiated outcome which would have
returned Iran to compliance with the JCPoA. Instead, Iran has
chosen to escalate and to expand its nuclear programme to
alarming levels.
We therefore urge Iran:
- To immediately halt its nuclear escalation and refrain from
making threats to produce nuclear weapons;
- To return to the limits imposed by the JCPoA, in particular
those regarding enrichment;
- To implement the commitments it made regarding transparency
and cooperation with the IAEA including re-applying all
transparency measures that it stopped in February 2021;
- To re-implement and swiftly ratify its Additional Protocol;
and
- To reverse its September 2023 decision to withdraw the
designations of experienced inspectors.
These steps would help rebuild the urgently needed trust between
Iran and the international community, a trust that has been
further eroded by recent statements made in Iran about its
technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons and the
possibility of changing its nuclear doctrine.
Chair,
Iran's escalating nuclear activities significantly harm
international security and undermine the global non-proliferation
architecture. We will continue consultations, alongside
international partners, on how best to address the increasing
doubts about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. We
remain committed to a diplomatic solution and stand ready to use
all diplomatic levers available to prevent Iran from developing
nuclear weapons.
Finally, we ask the Director General to keep the Board of
Governors informed on the status of Iran's nuclear programme. We
ask for the report to be made public.