Asylum accommodation and Rwanda: Little to show for money spent so far, PAC report finds

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has published its report scrutinising asylum accommodation and the UK-Rwanda Partnership.

The report finds that, despite the Home Office committing significant sums of money to the Rwanda partnership and its large accommodation sites, there is little to show for the money spent so far. Questions also remain as to what will happen to the more than 50,000 people left in limbo by the system - people who are living in the UK, with no ability to claim asylum, who are officially “pending relocation”.

On asylum accommodation, the report welcomes Government's progress in closing asylum hotels in communities. However, the report finds the Home Office's assessment of the requirements for setting up alternative accommodation in large sites fell woefully short of reality and risked wasting taxpayers' money, while the new sites will not house anywhere near as many people as initially expected, exacerbating existing accommodation issues.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. We are concerned that the Home Office does not have a credible plan for implementing the Rwanda partnership. The government intends to start flights to Rwanda as soon as possible now that the Safety of Rwanda Bill has received Royal Assent and UK-Rwanda Treaty has been ratified. There are currently more than 50,000 people who are deemed to be in the UK illegally, and that the Home Secretary will have a duty to remove. On 22 April, the Prime Minister set out some high-level proposals to begin relocations. But during our session, the Home Office was unwilling to say how many people it is planning to relocate to Rwanda, and how it would do this. The Home Office asserts that it has robust operational plans, which are dependent on the flow of relocations. However, we are concerned by the Home Office's inability to explain the practical details including, for example, where those people who may be subject to relocations currently are and the arrangements for escorting them to Rwanda. Further, it could not provide clarity on escort or flight costs, including whether training costs were included in its contract with Mitie. We are left with little confidence in the Home Office's ability to implement the Rwanda partnership, and its understanding of the costs, particularly given its track record in delivering other major programmes.

Recommendation 1: In its Treasury Minute response, the Home Office should set out its implementation plan for the Rwanda partnership, including a breakdown of current cost estimates. This should include an update on the arrangements for – and cost of - transporting people to Rwanda. It should also explain how it has assessed the feasibility of relocating people, based on the revised plan.

2. In its haste to establish large accommodation sites, the Home Office made unacceptable and avoidable mistakes, and failed to protect value for money. The Home Office asserts that its need to deal with a “national emergency” meant it had to take quick decisions, and so it pressed ahead with setting up expensive large asylum accommodation sites without an adequate understanding of what would be required. The Home Office's estimates of the set-up costs for the large former military sites fell far short of reality. It estimated that it would cost £5 million to ready each of the sites at Wethersfield and Scampton. But costs spiralled to £49 million at Wethersfield, and has cost £27 million so far at Scampton. It also failed to maximise competition in awarding its contracts by simply amending current contracts or using frameworks. Furthermore, these two previous RAF bases will now accommodate significantly fewer people than the Home Office envisioned. Fewer people on sites means a higher per person cost. These errors may ultimately cost the taxpayer £46 million more than if the Home Office had simply retained the use of hotels instead. It is essential that departments ensure that taxpayers' money is protected, even when required to work quickly.

Recommendation 2: As part of its Treasury Minute response, the Home Office should set out what it will do differently in the future so it ensures it undertakes sufficient due diligence at the outset of projects and protects taxpayers' money when working at pace.

3. We are not convinced the Home Office has put in place sufficient measures to safeguard those pending relocation while they wait to hear what will happen to them. The Home Office is not processing asylum claims for more than 50,000 people who have arrived in the UK via small boats and other irregular means and are deemed ‘inadmissible' to the asylum system. Currently, the only viable option for many of them is to remove them to Rwanda, as other potential third-country partnerships would need significant lead times to be up and running. Meanwhile, these people remain in limbo – some people have now been waiting for over a year to be told what will happen to them.  Many of them are living in temporary Home Office accommodation, where there have been numerous reports of self-harm and suicide. While the Home Office told us it incorporated safety measures into its contracts with providers, it could not provide information about any penalties for falling below standards, despite reports of significant safety failures on sites.

Recommendation 3a: The Home Office should, before the end of July, write to the Committee to explain how it is ensuring the wellbeing of people pending relocation and what plans it has to provide clarity for their future.

Recommendation 3b: The Home Office should also update the Committee quarterly on the number of people awaiting relocation and how many are being supported by the Home Office, including specifying how many have waited for more than one year.

Recommendation 3c: The Home Office should also update the Committee quarterly on any penalties issued relating to safety matters (including health and welfare). The update should state for each penalty the size of the penalty, the reason for it, the location concerned, and the contractor to whom the penalty has been issued.

4. We are concerned that the Home Office has not engaged effectively with local authorities about the impact its work is having on local areas. The Home Office is making progress in its plans to reduce its use of hotels. By the end of March, it had exited 100 hotels, with around 300 still in use. But it still could not say when it intends to stop using hotels altogether. The Home Office's actions to reduce its reliance on hotels risk having unintended consequences such as driving up rental costs, increasing homelessness and putting unacceptable pressure on local councils. There are also substantial additional costs for local areas where the Home Office develops alternative accommodation such as large sites. West Lindsey District Council, in which the site at Scampton resides, estimates that it and its neighbouring councils have faced additional costs of nearly £0.5 million as a result of needing to employ additional staff and updating infrastructure. We are pleased to hear the Home Office is now sharing more data with local authorities about the asylum seekers in their communities and that it has put in place dedicated liaison officers.

Recommendation 4: The Home Office should, within three months, write to us setting out what it will do to better understand the impact its asylum policies are having in local areas and how its liaison officers will help resolve the litany of problems raised with us by councils.

5. The Home Office does not yet know how it will evaluate the impact and value for money of the Rwanda partnership. The success of the Rwanda partnership is dependent on whether it deters people from making dangerous and illegal journeys to the UK, including small boat crossings. The Home Office estimates that illegal entries need to fall by one third from 2022 levels for the Rwanda partnership to be considered value for money. However, measuring the deterrent effect of the partnership will be complex as it will require an understanding of: the motivations of asylum seekers (including why they are not coming to the UK); the impact of other government policies to deter illegal entry to the UK; and the full costs of the Rwanda partnership and asylum accommodation in the UK. Despite the deterrent effect being critical to the partnership's success, the Home Office has not yet worked out how it will measure success or what data it will need.

Recommendation 5: As a matter of urgency, the Home Office should develop a robust evaluation strategy to assess the deterrent impact of the third country asylum processing policy, carefully considering whether it is possible to assess the success of this policy in isolation. It should also explain how it intends to assess value for money.

6. We are disappointed that, despite the Committee previously raising concerns, the Permanent Secretary is still not providing the necessary transparency to enable Parliament to hold the Home Office to account on its asylum and immigration plans. We have previously raised concerns about the Accounting Officer's transparency to Parliament. Despite this, the Home Office published the summary Accounting Officer Assessment for the Sovereign Borders Programme nine months late, and 15 months after it approved the programme. The assessment did not cover the implementation of the Illegal Migration Act, despite this representing a major change to asylum policy. The Accounting Officer asserts that it is up to ministers when to make these assessments public, but other departments have repeatedly shared assessments in a much more timely manner, without Ministerial approval being a barrier. The Accounting Officer was also unwilling to share any details on negotiations with other countries over other potential third country asylum processing partnerships. While respecting the need for a level of confidentiality, we are concerned at the Home Office's unwillingness to engage with the Committee on its only “plan B”.

Recommendation 6: As a matter of urgency, and no later than one month after the publication of this report, the Home Office should:

1. a) Publish all outstanding Accounting Officer Assessments, including those where there has been a significant change to an ongoing programme, and in the future should publish all Accounting Officer Assessments in a timely manner; and
2. b) Write to the Committee to explain how it intends to share information about negotiations with other countries it is considering for third country processing, while respecting confidentiality.