Statement by Deputy Political Coordinator Thomas Phipps
at the UN Security Council meeting on Syria.
Thank you President and thank you Director Ebo for your
comprehensive briefing this morning.
President, as we heard from Director Ebo this morning, the OPCW’s
Investigation and Identification Team released its fourth report
on 22 February.
This latest report attributed responsibility to Daesh for a
sulphur mustard attack in Marea on 1 September 2015.
We commend the continued professionalism and expertise of the IIT
and we condemn this confirmed use of chemical weapons in Syria by
Daesh.
The UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism and the OPCW have now
confirmed nine uses of chemical weapons by the Assad regime; and
four by Daesh.
Any use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere at any time is
unacceptable.
And we regret that we cannot exclude the possibility of further
use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime or by non-state
actors in Syria.
President, Syria continues to fail to fulfil its obligations
under the Chemical Weapons Convention and under this Council’s
Resolution 2118.
As we have said many times in this chamber, the outstanding
issues with Syria’s initial chemical weapons declaration that
Director Ebo covered this morning are not academic.
They include the fate of several hundred tonnes of chemical
warfare agents and thousands of chemical munitions.
Instability in the region increases the risk of proliferation of
chemical weapons to non-state actors.
We need to remain focused on the risk that non-state actors
develop, acquire or use chemical weapons.
All states should meet their obligations under Resolution 1540 to
ensure appropriate mechanisms are in place to counter the spread
of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of
delivery.
President, Syria’s obstructive behaviour and failure to declare
in full its chemical weapons stockpile gives no grounds for
confidence in Syria’s handling of the chemicals and precursors
that we know it retains.
At the Chemical Weapons Convention Conference of States Parties
in November 2023, states parties adopted a Decision on
‘Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use and the Threat
of Future Use.’
Despite the spin that our Russian colleagues attempted to put on
this decision, its function was very clear.
It recommends that States Parties review and enhance domestic
measures on the transfer of toxic dual use chemicals and
materials to Syria; and secondly, it calls on states parties to
strengthen cooperation at the OPCW on tackling the threat of
chemical weapon use by non-state actors.
President, in the week in which Russia has called a Security
Council meeting on the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia that took
place 25 years ago, it’s rich that our Russian colleagues say
that these meetings are pointless.
Because until Syria cooperates constructively and transparently
with the OPCW, until Syria grants unfettered access to the OPCW
Declaration Assessment Team and until Syria fully declares and
destroys its chemical weapons, this Council should also remain
focused on this clear ongoing threat to international peace and
security.
