Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD) I beg to move,
That this House has considered the regulation of defined benefit
pension schemes. After the heat of the debate on High Speed 2 that
has just ended, I hope that we might be able to generate a little
more light. The subject of defined-benefit pension schemes and
their regulation does not always lead to that sort of excitement,
important though it undoubtedly is. I suppose that in speaking
about...Request free trial
(Orkney and Shetland)
(LD)
I beg to move,
That this House has considered the regulation of defined benefit
pension schemes.
After the heat of the debate on High Speed 2 that has just ended,
I hope that we might be able to generate a little more light. The
subject of defined-benefit pension schemes and their regulation
does not always lead to that sort of excitement, important though
it undoubtedly is. I suppose that in speaking about
defined-benefit pension schemes I should declare an interest.
Defined-benefit pension schemes, many of which are of course
final salary schemes, were what people like me were part of when
we were first elected to serve here. Then, in about 2011 or 2012,
I think, we moved to a career average earnings scheme.
The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, in a briefing provided
ahead of today, says:
“This is a particularly broad and complex topic”—
a warning that I think we should all be willing to take. I am not
much given to dealing with broad and complex topics, especially
where hard sums are involved. I always take a fairly simple view
of these things, and when it comes to pensions, some things are
worth bearing in mind and never losing sight of. The first of
those—I will come back to this point in a minute—is that a
pension is in effect a matter of contract between an employer and
an employee. It is, in other words, simply salary paid at a later
stage in the employee’s life. The relevance of that is that when
we anticipate changes in the way in which pensions are to be
provided, we have to make allowance for the fact that people will
have made decisions in their life about how they are going to
provide for themselves at a later stage in their life.
Thirty years ago, I was a part of the established civil service.
I was a prosecutor, a procurator fiscal depute, working at the
Crown Office in Edinburgh. I worked with many talented lawyers
who were able to do remarkable things as prosecutors, and most of
them would have been able to command much higher salaries had
they worked in private practice. They did not do so for a variety
of reasons. Some had a particular commitment to prosecution and
to public service, but they also had an understanding that as
members of the civil service with a final salary scheme, a
defined-benefit scheme, they would trade that off against the
higher salary that they could have got when they were working. It
is worth noting in passing in relation to the BP pension scheme,
about which I will speak later, that when BP closed its scheme to
new entrants, it compensated for that with a 20% increase in
salary for those who were still in employment.
When we anticipate a change, we always recognise that there is a
greater importance of maintaining benefits for those who are in a
later stage of their career. This is currently coming to my
attention and to the attention of many right hon. and hon.
Members. Indeed, the Select Committee on Work and Pensions has
recently taken an interest in it, because of the experience of
pensioners who are beneficiaries of schemes such as BP’s, and
Shell’s scheme is another. Although there are differences in the
terms of the trust deed for the Shell scheme, the
outcome in terms of the beneficiaries is that they are actually
in lockstep with each other.
(Ellesmere Port and Neston)
(Lab)
The right hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to learn that
there are many Shell pensioners in my
constituency. I have been in correspondence with Shell about its
decision last year not to award an inflation-matching increase in
the pension, and it told me that it did not have to do that. When
it was pointed out that it had given a similar inflation-matching
rise to Dutch pensioners, Shell’s response was that there are
different rules and regulations for managing the Dutch schemes.
That highlights the essence of the problem that we are trying to
deal with.
Mr Carmichael
It absolutely does. Representing a constituency that had the
Sullom Voe oil terminal managed by BP for many years, I suspect
that the reasons why the hon. Gentleman has Shell pensioners in his
constituency and I have BP pensioners in mine are very
similar.
(Strangford) (DUP)
I commend the right hon. Gentleman for bringing forward this
debate. It is a critical issue, and it goes beyond the two
pensions that he has referred to. Does he agree that the
Government—I say this with great respect to them—have had
adequate warning that we are heading towards a UK-wide pension
crisis if we do not make changes to pension schemes soon? Will he
join me in asking the Department for Work and Pensions to begin,
today, to take adequate steps to rectify the precarious position
we are currently in, on behalf of our constituents?
Mr Carmichael
The hon. Gentleman strikes at the reasons why I brought forward
this debate. We might benefit from a wider and longer ventilation
of the issues at some later stage, but we have 30 minutes today,
so let us use it. I had the opportunity to discuss the issues
yesterday with the Minister, and he is alive to the concerns.
When it comes to regulating pensions, and indeed other similar
financial provisions, the law of unintended consequences is never
far away. The Government are right to be cautious, but they have
to be alive to the fact that this is an emerging crisis. What
happens to the beneficiaries of the BP and Shell pension schemes
today could happen to just about any pensioner the future. As
those pension funds come to a point of greater maturity, the
concern that we hear from BP, Shell and other
pensioners is that decisions are being taken not in relation to
their best interests, which is the primary fiduciary duty of the
trustees, but because of other concerns. There is a significant
number of significant issues for the Government to look at in
relation to pension regulation, not least of which is the balance
between the companies that have created these pension funds in
the first place and the independence of the trustees.
(North East Fife)
(LD)
With 60,000 BP pensioners impacted, it is unsurprising that I too
have been contacted by constituents. There is a wider debate
about the fact that if multinational companies such as BP
and Shell are making these
decisions, smaller companies will end up making similar decisions
if something is not done. My right hon. Friend mentioned
appointed trustees. Does he agree that BP has a duty to take the
advice of its appointed trustees to prevent real-terms cuts to
pensions? Otherwise, what is the point in having trustees at
all?
Mr Carmichael
I almost entirely agree with my hon. Friend. The way in which the
BP pension fund works is that the trustees have virtually no
discretion up to 5%, and then from 5% to 9% there is a
discretionary level. In the last year, the BP trustees
recommended 9% but the company refused to pay it. I can see that
there might be good reasons why a company does not want to be
tied to that discretionary level, but there must be a reason for
refusing to pay it. As far as I can see, the BP and Shell response has
been, “No, we don’t need to give you a reason.” They play off
defined benefit against defined contribution; they play off
against pensioners in other parts of the world because they are
transnational corporations; and they come up with other
points.
That is why it is so important that when we talk about this
issue, we hold right at the top of our minds that this is a
matter of contract between the employer and the employee. If they
were still working and receiving this money instead of receiving
it as a pension, we would not tolerate it. If it is not a good
enough way of dealing with somebody’s salary, it is not a good
enough way of dealing with somebody’s pension.
When Nick Coleman from the BP Pensioner Group, who provided me
with an invaluable briefing in the last few weeks, gave evidence
to the Work and Pensions Committee, he touched on the point about
the relationship between the trustees and the company, and the
independence of the trustees. He produced something that,
frankly, shocked me and shocked Committee members as well. He
said:
“We checked the pension fund company’s annual returns to
Companies House the other day and found that for the first time
ever, they had added some words saying the duty of the directors,
among the normal things you would expect, was also to maximise
BP’s long-term shareholder value.”
As a trustee, that is a quite remarkable addition to the trust’s
purposes, because the fiduciary duty is the duty of utmost good
faith to the beneficiaries. If there is a conflict between the
beneficiaries and the company, the trustees’ duty is to protect
the interests of the beneficiaries. Nick Coleman went on:
“We are saying that the solution here is to somehow reinforce the
requirement that trustee boards are demonstrably and fully
independent. For example, the majority of members should be
demonstrably independent rather than, in our case, the majority
being company employees. They also need to be expert. Some of
them have only been hired by BP two years ago and they are now
trustees of the Pension Fund. They know very little about
pensions, whereas they replaced people with 12 years’ experience.
Expertise is a very big deal.”
It is pretty clear that these problems and pressures will become
more acute. It is widely believed by BP’s beneficiaries that it
wants to reduce the level of outgoings from the pension fund so
that it will be a more attractive prospect for being hived off,
perhaps to an insurance company or others. Such things are
legally possible, but it comes back to the relationship between
the employer or former employer and the employee or pensioner. If
the pension fund is owned and administered by an insurance
company, for argument’s sake, where will that relationship be and
how will that impact on the outcome for the beneficiaries?
I raised that question in discussion with BP yesterday.
Incidentally, BP has eventually come to talk to me about this,
but it is still not talking to its pensioners. If BP is to avoid
the reputational damage that could come from this, it would be
well advised to spend time talking to its pensioners and
employees in a meaningful and serious way, which it has failed to
do thus far.
The BP pension fund was established 95 years ago. It has 58,000
members and 42,000 pensioners in payment, 30,000 of whom are more
than 70 years old. BP closed access to the defined-benefit scheme
in 2010 and closed it to new accruals by existing members in
2021. Over the years, however, BP has made significant
undertakings to its employees and pensioners, a number of which I
have had the benefit of considering. As far back as 1996, there
was a Pensions News for BP’s pensioners, which stated:
“It is important to remember that the BP Scheme guarantees
pension increases equivalent to the annual increase in the Retail
Prices Index (RPI) up to 5% and the Trustees, with the agreement
of the Company have stated that they intend to follow a policy of
increasing pensions in line with RPI wherever possible even when
this exceeds 5%, so long as the BP Pension Fund has sufficient
resources to permit this.”
I will come back to the resources question. It continues:
“In times of high inflation, this would be a valuable
underpinning to the purchasing power of your pension.”
This material was given to BP pensioners then. Underneath those
words, the benefits of scheme membership are listed:
“The security of a large well funded arrangement…A pension linked
to your earnings at, or close to retirement, part of which can be
taken as a lump sum…Guaranteed increases to protect the value of
your pension over the years of your retirement”.
It was on the basis of undertakings such as those given by BP to
its employees that many of them made the decisions they did for
their future provision. That is why, when I questioned the
Minister on this in the Chamber last month, I said that BP was
effectively dealing from the bottom of the pack. I hold very much
to that view, which is why I think this House is right to
highlight what BP has done. As I said, it could happen to
others.
Fast forward to 18 months ago when BP first withheld consent for
a pension increase according to the retail prices index:
inflation then was at 7.5%, but it agreed to a 5% increase only
six months ago when inflation was at 13.4%. The net effect of
that was a 11% decrease in the pension value received by the
beneficiaries.
The oil industry obviously has a reputation for high salaries,
but it is worth bearing in mind that the average pension paid out
by the BP pension fund is only £18,000. BP’s defence is quite
revealing. It has referred me to the funds made available for
payment from its Helios fund, which is effectively a lump sum
payment of £2,500 for people in receipt of a household income of
less than £30,000. Again, we are breaking the link between the
former employer, the salary and the pension recipient. Pensions
are not charitable hand-outs; this is money that people have
earned in the course of their working life.
BP seeks every step of the way to play one group off against the
other. It plays the defined-benefit recipients off against the
defined-contribution recipients. It says, “We are a multinational
company and we have liabilities to pensioners in other parts of
the world.” It absolutely does, of course, but it pays people
different salaries in different parts of the world. If it pays
something during a person’s working life, it should be prepared
to accept the logic that it should pay that at the end of a
person’s working life and into retirement.
The funding ratio of the BP pension fund at the moment stands at
132%. If it were to meet the extra 4% this year, the funding
ratio would still stand at 129%. There is no reason, from the
position of the fund, why that should be regarded as an
unsustainable payment, but of course it would make an enormous
difference to the beneficiaries—the pensioners themselves.
BP has generally had a well-funded and well-managed pension fund.
From 1990 to 2020, it made virtually no extra payments to the
pension fund at all. It is worth reflecting on the fact that BP
has announced that its new chief executive will be Murray
Auchincloss, who, as chief financial officer, was the author of
many of these decisions. Mr Auchincloss will enjoy a salary of
£1.4 million plus a variety of other benefits in kind. I have not
had the time to work out exactly what those other benefits will
be, but when BP sacked his predecessor, it clawed back £32
million, never mind what it paid him. It is fair to say that Mr
Auchincloss, and probably Mr Looney too, will have to go some way
before they are eligible for universal credit.
The final word in this debate should go to the BP pensioners
themselves. Some truly heart-rending contributions have been
quoted to me. One came from a pensioner who said:
“In the 1990s, BP introduced an option for staff to put 15% of
their salary into accruing pension at a faster rate which I did
because my wife had no pension of her own. It was not an easy
decision as we had just started a family and money was very
tight.”
The other one that really jumped off the page for me was from a
pensioner who had 20 years’ service with BP working in IT. They
said:
“I am dying from cancer and emphysema, suddenly I am informed by
bp that my widow and family will no longer be protected from
inflation in the way I had always believed. Now please tell me
how you would react if your loved ones came under attack in this
way. And how would you feel when the man responsible for this
assault is claiming to be a champion of mental health and to care
about people?”
That is the human cost of the decisions that BP has taken and
continues to take.
BP and Shell are just the
canary in the coalmine; what happens to them can happen to
others. That is why this is a matter to which the Government must
now pay the most urgent attention.
11.19am
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
()
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I
am grateful to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr
Carmichael) for securing this debate. We had a good discussion on
this matter yesterday, but I hope I can say a bit more today.
First and foremost, I am very pleased that people are showing
more interest in pension schemes more generally and the pensions
they receive. I always think that we, as a nation, do not show
enough interest in our pensions at the right time in our lives. I
have heard very clearly the points made about individual schemes.
Today I will not talk about specific schemes but will comment in
more general terms about how these pension schemes are supposed
to work. I recognise that many people depend on these schemes for
their retirement income, but let me talk about the issues more
broadly.
I understand the upset caused by schemes when pension scheme
members no longer receive the discretionary increases that they
had received previously. It is important to stress that
legislation does not seek to set out exactly what every scheme
must do in every conceivable circumstance; rather, legislation
sets out minimum standards for indexation. That does not prevent
more generous arrangements, which may be brought into a scheme
through its rules or provided on a discretionary basis.
It is quite right that there should be some minimum
standards—statutory requirements for DB indexation that all
schemes must follow. These requirements are in place for all
schemes, and they try to achieve a balance between providing
members with some measure of protection against inflation without
increasing a scheme’s costs beyond what most schemes can
generally afford. That is a critical balance to strike.
It is important to provide a measure of protection for members,
but we also need to have an eye to the future viability of a
scheme, which could be compromised by creating significant
additional liabilities. We also have to consider employer
affordability. The best possible protection for the members’
future benefits is a strong and profitable employer, and we must
remember that not all DB schemes are sponsored by monolithic
employers with deep pockets. The setting of a statutory minimum
is therefore a delicate balance to strike.
Some pension schemes go beyond the legal requirements and do
indeed provide more generous indexation. Of course, if higher
levels of indexation are set out in scheme rules, those levels of
indexation must be paid. The scheme rules set out the pension
package that the members have the right to receive.
Mr Carmichael
I agree with most of what the Minister is saying, but there is
something more that comes into play here, which is the question
of light-touch regulation. Light-touch regulation only works if
it is possible to proceed on the basis of good-faith acting by
both parties, particularly the companies. Where there is evidence
of the lack of good-faith acting, as we have with BP
and Shell is it not
necessary to adjust the system to ensure that at the end of the
day the beneficiaries are not suffering as a consequence?
I note the right hon. Gentleman’s point. I am also conscious of
time, so I do not think that I will be able to make my entire
legal presentation. He very kindly said in his speech that I was
alive to the issues, which I hope I can demonstrate towards the
end of my speech by setting out where my thinking is moving
to.
As the right hon. Gentleman rightly said, the Government’s role
is to ensure that the fundamental promise of a DB scheme, as set
out in its rules, is met. Whether discretionary payments are made
must be a matter for the trustees and the sponsoring employer.
The Government have no power to intervene to require a scheme to
pay an annual increase above that required by the law or to go
beyond the rules of the scheme.
It is up to trustees and sponsors to agree how their specific
scheme should be run in the best long-term interests of all
parties. It would not be appropriate for the Government to
interfere in decisions made by individual schemes, beyond setting
clear and reasonable minimum standards that apply to all schemes,
including through regulation.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way; I will just pick up
on the point made by the right hon. Member for Orkney and
Shetland (Mr Carmichael). This issue is about good faith and
promises being kept. If we look not just at the schemes that have
been mentioned today but at others—I am thinking of the FOSPEN,
the Midland Bank clawback issue, and of course the WASPI women—we
see that there is a whole generation of pensioners out there who
feel that they have not been delivered what they were entitled
to. What kind of message does that send to the pensioners of
tomorrow? We really need to toughen up on this, don’t we?
I agree entirely. Since coming into this job, I met
representatives of the Pensions Action Group— an organisation
that covers employees of a number of companies that went into
liquidation many years ago. Differing rules around indexation
have caused very different outcomes for those individuals, so I
am very conscious of the issue. I made a point of meeting them
because I believe predecessors have not met them; I wanted to
make sure that I heard their case and could reflect on it, and I
have commissioned further work from officials. They are aware
that that is ongoing, and I look forward to hearing what my
officials have to say.
Key to the points I have heard in this debate is the role of
trustees. No matter whether they are employer-nominated or
member-nominated, they have first to comply with the rules of the
scheme and, secondly and crucially, to act in what they regard as
the best interests of their members now and in the future. That
includes investment decisions that they may choose to make. It
also includes decisions on indexation. The trustees will
sometimes need to make difficult decisions; that is the nature of
trusteeship. The needs of different parties, today and in the
future, have to be balanced. They have to ensure that funding
problems do not emerge in the future. Trustees and sponsors must
work together to seek the best way forward, taking account of a
whole range of issues including the long-term health of the
scheme.
Depending on the circumstances of the scheme, different models of
trusteeship may be more or less appropriate. The type of trustee
best for appointment to a scheme will depend upon the
characteristics of the scheme. The governance and trusteeship of
a scheme is best handled by the scheme and its sponsors. They
will know better than anyone else what the scheme’s long-term
future looks like and how best to get there, but trustees,
regardless of whether they are appointed by members or by
sponsors, do not and cannot act to represent any particular
group. There are safeguards, however. The Pensions Regulator has
powers to remove and replace trustees with an independent trustee
or add an independent trustee to a trustee board should it have
concerns about the capability or behaviour of a trustee.
A defined-benefit pension is a promise to pay the person
concerned a certain amount of pension income every month in
retirement for the rest of their life. That means that while the
sponsor remains solvent, a person’s retirement income cannot
decline below a set amount, regardless of the value of the
pension fund or the wider economic situation. In addition, a
proportion of the DB pension may also be inherited by a spouse
after the pension holder’s death—again, guaranteed in value for
life.
Rights in a defined-benefit pension scheme are extremely valuable
and we should be rightly proud that such schemes exist for the
bulk of today’s pensioners, but ensuring that these rights are
protected for all scheme members involves many different parties:
trustees, employers, and current and future individual scheme
members. The governance of defined-benefit pension schemes must
therefore balance the needs of all those different parties. It
has to work for today, and in the short and long term. Our
priority is to ensure that schemes pay out the full value of the
promised pension to each member when it falls due, as set out in
the scheme and in line with the relevant legislation. When it
comes to indexation, legislation sets out the minimum standard
that tries to ensure there is a measure of protection against
inflation.
Having listened to the debate today, as well as to other
individuals I have met in recent days, it is difficult not to
have sympathy with pensioners who have planned on the assumption
of receiving certain increases, no matter how discretionary they
may be, but then find that their income is not increasing as they
had expected or planned on. As much as I can do, I will look
closely again at the situation regarding the scheme that I have
heard about in this debate—and others that I am sure other
Members might have covered had they been able to attend—and try
to understand fully what has happened and whether the
arrangements currently in place in regulation are working as
intended. I will do this by discussing it with the Pensions
Regulator in particular.
I will also look at the proposals we made in the autumn statement
on improving the quality of trustees. I am not saying that all
trustees are awful or anything like that; we have excellent
trustees in many pension schemes, but we also have to bear in
mind that, as I and the hon. Member for North East Fife () said, many large and
monolithic employers have a different ability to absorb rapid
changes in the pensions landscape compared with much smaller
schemes. I do not want smaller schemes pushed into administration
under the Pension Protection Fund, which would then lead to
reduced pensions for those scheme members. Both must be kept in
balance.
I thank the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland.
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