The Minister for Defence Procurement (James Cartlidge) With
permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I would like to make a statement
to update the House on the review conducted by Clive Sheldon KC on
the lessons to be learned from the armoured cavalry programme,
which is the Army programme centred on the Ajax vehicles. The
Defence Secretary has previously acknowledged that the programme
was a troubled programme. Albeit that he has more recently
announced that it has turned a...Request free trial
The Minister for Defence Procurement ()
With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I would like to make a
statement to update the House on the review conducted by Clive
Sheldon KC on the lessons to be learned from the armoured cavalry
programme, which is the Army programme centred on the Ajax
vehicles. The Defence Secretary has previously acknowledged that
the programme was a troubled programme. Albeit that he has more
recently announced that it has turned a corner, it is against the
backdrop of concerns he had about the programme, and those of
this House about what was known at the time of publishing the
integrated review, that he commissioned an independent review by
a senior legal figure to investigate the circumstances.
In May last year, Clive Sheldon KC was appointed to lead a
lessons learned review into the armoured cavalry programme. The
review’s terms of reference were to
“identify lessons and make recommendations to help Ministry of
Defence (MOD) deliver major programmes more effectively in
future, with a particular focus on how MOD shares and elevates
issues across the Department.”
An earlier Ministry of Defence report, by David King,
specifically relating to the health and safety concerns about
noise and vibration, was published in December 2021. We continue
to make good progress on implementing the recommendations from
that report, some of which are echoed in Mr Sheldon’s review.
Mr Sheldon submitted his report to Ministers on 19 May, and I am
today publishing that report, unredacted, on gov.uk, and placing
a copy in the Library of the House. I wish to formally thank Mr
Sheldon and his team for the painstaking work that they have
undertaken to enable us to better understand how the MOD can
improve the governance, culture and leadership of our major
programmes. They interviewed some 70 people and considered tens
of thousands of pages of evidence.
The resulting report makes for difficult reading, highlighting a
number of systemic, cultural and institutional problems across
several areas of the Department. These problems include:
fragmented relationships and the conflicting priorities of the
senior responsible owner role. It also points to a reticence to
raise, and occasionally by seniors to listen to, genuine problems
in a timely, evidenced manner.
We accept these findings and most of Mr Sheldon’s 24 formal
recommendations, with 15 accepted and nine accepted in principle.
Crucially, the review did not find that either Ministers or
Parliament were misled. Equally, the review team did not see any
evidence of misconduct by any individual, let alone gross
misconduct, and nothing that would justify disciplinary action.
It is, though, true that many of the behaviours highlighted in
the report are far from ideal, but in many cases they have
already been recognised and acted on, both specifically on the
armoured cavalry programme as well as across the Department.
Where work is not already under way to implement a
recommendation, we commit to making the necessary changes at
pace. In the interest of time, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will
address the recommendations in the themes set out by Mr Sheldon
in his executive summary, rather than going through each of the
recommendations.
A number of recommendations relate to MOD’s internal
relationships, including with the Defence Science and Technology
Laboratory. Considerable effort has already been made to address
these issues within and beyond the Ajax programme. This has
resulted in much improved working and reporting arrangements, in
particular with the Defence Equipment & Support organisation
and also the newly established acquisition safety cell that
advises the Investment Approvals Committee on equipment safety
matters. Escalation routes also exist for DSTL through the chief
science officer where concerns are not acted on.
Another area of focus is SROs. I know that many colleagues are
interested in this point. We fully agree with the need to improve
how senior responsible owners are supported and much work has
gone into upskilling and supporting SROs, ensuring that they have
the time and space to focus on delivering their programmes and
can build skills through the Major Projects Leadership
Academy.
Today, four in every five of our major project SROs are
committing at least half their time to leading their
programmes—half the Army’s 19 SROs dedicate 100% of their time.
We also agree in principle with Mr Sheldon’s presumption for a
minimum tenure, subject to compatibility with employment law.
Finally, the report comments extensively on a culture that led to
issues not being escalated and makes recommendations to improve
that and the flow of information. Transparency has improved since
the period of this report. For Ajax, there are detailed updates
through the SRO to Ministers that ensure the potential issues are
exposed early should they arise in the future. Processes will be
further strengthened through the defence acquisition operating
model and guidance. Work is also under way to implement a project
delivery data strategy to strengthen the use of data to both
support performance reporting and assist in early identification
of issues. Of course, the main aim of commissioning this review
was to learn lessons to improve procurement—not just on Ajax, but
across the MOD’s programmes.
Ultimately, the core of our intent is to ensure that the
equipment we procure for the British armed forces is of the
highest possible standard and, furthermore, that our service
personnel have faith in the system and the taxpayer has faith in
our spending of money from the public purse. Quite simply, we
need to deliver change across the Department, turning widespread
desire for acquisition reform into tangible reality, in
particular driving increased pace and agility into acquisition,
so that we can keep pace with technology and maintain our
competitive edge.
Although I recognise the many challenges in this programme to
date and the need to learn lessons, I would stress that there is
already intense work under way in the Department—especially at
DE&S—to improve performance, with encouraging signs. For
example, between December 2020 to December 2022 we saw a
reduction from 6.1 years to 5.1 years in the time that it takes
to go from outline business case to delivering equipment into the
hands of our armed forces.
In further positive news, I hope the House will welcome the
significant progress made to recover the Ajax programme. I can
confirm that, as of Tuesday afternoon, the Household Cavalry has
been undergoing standard Army field training on Salisbury plain
in a range of Ajax vehicles. Focused on individual and crew
training, this step marks the restarting of British Army training
on these sophisticated vehicles, and I hope underlines that this
project really has turned the corner. Indeed, last Friday I had
the great privilege of visiting Bovington to experience the Ajax
vehicle at first hand.
I am pleased to report that the soldiers I met described the
vehicle and its capabilities as “night and day”—a phrase used
repeatedly—compared with their current equipment. In describing
Ajax’s strengths, the soldiers I spoke to emphasised the
platform’s high mobility, increased firepower from the new cannon
and a highly sophisticated sensor suite that really helps them do
their job, representing in totality a very real and positive step
change in capability—all packaged in a vehicle with high levels
of crew protection and survivability. As training increases
across other field Army units on the 44 vehicles already
delivered, in parallel General Dynamics’s personnel in Wales
continue to run their production lines to build the operationally
deployable vehicles, with the end goal of 589 fully operational
vehicles by 2029.
To conclude, I reiterate my gratitude to Mr Sheldon and his team
for their considerable efforts and for distilling his findings
into clear lessons and recommendations for the future. Our focus
now is on understanding and applying those lessons, ensuring that
they are implemented in the armoured cavalry and other major
defence programmes, as well as ensuring that we deliver the
game-changing capability that Ajax will provide to the British
Army as quickly as possible. I commend this statement to the
House.
Madam Deputy Speaker ( )
I call the shadow Minister.
12.10pm
(Islwyn) (Lab/Co-op)
Before I start, if you will allow me, Madam Deputy Speaker, I
want to pay tribute to , our former colleague, given
the sad news that she recently passed away. She was a doughty
champion for social justice and was the greatest actor of this or
any other generation. I am sure further tributes will be paid in
the coming days.
What the Sheldon review has shown without a shadow of a doubt is
that Ajax is the biggest procurement failure for a decade. The
review is beyond damning. For a report to state,
“Reporting was at times lacking, or unclear, or overly
optimistic. That led to senior personnel and Ministers being
surprised to discover in late 2020 and early 2021 that the
programme was at much greater risk than they had
appreciated”,
is frankly embarrassing.
There is no place to hide any longer. The failure to manage this
contract was on this Conservative Government’s watch. It was they
who allowed the relationship with General Dynamics to break down
to such an extent that every time Ajax was mentioned, here or in
the press, there was fevered speculation that the contract was
about to be cancelled. That has caused anxiety for the Army and
above all for the workers in General Dynamics in both Merthyr
Tydfil and Oakdale in my own Islwyn constituency. Even the threat
of losing 400 jobs would be devastating for the south Wales
economy.
This programme has cost £5.5 billion and has been running for 13
years, but has yet to deliver one deployable vehicle. If this was
the private sector, heads would roll, so I ask the Minister this:
has any action been taken against anyone responsible for this
mess? What new procedures have already been put in place on other
major programmes to stop similar mistakes happening? Ministers
must ensure that our NATO obligations are met in full, but,
whether it is Ajax, delays to Wedgetail or a modern war-fighting
division, NATO must have concerns. Have any been raised with the
Government about Ajax?
I well remember the sense of excitement from workers at Oakdale
when this contract was signed in 2010, just after I was elected.
The Ajax contract was then labelled a game changer, not only for
south Wales, but for the Army. It is truly sad that we have
arrived at a point where Ajax has become a byword for waste and
incompetence.
Workers at General Dynamics should have been listened to, but
they were not. There was a
“lack of appreciation of diverse and contrary voices, especially
from those working on the ‘shopfloor’. These voices were not
fully included, and were too easily dismissed.”
Those are not my words, but the words of the report. Perhaps if
workers had been listened to, we would not be standing here
now.
As the Minister knows, Ajax is not an isolated case: 37 out of 39
defence equipment contracts being run by the Ministry of Defence
are marked red or amber by the National Audit Office. That
includes Morpheus, which is extremely important to our armed
forces. Have the problems with that programme’s communications
system been fixed, or are they unfixable? What contingency plans
are being made for Morpheus?
For a contract as important as Ajax, with so much speculation
around it, it is amazing that we have not had an oral statement
on Ajax since December 2021. For too long, the Government have
avoided scrutiny on this issue. On this and other future
contracts, will the Minister commit to giving regular updates to
the House? We are, after all, ensuring soldiers’ safety—the most
important thing about the contract—and spending taxpayers’ money.
I find myself in agreement with the Minister when he says that
change has to come. It is not a moment too soon.
I begin by agreeing with the hon. Gentleman on ; I do not think she was in
the House when I was here, but she was an amazing actress and I
join in his sentiments and echo them entirely.
I recognise that the hon. Gentleman is not just the shadow
spokesman but has a clear constituency interest, and I respect
that. He talks about fevered speculation and the impact on the
workforce, and I totally understand that. We do not want to see
that. He talks about coming to the House: I am here today to be
absolutely clear with everyone about the latest position. In
fact, my colleague the Paymaster General regularly updated the
House on the position around Ajax when he was the Minister. My
predecessor, now the Lord Chancellor, also issued a written
statement earlier this year that was very detailed about the
programme, so I think we have been consistent in updating the
House.
On some of the hon. Gentleman’s specific questions, he asked
about action on individuals. What we said when commissioning this
review was that disciplinary action would be taken only if there
was evidence of gross misconduct, and Mr Sheldon found no
evidence of misconduct, let alone gross misconduct. That is the
clear reason why individual action has not been taken.
In terms of action across programmes, I point the hon. Gentleman
to the very significant investment by the Army of £70 million
over the next 10 years in Army procurement programmes, including
in the past two years a doubling in the number of SROs and a
doubling of the amount of time that SROs spend on their
responsible major projects. Those are significant
investments.
I also point out to the hon. Gentleman some of the improvements
we have seen. I accept that we need to go further but, if I may
draw a contrast, this is not the first review of acquisition.
Bernard Gray issued an independent “Review of Acquisition for the
Secretary of State for Defence” in 2009, which described a poorly
performing procurement system. That review found that
“the average programme overruns by 80% or c.5 years from the time
specified at initial approval through to in service dates”,
and that was under a previous Government.
These problems have been around for some time and it is
disappointing. I have pointed to the improvements we have seen,
but let me be absolutely clear: the ultimate reason we have this
report is to learn lessons and the way we respond to it is to
deliver a fundamentally better acquisition system. I totally
agree with the hon. Gentleman on that and I hope we can all work
together to that end.
Madam Deputy Speaker ( )
I would like to just take this opportunity to add my thoughts
about , as I can see there are
colleagues in the Chamber who were here in the House at the same
time as her. She was a wonderful colleague and a great Minister,
and I think we all want to send our condolences to her family. I
call the Chair of the Defence Committee.
(Bournemouth East) (Con)
May I immediately associate myself with your kind words about
, Madam Deputy Speaker?
We now have in the Chamber not one, but three current or former
procurement Ministers who bear the scars of this project. I am
pleased that we are able to discuss the matter so openly and I
commend the recent work that the MOD has done to get on top of
the issue.
Ajax is now a case study that the MOD and DNS should use on how
not to do procurement. This is all about the British Army’s recce
vehicle. The current one being used, the Scimitar, was introduced
in 1971. It is good to hear that the soldiers the Minister met
said that the replacement is better than the last—that is
brilliant, because it was built in 1971. Ajax’s journey has been
miserable. It started in 2010 and the delivery date was 2017, yet
it is not expected to enter service until 2030. Something very
serious has gone wrong.
I absolutely welcome Clive Sheldon’s report. The Committee will
look into that in more detail and, rather fortuitously, a
Sub-Committee study on procurement, by my right hon. Friend the
Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), is currently
under way. I am sure that he will have more words on how we will
digest the report in more detail.
The Minister covered some of the issues. Concerns include the
relationships between different entities within, or associated
with, the MOD. The senior responsible officer has been criticised
for not being a single point of contact or owning the actual
project itself but having to have a number of projects going
concurrently. Concerns got stuck because of people taking a rigid
view of their remits. It is not just with Ajax that there is a
problem; there is also with the land warfare capability. We have
similar problems with the main battle tank and the armoured
fighting vehicle. I hope that those problems will be addressed
when the defence Command Paper comes out.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Chairman of the Select
Committee. Of course, we are absolutely committed to engaging
with his Committee and, indeed, with the Sub-Committee, before
which I will appear next week. I was born in 1974. He makes a
striking point about the existing vehicle being from 1971—it is
the same age as my elder brother. I take his point that one might
therefore expect servicemen to say that it is night and day.
I put great store by meeting those on the frontline, and I will
always continue to do that. It was a great privilege to go to
Bovington. One of the soldiers I sat next to in the Ares version
had been in a Challenger 2 when it was hit by an IED—I think it
was in Iraq or Afghanistan; he did not say. He felt confidence in
the protection. It is so important that we interact with the
soldiers on the frontline. Ultimately, that is the point: we want
to deliver a better acquisitions system for them and I look
forward to working with my right hon. Friend’s Committee to that
end.
Madam Deputy Speaker ( )
I call the SNP spokesperson.
(West
Dunbartonshire) (SNP)
Let me associate myself with the comments about the former Member
for Hampstead and Kilburn—a great actor, but, I have to say to
Labour colleagues, a great socialist, who will be deeply missed.
I express my condolences to Labour group Members—a great loss to
socialism.
I have sat on the Defence Select Committee for almost five years.
I have sat through enough evidence sessions and seen enough gloss
poured over the evident shortcomings of this programme by
Ministers and officials alike to treat today’s statement with
much scepticism. Despite the fact that we are seeing various
cheaper competitor platforms to Ajax tested in the theatre in
Ukraine before our very eyes, we continue with what I think is an
absolute classic 24-carat bespoke option straight out of Main
Building’s fevered imagination. Today’s news is telling us that
Ajax will not be ready until the end of the decade—the Minister
may correct me if I am wrong—meaning that a full 20 years will
have passed between concept and deployment. That is, frankly,
unforgivable.
Yet so many of us across the Chamber would tell us today that it
does not have to be like this. To give just one allied example,
Norway has recently terminated its contract for the NH90
helicopters after problems were found, and will return all those
helicopters while demanding a full refund. What is stopping the
MOD from doing the same with Ajax and General Dynamics?
As we have talked about Ukraine, if we eventually ever see any of
these vehicles deployed in the field, would the Minister be happy
for the UK to supply them to a country fighting for its survival
against a technically advanced adversary?
I did not have the pleasure of appearing before the hon.
Gentleman in the Select Committee. Obviously, we bring forward
this capability to ensure that it can add huge capability on the
frontline when it really matters—that is what it is being tested
for. That is why it is really good news that the Army is now
training on that vehicle at Salisbury Plain. Of course, that has
happened much later than we wanted. That is why we are here and
have the Sheldon report. Ultimately, we want to improve our
acquisitions system, but procurement can be complex, even for
simple things such as ferries, as the Scottish Government have
themselves discovered.
(Rayleigh and Wickford)
(Con)
The Ajax programme has been an absolute debacle, first initiated
in 2010. Thirteen years and some £4 billion later, we still do
not have a new armoured vehicle in frontline service. We will not
have it until late 2025, and it will not be fully in service
until 2030. This report starkly reveals in exquisite, agonising
detail just how massively bureaucratic and broken the MOD’s
procurement really is. With war under way in Ukraine, will the
Minister assure the House that he is now genuinely personally
committed to root-and-branch reform of how we buy military
equipment in this country? The taxpayer and our armed forces
deserve no less.
It is no exaggeration to say that no one in this Chamber has
greater passion on the subject of procurement and acquisition
reform than my right hon. Friend. I look forward to appearing
before his Sub-Committee next week to discuss the important role
of Defence Equipment and Support, on which, of course, so much of
the report is focused. He is absolutely right: we need
fundamentally to improve acquisition. A key reason for that is
technology. We have to have a system that is faster, leaner and
more agile so that we can respond more quickly to evolving
technology. It must be self-evident to us all from the theatre in
Ukraine—the way that uncrewed systems, one-way attack drones and
all the rest of it are being used—that war is changing rapidly
and we need to respond to that. Our acquisitions system needs to
be able to do so, too.
(Warley) (Lab)
May I first express concern that there was in the Minister’s
statement no estimate of the extra cost that will be incurred or
of the capability gap? To echo the comments of others, the
excellent workforce in Merthyr Tydfil are certainly not to blame
in this debacle. Indeed, one of the issues highlighted in the
report is that they were not listened to when they expressed
concerns about the progress of the project. What I am unclear
about is why, yet again, no one is to blame. It is probably
because Ministers change so quickly that they can evade
responsibility. Certainly, the system, and individuals’ roles in
it, are to blame.
Why did we need a KC and a year of examination to deal with the
blindingly obvious failures in the procurement system, of which
this programme is merely an extreme example? Why did Ministers
not do a rapid assessment and get on with the job? Will the
Minister actually get on with changing the system and not let the
natural inertia within the civil service get back to business as
usual, as we have seen so often before and as we are seeing again
in health with the vaccines programme—this system is failing the
British people and, in this case, the British armed forces—or
will a successor stand up there and make the same lame excuses in
a few months’ time?
I have the greatest of respect for the right hon. Gentleman’s
experience as a former Defence Minister. There are three points
to address. In relation to the cost, it was a fixed-price
contract. The point about the workforce is extremely important.
As I said in responding to the shadow spokesperson, the hon.
Member for Islwyn (), I am seized of that point.
The defence sector is incredibly important to every single part
of the United Kingdom, but particularly to Wales and in terms of
General Dynamics UK.
Finally, the right hon. Gentleman asks why there was the need for
all this time and a KC. If only there were such a simple answer.
This is incredibly complex territory: 10,000 pages of evidence
and 70 people interviewed on complex matters. It has taken time,
but we now have the report in front of us and the key thing, as I
have said, is to learn the lessons from it.
(North Wiltshire) (Con)
I welcome the sharp and cleansing light that the report will
shine into the shambolic Ajax programme and, by extension, into
the whole of the defence procurement programme, which has been a
problem—we have been saying so for years. The report shines a
light into it. I very much welcome the Minister’s commitment to
listening to the lessons learned from the report and to change
things fundamentally in wider procurement. In that context, will
he let us know when the defence Command Paper is due out—it will
presumably reflect some of those lessons—and, in particular,
whether a defence industrial strategy will be published
separately or alongside the Command Paper, and whether it will
genuinely reflect the changes that he intends to make?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. We are hoping to publish the
Command Paper imminently, and it is certainly my hope that it
will contain important statements on the issue of acquisition
reform. For me, it is an absolute priority; obviously, I would
say that as the Minister for Defence Procurement.
My hon. Friend referred to the defence and security industrial
strategy. The key point about that is that we see the defence
industry as part of our military capability. That has never been
more the case, because of the urgent strategy that we need to get
replenishment under way due to the stocks we have gifted—for
entirely the right reasons—to Ukraine. He makes a very good
point.
(Tiverton and Honiton)
(LD)
I would like to build on the searching question from the right
hon. Member for Warley (). The Government announced in
March that they would resume payments for Ajax towards the £5.5
billion cost. We had been expecting the CVR(T)––combat vehicle
reconnaissance (tracked)—to be retired this year and for Warrior
to be retired in 2025, but if Ajax is not to reach full operating
capability until 2029 at the earliest, how will the capability
gap be closed? If that is by extending Warrior, how much
additional taxpayer’s money will be spent on extending the life
of Warrior?
The hon. Gentleman asks a very good question. Obviously, it is
important that the Army is satisfied with the capability it has,
so that it can fulfil its key operational requirements. I am
assured that that is the case. Inevitably, if there is delay in
one capability coming forward, there will be some impact. We
estimate that there is a cost of roughly £200 million to extend
the life of Warrior and Challenger 2 in response to delay in this
programme and the timescale in relation to Boxer coming
forward.
(Wrexham) (Con)
At its height, the Ajax project supported 850 jobs across Oakdale
and Merthyr and a further 22 Welsh small and medium-sized
enterprises. That is considerable investment in Wales and a void
we cannot easily fill. Paragraph 7.8 of the Sheldon review
details a number of examples of personnel feeling that there was
not a “psychologically safe” environment in the MOD to raise
concerns, as it would be “career limiting”, despite Joint Service
Publication 492. This meant that “optimism bias” towards the
project succeeding ran riot. How is the Minister going to change
the culture, because that is not procedural?
My hon. Friend, who speaks with the expertise of a former Army
officer and someone who serves on the Defence Committee, has hit
the nail on the head in terms of the issue of optimism bias.
[Interruption.] Did I say “former Minister”? I correct the record
if I said that, but she is certainly on the Defence
Committee.
Mr Ellwood
No, she was a Minister!
I apologise; she is a former Minister. She knows what she is
talking about—that is for certain. She made an extremely
important point about optimism bias. It may be that I was a bit
pessimistic in my answer.
This is a serious point, because Mr Sheldon talks about optimism
bias at length. Obviously, the new initial operating capability
and full operating capability are much later than we wanted them
to be, but I think what happened is that DE&S sat down with
General Dynamics and said, “This time we’ve got to be realistic.
Let’s have a programme we can actually deliver to.” I know it is
disappointing, but that is the key thing; we want to actually get
this equipment delivered.
My hon. Friend’s point about having psychological confidence to
speak up is incredibly important, and she is a champion on that.
We conduct the pan-Defence people survey, and the last iteration
of the survey asked questions in relation to psychological
confidence—are people confident in coming forward and challenging
the system? In the last survey, the Army was eight percentage
points above the civil service benchmark, so there is improvement
happening in this space.
(Strangford) (DUP)
I thank the Minister for his statement. This report makes for
hard reading, and yet the humility with which he has accepted the
critique is to be admired in these days of blame-shift. Mistakes
were made; that is clear. It is also clear that transparency and
efficiency go hand in hand. Will he confirm that the application
of these lessons and new procedures will be armed forces-wide and
that every officer stationed in Northern Ireland and Wales, and
from the top of Scotland to the tip of England, will be made
fully aware of the dangers of doing what has been done before and
will embrace these changes for the better?
It is always a pleasure to receive questions from the hon.
Gentleman; we always keep the best until last on the Opposition
Benches, in my view. It is a matter of pride for me that I will
be going to Northern Ireland to mark Armed Forces Week starting
next Saturday, and I am looking forward to that immensely. I can
confirm to him that I will not blame-shift; I will take
responsibly. I am the Minister for Defence Procurement: I have
the responsibility of delivering a better procurement system, and
that must apply across the forces, as he rightly says.
(Bracknell) (Con)
Notwithstanding the technical and procurement difficulties that
have been reported, and the Sheldon review, which I welcome, Ajax
has probably had more TLC than any British-made platform in
history. Members may feel free to accuse me of optimism bias, but
does the Minister agree that when it is finally rolled off the
production line, it will be an excellent platform and fit for
export?
My hon. Friend speaks with huge experience as a former senior
Army officer, and he is absolutely right. I referred to visiting
Bovington last Friday. For the soldiers there, Ajax is a step
change from the vehicle from 1971, but there is another very
serious point. They talked about the extra lethality of the
cannon, the manoeuvrability and the amazing sensors in that
machine, which gives them such huge oversight of the battlefield.
It has great capability.
On my hon. Friend’s final point, as someone who is passionate
about exportability and our defence sector exporting around the
world, I would like to see it get to that phase, but the good
news is that we have got it out there, and the Army is now
training on it.
(South Dorset) (Con)
I commend the Minister—a conscientious Minister, if ever there
was one—and his predecessor, my right hon. and learned Friend the
Member for Cheltenham (), to whom we have spoken on many
occasions in the Defence Committee, on which I sit. I know that
they are just as alarmed by this as we all are.
We have to learn the lesson about attention to detail. On our
visit to General Dynamics, there were two sets of headphones on
the table. One set was used by the civilian operators, and one
was used by the military, for which the vehicle was being built.
The civilian one had double protection, but the military one did
not, so when the military used their headphones, it affected
their hearing. That was 10 years after the vehicle had been
built. As it took another while to drive this vehicle, as we can
no longer afford to do so, it took another year before the fault
was eventually found. It is attention to detail, quite apart from
everything else, that we need, to ensure that this never happens
again.
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point and reminds us about the
background of the noise and vibration issues. It is my
understanding that part of that was because this vehicle came
forward in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, and had what is
called a rigid body design, which has its own characteristics of
noise and vibration. He is right to highlight the issue of the
headphones. We do not believe that the first headset that was
used was responsible for those noise and vibration issues, but
the good thing is that we worked with General Dynamics and
brought in the second headset. That is the one I wore one on
Friday. To put it crudely, there is a smaller black one that goes
right into your ears—a bit like the sort of thing we are given
when we go on a factory visit—and then there are the bigger
external ones that sit on top of the helmet. It was very
effective.
This has been a very difficult programme, and I have been
completely open in acknowledging that to the House, but I believe
that we can use this moment as an opportunity genuinely to
improve our acquisition system.
Mr Deputy Speaker ( )
I thank the Minister for his statement and for responding to
questions for over half an hour.
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