Moved by Lord Davies of Brixton That the Grand Committee takes note
of the Pension Protection Fund and Occupational Pension
Schemes (Levy Ceiling) (No. 2) Order 2023, given the impact of
current increases in the cost of living on pensions payable by
the Pension Protection Fund Relevant document: 30th
Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee Lord
Davies of Brixton (Lab) My Lords, this order is routine and has
little practical...Request free trial
Moved by
That the Grand Committee takes note of the Pension
Protection Fund and Occupational Pension Schemes (Levy
Ceiling) (No. 2) Order 2023, given the impact of current
increases in the cost of living on pensions payable by
the Pension Protection
Fund
Relevant document: 30th Report from the Secondary Legislation
Scrutiny Committee
(Lab)
My Lords, this order is routine and has little practical impact
on the PPF. The levy that is currently payable is only 16% of the
cap set by the order. However, having it before us provides an
opportunity to discuss the operation of what is becoming—a bit
under the radar—one of the country’s biggest financial
institutions.
I have a particular interest as I like to think that the PPF, or
at least the name, was my idea. Back in 1995, following the
Maxwell scandal, I drafted a paper for the TUC that proposed,
among other things, that there should be a central discontinuance
fund that should be called—wait for it—the Pensions Protection
Fund, or PPF. Of course, the proposal was not accepted at that
time, but it was introduced subsequently in the Pensions Act
2004.
Before getting to the focus of my speech, I have a couple of
questions. First, the Minister should provide the Committee with
some explanation of the error that was made with this order. I am
not trying to embarrass anyone, but it surely suggests excessive
pressure on DWP staff, so the question is: has the situation been
rectified?
Secondly, as was raised in the 30th report from the Secondary
Legislation Scrutiny Committee, can the Minister tell us where we
have got to in following the recommendations in the departmental
review? I will highlight two recommendations from the review.
First, recommendation 2 is that
“the DWP and the PPF work together to understand the implications
of the PPF’s funding position in light of expected future
developments in the population of Defined Benefit (DB) pension
schemes and plan well ahead for any legislative changes that
might be needed; for example, to address what happens to any
funding which is surplus to requirements”.
It is worth noting that the current legislation says nothing
about what should happen to any assets that, in the event, are
not needed to pay members’ benefits. Given the PPF’s policy of
building up a substantial buffer that, even on its own figures,
is unlikely to be needed, the question needs to be addressed.
Any money that is left over cannot go back to the employers,
because things will have moved on and employers will have moved
on. It also seems wrong that it should go to the Government. The
only just solution is for it to be used, as far as possible, to
provide benefits for members. In practice, this means that the
buffer should not be excessive. In these circumstances, where
there is no residual legatee, bigger is not necessarily better.
It might be unjust, and its level therefore becomes not just a
technical issue but an issue of fairness to members.
Recommendation 6 states:
“The PPF should consider how the Board could hear more directly
about the member perspective to inform its deliberations”.
It should be a matter of concern that currently there is no
formal procedure to reflect the interests of members. So what
thought are the Government giving specifically to these two
recommendations in the context of the review?
These two recommendations also bring me to focus on the central
issue of my remarks: the impact of high rates of inflation on
pensions in payment from the PPF and the scope for the fund’s
assets to be used to protect their real value. The problem is
that the limits on annual pension increases are severe in current
circumstances: none at all for benefits accrued before 1997 and
only 2.5% per annum for benefits accrued thereafter. Until
recently, the PPF operated in a period of relatively low
inflation. The problem of inflation has always been there, but it
has become more salient now we have moved into a period of
materially higher rates of inflation—most obviously in the
current year, but the issue is not going to go away.
The net effect of these limits is that the real value of members’
pensions has been cut significantly. Pre-1997 benefits have
already been cut by up to one-third, while benefits accrued after
that date have fallen by up to one-sixth. It is important to
understand that these are reductions so far; they are going to
continue. There is bound to be another cut next January, which
will be based on the level of inflation this coming May. It is
potentially another 7% if we believe the OBR’s forecasts. In the
longer term, I am a relative pessimist about inflation —but even
optimists do not expect a return to CPI increases of 0% or even
2.5%. So the need to protect the real value of members’ benefits
will only increase.
The reductions in the real value of members’ benefits must be
seen in context: the funding position of the PPF, in its own
words, is “strong”. As a result, the PPF levy has, quite rightly,
been reduced and there are plans to reduce it further. I have no
problem with that. According to the PPF’s latest annual report
and accounts, the scheme held £39 billion in assets as at 31
March 2022. At that point, the PPF estimated that, of that
figure, £11.7 billion—almost £12 billion—was in excess of what it
needed to pay every current member and their dependants their
compensation for life. This represented a funding ratio of
137.9%. I think that would be broadly recognised as going a bit
beyond “strong”.
Given the experience of the last 12 months, it is likely that the
position this March will be materially stronger. It also needs to
be understood that these figures are already being calculated—I
presume—on a prudent basis. The general practice is to undertake
these valuations on a prudent basis. Unless the PPF advises me
otherwise, I assume that this is the case here, so we have
prudence placed on top of prudence.
The problem with all this is that PPF members have not shared the
benefits of this strong funding position. Indeed, it is the
reduction in the real value of their benefits that has been one
of the contributing factors to the strong position. This
situation is wrong and should be remedied as soon as possible.
This will probably require legislation because the board of the
PPF has limited ability to pay compensation over the levels set
in the Pensions Act. The lack of increases for compensation in
respect of pre-1997 service is devastating for the members who
are affected, especially during the current cost of living
crisis.
As well as the size of the impact, it is also important to
appreciate the differential effect on various groups of members.
Information released to the trade union Prospect through a
freedom of information request shows that the lack of inflation
protection for pre-1997 service disproportionately impacts women
and older members. There is no rational justification for this
discriminatory treatment. Ministers have sought to justify the
discrimination by saying that there was no statutory right to
increases before 1997—true, but there was no statutory right to
have an occupational pension at all. The idea that the initial
pension is the real benefit and the increases are an optional
extra is fundamentally wrong.
In practice, the majority of pre-1997 scheme members were either
accruing benefits to which they were entitled through RPI
increases, typically capped at 5%, or were in the many schemes
funded on the basis that such increases were going to be provided
and members had a reasonable expectation of receiving them. In
other words, such increases were part and parcel of the package
of scheme benefits, and their effective exclusion from protection
must be open to legal challenge. Such a challenge becomes more
likely as higher rates of inflation persist. So we should, first,
provide higher rates of protection to better reflect modern rates
of inflation and, secondly, eliminate the arbitrary and unfair
difference in treatment for compensation in respect of pre-1997
and post-1997 service.
On a Brexit note, it is a matter of much regret that the Retained
EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill does not provide for the
retention of the minimum levels of compensation established in
the Hampshire and Bauer cases. When that Bill was debated in the
Commons, a Minister even went so far as to state that the
Hampshire case
“is a clear example of where an EU judgment conflicts with the
United Kingdom Government’s policies”.—[Official Report, Commons,
Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill Committee, 22/11/22;
col. 169.]
To conclude, is it the Government’s intention to cut the
potential benefits that members might receive from the PPF to
below the level to which they are entitled at present? I beg to
move.
(Lab)
My Lords, the PPF provides real support to some 295,000 pension
scheme members who have entered it, including through the £1.1
billion paid out in compensation each year. It provides security
to those in current DB schemes who may need to call on it in
future. Add to those figures the Financial Assistance Scheme,
which covers a further 150,000 members and, following the
Pensions Act 2004, is administered by but not funded through the
PPF, and we are providing a blanket of considerable security to
heading for half a million people.
It is very important to remember that, before the 2004 Act,
members could lose all or much of their pension savings when
employers became insolvent or simply walked away from their
liabilities. When the Labour Government created the PPF, there
were many doomsayers who predicted that it would not be
sustainable. In fact, the PPF has defied those doubters: it is
financially resilient, has been well run, and has weathered the
various economic storms that have occurred over the past 15
years.
18:45:00
However, the financial resilience of the PPF over the very long
term still needs careful consideration. I probably take more
comfort from the cosiness of prudence than my noble friend does,
but the past few years have seen a significant improvement in
overall scheme funding through increased employer contributions,
rising interest rates and, more recently, rising gilt yields. I
acknowledge that, but there is always the risk of the economic
environment worsening and future large claims on the PPF. There
will be a decline in the number of PPF levy payers resulting from
schemes transferring into the PPF, and the number of schemes
likely to buy out with an insurance company. Schemes underfunding
is one of the biggest risks that the PPF faces, and there are
still scenarios in which scheme funding could deteriorate. We
have seen rapid movements in the level of scheme funding. What we
have witnessed over the past 15 years confirms that.
The funding regime for the remaining open schemes is also
important. Many of the larger such DB schemes have considerable
deficits on a Section 179 basis—that is, the basis for funding to
provide a PPF level of benefits. The Purple Book shows that open
schemes are around 20% worse funded than closed schemes, on a
Section 179 PPF benefits level basis. Such schemes presenting to
the PPF could have a significant impact on the PPF’s funding, if
they made a claim. There is also a long tail of small schemes
which, together with stress schemes, collectively constitute, as
I understand it, over one-third of the remaining 5,100 DB
schemes. The estimates suggest that the annual capacity of the
buy-out market is £50 billion to £100 billion, but it is likely
to be the stronger schemes that buy out, with the less
financially resilient schemes left in the PPF universe.
I mention all those things because, although the PPF is resilient
when looked at today, we know that the risks that it has to be
embrace and deal with can move against it. What work is being
done to assess the impact and extent of a future decline in the
number of levy players and the implications for the annual levy
and the financial resilience of the PPF? In the light of the
PPF’s current improved resilience, I understand that the DWP and
the PPF are jointly considering the potential for more
flexibility in setting the levy. Is the Minister able to report
on when we are likely to know the outcome of those
deliberations?
Improved PPF financial resilience, against a background of
current high inflation levels, is bound to raise questions about
current compensation levels paid to scheme members who entered
the PPF. Looked at over the long term, an important part of
maintaining the financial resilience of the PPF and the fairness
towards levy payers has been the level at which PPF compensation
payments are set. As my noble friend spelled out, current
compensation payments are inflation indexed only on pension
benefits accrued since 1997, not on benefits accrued before then,
and the index is capped at 2.5%.
Understandably my noble friend is concerned that, in the face of
high inflation and its impact on members of the PPF, the annual
levy for 2023 is being reduced to 16% of the levy ceiling, given
that there are some strong arguments for saying that the level of
compensation payments should be improved. Again, I go back to my
natural affection for prudence. Changing the PPF compensation
levels, specifically to provide improved inflation indexing,
would have a material financial impact on the PPF and wider
implications for DB schemes, and, by association, the funding of
the Financial Assistance Scheme. Changes to indexing would need
consideration of the level of increase on the PPF’s future
liabilities and the impact on the number and size of claims that
the PPF would receive in the future, and it would almost
certainly raise arguments about the cost of backdating any index
payments.
We would also have to deal with schemes that had wound up outside
the PPF through buyout at a level of benefit above current PPF
benefits but which, if compensation payments are increased, would
have been better off if they had transferred into the PPF. More
schemes will become underfunded on a Section 179 basis. In
looking at ways in which compensation could be improved,
particularly for benefits accrued prior to 1997—I am hesitating
on my memory—there are some quite serious issues to reflect
on.
I am aware that the Work and Pensions Committee is looking at the
system and the level of PPF compensation. Without treading on its
toes, I ask the Minister whether there are any plans to increase
the transparency of reporting on the department’s consideration
of the annual levy raised, and about the scope for increasing the
level of compensation to members in a high-inflation environment,
and the need to ensure financial resilience of the PPF in the
face of other risks evolving over time.
The other issue is that the PPF will be entering its own maturing
phase, which will require it to have a greater focus on
maintaining financial resilience. Reading the various papers that
we had before us, I did wonder whether, in those circumstances,
the PPF is right to decide to build reserves at a significantly
slower pace than it had been building them. Certainly, in the DB
scheme world, the regulator often encourages DB schemes to get
assets in while the covenant is strong, and not wait until it is
weak and seek the money. I wondered whether it is such a good
idea to slow down the building at pace of reserves.
Finally, is it possible to update the Committee on the DWP’s view
on the maturing of the PPF, which is a kind of shift in its
position? I appreciate that it may not be possible to make a
verbal response to that, but a written response would be
helpful.
(Con)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on securing
this debate; it is an important one. At the outset, I say that I
believe that the Pension Protection
Fund has done and is doing an excellent job, and member
experience in the PPF seems to be very positive—for me, that is
one of the big tests of whether this is working well. The
administration is very efficient, and the amount of compensation
being paid is reaching those who need it, and are entitled to it,
well.
I also congratulate the noble Lord on his foresight in 1995. I
recall first becoming involved with Allied Steel and Wire and the
various other pension schemes whose members had lost their entire
pension very close to the point at which they were expecting to
start receiving it, together with all their other life private
savings —in those days, if you wanted to have any extra pension
contributions you had to put all of it into your employer’s
pension scheme. I remember reading about the proposals for a
central discontinuance fund and thinking, “If only”. It informed
my conversations with the No. 10 Policy Unit, the Treasury and
the economic advisers to the Prime Minister at the time as to
which way we needed to go to improve the situation the country
faced. Over the subsequent two to three years, more and more
pension schemes failed, and more and more members started losing
their pensions; it was a serious and heartbreaking time. Members,
having been told that they were fully protected, would have
expected that all their money was safe. They were told that,
regardless of what happened to their employer, their money was
safe and that their pension was protected—but it turned out not
to be the case.
Instead of the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, of a
central discontinuance fund, we got the actuarial profession’s
minimum funding requirement. Unbeknown to members—and, indeed, to
most pension professionals outside actuarial circles—that was
designed to deliver only a 50:50 chance of people receiving their
full pensions, and yet members, trustees and employers were told
that, on that basis, their fund was fully funded or in surplus.
Unfortunately, what happened subsequently, around the end of the
1990s, with the market crash, was that those surpluses melted
away. It looked as though the benefits had been secure but,
suddenly, the market crash made that position unsafe. We saw that
those so-called surpluses were in fact buffers against bad
markets, rather than real surpluses—you could judge that only
with hindsight in the end.
This is my concern about the Pension Protection
Fund I absolutely want to try to ensure that anyone who has
a pension insured by the Pension Protection
Fund receives as much as possible. If there were a secure
way of ensuring that they did not fall behind while we are
suffering this cost of living crisis, I would be the first to
support it. My thinking has perhaps been coloured by my
experience during those dreadful years, before we got the
Financial Assistance Scheme sorted out in 2007—it started around
2008—of seeing people who thought that their pensions were in
surplus and that their position was secure finding that, because
markets had moved suddenly and unexpectedly and in a way that had
never been properly forecast, their pension had disappeared.
I also believe that, although the PPF looks as though it is in
surplus now, we need to address what happens should there be a
severe economic dislocation causing some of the huge pension
schemes, which currently seem safe—and even some of the open
schemes —to fail and fall into the same problem. This is an
insurance policy rather than a pension, which, for me, is an
important distinction.
I would love the Government to find a way to underwrite more
generous increases for the Pension Protection
Fund I am particularly mindful of the fact that, before
1997, benefits had no inflation protection at all, yet many
schemes—but by no means all—offered full inflation linking, or at
least up to 5%. In that pre-1997 period, the older the member was
when their scheme failed, the more pension they lost as a result
of the failure, because they would have had more accrual.
I support the concept that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is
promoting: that in a time of economic difficulty, with inflation
roaring away, we do not want to leave pensioners behind. It is
clearly the case that the Pension Protection
Fund is, to some degree, leaving pension members behind in
real terms. To some degree, it was modelled on the American PBGC,
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Generally speaking, in
America there is no inflation protection at all on these DB
schemes, so the UK has always been a little unusual in that
regard. Having said that, it makes sense to look at the structure
of the levy and I echo the questions for my noble friend about
plans for the future management of it.
19:00:00
Finally, to pick up on the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord
Davies, on the arbitrary and unfair treatment of pre-1997
members, that applies particularly strongly to members in the
Financial Assistance Scheme. This scheme is not funded by all
other pension schemes or employers; it is a part of government
spending. Members in the Financial Assistance Scheme were never
told that there was a Pension Protection
Fund that would reduce their pension when they reached
retirement; they were always told that their pension was
completely “safe and protected by law”, to cite government
documents sent to them at the time. They would be particularly at
risk, because their schemes failed before the schemes that
belonged to the PPF. They would be at risk of losing more
because, by definition, they had more pre-1997 benefits.
May I put in a plea? Given that the Financial Assistance Scheme’s
membership is more than half the size of the membership of the
PPF, if there were any consideration of increasing the generosity
of inflation protection for members of the Pension
Protection Fund even on a one-year basis, for example could
that be applied to the Financial Assistance Scheme as well? It
would be an option to offer them extra on a temporary period. On
that basis, does my noble friend know, or will he write to me
about, how much extra money the Government have so far added to
the assets that were gathered in from Financial Assistance Scheme
schemes to supplement the amounts paid out for members of those
schemes?
I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on this. I echo the
words of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, who knows so much in
this area, about a need to be mindful of the longer-term
potential risks. I look forward to hearing my noble friend’s
response.
(Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken, especially my
noble friend for giving us this
opportunity to reflect on the role and operation of
the Pension Protection
Fund
My noble friend Lady Drake was right to remind the Committee of
the huge value of the PPF to the thousands of members of DB
schemes—both those who benefit directly from the £1 billion-plus
of compensation it pays out every year and those who are happily
sailing in calm pension waters but benefit from the security of
knowing that the lifeboat is there, should they find they need
it. Certainly, every day is a school day. I have learned a
certain amount of history today, for which I thank noble Lords
who have spoken, including the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and
my noble friends on this side. They reminded me that the PPF was
created by the Labour Government to protect the hard-earned
pension savings of workers. It is important that we never take it
for granted and that we, in our time, do all we can to keep it
sustainable.
The Pensions Act 2004 requires the DWP to make an annual order to
increase the PPF levy ceiling in line with the growth in
earnings. As my noble friend Lord Davies noted, this year we have
had two orders, as the first draft omitted the relevant figures
in favour of “X”s. I do not want to make life harder for
whichever poor person found that they had done that by accident,
but I have to note that it is not the first error in recent times
that we have had in a DWP order. When I was a non-exec on boards,
we were always told that if an error is reported, the question to
ask is: is it systemic? Clearly, one error is not systemic, but
this is not the first. Can the Minister tell the Committee
whether he is confident that his department is sufficiently well
resourced with the people whose job it is to draft legislation
and make sure that it is checked before it goes out?
The levy ceiling was set in primary legislation to be uprated
annually in line with the growth in average weekly earnings, the
rationale being that this would allow the increases in the
ceiling roughly to track the increases in the pension liabilities
of DB schemes, which are, in turn, linked to members’ earnings.
In its 30th report, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
asked whether the policy of annual increase by the growth in
earnings is still producing a sensible outcome, or whether it is
far outstripping actual usage. It highlighted the gap between the
levy ceiling and the actual levy. As we have heard, in 2023-24,
the levy will be 16% of the ceiling, compared with 33% in 2022-23
and 43% in 2021-22.
The answer provided to the committee in that 30th report was
that
“PPF investment performance has consistently performed ahead of
target and combined with the PPF’s levy collection and risk
reduction strategies, has resulted in a reserve of £11.7 billion
and assets of £39 billion (as of 31 March 2022)”—
as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Davies. It was this which
enabled the drop in the levy. The recent PPF funding review
concluded that
“the PPF’s financial position has significantly strengthened in
recent years, driven principally by strong investment
performance, and a changed risk profile. As a result, the PPF is
making a step change in its approach and entering a new phase
where the focus will shift from building to maintaining its
financial resilience”.
As somebody who likes the Janet and John version, I think that
means that it has been building up reserves steadily and feels
that the time has come to build them up more slowly in
future.
The challenge for the PPF is that it has to tack a course between
levying enough for its likely needs in the year ahead while
ensuring that it is still able to bring in enough additional
revenue if it suddenly faces large claims or a significantly
riskier environment. Since it can increase the levy by only 25% a
year, the decision on the levy can never just be a short-term
consideration with a 12-month horizon. Is the Minister confident
that the PPF has landed in the sweet spot?
I am also interested to hear the answers to the questions raised
by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and my noble friend Lady
Drake about the consideration that is being given by the
department and the PPF as to whether there is a need for more
flexibility in the way that the levy is set and constructed.
Clearly, if the PPF is deemed to have more reserves than it
needs, it can do one of two things: reduce the levy or spend
more. My noble friend Lord Davies has come down clearly on one
side of that, namely that it should choose to spend more. He
rightly pointed out that this is a time of very high inflation
and, therefore, the impact of the 2.5% cap on indexing is being
felt particularly acutely at the moment. Clearly, that has put
pressures on all pensioners, including those who rely on PPF
payouts. My noble friend’s proposal has attracted support in
principle from the committee. The obvious question to the
Minister is: has any modelling been done on the cost of removing
or raising the cap and, if so, what can he share with us on
that—what did it show?
My noble friend Lord Davies also raised two of the questions from
the independent review of the PPF. Can the Minister tell me
whether the Government have responded to that review? I could not
find it, but that may just be because of my search skills.
Perhaps he could let us know.
I add another question that had been raised. The costs of
administering the PPF are borne by the PPF administration fund
and amounted, I gather, to £13.3 million last year. The
independent review recommended folding the administration levy
into the general PPF levy. Did that proposal find favour?
I am interested to hear the Minister’s take on this delicate
balance facing the PPF, especially as it matures. It has been
suggested that is in a healthier position than ever, but also
that, as more schemes prepare to move into buyouts, the
environment could get riskier in future than it has been in the
past. It is perhaps time for more of the workings to be made
manifest so that there is more clarity for all
stakeholders—pension schemes, savers and pensioners—as to the
balance of decisions that are being taken. I look forward to
hearing the Minister’s reply.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work
and Pensions () (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, , for providing this
opportunity to discuss the Pension Protection
Fund and Occupational Pension Schemes (Levy Ceiling) (No. 2)
Order 2023. This order enables the board of the Pension Protection
Fund to raise a pension protection levy that is sufficient
to ensure the safe funding of the compensation it provides, while
providing reassurance to business that the levy will not be set
above a certain amount in any one year.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. As
ever, I am somewhat daunted by the level of expertise, bar none,
in this Committee. A good number of questions have been raised
and, as ever, I will endeavour to answer them all—mostly at the
end of my remarks, just to manage expectations.
I emphasise the Government’s continued commitment to supporting
pensioners and protecting their hard-earned retirement savings.
Ensuring that those who have worked hard all their lives receive
a retirement income that provides them with dignity and financial
security is one of our core objectives, and so it should be. We
recognise that recent increases in the cost of living have placed
particular pressure on pensioners’ household budgets, so we are
taking action to target support specifically at pensioners.
Around 12 million pensioners in Great Britain will benefit from
the 10.1% increase to their state pensions from this month,
fulfilling the Government’s manifesto commitment to apply the
triple lock. More than 8 million pensioner households across the
UK will receive an additional £300 cost of living payment this
winter. To aid the most vulnerable, the pension credit standard
minimum guarantee has also been increased by 10.1%.
As the Committee will know, combating inflation is one of the
Government’s top priorities. Forecasts indicate that inflation is
still likely to fall sharply by the end of 2023, in line with the
Prime Minister’s pledge to reduce it by half by the end of the
year.
I will return to the Pension Protection
Fund in a moment, but first I will take a step back to
consider the wider context of the schemes it protects. I pay
tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for all that he has done;
I was interested, pleased and perhaps not surprised that he had
such a hand in the naming and setting up of the PPF—I am not sure
of the precise date—back in the 1990s. With around £1.7 trillion
of assets over 5,000 schemes and supporting nearly 10 million
members as of March 2022, the defined benefit sector is critical
for the UK population.
Set against this backdrop, the PPF’s £39 billion in assets under
management as of March 2022, including £11.7 billion in reserves,
certainly seem proportionate to the scale of its task. As of
March 2022, since its inception in 2005 the scheme has stepped in
to protect close to 300,000 members who might otherwise have
received a greatly reduced retirement income. The noble
Baronesses, Lady Drake and Lady Sherlock, referred to the success
of this.
Despite the strength of its financial position, the PPF continues
to face risks, the biggest being future claims for compensation
and increased longevity. It uses its stochastic modelling tool,
the “long-term risk model”, to help determine the funding it
requires to protect against these future risks. Like other major
financial institutions, the PPF protects against risk by holding
reserves. The size of its reserve should therefore provide
reassurance not only to existing members of the PPF but to
members of all eligible pension schemes.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked about the Pension Protection
Fund’s reserve of £11.7 billion and asked whether that could be
shared with its members—I think that was the gist of his
question. It enables the Pension Protection
Fund to protect financial security for current and future
members. As I said, despite the strength of its financial
position, the PPF continues to face a number of risks, the
biggest being future claims to compensation and increased
longevity, so there is a balance that I am sure the noble Lord
could tell me much about.
The compensation provided by the PPF makes it a critical partner
in delivering on the Government’s objective of ensuring financial
security for pensioners. The PPF provides a crucial safety net to
members of eligible pension schemes who are at risk of losing
their pensions because of the insolvency of their employer. This
safety net could not be more important in these challenging
times.
I reiterate, however, that the Pension Protection
Fund is therefore a compensation scheme; I know that my
noble friend Lady Altmann defined it as an insurance scheme,
which is fair enough. As such, it seeks not to replicate the
benefits of underfunded pension schemes but rather to ensure that
members are compensated fairly and sustainably. A balance must be
struck between the interests of those who receive compensation
and the levy payers who fund it. It is only by striking this
delicate balance, perhaps, that the long-term stability of the
PPF can be ensured.
19:15:00
As it is a safety net, the PPF indexation rules are broadly in
line with the minimum legal requirements for defined benefit
schemes, which vary depending on the time the benefits were
accrued. This means that some members receive lower levels of
indexation than they would have done had the scheme not entered
the PPF. Changes to these rules would be costly and complex, with
significant consequences for the pensions system. The PPF’s
current liabilities would increase, as would the deficits of the
schemes it protects, which use PPF compensation levels to measure
their funding. This would mean an immediate increase in costs as
well as an increase in the potential scale and likelihood of
future claims for compensation. As a result, the PPF would have
to alter its funding strategy, likely increasing the burden on
levy payers. It would not be appropriate for the Government to
increase the burden on levy payers for the purpose of providing
more generous indexation than the minimum as laid out in
legislation.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, expanded on this theme by asking why
compensation paid by the PPF does not increase in line with
inflation. As he knows, compensation based on benefits accrued
after April 1997 is increased in line with inflation up to a
maximum of 2.5%, which is broadly in line with the legal
requirements for defined benefit pension schemes. However, as I
mentioned earlier, it is a compensation scheme and was never
intended to replicate the benefits. Legislation limits what the
PPF can do and there is no discretion either to pay the uplifting
of the pre-1997 funds or to pay more than the 2.5%; I may say
more about that later.
As my noble friend Lady Altmann said, the PPF has been highly
successful in securing the funding required to pay for the
compensation that it currently provides. The strength of its
financial position, combined with improvements in the funding
levels of the schemes it protects, means that it expects to be
able to reduce its reliance on the levy. In 2023-24, it intends
to collect approximately £200 million—around half of last year’s
levy estimate. Reducing the levy will ease the burden on levy
payers without risking the long-term funding of compensation.
I thank the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for the
attention that it has paid to this instrument. I hope that the
information provided by the department about the levy ceiling has
been helpful for noble Lords’ understanding of this successful
compensation scheme. I repeat the department’s apologies for the
technical errors contained in the original version of this order.
They were spotted by the statutory instrument registrar, and this
allowed the department to act swiftly to lay this order—it also
revoked the defective order—and minimise any inconvenience.
Understandably, this matter was raised by the noble Lord, Lord
Davies.
To expand on what I have just said, as the noble Lord knows, the
technical error in the original version led to the order having
to be revoked. This order, No. 2, now revokes and replaces the
original instrument and introduces the increase in the levy
ceiling as intended. To reassure the Committee, in order to
prevent future errors of this type, the department has put in
place stronger and clearer processes to ensure accuracy in
statutory instruments; that is more of a general comment. The
department will continue to work with the PPF as it adapts to the
changing landscape of defined benefit pension schemes and takes
opportunities to enhance its role in the pension protection
network.
I turn to the questions raised in much more depth. The noble
Lord, Lord Davies, asked—this was added to by the noble Baroness,
Lady Sherlock—about the follow-up planned by our department since
the publication of the departmental review of the PPF. The
departmental review, published in December 2022, made a limited
number of recommendations that focused on finding opportunities
to enhance the profile of the PPF and take advantage of its
expertise. I can reassure the Committee that the department is
currently working with the PPF to explore the recommendations and
options for implementing them, including the funding of
the Pension Protection
Fund and improving member engagement. I hope that that gives
some answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, who asked
whether we had responded; that is where we are at the moment.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked why the Pension
Protection Fund does not pay the indexation provided for in
the scheme rules. As he will know, the rules on indexation can
vary significantly across schemes, so trying to replicate scheme
rules would introduce complexity into the broadly standardised
indexation rules. The PPF is a compensation scheme and, as such,
was never intended to replicate, and I mentioned earlier the
balance that has to be struck.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, also asked how it is fair that the
PPF indexes of pre-1997 accruals are so different from more
recent accruals. PPF’s indexation rules simply allow for benefits
accrued before and after a certain date to be treated differently
for the purposes of indexation, which broadly reflects the
statutory requirements for defined benefit pension schemes. There
is no statutory requirement for defined benefit pensions relating
to service before April 1997 to be increased when in payment,
apart from any guaranteed minimum pension element.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, and my noble friend Lady Altmann
alluded to the point about why the Government do not legislate to
introduce indexation on pre-1997 accruals. I think I may have
alluded to this earlier, but changes in the indexation rules
would significantly impact the PPF’s funding strategy and the
wider pensions system. Increasing the indexation provided on
compensation would incur significant direct costs for the
PPF.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked an interesting question about
retained EU law, particularly in respect of the Hampshire
judgment. I can give a short answer which I hope may be of help
to him, which is that the Government intend to retain the
Hampshire judgment beyond the sunset date. I hope that gives him
the answer that he was looking for—there is a nod there, which is
helpful to me.
The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, asked a number of questions, the
first being what consideration our department has made of the
fall in the levy population as a product of the rise in the
number of schemes buying out. I think that that was the gist of
her question. Stronger regulation has led to scheme funding
positions improving significantly in recent years, and the
department and the PPF have been considering the implications for
the pension protection levy. Maybe I can give some assurance by
saying that early discussions between the two organisations have
focused on the potential rebalancing of the levy, so that it is
more aligned with the evolving universe of defined benefit
schemes that the PPF is there to protect.
The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, also asked about the materiality
of increasing the indexation of the PPF payments above the 2.5%
cap, and I believe that that theme was raised by one or two other
Peers. Increasing the indexation provided on compensation would
incur significant extra direct costs, as mentioned earlier. The
deficits of eligible schemes that use the PPF levels as a way of
measuring funding would increase, and therefore the size and
likelihood of future claims would grow. I alluded to this in my
main speech; I am afraid I cannot add much more to what I have
already said.
The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, asked what consideration the
department has given in terms of the increasing maturity of the
PPF and the resulting changes to its cash flow—a slightly
different question. The PPF new funding strategy recognises that
its population is maturing and seeks to provide security for its
current membership, while holding adequate assets for its future
claims. Its investment portfolio is aimed to ensure that it has a
stable, long-term cash flow for its current membership, while
growing its reserve over a period of time.
My noble friend Lady Altmann asked about financial assistance
from the financial assistance scheme and, linked to that, there
was a theme about improving the generosity of the scheme. A brief
answer is that the indexation rules on financial assistance are
broadly in line with the legislation for pension schemes more
widely but, further to this, the financial assistance scheme is
funded from general taxation and thus this balance—this goes back
to this balance—has to be struck between the interests of members
of the schemes which are unable to secure their liabilities and
the wider taxpayer interests.
As regards a question that my noble friend asked about how much
remains of assets transferred from the financial assistance
schemes to the Treasury, that is a very specific question on
which I will have to write, which I am very happy to do.
The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, asked about DWP’s plans for
improving transparency of the PPF’s funding and indeed the levy.
The PPF publishes its annual report and accounts and consults on
the basis on which it collects the levy. That is the answer I
have, and I will consider that and look at Hansard later and see
whether I can expand on it.
(Lab)
I appreciate that there is a lot out there, but there are three
elements: the scope for raising the levy, the compensation levels
and the resilience of the PPF over time. Clearly, there is a sort
of inflection point for revisiting and managing that. It was just
about understanding that and getting more transparency around
it.
(Con)
Absolutely. That plays well into what I said in that I will
reflect on what I and the noble Baroness have said, and there may
well be a letter coming to add to the one that I will send to my
noble friend.
I will address a couple more questions before I wind up finally.
The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and indeed the noble Baroness,
Lady Sherlock, asked whether the PPF is right to build reserves
at a slower pace than it has been doing. It is a fair question
but that is, as the noble Baroness will expect me to say, very
much a matter for the PPF board.
On whether there will be an update on the levy discussions, I may
have alluded to this earlier—it was raised not only by the noble
Baroness, Lady Drake, but by my noble friend Lady Altmann and
indeed the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. I will certainly
happily make inquiries, and that will be an addition to the
letter which is growing bigger by the moment. There may be some
other questions that I have not answered, but I will certainly
look very closely with my team at Hansard.
To conclude, again I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for
providing us with this opportunity to discuss the UK’s flexible
and robust regime for funding and protecting defined benefit
pensions, which, as was mentioned, is an important subject. This
regime has enabled most schemes to weather the severe economic
downturns following the crash in 2007-08—the financial crisis, I
should better call it—and the Covid pandemic, as well as the
prolonged period of historically low interest rates. In fact, the
aggregate scheme funding position on a Pension
Protection Fund basis improved from 83.4% on 31 March 2012
to 113.1% on 31 March 2022 —an interesting statistic to reflect
on. These improvements to scheme funding mean that fewer and
fewer members of DB schemes will require the safety net of the
PPF. That is of course good news for members, who are
increasingly likely to receive their full pension entitlement.
This is progress indeed but there is more to do, although of
course we cannot eliminate all risk. When employers become
insolvent, the PPF continues to stand by as a well-funded and
responsibly managed safety net.
(Lab)
I thank the Minister for his detailed and considered response to
what I have certainly found a useful debate. I just need to say
that I do not think that the issue will go away. As I suggested,
the attrition of members’ benefits will continue, and pressure to
do something will get stronger. It would be useful if a meeting
could be organised—it is probably just as easy to do it directly
with the PPF, but Ministers and officials might like to be
involved in it as well, so I will write and suggest that. I thank
the Minister again for his attention to this important topic.
Motion agreed.
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