Defence Committee report: The Integrated Review, Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy

The Defence Select Committee has published its report The Integrated Review, Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy.

Conclusions and recommendations

Introduction

1. It is difficult not to feel a sense of déjà vu as we see British military ambitions which are not entirely matched by resources. Open conflict has returned to Europe and it is disappointing to see that the Government is not preparing for the impact of inflation and insufficient industrial capacity on the production of defence equipment as it looks to meet the new challenges. Paragraph 8)

The threat

2. In the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper, the Government identified and understood the implications of the range of complex and cascading threats faced by the UK. However, the impact of both the Afghan withdrawal and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine are being seemingly dismissed as insignificant and there appears to be no intention to re-visit the conclusions of the documents. UK Defence thus appears as arrogant and unwilling to learn lessons. Events of the last year have demonstrated that the Government was unprepared for (and in the case of Afghanistan, failed to appropriately respond to) international crises. No strategy should be set in stone nor subject to constant revision. However, there is a need for Government to be able to respond to major events—which it was manifestly not prepared for—rather than downplaying the potential implications of such geopolitical shocks. (Paragraph 21)

3. There is a need for a New Chapter update to the IR and the Defence Command Paper which takes into account the events in Afghanistan and Ukraine. The document should then set out how the analysis of the strategic context has changed and what decisions in the Command Paper the UK Government is reviewing. (Paragraph 22)

4. The UK public is aware of the threats which the UK faces but does not appear to trust the Government to act in the national interest. Whilst investments in new technology are vital, it is also clear that, the days of “big tank battles on the European landmass” are not over and so a review of the decisions made in the Integrated Review and Defence in a Competitive Age, and the timelines committed to, is important for the UK’s defence and security and for the public’s trust. (Paragraph 30)

5. The Government needs to ensure that the public is aware of the link between the cost of living and global instability: the rises in energy and food prices are both directly attributable to the conflict in Ukraine. The Government needs to ensure that they are effectively communicating this to the public, particularly given the increasing cost of UK support to the Ukrainians. (Paragraph 31)

6. Foreign policy decisions and consequent actions by UK Defence need to be supported by the UK public. The lack of organisation round the withdrawal from Afghanistan damaged the Government’s standing. However, so far, engagement with the public on the Russian offensive in Ukraine and British support for Ukraine has been regular and transparent. We welcome this approach: the Government needs to build on this. (Paragraph 32)

The Government’s response to the evolving threat

7. Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy are ambitious papers, aimed at modernising UK defence and ensuring it has equipment suitable for the Information Age. Whilst the conclusions of Defence in a Competitive Age ought to be revisited in light of the conflict in Ukraine, the commitments made in the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy ought to be implemented fully. We recognise that this will take time—we urge the MOD to ensure that the changes are seen through. (Paragraph 44) Prioritisation and potential pitfalls

8. The reason that lack of publicly available information of the Government’s defence and security priorities presents a problem is that for integration—highlighted by the MoD as absolutely vital for the UK’s security—to be effective, the NSC must set clear priorities, backed with sufficient resources. If we (and the general public) are not aware of the priorities or the progress made on them, we cannot say with certainty whether we are being adequately protected by our Government. (Paragraph 53)

9. The lack of prioritisation means that it is impossible to determine which of the threats highlighted the Government perceives to be greatest. It also results in the military seemingly being the answer for every question whilst not being appropriately resourced for the task. (Paragraph 54)

10. We are further concerned by the use of the UK Armed Forces as a ‘backfill’, employed to carry out civilian tasks by Departments which are seemingly unable to respond to crises themselves. This is compounded by the MOD’s failure to respond to the 18 recommendations made by the Reserves Review. (Paragraph 55)

11. We recommend that the MOD publish annual figures for the assistance provided to other Government Departments and to public authorities. This list should include the number of personnel deployed, the length of deployment, the task they were deployed for, the cost of the task and the renumeration received by the Department. Furthermore we recommend that the MOD commit to publishing its response to the Reserves Review in the Autumn. (Paragraph 56)

12. Alongside the Permanent Secretary’s acknowledgement that some of the risk judgements made within the Integrated Review process might need to be revisited in light of events in Ukraine, it is clear that the capability gaps which the Defence Command Paper saw as acceptable are now no longer palatable. Furthermore, the move to such a position relies on technological innovation and the adoption of digital capabilities (such as Ajax and the Digital Backbone, as noted above). (Paragraph 72)

13. The MOD faces a number of challenges following decisions made in the Integrated Review: the likelihood of a capability gap, as equipment is retired before its replacement is introduced; a reduction in the British Army’s heavy armour and mass at a time when tank battles are raging in Ukraine; and a reliance on not yet tested, let alone proven, technology, to counteract that reduction in equipment and numbers. There are also valid questions about whether the resources allocated to the task of moving the UK Armed Forces into the information age are adequate—a number of our witnesses seem to believe not. (Paragraph 77)

14. It is clear that, even if the Government decides to proceed with the decisions taken in the IR and the Defence Command Paper, the timeline of changes ought also to be reviewed given the potential for capability gaps which leave the UK Armed Forces vulnerable. We are especially concerned about the proposed cuts to personnel numbers and the effective reduction in mass, particularly since that we are seeing Defence being used more and more often as an emergency measure to relieve exceptional pressures on public services and perform such tasks that otherwise might be expected to be carried out by others. In this context, we welcome the decision by the new Chief of the General Staff to describe the cuts as “perverse” and, as a first step, the Secretary of State’s seeming acknowledgement of the need to review the decision. (Paragraph 78)

15. There is a danger of overstretch. The Government needs to ensure that the military is properly resourced with both equipment and personnel to carry out the tasks required of it. To do this, we recommend there be a wholesale re-examination of the decisions on capabilities and timeframes within the Defence Command Paper and the decisions taken in it following events in Ukraine. (Paragraph 79) Integration and funding

16. Integration is key to the effective implementation of the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Papers. It is clear that this requires a long-term commitment, with decisions consistently re-evaluated as progress is made. It further requires a cohesive, effective and dedicated Government which is able to work collaboratively towards a common goal. (Paragraph 92)

17. If Afghanistan was intended to be an example of effective policy integration in action then it leaves a lot to be desired. It is even more worrying given that the NSC apparently gave the political direction required to bring together a ‘wholeof-systems’ approach. If the NSC set the appropriate direction then it leads to two pertinent questions: why did implementation of the policy, agreed by Ministers, fail? And how can the Government ensure that integrated, cross-Government policy decisions—made by those Ministers who have been elected by the UK public and accountable to them and this Parliament—are fully implemented in future? The fact that these Departments are carrying out individual lessons learned exercises, rather than a single integrated exercise, is concerning. Furthermore, the Government has failed to take disciplinary action against any senior individual for any (of the many) mistakes made during the withdrawal from Afghanistan. (Paragraph 93)

18. The Government should publish the actions agreed by each of the Departments as a result of the lessons learned exercises which examined the response to the Afghanistan crisis, together with a time frame for implementation. (Paragraph 94)

19. We welcome the uplift to the MOD’s budget in 2020 and the four-year budget commitment. However, inflationary pressures and an increase in the scale of threat means that it is no longer enough. At the same time, serious concerns persist around a number of procurement programmes. The Department now needs a strategy to regain both Parliament’s and the public’s trust in its procurement abilities. We are concerned that a real terms fall in sustainment funding (RDEL) up to 2024–25 will erode the Armed Forces’ ability to maintain and train on military equipment. We recommend a further, long-term increase to the budget but the MOD must ensure that money is not wasted. We recommend a further, long-term increase to the budget but the MOD must ensure that money is not wasted. (Paragraph 103)

20. There are significant challenges to integration but none that concerns us as much as the MOD’s procurement difficulties. For instance, the MOD has made it clear that in order to achieve integration and utilise new technologies, it needs an effective digital network. Without that network, few of the suggested benefits are accrued. Yet its track record in large and complex programmes is abysmal. We recommend that the Government identify those programmes which are critical enablers and ensure there is additional scrutiny of them. Furthermore, it needs to identify international partners with whom it can collaborate on the technologically advanced equipment that the UK Armed Forces require. (Paragraph 104)

What next?

21. The lack of a definition of what it means to be integrated makes it somewhat difficult to measure the success of the Government in achieving its objectives. However, we will continue to evaluate the implementation of the Integrated Review, the Defence Command Paper and the DSIS throughout the life of this Parliament. (Paragraph 105)

22. We welcome the Government’s commitment to the publication of an annual review on the implementation of the Integrated Review. However, given that the implementation is the key, consistent evaluation of the implementation of the strategies throughout this Parliament is vital. This Committee, alongside our colleagues on the Public Accounts Committee, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy and the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee, plays a vital role in ensuring that Government decisions, and their implementation, are regularly scrutinised. Since the Integrated Review papers were published, we have published a Report on Naval procurement and are currently holding inquiries examining Defence Space policy, how the UK works with the US and NATO, the tilt to the Indo-Pacific, aviation procurement and the impact of climate change on Defence. (Paragraph 106)

23. As well as an annual report on the implementation of the IR, we recommend the MOD produce an annual evaluation of what has been achieved in their implementation of Defence in a Competitive Age and DSIS. This evaluation should include case studies which demonstrate implementation (examples of integration with other Government Departments, allies and partners, and defence industry). It should also include an account of how certain events have led to a review of thinking and any subsequent decisions made which change previously agreed outcomes. This will allow Parliamentary Committees and the UK public to scrutinise the implementation of the Integrated Review, Defence in a Competitive Age and the Defence Security and Industrial Strategy. (Paragraph 107)

Download the full report