PAC: Government “not prioritising significant threat” from animal diseases like COVID-19, avian flu, swine fever

• Main animal disease facility at Weybridge “left to deteriorate to an alarming extent”

In a report today the Public Accounts Committee says Government is not sufficiently prioritising the “significant threat to UK health, trade, farming and rural communities” posed by animal diseases.  The risk of a zoonotic (animal sourced) disease is real and the consequences can be devastating: the Foot and Mouth disease outbreak in 2001, more recently Avian Influenza and of course COVID-19 showed the breadth of impact a zoonotic disease outbreak can have across society.

The Committee found there were “over 1,000 ‘single points of failure’ that would cause major disruption” at the Weybridge site. Due to the considerable time taken to get a redevelopment programme up and running a “critical works ‘patch and repair’ programme” will run until the redevelopment programme is due to be completed in 2036.

The Committee says the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra) has “comprehensively failed in its historical management” of the UK’s primary site for managing plant and animal disease threats at Weybridge (APHA). Deterioration due to “inadequate management and under-investment” has left the site “continually vulnerable to a major breakdown” which would severely impact the ability to effectively respond to disease outbreaks. The centre would already “struggle” with higher than a medium category outbreak, or any multiple outbreaks. The UK faces current and ongoing threats from Bovine Tuberculosis and potential new diseases including African Swine Fever and rabies.

Dame Meg Hillier MP, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, said “After the 2001 disaster of foot and mouth disease, the past decades have brought one animal sourced disease after another. It is shocking that government has allowed UK capacity in this area to deteriorate so alarmingly over that same period. These diseases are devastating for our food production systems, the economy and, when they jump the species barrier to humans as COVID-19 did, to our whole society. Government must get a grip on this crucial and much delayed redevelopment programme. When it comes to the safety of our country we cannot afford more of the waste and delivery failures that continue to characterise far too many major projects.”

PAC report recommendations and conclusions (see also attached)

1        We are greatly concerned that the UK government is not sufficiently prioritising the threat from animal diseases. Animal diseases pose a significant threat to the UK. The 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak was devastating for many farmers and also for wider rural communities. To support UK trade in animals and animal products, it is vital that there is confidence in the UK’s ability to respond to animal disease outbreaks and in its on-going surveillance activities. The UK faces threats from: on-going diseases such as Bovine Tuberculosis; new potential diseases such as African Swine Fever; and diseases affecting domestic pets including rabies. The COVID-19 pandemic has also highlighted the impact a zoonotic disease outbreak can have. We are concerned that the Government’s National Risk Register only ranks the impact of animal diseases as Category C, the middle ranking on a five-point scale A to E, despite the scale of potential economic and social impacts of animal diseases so starkly set out during our evidence session. The Department’s inadequate long-term management of the Weybridge site demonstrates that it has not viewed animal disease as a high enough priority, but we also think the Department has not had a strong enough voice in government to stress the seriousness of the threat.   

Recommendation: The Department must be more effective in highlighting the significant threat from animal diseases and ensure that the next update to the National Risk Register adequately reflects the seriousness of this threat.

The Department should also write to the Committee after the next National Risk Register update and explain the rationale behind the new ranking for animal diseases. 

2        The Department has allowed the Weybridge site to deteriorate to a completely unacceptable degree, through a combination of inadequate management and under investment. The Department has not managed the Weybridge site as an important national asset. It has not had a long-term strategic plan for the site and has under invested in its infrastructure. The Department managed the Weybridge site simply as a property asset, not recognising the importance of the science undertaken at the site. For example, the Department consolidated its facilities management contracts in 2009 to cover a large part of its estate including Weybridge, but the contract was not suited to the specific requirements of a high containment science site such as Weybridge. Historically, the Department has not invested enough staff resources in managing the site and to understand the site’s requirements. Despite recognising the deteriorating condition of the Weybridge site in 2015, the Department has taken a considerable time to get a redevelopment programme up and running.     

Recommendation: The Department and HM Treasury must learn lessons from Weybridge and ensure that the situation is not repeated with the Department’s other key infrastructure or more widely across the UK’s important national infrastructure. The Department’s Treasury Minute response must include details of how it is implementing an asset management strategy for the Weybridge site and how it is implementing lessons learned in developing its new facilities management contract. 

3        The Weybridge site is continually vulnerable to a major breakdown which would severely impact the APHA’s operations including responding to disease outbreaks. The Department and the APHA rate the risk of a major breakdown of facilities at the Weybridge site as high. The potential risk was illustrated by a 2014 generator failure which led to a loss of power to some of the high containment buildings. The APHA does have contingency plans in place, but a major breakdown could result in it taking longer to do surveillance testing during a disease outbreak. It would also need to prioritise disease outbreaks over other work such as its important research programme. The Weybridge site has over 1,000 ‘single points of failure’ that would cause a major disruption to operations. With the Weybridge redevelopment programme not due to be completed until 2036, the Department is looking to manage the risk of breakdown in the shorter-term through: a critical works ‘patch and repair’ programme; increasing its staff resources to manage the site; and putting in place a more appropriate facilities management contract.

Recommendation: As a matter of urgency, the Department and the APHA need to stress test their contingency plans for a major breakdown at the Weybridge site and how they would cope with a significant animal disease outbreak which coincided with a major breakdown. In its Treasury Minute response, the Department should provide assurance about the strength of its contingency plans.

4        It is not yet certain that there will be sufficient investment in developing Weybridge’s capacity to ensure the UK’s long-term resilience to animal diseases. It is vital that the UK has the right science facilities to ensure its long-term resilience to animal diseases. The APHA is confident it could respond to a Category 3 animal disease outbreak (the middle category on a scale from one to five) such as the recent Avian Influenza outbreak, but can only do this by pausing some of its important research due to limited laboratory capacity. However, it would struggle with higher category outbreaks, or where outbreaks happened concurrently. The UK’s current laboratory capacity for the highest containment level (ACPD level four) is very limited and cannot undertake testing and research on large animals. HM Treasury has approved funding of £1.2 billion for the Weybridge redevelopment programme including £200 million up to 2024-25. This compares with the Department’s current cost estimate of £2.8 billion. Failure to secure adequate additional funding at the next stage in 2024 would mean decisions needed to be made about the scope of the Programme and the extent of redevelopment at Weybridge. The Department is finding it challenging to quantity and value the benefits of the redevelopment programme such as the economic benefits of science investment. 

Recommendation: The Department needs to work with HM Treasury to establish a more certain funding position for the Weybridge redevelopment programme. In doing this, the Department will need to improve its understanding of the benefits of the programme to support the investment case. In addition to its Treasury Minute response, the Department should provide the Committee with a further update on the status of Weybridge’s funding shortfall by Summer 2023.

5        There remains substantial uncertainty over the costs of the Weybridge redevelopment programme. In developing its Programme Business Case the Department did more detailed work to understand the costs of the Programme. This increased its cost estimate from £1.2 billion in its Outline Business Case (March 2020) to £2.8 billion. The Department acknowledges there remains substantial uncertainty over its cost estimate and it has continued to develop the estimate by, for example, undertaking building condition surveys and developing it sustainability plans. It is using the period up to its next Programme Business Case in June 2024 to increase its confidence in the cost estimate. The Department has included a substantial allowance for inflation in its current cost estimate, but plans to revisit this in 2024. Despite the uncertainty over its cost estimate, the Department has used a single point estimates, rather than ranges which would be best practice, to set out the costs in its 2021 Programme Business Case.

Recommendation: The Department needs to continue to develop its cost estimate and be clear where, and how much, uncertainty remains. This should include the use of cost ranges to illustrate the level of uncertainty.

6        There is a risk that the Weybridge redevelopment programme will not have sufficient staff capability and capacity to manage the Programme effectively. The Weybridge site is nationally important in the UK’s defence against animal diseases. The Department confirmed that the Weybridge redevelopment programme is a high priority for staffing. However, the National Audit Office highlighted the challenges the Department is having recruiting staff to some of the more specialist technical, engineering and programme delivery roles. At the same time, the Government has asked departments to draw up plans to reduce staff numbers. The Department is still drawing up its plans for how it might reduce staff, but is already limiting its recruitment. It is not yet clear how the Department is going to manage an overall reduction in staff numbers while needing to recruit experts to ensure the effective management of the Weybridge redevelopment programme.

Recommendation: The Department needs to ensure that it has the right staff capability and capacity to deliver the Weybridge redevelopment programme. It should report back to us once it has finalised its wider plans for staff reductions setting out how it plans to ensure it has the staff it needs to deliver the Programme.

7        The redevelopment of Weybridge is a large construction programme with a range of commercial risks that will need careful management. The Weybridge redevelopment programme will have a range of contracts covering professional services and construction. The Department recognises the challenges of integrating a large number of contracts. It is looking to minimise these where appropriate and also to building up its capability to manage and integrate the contracts. The Department is also concerned about the risk of a lack of contractor appetite to bid for the main construction contracts. It has done some market engagement and has employed consultants to help gauge the capacity and appetite of the market, but recognises it needs to do more. The Department has looked to learn lessons from the commercial aspects of other major programmes such as Crossrail and says that it will finalise its commercial strategy for the Programme soon.

Recommendation: The Department should report back to us in six months on progress in developing its commercial strategy and specifically on how it:

•  intends to structure its contracts and manage their integration effectively; and
•  will ensure there is adequate competition for the main construction contracts.