Asked by
To ask His Majesty’s Government what procurement criteria they
used in awarding Fujitsu a £48 million contract to upgrade the
Police National Computer; and whether their decision to award
that contract took into account that company’s role in developing
the Horizon software for the Post Office.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office () (Con)
My Lords, every contract award is considered on its own merit and
in line with procurement regulations and evidence of historic
supply and delivery. The police national computer is a critical
service used by UK policing and other agencies to maintain public
safety and security. The contract to replace PNC mainframe
hardware technology, ensuring the future of the service, was
awarded following market engagement on grounds of time, cost and
risk to continuity of service.
(LD)
My Lords, the Government have awarded contracts to Fujitsu of
over £3.5 billion since 2013, including nearly £500 million this
year, of which £48 million was on the police national computer.
Considering that Fujitsu’s Horizon software was at the heart of
the Post Office sub-postmaster scandal, why do the Government
believe that Fujitsu software has the necessary integrity for the
critical data in the PNC? How is a business-as-usual approach on
the award of contracts before the official Post Office inquiry
concludes prudent? Lastly, how does this government largesse give
Fujitsu any incentive to contribute to the massive compensation
cost for sub-postmasters, which is set to fall on the taxpayer?
(Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for her questions. The police national
computer has been hosted on Fujitsu mainframe technology for over
30 years, and existing Fujitsu-leased hardware technology would
not have been viable to use beyond March 2022. It required urgent
replacement, which is why Fujitsu was selected. The market
engagement exercise held in 2020 to review options to replace the
Fujitsu hardware and support found no viable alternative
solutions, and that is why Fujitsu received this contract—which,
I should also stress, is making up the difference between now and
when the new police national computer comes into operation. I
could go on, but there was basically no alternative.
(Lab)
My Lords, the Minister has given us a very interesting answer.
Basically, he said that it came as a big shock to the Home Office
that this equipment had expired. Can he tell us what confidence
he has in the Home Office’s management of IT contracts of various
sizes—bearing in mind, for example, the grotesque overspending on
the replacement of the Airwave system for emergency services
communication, and the fact that that contract has overrun by
five or six years already, with no sign that the costs are going
to be met?
(Con)
I am afraid that that is not what I said to the noble Baroness or
to the House at all. I have confidence that Fujitsu will deliver
on this.
(CB)
My Lords, I declare my interests, and I support the noble Lord,
Lord Harris. The emergency services network is technology rather
than IT. Not only is it five years delayed, but I think the costs
have risen by five times, from around £2 billion to over £10
billion. As yet, I am afraid that the Government are trapped in a
terrible contract with Motorola, which is delivering a legacy
solution but is also charged with delivering the new one.
Unfortunately, it is being paid £250 million more for the old
system per year, so there is no great incentive. It is a great
worry, not only for the Government but for the police, that this
system is not yet delivered.
(Con)
I understand where the noble Lord is coming from, and I commend
him for his work on this and other matters. Obviously, I am here
more to talk about the subject of the Question, but I will take
his concerns back, find out more information and write to him.
(Con)
My Lords, to return to the question asked by the noble Baroness,
Lady Ludford, about Horizon, the words that come to my mind are:
“scandalous”, “miscarriage of justice”, “broken lives”, “families
financially ruined”—and yet Fujitsu has paid nothing. Talking has
gone on long enough. I know there are legal cases, but should not
the Government stop any contracts to Fujitsu? It is just morally
wrong.
(Con)
My noble friend is right to point out that we are trying to get
to the bottom of the Horizon issue. That is why Sir Wyn Williams
has been tasked to hold his statutory inquiry. Fujitsu is a core
participant and is co-operating fully. Accountability depends on
evidence, so I think it is proper to let Sir Wyn hear it before
judging any possible consequences.
(Lab Co-op)
My Lords, was any consideration given by the Government to the
public perception of awarding such a vital contract to a company
with such a shocking record? Can the Minister confirm clearly
whether Fujitsu was the only company that actually bid for this
contract? If that is the case, how can we be assured of a
genuinely competitive process? How will this improve standards?
How do we get good value for money and end up with results which,
when you consider the role of this company, is truly shocking? I
endorse all the words of the noble Lord, : it is appalling that this
company can get anywhere near another government contract.
(Con)
As I said earlier in answer to another question, it was the only
viable alternative. Other companies were invited in and, for
reasons most of which were around the time it would take to
implement new systems, Fujitsu offered the only solution. Of
course, I agree with the public perception argument; however, I
do not think we had any alternative.
(GP)
My Lords, given that the flaws in Horizon software by Fujitsu
were the cause of an awful lot of distress and misspent money,
are the Government confident that so far there have been no
similar mistakes on the police national computer?
(Con)
The Government are confident. There has been one incident of data
loss, but it was a human error, as opposed to a software error
and all that data has been recovered. So, yes, the Government are
confident.
(LD)
My Lords, the Horizon scandal involved 736 innocent
sub-postmasters being prosecuted; four suicides; many more
individuals and families torn apart by the prolonged cover-up of
technical problems; and a cost to taxpayers of more than £1
billion so far. I know this Government’s reputation for financial
probity is at a very low ebb, but can the Minister explain how
Fujitsu was able to land this complex and sensitive contract when
the Government had removed it from the list of preferred
suppliers in the last year?
(Con)
I have to say again that I think I have answered most of the
noble Baroness’s question already. Fujitsu is not a preferred
supplier, but it is able to enter open competitions for
government business. Fujitsu has not been found guilty of any
fraud or other crime related to Horizon and is complying with all
inquiries. There was no viable alternative.
(Con)
My Lords, I am grateful that my noble friend accepts the public
perception point, because more taxpayers’ money is going into
this company at the moment. Inquiries take a long time, but in
relation to other inquiries, such as contaminated blood, there
has been a process to expedite payments and, as the noble
Baroness has outlined, some people have taken their own lives.
Surely, we should expedite the public funds that need to be in
the pockets of those people harmed by Post Office and potentially
Fujitsu.
(Con)
I agree with my noble friend. So far, to date, the Government and
Post Office have made good progress on delivering compensation to
postmasters through the scheme fairly and quickly—82% of eligible
claimants have now received an offer, and £52 million has been
offered in total. I accept that it is not enough, but it is being
done.
(Lab)
My Lords, the Government have presided over the economy and vital
sensitive infrastructure, including tech infrastructure, for 12
years. If, as the Minister suggests, there was no viable
alternative, why not?
(Con)
Unfortunately, as I said, this relates to the delay in the
rollout of the new system. The new system was delayed because of
unforeseen complexity. I should state for the record that
statistics around the police national computer are mind-boggling
in their complexity: 30 million people’s information; 68 million
vehicle records; 61 million driving licence holder records; 1.34
million daily transactions; 114 million checks per annum. It has
to work; therefore, there was no viable alternative.
(CB)
My Lords, could the Minister tell the House whether external
consultants were involved in deciding that this contract should
go to Fujitsu and, if so, how much were they paid for coming to
the rather defeatist conclusion that there was no alternative?
(Con)
The process was subject to all the usual Cabinet Office rules. I
do not know how much external consultants were paid; I will find
out.
(CB)
My Lords, will the Minister confirm—I think he has been trying to
tell us—that Fujitsu has an unassailable monopoly on this
contract?
(Con)
No, it does not have an unassailable monopoly. It obviously has a
long history with the police national computer. When the police
national computer finally breathes its last, its monopoly
effectively does the same.
(Con)
Will the noble Lord agree that over the last century pretty well
every government contract that has been put out becomes a
monopoly? Is it not time that we had a new approach to how such
contracts are handed out?
(Con)
That sounds like a very sensible suggestion, and I will take it
back to the department. I have not necessarily been around for as
long as the noble Lord described.
