In a report today the Public Accounts Committee says a “high-risk
and over-complicated delivery model, poor oversight of suppliers,
overambitious timetable and light-touch scrutiny from the
Ministry of Justice” all contributed to the failure of a new case
management system for electronic monitoring of offenders which
has “cost taxpayers dear”.
The Committee says “avoidable mistakes” wasted £98 million of
taxpayers’ money and left the tagging service “reliant on legacy
systems that needed urgent remedial action, costing a further
£9.8 million”.
Even after this, the Ministry of Justice and HMPPS still “do not
know what works and for who, and whether tagging reduces
reoffending”. Despite the lack of knowledge and evaluation,
government is pressing ahead with a £1.2 billion programme to
expand tagging to another 10,000 people in the next three years.
Given the “long history of poor performance in this area” the
Committee is “unconvinced” that the MoJ is equipped to handle
emerging problems and will continue to monitor the “serious
risks” that remain for the expansion of tagging and the need to
procure new contracts by early 2024.
, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee,
said: “The prison and probation service is reliant
on outdated technology that is swallowing taxpayers’ money just
to stand still. The existing system is at constant risk of
failure – and let us be clear that in the case of tagging,
“failure” can mean direct and preventable risk to the public –
and attempts to transform it have failed.
“The incredible scale of waste and loss in the Government’s Covid
response should in no way inure us to this: that’s another
hundred million pounds of taxpayers’ money for essential public
services just thrown away, wasted, lost. We expect a serious
explanation, and a serious plan, from the MoJ and Government more
widely how they are going to stop this haemorrhaging of
taxpayers’ money that they are presiding over. We need assurances
up front over the further £1.2 billion they have already
committed to the tagging programme – what will be achieved, by
when, and, crucially, what will be recovered for the public if
goals aren’t met.”
PAC report conclusions and
recommendations:
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HMPPS’s failure to transform tagging services has
wasted £98 million of taxpayers’ money. By the end of
2020-21, HMPPS had spent around £157 million on its tagging
transformation programme. Both its and its supplier’s (Capita)
failure to deliver the new case management system, Gemini,
wasted £98 million. Although the Ministry claims that
terminating Gemini was the optimal value for money decision in
2021, we are deeply concerned about the scale of these losses.
HMPPS adopted a high-risk and complex delivery model for the
programme, but did not appreciate the inherent complexity of
contracting with four different suppliers, resulting in severe
delays. It has been similarly over-ambitious in its development
of Gemini, where its pursuit of a bespoke technical solution
introduced complexity and inflexibility, and limited
innovation. It did not intervene early enough to resolve
integration issues. There was weak governance in the programme
and the Ministry took a light-touch approach to scrutiny,
despite persistent delays and risks. HMPPS and the Ministry
have since reformed their approaches to overseeing major
projects and programmes, including introducing new thresholds
to inform when risks and issues should be escalated for
review.
Recommendation: As part of its Treasury Minute response,
the Ministry should explain how its new controls, governance
framework, and risk tolerances which set time and cost thresholds
for when issues should be escalated, will prevent future
significant losses to the taxpayer across its portfolio of major
projects and programmes.
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HMPPS remains reliant on outdated technology which puts
the tagging service at risk of failing. Due to the
prolonged delays in the programme, HMPPS is relying on legacy
technology and will have to use its current case management
system until at least 2024, which will cost £9.8 million for
remediation work and licensing costs. As HMPPS has been using
its current system since 2012, many of its applications are no
longer supported by manufacturers and have severe risks, with
outdated hardware and software. The telephone system Capita
uses in the live service has failed six times since May 2021.
HMPPS asserts that there have not been any undetected breaches
by offenders, as it recovers data after an outage. But this
clearly remains a significant risk until it replaces the
system. HMPPS is updating and replacing systems to ensure they
are stable and scalable as the number of people fitted with
tags rises. It opted not to simulate additional tagging volumes
on its existing systems to see how well they can cope with
caseload increases, but asserts that it will improve resilience
by moving the system to the cloud.
Recommendation: To provide assurance that the risk of
system failure will not materialise, HMPPS should explain the
following in its Treasury Minute response:
- what progress it has made in
delivering planned remediation work on its case management
system;
- how well its systems are coping
with caseload increases; and
- how it will ensure that future
digital contracts will factor in routine IT upgrades and
maintenance.
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HMPPS has failed to provide police forces and the
Probation Service with timely access to the tagging information
they need to effectively supervise offenders and protect the
public. HMPPS expected Gemini and the user portal to
enhance probation officers’ supervision of offenders and
improve public protection by providing: a single version of
case management records; improved management information and
reporting capabilities; and crucially, access to historical and
real-time maps of offenders’ movements by using GPS tags.
Without this system, police and probation officers cannot
access real-time data and have to submit manual requests for
location data, which limits the value of using GPS tracking.
However, HMPPS’s acquisitive crime pilot - which involves
comparing data from GPS tags against the locations of alleged
crimes submitted by the police – has enabled probation officers
to have real-time access to location data for the 650 offenders
in the pilot. HMPPS has received requests from the police for
direct access to its system, but it has so far not provided
this due to data protection considerations.
Recommendation: Before starting future contracts in
January 2024, HMPPS should explore how it can provide police
forces and other law enforcement agencies with real-time access
to location monitoring data across all GPS tagging cohorts -
taking account of data protection considerations – and update us
on its plans.
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It is unacceptable that HMPPS still does not know if or
how tagging reduces reoffending, and it has been too slow to
improve data. Despite our previous recommendations,
HMPPS still does not know the impact of tagging. The Ministry
recognises that evaluation of the transformation programme was
not as strong as it should have been. HMPPS has now
strengthened its analytical capacity, and has committed to
evaluating its expansion programme, although it will need to
rely on higher numbers of tagged offenders to better understand
differences in outcomes between tagged offenders and control
groups if it is to build a rich evidence base. It recognises
the importance of establishing links to reoffending, but
accepts it has previously missed opportunities to develop this
understanding. There is variable use of tagging between courts.
Going forward, better evidence on what works in tagging will
help improve magistrates’ and judges’ understanding of the
sentencing options available. Linked to this, HMPPS has
not improved persistent issues with data availability and
quality, such as the lack of data on offenders’ protected
characteristics. It does not know whether ethnic minority
offenders are over- or under-represented in tagging services
but has committed to collect better data in future
contracts.
Recommendation: Within one year, HMPPS should publish a
comprehensive plan outlining what it has achieved so far and
remaining work required in:
- improving data collection and
analysis in tagging services;
- monitoring the delivery of benefits
in its expansion programme; and
- building the evidence base for the
impact of tagging on reoffending and offenders’ diversion from
prison.
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HMPPS’s innovative use of technology in its expansion
projects has yielded some encouraging early results.
HMPPS has achieved some initial positive results from using new
technology in its alcohol monitoring scheme and acquisitive
crime project. For example, offenders have had high short-term
sobriety rates while being tagged, although HMPPS did not
explain how it will be able to monitor longer-term abstinence
or whether the scheme reduces alcohol-fuelled offending.
HMPPS’s acquisitive crime project has helped to secure 30
charges for theft, burglary or robbery and it claims that
participating police forces value the scheme. However, HMPPS’s
early experience in delivering non-fitted monitoring devices
for Foreign National Offenders was much less positive, as the
system was discovered not to be compliant with cyber security
standards. It has created an £18.5 million innovation fund
which will help it explore further tagging options, including a
possible drugs tag. In order to ensure that HMPPS protects
taxpayers’ interests, we expect it to rigorously apply learning
from its experience of developing and using new technology as
it continues to expand tagging services.
Recommendation: In its Treasury Minute response, HMPPS
should explain how it will apply lessons from its tagging
expansion projects to future schemes, including the forthcoming
project for tagging domestic abusers.
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HMPPS’s poor track record in its transformation
programme does not inspire confidence that it will be
well-equipped to handle risks in its £1.2 billion expansion
programme. HMPPS is re-procuring contracts to run the
electronic monitoring service. It is attempting to apply
lessons and reduce delivery risks, for example by using
off-the-shelf systems and limiting the number of suppliers in
the new model. However, there are inherent delivery risks to
reprocuring a changing service where the number of tagged
people is increasing. In addition, it will still face
challenges in integrating the work of its suppliers,
particularly given its tight timeframes to put new contracts in
place by early 2024. It expects suppliers to integrate their
systems in six months, but HMPPS has not yet started its
testing work so does not know how difficult this would be.
HMPPS intends to outsource the role of systems integrator
again, something which it tried and failed to do before. There
are significant risks with this approach, including the risk of
conflicts of interest and unclear accountability due to
dependencies between future suppliers’ work.
Recommendation: HMPPS should write to the Committee in
2023, once the procurement of new contracts to run electronic
monitoring is complete, on how it is handling risks in the
programme. As part of this, it should explain how it will oversee
suppliers’ work effectively and ensure clear lines of
responsibility and accountability between the integrator and its
other suppliers in the programme.