(Lab): My Lords, the
UK Government played an important role in the discussions with
Iran which first led to the JCPOA and today are part of an
important negotiation being led by the United States for a new
treaty. There are many voices pressing caution. I draw particular
attention to an article in March’s edition of Foreign Policy by
Hussein Agha, one of the most astute and brilliant commentators
on the region and an active and widely respected peace
negotiator. His article is a brutal assessment of where we could
be heading. He writes, under the headline, “The United States’
Clueless Diplomacy Won’t Stop a Nuclear Iran”, that a deal could
lead to the worst of both worlds. It will not derail the regime’s
nuclear ambitions and will strengthen the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps
Today is not 2015, and the deal of 2015 was achieved through
wider considerations, but its work was unfinished. Today Iran’s
capacity is very significantly advanced and it is a lesson, if
ever we needed it, that it is not just about signing agreements
but about ensuring that provisions are implemented and the
consequences properly managed. Many felt able to justify the 2015
accord as some totemic struggle for power in Iran between
extremists and moderates, or between fundamentalists and
reformers. However, as Agha notes, the real struggle has been
between the revolutionary guard and the official state and its
military.
The revolutionary guard was not present at the 2015 talks and did
not like the deal. As Agha concludes, it is unequivocally in
control now, which is why the issue about its proscription is so
important—a position the US should not weaken and one in which
other countries should join, including the UK. We have seen its
role in creating parallel institutions around the region and
supporting destabilisation, which has only gained pace since the
Afghan withdrawal. It is not just about how it has increased
popular mobilisation forces in Iraq, or various militias in
Syria, and not just about Hezbollah in Lebanon, whose rule has
destroyed and crippled the country and whose electoral setbacks
still mean that it will exert much destructive influence. It is
not just about its increased activity and support for Hamas and
Islamic jihad in the Palestinian territories, setting loose
terrorism in Israel to undermine the Palestinian Authority and
push further away, as if it was not far away already, any
opportunity to re-engage in any form of peace process. Its
influence with the Houthis in Yemen continually undermines the
fragile ceasefire.
Agreements work when the politics in which they are embedded is
right. This was a flaw in 2015, and we must avoid it with any new
agreement. Is it really possible today to say that the new
agreement can be trusted when it is underpinned by Russia acting
as guarantor and the custodian of billions of dollars for Iran’s
domestic nuclear development? May I seek the assurance of the
Minister that the agreement ensures that our vital security and
strategic interests and our work for stability in the wider
region are properly reflected in what we are prepared to sign up
to?
