Report by the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee: The role and status of the Prime Minister’s Office

The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee has published its report on the role and status of the Prime Minister’s Office.

Conclusions and recommendations

The Office of the Prime Minister

1.The lack of a statutory definition of the roles of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet in the UK has been reflected in the evolution of the Office of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office. As Prime Ministers have sought to increase their strategic leadership and policy role, the Office of the Prime Minister (Number 10) has expanded and adapted to reflect that. They have also drawn on the supposedly collective resource of the Cabinet Office in the process. (Paragraph 35)

2.There should be a clearer delineation between those resources provided to support the Prime Minister and the support for collective government and cross-government activity more generally. (Paragraph 36)

Accountability

3.The Office of the Prime Minister is nominally a business unit of the Cabinet Office. However, it currently it appears to operate with even less transparency than other Cabinet Office business units. The Cabinet Office Annual Report and Accounts do not include a narrative report on the Office of the Prime Minister as they do for its other business units. And governments have declined to respond to Parliamentary Questions about its organisation. This is not acceptable. (Paragraph 41)

4.We do not consider the status of the Office of Prime Minister as a business unit to be an accurate reflection of the role that it plays. Yet it currently operates with even less transparency that this status suggests. For so long as the Government maintains that it is a business unit of the Cabinet Office, the Government should report on its activities in the Annual Report and Accounts as it does for its other business units. And in its response to Parliamentary Questions, it should provide information as it does for its other business units. (Paragraph 42)

5.In its Single Departmental Plan, the objectives of supporting the Prime Minister should be disaggregated from the support provided to the Cabinet or the Government more generally. (Paragraph 43)

6.We have heard little evidence to support the creation of a separate Department for the Prime Minister. The current Office of the Prime Minister is too small and much of its workforce too transient to be sensibly treated as a distinct department. The creation of a larger department, bringing together Number 10, the Cabinet Office and perhaps parts of HM Treasury has its supporters. However, the detail of this and how it might work are beyond the remit of this inquiry. Moreover, at least some of the benefits could be achieved through better collective working and a clearer specification of the respective roles of Number 10 and the Cabinet Office. (Paragraph 49)

7.Whilst the creation of a separate department would help to resolve some of the accountability issues that have concerned us in this inquiry, these could be resolved more easily through greater transparency within the existing arrangements. (Paragraph 50)

8.Increasing the direct accountability of the most senior Spads in Number 10 in this way would reflect the quasi-executive role that some have assumed. However, to do so would be to accept this quasi-executive role. The principle that “advisers advise, ministers decide” should remain the practice and Ministers, including the Prime Minister, should remain accountable to Parliament for the conduct of their advisers. To this end, much greater clarity around the roles that Spads can play and their relationship with officials may be needed. The Committee will be undertaking a dedicated inquiry into Special Advisers later in the Parliament when we will consider this in more detail. (Paragraph 56)

9.The role of Special Advisers in Number 10 has evolved to such a degree that some have played a quasi-executive role. This is wrong. It undermines both ministerial accountability to Parliament and collective responsibility on the part of Cabinet. Ministers, including the Prime Minister, should remain fully accountable for the actions of the Special Advisers. It is the responsibility of Prime Ministers to ensure that their Special Advisers work within the proper parameters of their role and of senior officials as well as of other Cabinet members, to reinforce this. (Paragraph 57)

Full report