The Public Accounts Committee reports today that for the last
five years, the Home Office has “wasted vital time and scarce
funding without making any meaningful progress” in replacing the
Police National Computer (PNC) and the Police National Database
(PND).
This continues what PAC has described as the Home Office’s
“miserable record of exorbitantly expensive digital programmes
that fail to deliver” - on their objectives or for the taxpayer.
The Emergency Services Network and Digital Services at the Border
programmes are examples of critical projects that have suffered
severe delays and cost overruns, and this latest project “does
not give the committee any comfort that the Department is
learning from past mistakes”.
The PNC, which is vital to all aspects of police work and their
efforts to prevent crime and protect the public from harm, is
reaching the end of its life and requires urgent replacement. The
PND is newer but also needs replacing.
Under the Department’s current plans, a replacement for the PNC
is not expected to be available until at least 2025-26, more than
five years later than the original delivery date of 2020, while
costs have increased by a “staggering 68% to £1.1 billion”. The
Home Office now plans to upgrade or replace PND by a separate
programme, but it is “unclear when this will happen and at what
cost”.
Police have lost confidence in the Home Office’s ability to
deliver these programmes to the point where the
country’s most senior officers took the unusual step of
writing to the Home Office to raise their concerns.
Despite these delivery failures and several negative progress
evaluations, the Home Office did not act decisively to recover
the programme until late 2020 – and the Committee says it’s still
not clear even these changes will actually put the NLED programme
on track.
, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee,
said “The Home Office has a number of large, complex,
costly digital and technology projects to deliver. All are
critical to security and yet we see perpetual failure and an
inability to learn lessons on basic project management. It is
hard to see what steps the Home Office is taking to resolve these
huge problems and whether it has any inkling that they will work.
“Personal and national security are arguably the most fundamental
duties of a government to its citizens. And the Home Office is
falling down on these major projects with little urgency or
planning for how to deliver them.
"Our front line Police rely on these systems to do their job. The
Home Office must be clear about the route ahead or confidence of
the UK's Police forces in the Home Office will sink even lower."
PAC report conclusions and
recommendations
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After five years, the Department has not delivered
any of the expected services to the police
through the NLEDS programme, and it is not clear how it can
deliver the full capability required by 2025-26.The
Department has produced a ‘roadmap’ showing the
progress it expects to make over the next
year on six product areas within the revised
NLEDS programme. Because this is an iterative plan,
it is not clear what capabilities will be
developed and how and when these will be delivered beyond
the next 12 months. The programme has yet to demonstrate that
the PND and PNC systems can be successfully brought together to
provide police officers with the single system that is
envisaged. The Department lacks the skilled staff required to
design, develop and manage its various technology
programmes, including NLEDS. Given the problems and
complexities the programme has encountered in its first five
years, it is clear that NLEDS retains a great deal of risk. We
are sceptical that the Home Office’s optimism for delivery by
2025-26 is justified.
Recommendation: The Department must set
out a detailed roadmap for the delivery of the full NLEDS
capability by 2025-26 and its plans for police forces to
transition from the PNC to the new service. This should
include clear milestones to which the Department can be held
accountable for.
-
The Department made poor decisions at the
outset of the NLEDS programme and, despite signs it was going
badly, was slow to make the necessary changes to correct
this. The original scope and ambition for the
NLEDS programme was unrealistic.
The Department created a programme designed to
replace two vital police information systems without fully
understanding the police’s requirements or how these systems
worked. The PNC had evolved over several decades as it was
adapted and expanded. When the programme
team attempted to understand how the PNC
worked, it became clear that it was much more complex
than the Department had anticipated, resulting in delays and
large amounts of additional work. An early programme decision
to merge the PNC and PND systems made the complexity worse
because the two systems used very different data
formats. As the consequences of these issues became apparent, a
series of internal and external reviews highlighted that NLEDS
was at risk of not delivering what the police needed.
Despite these warnings, the Department did not step back
to assess the fundamental problems that the
programme had encountered, and its first
programme reset in 2019 was not effective in addressing
these problems. Following the second programme
reset in late 2020, the Department then took
several months to decide whether to proceed with the
programme.
Recommendation: The Permanent Secretary should ensure
that he and other senior staff have sufficient regular oversight
of NLEDS from now on, to ensure that he can quickly see
problems as they arise and be prepared to take early and decisive
action to recover or restructure the programme.
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Working effectively with the police is critical
to the delivery of NLEDS and other technology
programmes, but it is not yet clear that the Department’s new
approach will resolve longstanding challenges in delivering
national programmes for local forces. We
recognise that the challenge of managing relationships with 45
operationally independent police forces to deliver a national
programme is a significant one,
but the Department and police have long been
aware of this.Contrary to good practice in other bodies such as
the NHS, the Department failed to establish a joint vision with
police until two years into the programme. As costs
increased and the programme failed to deliver any
meaningful capability in its first four years, police users
lost confidence in the Home Office’s ability to deliver NLEDS
and other technology programmes, to the point where the
police’s most senior officers wrote to the Permanent
Secretary to raise their concerns. The Department has
now belatedly changed its approach to working with
the police and is aiming to establish a
partnership approach rather than a customer-supplier
arrangement. The Department recognises that police
forces may require additional funding to
adopt the NLEDS system and will need to
address this in the forthcoming Spending Review.
Recommendation: The Department needs
to carefully monitor its new partnership approach
to ensure it enables joint and timely decision-making with the
police. The Department should write to the Committee in six
months with an update on the new working relationship and whether
further changes will be required.
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The police must continue to rely on the PNC for another
five years, despite the risks to its availability. The
PNC is the most important law enforcement technology system in
the UK, and it is vital that it is constantly available to
police and other users. Given its age, the current system
is remarkably reliable. However, the PNC experienced a
significant data loss in January 2021 and the
knowledge of how it works has become harder for the
Department to maintain. It is difficult and expensive to
recruit people with skills and experience in
the ageing technology used by the PNC. The team
that maintains the PNC is under-resourced and several
staff are nearing retirement, which means it is difficult
for the team to run the PNC and also support
programmes like NLEDS.
The Department currently plans to run this piece
of critical national infrastructure
without full manufacturer support for the database
after 2024, meaning it will not have that support for
at least a year, though the Department plans to
provide in-house support instead.
Recommendation: Alongside its Treasury Minute
response, the Department should set out for the Committee how it
will guarantee that police will be able to access the PNC service
until NLEDS is ready. This should include a full
assessment of the risks of continuing to run the PNC and
contingency plans for failure. This plan should include a review
point at which the decision to replace the PNC’s operating system
can be taken promptly.
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The Department does not yet have a plan for maintaining
the PND and combining its data with NLEDS in
future. The Department has changed
its plans for integrating the
PND with the NLEDS programme several
times, and it has now been excluded. The PND,
introduced in 2011, is nearing the end of its original lifespan
and will need a technology update. The Department intends to
establish a separate five-year programme to update
the PND, but this will not begin until 2022. The previous
intention to integrate PND and PNC led to the Department
repeatedly deferring upgrades to and investment in the PND,
affecting both service quality and stability, but a
refresh of the most critical elements of the PND will cost at
least £13 million. The Department says that data
from the PND and the PNC will be accessible to police using a
‘federated search’ without the need to merge the two systems.
While we welcome the prospect of police finally receiving this
capability, these changes to the Department’s
approach mean that the planned benefits of
joined-up systems and wider usage of the PND by police are now
delayed and cost savings from rationalisation are less
likely.
Recommendation: The Department should write to the
Committee when it has an approved business case for the
PND setting out its plan, milestones and
budget for expanding the use of the PND and ensuring police will
be able to access PND data via NLEDS.
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There is a risk that
the Department still lacks the capacity to
prioritise and deliver major digital programmes on
time. In common with many other government
departments and agencies, the Department is reliant on a range
of legacy technology systems that need updating or replacing.
We have seen several major programmes to deliver such
replacements encounter major problems and require resetting,
for example the Emergency Services Network and Digital Services
at the Border programmes. The Department’s failure to
deliver NLEDS is another example. The
Department has tried to do too much at once
and has failed to prioritise programmes or develop
the skills it needed to adopt ‘agile’ methods. It did not
understand challenges posed by complex legacy systems and
police forces’ operational independence, even though it should
have been clear that these were present. In its evidence the
Department recognised that it needs to be better at saying ‘no’
to unrealistic technology programme proposals. The
Department has now made some changes to improve how it involves
police users in such programmes and plans to use the NLEDS as a
pilot for its new approach, which can then be applied to other
police programmes. There is a clear risk that the Department
still lacks the programme, technical and commercial skills
needed to identify realistic timetables for its major
programmes.
Recommendation: The Department must
be realistic about how long it will take to deliver major
programmes, given the skills and capabilities and
funding available. It should require all SROs of major programmes
to report annually on how they will manage any gaps between the
skills and capabilities required to deliver and those available
in their programmes. The Department should write to us in
six months’ time with an update on how this is
being implemented.