Moved by Lord Best That the Grand Committee takes note of the
report from the Parliamentary Works Sponsor Body Annual Report and
Accounts 2020-21 (HC Paper 472). Lord Best (CB) My Lords, as the
Lords spokesperson for Parliament’s Restoration and
Renewal sponsor body overseeing this mighty project, alongside
the noble Lords, Lord Carter of Coles and Lord Deighton, and the
noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, it falls to me to open this important
debate. I follow...Request free trial
Moved by
That the Grand Committee takes note of the report from the
Parliamentary Works Sponsor Body Annual Report and Accounts
2020-21 (HC Paper 472).
(CB)
My Lords, as the Lords spokesperson for
Parliament’s Restoration and
Renewal sponsor body overseeing this mighty project,
alongside the noble Lords, and , and the noble Baroness, Lady
Doocey, it falls to me to open this important debate. I follow in
the footsteps of the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Needham
Market, who was our spokesperson from April 2020, when the
sponsor body became a statutory organisation. I pay tribute to
her diligent and committed work and am delighted that she will be
contributing later to this debate.
My job is to draw attention to our annual report and accounts,
but I know that such reports and accounts are seldom priority
reading for any of us and I am sure this debate will cover wider
matters. Indeed, I intend to refer to one such issue—an urgent
one—myself. I must begin by underlining the critical need for the
wholesale Restoration and
Renewal of the Houses of Parliament. Noble Lords will be
aware of the scale of this task, but it bears repeating. Our 150
year-old building, a UNESCO world heritage site, is vast; it has
a floorplan the size of 16 football pitches, with well over 1,000
rooms, 100 staircases and four floors on 65 different levels.
Beneath us, there are three miles of passageways and 250 miles of
wires and cabling. The building has 4,000 original windows, 3,800
of them in bronze, and it houses 11,000 artefacts.
Shockingly, however, this iconic Palace is falling apart faster
than it can be fixed. There is a growing backlog of repairs. The
cost of maintenance has doubled in three years to £127 million a
year and, if left alone, will no doubt double again. The heating,
drainage, gas, mechanical and electrical systems all need
replacing, as does the sewerage system, which dates back to 1888.
After the last war, the building was packed with harmful
asbestos, and of course falling masonry is a serious hazard.
After decades of patch and mend, and despite the very best
efforts of our excellent in-house maintenance and repair teams,
whose recent work has included installing new fire safety
systems, we are doing little more than managing the continuing
decline of the building.
If noble Lords have not done so, I encourage them to book a place
on one of the tours of the labyrinthine basement—the sponsor body
will be organising the next round of these in the new year—to see
what lies beneath: over half a mile of jumbled pipes and cables,
with no one knowing where in the Palace half of them end up.
There are photos of all this in the modest exhibition on display
today in the Royal Gallery as part of the ongoing work of
consulting Members and staff. The alternative to restoration is
demolition, but Parliament, recognising that this landmark
building is known the world over and is much loved by the British
people, has determined that it should be restored. This exercise
will of absolute necessity be extremely costly, but the public—as
our sponsor body board has discovered from surveys of thousands
of people of all ages and in all four nations this year—have real
pride in the Palace and they want it renewed.
Nevertheless, the public also want to see value for money, and
this has to be at the heart of the R&R programme. While
resisting the temptation to downplay and underestimate costs, and
to be overoptimistic when presenting the business case, we must
be ever mindful that all our spending really is essential. I am
grateful to the noble Lord, , as chair of the
Lords Finance Committee, for his attention to the detail of our
spending, which will help to ensure we keep on the straight and
narrow.
The annual report and accounts show that this has been an
important period for the R&R initiative, with valuable
progress in this planning phase. Substantial progress has been
made with our delivery authority in considering the requirements
from all sides, preparing designs, undertaking extensive surveys
of the Palace, working on the decant proposals for the House of
Lords and for the heritage assets, while preparing for numerous
contracts which will create jobs, skills and social value
throughout the UK.
Since the annual report and accounts were published, the
programme’s survey work has been stepped up with 50 specialists
spending nearly 5,000 hours investigating the building, examining
2,343 rooms and spaces, recording thousands of defects, including
cracks in stonework and widespread water damage. Acoustic experts
are considering how to improve audibility within the building and
have run 300 sound tests in 80 rooms, taking 2,000 measurements.
Intrusive surveys will be done over the Christmas Recess and
archaeologists will be studying the ground beneath the
building.
This work has already engaged people from across the country:
ecological and door specialists from Manchester, window surveyors
from Glasgow, architects and engineers from across London,
historic surveyors and specialists from Cambridge, Suffolk, and
Hampshire. When building works begin, materials will be sourced,
and training, apprenticeships and skills will be supported for
thousands throughout all parts of the UK.
As the annual report and accounts make clear, post Covid the
programme has concentrated on those works which are essential for
saving the Palace for future generations, with the emphasis on
efficiency and economy, using industry-standard benchmarking
methods to ensure value for money. We are learning from other
major heritage programmes including the Canadian Parliament,
Manchester Town Hall and King’s Cross station. The programme has
adopted governance and assurance functions as recommended by the
Treasury, the National Audit Office and the Infrastructure and
Projects Authority.
I can testify that all this has not been easy: there are strong
and conflicting views on the priorities for R&R, always with
the desire for more to be achieved and less to be spent. There
are myriad external interested parties, from the Westminster
planning authority and English Heritage, to the Port of London
Authority and the Environment Agency in respect of creating
access from the riverside, to the Department for Levelling Up,
Housing & Communities, which owns the QEII Centre, which we
need for the Lords decant. Satisfying everyone may not be
possible, but the sponsor body team, and the delivery authority
that we oversee, are making steady progress toward a
comprehensive plan that will be fully and realistically costed
and ready for Parliament to consider in 2023.
Once the plan is agreed, building work can commence on the
decanting accommodation. With a fair wind, these adaptation works
will be concluded by the end of 2027 and this House would then
decant to the QEII —although I rather suspect that we will not be
moving before 2028.
Before we can complete our proposed plan for presentation to both
Houses in 2023, a prior decision must be taken on a key question.
Those representing the House of Commons have expressed a strong
desire for that House to retain a continued presence in the
Palace during restoration. We have commissioned work to consider
the feasibility and costs of this staying-put proposition and
will make a recommendation accordingly in the next few weeks.
What we know already is that a decision for the House of Commons
to remain in situ, first in one Chamber and then the other, would
hugely increase the costs for the taxpayer and more than double
the time taken. During this extended period, the public would not
be able to visit the Palace, and Parliament sees 1.25 million
visitors in a normal year and 300,000 children. The other House
will have to operate in the midst of the probably largest
restoration project in the world, facing all the hazards of fire,
asbestos, noise, dust and vibration. There will be a high
additional cost of security for MPs in and around the Palace.
Since the underground plumbing and power will be out of action,
temporary systems and generators will be needed in the
courtyards, occupying space which is also needed by the
contractors.
However, it is not for me, as the Lords spokesperson, to comment
on what is best for those in the House of Commons, but an
insistence on retaining a continued presence within the massive
building site would have significant implications for the House
of Lords too. Our House has accepted the necessity—however
inconvenient—to decant to other premises in order to expedite the
restoration, with the assumption that the House of Commons would
do the same. This means a move for us to the QEII building, which
obviously has significant downsides as a working environment. If
the Commons is to be accommodated in the Palace throughout the
building works, the move to the QEII by your Lordships’ House
would be for twice as long as originally expected, twice as long
operating from a less satisfactory environment and twice as long
detached from the rest of Parliament. This is bound to have wider
implications for us.
Decisions will need to be made on this hugely important matter in
the next few months. It is entirely understandable that those
representing the Commons should want Parliament to continue to
operate out of the Palace, but the implications in terms of cost,
time and convenience illustrate the dilemmas and complexities of
this whole gigantic project. The sponsor body is the creature of
Parliament and will accept whatever decision Parliament takes,
but, speaking entirely personally and for myself alone, I
sincerely hope we will not be asked to proceed with the
requirement of a continued presence for the other House
throughout the Restoration and
Renewal of this extraordinary building.
I conclude by thanking my fellow members of the sponsor body
board, chaired so expertly by Liz Peace. I am delighted to
present, on the board’s behalf, our annual report and accounts
for the last year, as a record of good progress, and although I
have shared my concerns on the current issue of a continued
presence for the House of Commons, I congratulate the extremely
professional and talented new teams serving the sponsor body and
our high-powered delivery authority. I look forward to hearing
the views of noble Lords. I beg to move.
15:58:00
(Con)
My Lords, I welcome this opportunity to review the status of this
marathon project. We are here looking at the resilience of this
building, but for those of us who have been involved in this for
any period of time it is testing the resilience of some of us.
The noble Lord, Lord Carter, and I not only are members of the
sponsor body but were members of its preceding body, the Joint
Committee. It is worth spending a minute or two reminding
ourselves of where that combined group ended up, which was with a
very clear recommendation back in 2016 that the Palace of
Westminster was in urgent and immediate need of Restoration and
Renewal and that the best way to do that was quickly and
with a full decant of both Houses.
I want to go back to that, not because anybody was unclear about
the conclusion it reached but to share with the Committee the
process we went through to get there, which was to explore every
single way to try to get it done more cheaply and with far less
disruption. I suppose, like every good scientific process, we
unfortunately had to disprove all the other options and were left
with the full decant as the only truly viable option which would
produce the best value for money for the taxpayer. That
recommendation was endorsed by the House of Commons in a vote in
2018, which slightly surprised me. I had thought it would
probably reach a slightly more hedged recommendation; in fact, it
reinforced absolutely the full decant—the “Let’s just get on with
it” approach to this project.
Subsequently, we set up the sponsor body and the delivery
authority, which are charged with building the capacity to carry
out the project. The first, principal output from this work will
be the outline business case next year, to which the noble Lord,
, referred. Until then, it seems
there is a lot of sparring going on. We have resisted coming up
with a budget or timetable in any detail because we have never
really done the work. One of my approaches throughout this
project has been to say, let us just get the work done thoroughly
and then determine where we are on the three key variables which
drive every project: scope, cost and schedule. The interplay
between those three things is what you trade off, squeeze and
prioritise to drive your eventual project.
In examining the change of approach that the House of Commons has
adopted, I have asked myself what has changed. This place has not
suddenly become more resilient; it is still falling down. I can
think of only two things that have changed. One is that we have a
different composition in the House of Commons, so maybe its
current composition would vote differently from the previous one.
The only other thing that has changed is that the public finances
are in a much more difficult state post the Covid crisis, so our
keenness to find a solution which does not suffer from what I
would call sticker shock is even greater than it was before we
had the stresses on public finance, which came with all the
pandemic measures.
If I can step back for a little, it is always useful in these
processes to remind ourselves what we broadly agree on. I think
we broadly agree that the Palace of Westminster should be
preserved, and that the historical approach to doing so—what we
might describe as managed decline—runs out of time at some point,
and that we have reached that point. Something therefore has to
be done. We do not need to keep going over that argument; we are
going to renew this building so that it is a good working
building for Parliament going forward. Those are the arguments
that I think have been settled.
There are a couple of other things where it seems strong
agreement is always reached when we talk about what we should
accomplish in this project. The first is improved access, both
physically for those with a disability and broadly speaking for
the population at large, in what I would describe as a “spirit of
democracy” point of view. Finally, that the project should be
carried out in a way to maximise the benefits right around the
UK, by ensuring small businesses get involved and that
apprenticeships are all part of it. There are many other models
of big projects accomplishing that which will be quite useful for
us to copy, so I am relatively confident that once we get going,
we will be able to do that.
I will also say a little about the initial set-up stage of the
sponsor body and, particularly, the delivery authority. It is
really hard setting up a company from scratch to take on what is
probably the most difficult building restoration in the history
of the planet. In my experience, when we had to do that for the
Olympic Games the first year or two was really difficult: you
have to hire everybody while you do not really know how to work
with each other. You are never quite sure whether you have the
right people in the right jobs.
It was very different in the heyday of aviation, for example,
when we were trying to build a third runway at Heathrow, because
we had a very strong organisation at Heathrow Airport that knew
how to do that sort of thing. It was a much easier process. I
score us very satisfactorily on the initial set-up stages; it is
going fine given the degree of challenge and given what people
have had to accomplish during the Covid period.
What are the key challenges? They really all boil down to value
for money or cost. What does value for money mean for this
project? It is a useful concept when you have two or three
different ways of getting an agreed objective accomplished if you
can assess them and decide which represents best value for money,
but this project is just something that we have decided to do.
Personally, I do not think of value for money; I think, “What is
the most efficient way to deliver your chosen scope?” Again, my
experience tells me that what tends to add up to the biggest cost
overruns and inefficiencies is always a lack of clarity about
what you are trying to accomplish and your inability to make
decisions. That drags the project out for much too long, and you
are left carrying the cost of the overhead of massive project
apparatus while you figure out what it was you really wanted to
do.
If the question is, “How do you deliver efficiently your chosen
scope?”, then your chosen scope becomes incredibly important. We
do not have that much room to play with here, because virtually
every initial estimate tells you that something like
three-quarters of the cost is in the core engineering, which is
an inescapable part of the budget. You are left with a very small
part of the budget to satisfy everybody’s desires about what the
end product should look like. That is like squeezing a very large
person into a very tight corset. As the noble Lord, , put it, there will always be too
little money chasing too many requirements. It is okay to divide
our requirements into essential and highly desirable, but one man
or woman’s essential is frankly not necessarily another person’s.
What things are essential or desirable in heating, cooling or
security are all difficult to define in a crisp way within a
scope.
I have a comment on the decant challenges. This applies
particularly to the proposal that the House of Lords decants into
the QEII Centre, which is the more advanced of the projects. The
challenge again that we will meet there is that most of the
candidates for decant locations essentially require us to set up
a building that has long-term capability. In the case of the
QEII, you are restoring something that is completely and utterly
run down—yet we are using it only for a temporary period. Either
the structure or the communication needs to be handled in a way
that at least satisfactorily reflects this, or it is going to
look quite expensive.
It is also an appropriate time for us in this House to all be
sensitive about the world looking closely at what are deemed to
be our requirements for a temporary location, particularly if it
is seen to be extremely expensive. All that will come very much
under scrutiny. To the extent that there are any plans to reform
this House or the other, whether in size or practices, at some
point those reforms should be made consistent with whatever our
accommodation plan is, otherwise there is a strong risk of
building something for this age that will not work for the next
age.
I repeat my concern about what I described as sticker shock.
Whenever the budget number is announced, no matter how low or
high it is—even if it is impossibly low—it would still be greeted
with shock and awe at what a ridiculously expensive project it
is. There is no magic way of handling this, other than to have
done your work well and made sure that it is well evidenced. You
must make sure that your engagement with Parliament and the
public more generally is open, clear and consistent, and when you
say you are going to do something, you must actually do it and
deliver. You also must demonstrate that you have worked every
possible angle to reduce cost and that your definition of scope
is acceptable by anybody’s standards.
I have one final warning based on my own experience. When you are
confronted by this problem of a large potential budget and a
complicated scope, the easy compromise is to agree in the short
term an unrealistic budget. That may get you through the short
term but inevitably precipitates a crisis later. The cost of that
is far more serious than taking the heat of getting that scope
and cost right from the very beginning and adhering to them.
16:11:00
(Lab)
My Lords, first, I congratulate the noble Lord, , on securing this debate. It is a
pleasure to follow the noble Lord, , who covered many of the
points so eloquently.
This is a good moment to review where we are and, more
importantly, where we might go in the coming months. As the noble
Lord, , said, we—the noble Lord, the
noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and me—have been involved in trying
to make sense of what we do in this for some 20 years of our
time. When we started, we thought that it would be difficult.
That has absolutely been confirmed. It is a very difficult and
complex project. As we look at it, the key thing we need to do is
get decisions made at the right moment in time.
Despite Covid-19 and many impediments, there has been quite a lot
of progress since the 2019 Act was passed. If you think about it,
we are spending £100 million a year trying to find out what we
should be doing. If you look at that, it is a complex task. Other
noble Lords have referred to this being probably the largest
restoration project in the world. As we go through this, we have
to stick to the three questions we should always ask ourselves.
First, why are we doing it? Secondly, what are we going to do?
Thirdly, how are we going to do it?
The “why” is straightforward. The Palace is falling down, is
dangerous and is costing a lot of money. We are spending £120
million a year more than we would normally spend to keep an
ordinary building running. We are spending money looking into it.
What we need is to move forward and make some decisions.
The question of what is to be done is a great deal more
controversial. As the noble Lord, , said, scope is always one of
the most difficult issues in a major building project because if
you do not get that clear and freeze it, what you get is creep;
you then lose confidence because it is not nailed down. We are
trying to take a 160 year-old building and turn it into a modern,
publicly accessible workspace, so we have a rather irreconcilable
dilemma between the needs of a heritage site and the need for a
modern office block.
Above all, we want to preserve the valued traditions of both
Houses. However, that means that there will be trade-offs and
compromises. When these projects start, everybody gets a wish
list. In the initial stages, people go around listing things
then, gradually, one works one’s way through it. They might
include decent working conditions, access, sustainability—the
idea of this being a zero-carbon building is somewhat optimistic,
I would suggest—better security, better visitor access, et
cetera. All those things pose a challenge. We cannot have them
all, nor to the maximum degree.
How we arrive at those choices, which we will have to make, needs
to be informed by accurate costs and a clear spelling out of the
interrelationship between these things. For example, if you have
more of that and less of this, how will it fit together? On a
simple matter, if you think about the QEII, what will the working
conditions be going forward? One matter of particular concern is
whether we use cellular offices or go to open plan. What are our
compromises prepared to be to move this forward?
What we need is correct, accurate and, above all, validated
information. As the noble Lord, , noted, it is better to get
it right at the beginning and fight for it there and then rather
than constantly undermining the project by going back with
revisions. As they say, three profit warnings do not do you any
good, so we must learn how to do that.
Both those things are difficult, particularly the scope, but they
can be done. The most pressing issue is how we are going to get
on with it. This is the crux. If we think back, the 2019
legislation was based on the work that the Joint Committee did.
It recommended a full decant and, critically, it envisaged that
both Houses would be out for seven, eight, perhaps 10 years.
During that time, it was the aspiration that Members in the other
place would serve at least part of their time in the old Chamber
or the new Chamber, so there was to be a sense of continuity. I
suppose that would have been easier if the commitment to
fixed-term Parliaments were more fashionable, but there we
are.
Since the 2019 election, clearly there has been a change of
sentiment, and the other place has been very clear that it wishes
to maintain a continuing presence. To paraphrase Keynes, I
suppose that, when faced with changing facts, the sponsor body
has had to change its approach and get to work to determine what
the cost would be. At this moment, possibly unlike others, I
think that the sponsor body needs to adopt a neutral position
until it sees the facts; the facts will be produced. The key is
the money. At this point, we should probably draw comfort from
Luke, chapter 14, verses 28 to 29:
“Suppose one of you wants to build a tower. Won’t you first sit
down and estimate the cost to see if you have enough money to
complete it? For if you lay the foundation and are not able to
finish it, everyone who sees it will ridicule you”.
I do not think we—the Government, the House authorities, the
Speaker, the Lord Speaker, et cetera—are in the business of being
ridiculed.
So how do we get these things right? That is how we are spending
£100 million a year. People are trying to go through and not make
mistakes. We have out there a glaring example of a mistake. It
was estimated that it would cost £18 million to restore the
Elizabeth Tower and Big Ben. It now looks like it is going to be
£80 million. That is a microcosm of the challenges. What have we
found? We found gas mains in the wrong place, stone that
crumbles, cables in the wrong place and rotten lead. If we look
at that, to start on this without drilling down and finding out
what we are starting out with, not just what the scope should be
based on, would be foolish. Looking at it, early in 2022, the
first of the questions we need to address should be answered—that
is, is it a total decant, is the other place going to remain or
are the Government going to kick the can down the road? I will
return to that in a moment.
As others have reminded us, this is the largest refurbishment
programme in the world, and the critical thing is that it is the
work of professionals. This is a job for professionals, not
amateurs. We all have building experience; I think that some of
the more entertaining moments in our time on this have been the
eccentric suggestions that we, as a committee, have received,
helpful or unhelpful. Sometimes I felt it was a bit like the
suggestion that we should reduce the whole of the power system in
England to steam again. We have to look forward and find a way of
doing this.
Critically, what we have to do—the question is: who is the “we”
in this?—is be confident in our argument and settle what we are
going to do, then move on to get the OBC to understand absolutely
safely what the money is, stick to it and trust our
professionals. That does not mean that we should be weak on
governance. We should be absolutely clear that we want to see
value for money and we want to scrutinise it. Those responsible
do that, as does the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. These questions are
welcome because this is a unique project and we need all the
insight we can get to take it forward.
Coming to where we are now, in the new year, we will see the
proposals either for total decant or for continued presence—or we
might see the proposal not to do anything. However, what is
critical is that we reach a decision on what we are going to do,
we go on and cost it, and we build a case through Parliament to
take to the people. According to a recent survey—I think it was
in the Daily Mail—71% of the public support the Prime Minister’s
£1-trillion climate change programme, but only 16% of them would
spend a fiver a week for it. Our polling suggests that there is a
great public support for the rebuilding of Parliament, but we
have to convince more than 16% of the population that it is worth
while.
Where does responsibility for this sit? First, it sits with the
sponsor body. Then it sits with the parliamentary authorities in
both Houses; it sits with the Speaker and the Lord Speaker. Above
all, it sits with the Government, because a Government with an
80-seat majority will determine what is going to happen.
Therefore, they need to decide. Without a decision, or if the
decision is to kick the can down the road, we will be faced with
a catastrophe at some point. Whether it is this Government or the
next Government, it will be hard to explain to the British public
why this issue was not faced up to. We have the means in place to
make those recommendations; I just hope that we can move on. I
sometimes think that we, but particularly the Government, are all
a bit like the famous dog watching television—he can see it but
he does not get it. What we have to do now is get everybody to
get the importance of this and move on rapidly in the new
year.
16:21:00
(CB)
My Lords, I want to say at the start that I am completely
supportive of both getting on with the R&R project quickly
and a full decant. My noble friend eloquently described the
situation, and I wholeheartedly endorse his description of the
critical need for wholesale Restoration and
Renewal As some of my comments will raise questions about
elements of the R&R process, I wanted to make sure that that
was clear at the outset. I do not want to derail the process,
just ensure that it goes well. I also put on record my
appreciation for the work that the noble Lords who sit on the
sponsor body do— especially my noble friend , the Lords spokesman. I suspect
that this is a rather difficult and thankless task; they all
deserve our gratitude.
I will restrict my comments to the information that is set out in
the annual report and accounts for the year 2020-21—I am probably
one of the few who has read it, as my noble friend mentioned—and
a few other public announcements, tempting though it is to stray
into wider matters such as the continued presence. I should
stress that I am no expert in heritage restoration; I am one of
the amateurs just referred to. I am just an accountant who has
taken a reasonably close look at the figures.
My first comments are about value for money during this first
investigatory phase—not the actual building phase, just this
stage. I am afraid that, despite the various claims in the annual
report about
“a rigorous approach to value for money”
and
“a relentless focus on identifying savings and efficiencies”,
I have real concerns that that is not clearly demonstrated by the
figures. Let me provide some examples. Staff costs appear
extremely high. The 122 employees have a total cost of
£13,751,000, which is an average cost per head of £122,713. That
is very high by anyone’s standards. The 36 permanently employed
staff—this in that first year—cost on average £100,250 each,
while the 52 seconded staff are a bit cheaper, at an average of
£72,173 each. The 34 other staff, who I believe are interim, cost
a staggering £187,912 each. These are extremely high numbers.
On top of the employee costs, there are huge consulting costs.
Between the sponsor body and the development authority, a total
of £51.6 million was paid to consultants during the year for
project management fees, design services and other unspecified
services provided by the integrated delivery partner. That is
nearly four times the cost of the employees. There is no more
detail in the report and accounts about what they were doing, or
what sort of rates they are being paid, but this kind of reliance
on consultants is always going to make the costs higher than they
might otherwise be. There is no detail about how this is
controlled. In my experience, there is a risk that excessive use
of consultants can become self-fulfilling: consultants identify
additional needs that they can then fill, and they become
self-feeding entities. Without stringent controls on every single
engagement—that is, asking, “Do we actually need to do this now,
and could it be done more cheaply?”—this can quickly run out of
control. These numbers raise those sorts of questions, especially
as, as we shall hear later, little actual survey work was carried
out during the year.
Then we have IT costs. If we include the £5.2 million of IT costs
that have been capitalised, which has the net effect of reducing
the headline total expenditure by £4.5 million, a total of £22.9
million has been spent on IT, comprising £7.2 million of
equipment and £15 million on maintenance, development and
support. That is a quite extraordinary £187,705 per employee.
Some £59,000 on equipment on average has been spent for each
employee.
The report and accounts point out that the IT expenditure has
been benchmarked by a company called Proxima, and found to be
“in line with value for money expectations.”
I am afraid I have a rather cynical view of benchmarking. It is
entirely dependent on what you benchmark against and the question
you ask. If you choose the right comparators, you can justify
anything. As an example, let us assume that I am looking to buy a
new car. My neighbour on one side has a Ferrari, the neighbour on
the other a Lamborghini, so the McLaren that I rather fancy looks
like a completely reasonable choice and entirely justifiable to
my wife. Actually, I just need a car to get me to the station in
the morning—a second-hand VW Polo would do the job. In my
experience, there is always a good enough solution at a much
lower cost. I wonder whether those good-enough solutions were
fully explored. We should be spending only what is essential at
this stage, not what is nice to have.
So I have my concerns about how much money is being spent and
whether it truly represents good value for money but, as my
predecessor as chair of the Finance Committee—the noble Baroness,
Lady Doocey —will I am sure confirm, one of the biggest reasons
why so many of our large projects have gone over budget and over
time is because we have not spent enough time and money up front
on detailed intrusive surveys and preparatory work to make sure
we really understand the scale and scope needed. I therefore
agree wholeheartedly with those who say that we must spend enough
now in this preparatory phase to ensure the success of the final
project. As the noble Lord, Lord Carter, said, we must get it
right in the beginning. Money properly spent now should lead to
savings in the future, and as the report and accounts rightly say
with respect to the current year budget:
“This investment will improve the chances of success of the
Programme and create value in the future by … Understanding
better the state of the building by carrying out an extensive
range of surveys”.
Perhaps that is what all this money, especially the consultancy
fees, has been spent on. If so, I would be generally happy. Value
for money is just as much about what you spend the money on as
about how much you spend. But I am afraid not. Despite the
slightly misleading headline in the
“What we have delivered this year”
section of the report, which says
“Important progress on the Palace of Westminster surveys and
options”
and the statement
“We have made good progress with intrusive and non-intrusive
surveys”,
when you read a bit further you discover that in fact not a
single intrusive survey was carried out in the year. The report
states:
“The bulk of the intrusive work will take place next year”—
in other words, during this current financial year. But even that
has not happened. My noble friend has pointed out and the sponsor
body has put out a press release that says that over 50
specialists have, since the start of this financial year, carried
out nearly 5,000 hours of detailed surveys. That sounds good, but
let us put it into context. That represents only 13 days’ work
for each of those specialists. That does not include the
essential intrusive surveys, which, according to the latest press
release in October, will now take place over the winter and next
year. That is apparently somewhat delayed compared with the claim
in the report and accounts that the bulk will take place in the
current year. I understand that that has been further delayed
since.
16:29:00
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
16:38:00
(CB)
I was just saying that the intrusive surveys that were supposed
to take place in the current financial year have now been delayed
until the next financial year. That begs the question: what we
have been spending all this money on? According to the report and
accounts, the current year budget totals £155.6 million. Let us
assume that these 50 specialists who have been carrying out the
5,000 hours of surveys are consultants charging—let us be
generous and think of a number—£300 an hour. That is just a
guess; I hope it is much lower than that in reality. If so, then
so far this year just £1.5 million would have been spent on
surveys, which is only 1% of the total budget. I confess that I
find that difficult to understand, and it really does not seem
consistent with the statement I quoted about the budget being an
investment in understanding better the state of the building by
carrying out an extensive range of surveys.
Importantly, it appears that serious decisions may be made before
the essential intrusive surveys are carried out, including the
continued presence decision referred to by my noble friend . As we know from past projects,
including the Elizabeth Tower, as the noble Lord, Lord Carter,
mentioned, decision-making on large complex projects that is not
based on full detailed surveys is a recipe for disaster. We must
have a full and clear picture of the scale of the problems before
we can make informed decisions around how we go ahead. It is not
at all impossible to imagine a decision on continued presence
being taken based on incomplete information, and it then being
very difficult to row back from it if subsequent surveys throw up
something that might have led to a different decision if known
about up front.
As I said at the start, I remain convinced that we need to save
this building and that we need to get on with it quickly,
probably with a full decant. Although I have raised concerns
about how well the money has been spent, I would be delighted to
be proved wrong. We need to spend substantial amounts up front to
ensure the success of the project. My concerns are more about how
the money is being spent rather than the amount, and whether
efforts are really being concentrated on the essential tasks,
such as surveys. If this is not to be a disaster, our decisions
must be based on full, intrusive and necessarily expensive
surveys, not just on the consultation and desktop modelling that
appears to be where most of the time and money has been spent
until now. I will continue to want to be convinced that the phase
1 spending is only on what is essential to allow proper decisions
and to make the actual restoration phase a success, and that we
are not wasting any taxpayers’ money on non-essential items or
unnecessary gold-plating.
16:40:00
(LD)
My Lords, I joined the sponsor board only in September this year,
so I am not yet as familiar with the issues as my sponsor board
colleagues around the Room. However, for the past four years I
chaired the House of Lords Finance Committee, during which time
the focus of our work was overseeing the delivery of 15 very
large projects, ranging from Big Ben to the refurbishment of
Westminster Hall. The committee scrutinised these projects on
multiple occasions and in some detail, so I have a very good
understanding of the challenges that carrying out work in this
Palace entails.
It seems to me that three key principles weigh heavily on the
board as we undertake the planning of this major project. The
first is to ensure that the Palace of Westminster is preserved
for future generations. This Palace is at the centre of our
national and democratic heritage. The second is to achieve value
for money for today’s taxpayers as we ask them to stump up the
cost of these works. This, for me, is critical. The third is to
be transparent about the difficult choices before us, to share as
much information as possible and to draw on the experience we
already have of undertaking essential renovation of this
building. We know, for example, that the cost of repairing and
refurbishing Big Ben has rocketed, despite the fact that that was
a very well-managed project. This model cannot be repeated.
The noble Lord, , outlined the array of problems
with this building, which has never been properly maintained and
has been held together with an array of sticking plasters.
Another challenge is that there are no proper plans of the
building, and those plans that do exist are often inaccurate or
incomplete. The mechanical and electrical plant is the stuff of
nightmares and would be condemned by the authorities if it were
in any other building. Added to this is the catastrophic
consequences were the Palace to catch fire. So Restoration and
Renewal is essential but, however the project is executed,
it will be very complex and take many years.
The sponsor board is currently working on a comprehensive plan
for the work that will be required, and we are told that this has
so far involved 5,000 hours of surveys. I cannot emphasise enough
that this preparatory work is essential because proper, intrusive
survey work is critical to the success of any project. In my
experience, the key factors that result in cost and time overruns
time and again are: surveys and advance investigations being too
limited in scope, leading to inaccurate costings; work not being
fully defined and quantified from the outset; and budgets that
always hope for the best, rather than prepare for the worst. So
transparency is key, and it is essential that all relevant
information and lessons learned from major parliamentary projects
are shared between Parliament, the sponsor board and the delivery
authority. If a proper system of information sharing is not set
up and strictly adhered to—I emphasise that last part—costly
mistakes will be repeated and the public will be right not to
forgive us.
On cost and practicalities, there is no doubt that the quickest
and most cost-effective way of getting from where we are now to
where we need to be is for both Houses to move out of the Palace
to temporary accommodation. The sponsor board is very aware of
the fact that a lot of Members have real concerns about moving
out, but Members’ concerns will be as nothing compared to those
of taxpayers if we proceed to make this costly restoration
project slower and much more expensive than it needs to be. We
must remember that we are merely custodians of this building. It
is not ours. We have no divine right to occupy it during our time
as legislators. Our responsibility is to protect it for those the
public send here next.
As the sponsor board makes difficult decisions and puts forward
its proposals to both Houses, we must have a clear eye not on
what is convenient or comfortable for us now but on how our
decisions will be viewed 100 years from now. I only hope that, in
exercising their influence over this process, Members of both
Houses will bear that in mind.
16:46:00
(CB)
My Lords, let me begin by saying how impressed I am by the
contributions of the noble Lord, , and his colleagues on the
sponsor board as well as how lucky the House is to have them on
the job. We thank them for their dedication; we are truly
grateful for their skill and expertise.
As we all know, a British Parliament has existed on this site for
more than 700 years. We all know the story of how a fire
destroyed most of the buildings on this site in 1834—let that be
a warning to us—but parliamentarians then did not hang around.
Within two years, a new building was commissioned. A year later,
new building works began. The last piece in the jigsaw—the
Elizabeth Tower—was completed a little over 20 years later. The
design was a sublime partnership between Sir Charles Barry and
Augustus Pugin.
Pugin’s story is brilliantly captured in Rosemary Hill’s
page-turner biography; I heartily recommend it to anybody who has
not read it. Pugin was the son of a Huguenot asylum seeker
fleeing the French Revolution. He was a passionate and precocious
genius who won a competition to design the King’s furniture when
he was just 16 years old. With his father, who was an
architectural historian, he spent his summers touring European
cities. Together, they made drawings of medieval buildings—this
was before the age of photography—which were published and widely
bought. Pugin was deeply hostile to the plain simplicity of the
prevailing Georgian architecture of the period and proselytised
for a romantic Gothic revival. He was only 24 when he and Barry
won the commission with this neo-Gothic design. The Lords Chamber
is his particular masterpiece, in my view.
Unsurprisingly, the enormously ambitious Westminster Palace
project went over time and over budget, costing £2.166 million.
However, our Victorian forebears invested not just in a forum for
their day but in one of the most iconic buildings on the planet,
for ever a symbol understood the world over of all that is best
in this cradle of democracy. Those parliamentarians invested in
the future. Some 160 years later, we are truly beholden to their
vision and wisdom.
It goes without saying that the 21st-century restoration is
utterly unavoidable. I think we all agree on that, given the
parlous and dangerous state of the fabric. The 21st-century
restoration should match the quality of the 19th-century building
and carry us through the next period of our history. Of course,
the works should be carried out as economically as possible, but
let us not pretend that it is feasible precisely to budget the
restoration of a building of this age and condition. In the
1840s, it was discovered during construction that the site of the
Victoria Tower was in fact quicksand and that it would have to be
supported on piles. I know from painful personal experience that,
however much you assess it in advance, renovating an old building
comes with a litany of unexpected and unwelcome surprises.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has been extremely busy with his
calculator; I listened keenly to what he said. It had many echoes
from the whole of my career. I have not been responsible for a
major building project but I have been responsible for
innumerable large and complex projects of various kinds.
Listening to him, I thought: what is my takeaway about how you
run it? The noble Lord, , gave us the value of his own
considerable wisdom on the subject, but what would be my
experience of what is needed to run a successful project?
The first condition is that you absolutely must have around you
people of real experience and expertise, who have done it before
and know what it is like. The second condition is that you have
to have a completely open environment because all these projects
become mired in small-p politics, wherever they happen and in
whatever kind of organisation. It is absolutely vital not to let
small-p politics get in the way; you must have an honest and open
exchange of information. If something is not right, you must find
out about it straightaway. Because you have to problem-solve on
the way through, you need expert and speedy problem-solving as
you progress.
All these things will be necessary in this project, so yes, let
us manage the project with high professionalism. I am absolutely
certain that we will and that some of that high professionalism
is in this Room. However, let us not pretend that we can hold
those responsible to a budget calculated to three decimal places.
Let us at all times remember that we are making a capital
investment that will pay back over a century or more. I hope that
those preparing the investment case look at the two options: what
is the net present value of continuing to maintain this building
over time as against the net present value of a proper and
professional renovation?
Let us also renounce any thought that either the Commons or the
Lords Chambers should continue to be utilised while the works are
under way. That appears to be common ground today. Such a move
would absolutely guarantee huge extra delay and expense, as well
as complete misery for parliamentarians and builders alike.
Frankly, if I am to use slightly unparliamentary language, it is
a completely barmy idea. Let us rather, as parliamentarians, make
the sacrifice of leaving this building together until it is fully
restored. Let us remember, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey,
said, that we are but custodians of this glorious Palace at one
moment in time and that, as our forefathers did, we are investing
in the very future of our nation.
16:54:00
(LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, , for his introduction and his
kind words to me.
It is interesting how much we can get accustomed to things over
time. We turn up to this building and almost do not see the
ever-encroaching scaffolding, the netting that was installed to
stop masonry falling on us, the portakabins and the piles of
rubbish that fill the historic courtyards on the ground floor.
Despite this never-ending maintenance work, at a cost of around
£2 million a week, the building is getting worse. We expect many
of our staff to work in poky offices, some of which have little
or no natural light, inadequate ventilation and poor temperature
control. Colleagues with mobility issues struggle with stairs,
steps, small lifts and heavy doors.
It is worth pausing sometimes to look at the faces of the
tourists who look at our building, even in these rather difficult
times. They cannot believe what they are seeing; frankly, I find
it embarrassing that we have allowed the building to get into
this state. On the other side of the building, hidden away, is a
medieval cloister. It is reputed to have been the entrance that
was used by Henry VIII when he came to the Palace. It has been
virtually derelict for years. In these Houses, we make laws to
protect buildings. We enforce them and expect other people to
look after buildings to a standard that we ignore ourselves. This
simply will not do.
I have been along to the small exhibition in the Royal Gallery.
Pride of place is given to a small piece of masonry. It looks a
bit theatrical, actually—it looks like a piece of polystyrene or
something—but when you pick it up, then remember that it fell
from the building, you realise, without being too apocalyptic,
that it would have killed someone who was underneath it. I
understand the justifiable concerns, particularly of Members of
the House of Commons, about the expense of this project. I have
much less sympathy with the unwillingness to leave this building,
but it has resulted in the situation we see today.
Optimistic as I am, I really thought that we were getting
somewhere when both Houses overwhelmingly supported the
resolutions a couple of years ago. It was clear that there was to
be a full decant of both Houses, and the sponsor body/delivery
authority model was established. There was recognition that
Parliament itself does not have the skills that are needed to
undertake a project on this scale. This seemed a good way forward
to me, so I supported it; I was pleased to join the sponsor body
when it was formed. I put on the record now that every individual
I worked with on the sponsor body was completely committed to
this place. They brought skill and enthusiasm to their roles. We
are lucky with the non-executives who have chosen to give their
time to this project. They work well above their contracted hours
and play a really important part.
However, personally, I am really worried about the future of this
project—never more so than now. Although the sponsor body is
intended to act as the client, it is of course Parliament that
makes the key decisions. From the point of those resolutions to
the point where the outline business case comes, it is the
political leadership of Parliament, through these rather
mysterious bodies called the commissions, which is calling the
shots.
The noble Lord, , and others have talked about
the trade-offs; I think he talked about scope, schedule and cost.
Of course these trade-offs are clear, but what troubles me about
the model we have set up is that it enables some people to
outsource those difficult decisions to the sponsor body. It has
enabled them to say, “Just go away and make this happen. We don’t
like these choices, so you go and sort it out”. I find this
deeply troubling.
I am reassured that the Lords commission has been steadfast in
its support for the approach in the resolutions, whereas the
Commons has not been. I am perhaps not as warm-hearted as the
noble Lord, Lord Carter. I understand that things change in the
political world, but the problem with the timescales of this
refurbishment is that there will always be a point when a new
Parliament comes in. If we do not remain steadfast at some point,
we will never progress.
At a point when the sponsor body should have been able to narrow
down options for investigating and costing, it has had to add
back in the option for a continued presence for the House of
Commons, despite the fact that every individual and organisation
that has looked at this for well over a decade has counselled
against this approach on the grounds that it will cost more, take
longer and introduce massive uncertainty. This was confirmed by
last year’s strategic review, yet the Commons commission has
added it back in. If this were to end up as the preferred choice
of the Commons, I find it hard to believe that it would pass any
of the value-for-money tests required by the Treasury. We would
therefore have further extensive delays while that was negotiated
and resolved.
The continued presence would be for the Commons only. I suspect
that it neither knows nor cares about what happens to the House
of Lords operationally or the impact it would have on costs. A
full decant, or even a partial decant, is contingent on having
somewhere to go. In the case of the Commons it is Richmond House,
which is not under the control of the sponsor body; it is under
the remit of the House of Commons. Could the noble Lord, , say what progress the Commons is
making on a possible decant to Richmond House? My fear is that,
if it does not get on with that, we will end up defaulting to a
continued presence because it has nowhere else to go. The
nightmare scenario is that picked up by the noble Lord, Lord
Vaux, which is that, if the faults with the building turn out to
be far worse than we think, the Commons would be committed to a
continued presence in a building that is in a far more parlous
state than we could have thought.
As well as these well-documented potential additional costs and
risks with a continued presence, there are significant potential
security risks with having hundreds of contractors working in the
building while MPs are sitting. I understand that this is a
sensitive area, but I hope that ways can be found to make the
full security implications of this option crystal clear to those
making the decisions.
The decant option for the Lords is, as we have heard, the Queen
Elizabeth II Centre. It is owned by the Government, but it is a
building that itself needs some considerable work on its core
services, as well as to bring it up to the requirements for
temporary accommodation for the Lords. A consequence of the
Commons pushing on with a continued presence will be to lengthen
considerably the amount of time the Lords will need to be in the
QEII. I would have thought that would further add to the costs,
because a building that is converted to a standard for five years
might have to be rather differently dealt with if we are going to
be in it for 10 or 15. Despite issues around commercial
sensitivity, these costs again must be spelled out.
I am worried that the very real consensus that emerged across
both Houses and all parties when we voted on the resolutions is
now in danger of collapse under all sorts of competing pressures.
I may be wrong, but I find it hard to believe that this House
would ultimately vote for an option that it knows would cost
considerably more, add risk to the project, and consign it to an
extended period in temporary accommodation.
As we have heard, this will be the biggest restoration project
undertaken anywhere in the world. It is an opportunity to
preserve this building for the generations to come and to create
a better working environment for the staff. I absolutely
understand that the people who are answerable directly to an
electorate in a way that we are not have real reservations about
trying to make a case for spending money on this building, but
the problem is that they are not doing it for themselves or for
us. We could limp on somehow or other, but the building cannot
limp on indefinitely. We owe it to future generations of
parliamentarians, staff and the public to get on and deal with
this now.
17:03:00
(CB)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their very rich
contributions to this debate. I am very grateful to all of them
for their support for the line that the sponsor body is taking. I
also thank Clementine Brown, the parliamentary liaison officer,
who is behind me as I play this part of make-believe Minister
just for the day. I have discovered how difficult it is to be the
Minister in this position, when excellent notes are passed to you
but you do not have time to absorb them and set them out in an
orderly fashion. I am grateful for that presence behind me.
What a lot of wisdom has been added to this debate, beginning
with the noble Lord, . It is great to have somebody
who really knows how it is to set up a new delivery authority and
be part of that whole process, having done this with the 2012
Olympics. Having that knowledgeable insider among us has shown us
the way. We have also engaged people from that Olympics
experience in our staffing team. It is powerful stuff to have
this group around us. We have recruited some very high-powered
people to the team.
The noble Lord, , made a whole series of
important points. I shall not go over them all again, but I
picked out one or two that particularly impressed me. He was glad
to be able to say that, in our phasing-in of this whole system of
a sponsor body and a delivery authority, in this first period, he
felt that we had been getting it right. He was pleased to give
the whole sponsor body a commendation. If he says that we are on
the right track, that is powerful stuff.
The noble Lord pointed out that three-quarters of the cost of
what is coming down the track and will have to be paid for will
be just to satisfy the core engineering, and only a quarter of
the funding that we will need will be available to satisfy all
the other demands and the things that people want. We need to be
realistic up front, recognising how much of this is the
fundamental stuff at the back of it. The noble Lord made the
point that whatever number we finally announce as the likely cost
of the project, there will be shock and awe, and probably horror,
around the country. We will need to weather a storm. It will cost
an awful lot of money. We will have to be determined, grit our
teeth, recognise that and stand up for it.
The noble Lord, Lord Carter, who has also been on the case from
the very beginning, recognised that some compromises will have to
be made. He pointed out the interrelationships of the different
demands. We need accurate, up-to-the-minute, accessible and
useful information —that is the key. We are spending £100 million
a year getting there, but it is really important not to make the
same kind of mistakes, as the noble Lord pointed out, as have
been made in estimating the costs in relation to the Elizabeth
Tower—Big Ben and all that—running from a hoped-for £18 million
at the beginning to something nearer £80 million today. We need
to get things right at the beginning. He also made the point that
the public at large need to understand the importance of the
whole project. We need to work on that; maybe quoting St Luke
somewhere along the way would help.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, was kind enough to say that he is
utterly supportive of the project and wants to see it go ahead,
but he raised a number of points. We are really grateful for
having the noble Lord performing this role and keeping us on our
mettle. That will be a continuing process that I think we will
appreciate a lot. We need it to help us see the wood for the
trees and understand what is going on.
The noble Lord’s comments added up to telling us not to
gold-plate the whole operation and to spend only what really
needs to be spent. That is a message that we have to keep before
us all the time. He was worried about the high staff costs. They
have been high, but that is because of having to recruit, train
and retrain a highly skilled programme group with the necessary
leadership, engineering skills and infrastructure knowledge and
understanding. These are expensive people who have had to be
drawn in and attracted by the proposition. It does not look the
most secure job to take and costs have been high. Of necessity,
we have also had to use a lot of consultants. Their costs, as the
noble Lord, Lord Vaux, pointed out, can be four times as much as
having your own staff, but that is changing: we are now getting
to the position of being able to replace the external
consultancies with an in-house team, which will make a
significant difference.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, was worried about the surveys that
have not been undertaken. I mentioned the ones that have, and
there has been a lot of work on doing these, but the intrusive
surveys where you really poke about have had to be put back. This
is partly due to Covid, because it has been more difficult to get
access to all the places, and partly because the Palace
authorities want us to keep clear when the House is sitting and
things are operational. Perhaps parliamentarians are going to
have to get used to the fact that having people poking around,
inconvenient as it is, is a necessity. Those intrusive surveys
are now all organised and contracts for them are being placed as
we speak. They will be very detailed and will, I fear, discover
all kinds of other things that we did not know about: that is
bound to happen and will be the next stage.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, as a newcomer, brought fresh
insights with experience of handling other major projects
elsewhere. That is going to be important and helpful to us. She
emphasised that we need to be very transparent and share the
details of all the costs. This is a common undertaking. We do not
want to worry that there are commercial decisions going on here:
we have to be outgoing in showing what things really cost. We
must avoid the hazard of underestimating costs to try to keep
them down as low as possible: that, of course, will create
critical problems later on.
The noble Lord, , brought us the lessons of
history and the details of Pugin’s extraordinary life, reminding
us that the first time around, it went, I think, four times over
cost and took three times as long to complete. It is so important
to get the facts and figures and make the assessments in advance,
so we are not caught out in those kinds of ways. He also made the
important point that we need to recognise what we are saving each
year in the capitalised costs that we put in. The net present
value of maintaining the Palace will soon be £200 million a year:
what is it worth spending to save £200 million a year? That is a
lot of money just to break even, so there is that decision to
take.
The noble Baroness, Lady Scott, brought up the rear, and we are
all grateful to her for her initial input, so important in the
formation of this great enterprise. She was the first, I think,
to mention falling masonry— I am not sure that I had added
that to my list. It is a pretty important issue. We have to fix
everything: all the stonework has to be inspected. There are
hairline cracks and potential dangers there. The place is
increasingly unsafe but her call to us was to remain steadfast.
She expressed particular concern about the “continued presence”
concept, which I think was reflected by almost everyone who
spoke. We need to be mindful that the decision is only weeks
away. It will have to be taken within a very short space of time
and will affect everything that happens thereafter. It is a
crucial moment.
I will go away further resolved to get on with the job. Everyone
who spoke was supportive of us not delaying things, of making
progress and of not accepting the difficulties that are out
there, and that support is very much appreciated. The Committee
has reinforced our eagerness to get on with the job and, to quote
the noble Lord, , to remember that what we are
doing is investing in the very future of our nation.
Motion agreed.
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