Telecommunications (Security) Bill Commons Reasons 15:44:00 Motion
A Moved by Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay That this House do not
insist on its Amendment 4, to which the Commons have disagreed for
their Reason 4A. 4A: Because the Commons consider it appropriate
and sufficient for oversight and scrutiny of decisions made by the
Secretary of State for DCMS in relation to telecommunications
diversification to be conducted by the departmental select...Request free trial
Telecommunications
(Security) Bill
Commons Reasons
15:44:00
Motion A
Moved by
of Whitley Bay
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 4, to which the
Commons have disagreed for their Reason 4A.
4A: Because the Commons consider it appropriate and sufficient
for oversight and scrutiny of decisions made by the Secretary of
State for DCMS in relation to telecommunications diversification
to be conducted by the departmental select committee.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport ( of Whitley Bay) (Con)
My Lords, noble Lords will recall that this Bill will create one
of the toughest telecoms security regimes in the world and ensure
the security and resilience of the UK’s telecommunications
networks and infrastructure.
Amendment 4, which was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Merron,
and the noble Lords, and , would insert a new clause into
the Bill. The clause would require the Secretary of State to
report on the impact of the Government’s diversification strategy
on the security of telecommunication networks and services, and
would allow for a debate in another place on the report.
I ask that this House do not insist on its amendment for two
reasons. Our first objection to this amendment relates to the
flexibility necessary for diversification. The reporting
requirement, which is based on the risks as we find them today,
is restrictive and premature for a market and technology that is
evolving and rapidly changing. Policy work is at an early stage,
and the criteria for how we measure its success is evolving in
line with our policy. It would not be suitable to set out
specific reporting criteria in legislation.
The diversification strategy and any reporting on its progress
must be flexible so that we can focus on achieving the greatest
impact. As we hope diversification to be a short-term problem,
enshrining it in legislation—a long-term solution—would be
counterintuitive and unnecessary. We are currently focused on
diversifying radio access networks, for instance, but that may
change in the future.
The Government take diversification seriously. I reassure noble
Lords that mechanisms are already in place, through Parliamentary
Questions and Select Committees, to thoroughly scrutinise the
strategy and its progress now and in the future. This is the
appropriate method of scrutiny for an evolving, time-limited
strategy.
Secondly, this is principally a national security Bill intended
to strengthen the security and resilience of all our telecoms
networks. The Government’s 5G telecoms diversification strategy
has been developed to support that objective but it is not the
sole objective of the strategy. In addition, the strategy is
focused on a specific subset of the telecoms supply market, not
the security of public networks as a whole.
From debates in your Lordships’ House so far, it is clear that
this amendment intends to hold the Government to account on the
impact of the diversification strategy on the security of public
networks. We will be happy to provide updates on the strategy’s
progress through existing channels, and are encouraged by the
developments that we have seen since the strategy’s launch. The
amendment would extend the Bill beyond its intended national
security focus and creates an inflexible reporting requirement on
a strategy that, as I say, will evolve as it fulfils this
important work. That is why I ask your Lordships’ House not to
insist on Amendment 4.
I shall also speak to Motion B, which asks that this House do not
insist on its Amendment 5, to which the Commons have disagreed
for their Reason 5A. As noble Lords will recall, Amendment 5 was
tabled by the noble Lords, , and , and my noble friend . The amendment would
require the Secretary of State to review decisions taken by Five
Eyes partners to ban telecommunications vendors on security
grounds. In particular, it would require the Secretary of State
to review the UK’s security arrangements with that vendor and
consider whether to issue a designated vendor direction or take
similar action in the UK.
As I said on Report, I welcome the intention of the amendment. It
demonstrates that noble Lords across the House take the security
of this country and its people incredibly seriously. However,
while we support the spirit of the amendment, we cannot accept it
for four reasons.
First, this amendment is unnecessary as the Bill already allows
the Secretary of State to consider the policies of Five Eyes
countries. Clause 16 includes a non-exhaustive list of factors
that the Secretary of State may take into consideration when
issuing designation notices regarding high-risk vendors. That
list illustrates the kinds of factors we will be considering
proactively and on an ongoing basis as part of our national
security work. A decision by a Five Eyes partner or indeed any
other international partner to ban a vendor on security grounds
could be considered as part of that process. The amendment asks
the Government to do something that has been part of the Bill
from the outset. We believe that our existing approach is the
right way to continually consider the decisions of all our
international allies and partners.
Secondly, the amendment is unnecessary because we are already
committed to a close and enduring partnership with the Five Eyes
countries. We engage with our partners regularly and, where
relevant, consider their actions when developing our own
policies. The Five Eyes intelligence and security agencies
maintain close co-operation, which includes frequent dialogue
between the National Cyber Security Centre and its international
partners. This dialogue includes the sharing of technical
expertise on the security of telecoms networks and managing the
risks posed by high-risk vendors. Engaging with our partners in
this way is at the very core of our national security work.
In another place, members of the Intelligence and Security
Committee agreed that the amendment was not necessary as the
existing intelligence relationship with the Five Eyes, and other
international parties, is strong. The chairman of the
Intelligence and Security Committee, Dr Julian Lewis, said:
“We looked at Lords amendment 5 and we understood the temptation
to flag up the importance of the Five Eyes relationship. We
agreed ... whenever a serious objection is raised on security
grounds by one of the Five Eyes partners, we take that with the
utmost seriousness.”—[Official Report, Commons, 8/11/21; col.
119.]
The chairman of the DCMS Select Committee, , agreed and said that
“any Government worth their salt would take very seriously the
approach of our closest security partners.”—[Official Report,
Commons, 8/11/21; col. 117.]
Our third reason is that naming individual countries in
legislation would be restrictive to the development of wider
international relations and set an unhelpful precedent on
national security legislation. The Five Eyes alliance was not
created through legislation and it has not required legislation
for us to develop and strengthen that relationship in the past.
Moreover, we need to consider the policies of a wide range of
countries, including those of our European neighbours such as
France and Germany, and those of other nations such as Japan,
South Korea and India, to name but a few. It is highly unusual to
refer to specific countries in legislation in this way, and the
amendment would set an unhelpful precedent for future
legislation.
Finally, the amendment is impractical because of the many
different ways other countries operate their national security
decision-making. It may not be immediately clear when a country
has taken a decision to ban a vendor, particularly if it relied
on sensitive intelligence. It also may not be clear why a country
has taken this decision, and it may not always be based on
national security grounds. So, while I welcome the intentions
behind the amendment, we cannot accept it and that is why I ask
that the House does not insist on Amendment 5 either. I beg to
move.
(LD)
My Lords, I hope my noble friend has given his apologies to the
Minister for being unable to be here due to a Select Committee
engagement. However, that does not mean that on these Benches we
are any less disappointed—or indignant, as I think my noble
friend would put it—about the Government
having turned down both amendments, which my noble friend signed.
The Minister is developing a fine turn of phrase in turning down
amendments that appear perfectly sensible. On Report he talked
about sharing the ambition and warmly welcoming the intent and
then said that they did not quite fit the Bill and the Government
could not accept these amendments. It is rather baffling since
both are built very firmly on the Government’s expressed
intentions —indeed, ambitions—set out in the integrated review.
That was very clear in our debates on Report. It seems that the
Government’s motives are much more firmly based on resistance to
scrutiny and the idea that, somehow, they would be constrained in
their work on diversification by having to report, in the case of
Lords Amendment 4. However, the words he used were:
“legislating for a reporting requirement would be limiting and
inflexible.”—[Official Report, 19/10/21; col. 86.]
Having reread the debate and heard again what the Minister had to
say, I still cannot understand the Government’s rationale for
this.
The rejection of Lords Amendment 5 is equally baffling because
the Minister talks again about the limitation of the amendment to
a particular set of countries. Surely, one of the reasons we are
where we are, and the Government had to backtrack on their
treatment of high-risk vendors, is precisely that they were not
in step with their other Five Eyes allies. Therefore, the
Government are not even learning from experience. We are where we
are, however, and clearly we are not going to take this further,
but I believe that the Government will regret not accepting both
amendments.
(Lab)
My Lords, the matters under consideration today are about not
party politics but the first duty of any Government: to ensure
the security of our citizens and the United Kingdom. Following
majorities in this House and considered debate in this and the
other place, it is regrettable that the Government have rejected
sensible amendments to this important Bill, which I still believe
would have improved and enhanced our collective security. The
arguments against these amendments have been somewhat wanting,
generally conveying the message, throughout the passage of the
Bill, that it is all being take care of—a view that this House,
on all sides, has not shared.
Our extensive use of new technology throughout the pandemic shone
a very bright light on the degree to which we rely on telecoms
networks and our experience has reinforced how intertwined these
networks are with issues of national security. So, to ensure our
security, diversification is crucial and thus far an effective
plan to diversify the supply chain has been absent. As I recall,
we do, however, have broad agreement that we cannot have a robust
and secure network with only two service providers, which is what
will remain when Huawei goes. This is why we need to ensure
diversity of suppliers at different points of the chain, with
sufficient support for the UK’s own start-up businesses. I, too,
will quote, from the debate in the other place, the words of
, the chair of the Intelligence and Security
Committee, who is obviously much quoted today. He said, of Lords
Amendment 4:
“For the life of us, we cannot understand why the Government are
opposing it. We believe it would strengthen parliamentary
scrutiny and provide a valuable annual stocktake on the progress
being made on the diversification strategy and how it is helping
to improve national security.”—[Official Report, Commons,
8/11/21; col. 119.]
The Government have said that they are serious about protecting
our telecoms security and they respect the vital role that
diversification plays in achieving that. I would therefore have
thought that the Government would welcome the added layer of
diversification scrutiny that Lords Amendment 4 provided. It is
disheartening, therefore, that the amendment is rejected by
Motion A.
On Motion B, our telecoms security also depends on strengthening
our international intelligence bonds and the Five Eyes provides
the perfect opportunity to do so. It is therefore similarly
disappointing that the Government, having promised to work with
this alliance in the integrated review, have resisted introducing
a requirement that the Government should automatically review
vendors—and by that we meant only “review” vendors when others in
the Five Eyes ban companies from their networks. This was
provided for by Lords Amendment 5. Such a response, as outlined
in Motion B, flies in the face of common sense and it is very
disappointing to see this rejection.
I accept that on this occasion we have reached the end of the
parliamentary road with the Bill. However, as time goes on and
the provisions of the Bill take effect, I hope that the Minister
will reflect on the debates in the House and the other place
concerning the intent and practical considerations that would
contribute to security improvements, as provided by Lords
Amendments 4 and 5. I hope the Minister will not feel constrained
when he further considers making improvements in this area.
16:00:00
of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I certainly hear the disappointment and perhaps, as the
noble Lord, , said, even the
indignation of his noble friend , in his absence. I am sure that
if the noble Lord, , who is not able to
be with us today, were here he would have had something to say as
well. However, I hope to be able to reassure all noble Lords that
the Government certainly have listened to and taken on board the
points which have been made. Where we respectfully disagree, I
would point to the fact that another place has disagreed as well,
but, as I said in my opening remarks, we are very conscious of
the spirit of scrutiny in which these amendments have been put
forward. Noble Lords have wanted to ensure that the Bill does
what the Government intend: to set up a framework to protect the
national security of our country. We simply disagree about the
practicalities of some of the amendments which remain at this
late stage.
It may be helpful to say a little more about the opportunities
for parliamentary oversight of the diversification strategy which
noble Lords and Members of another place will have been able to
take advantage of. Since its publication, Members of another
place and noble Lords have had the opportunity to scrutinise and
provide feedback on the strategy. The Science and Technology
Select Committee in another place held an inquiry earlier this
year on 5G Market Diversification and Wider Lessons for Critical
and Emerging Technologies. The Government responded to the
committee’s report in April, agreeing with its assessment of the
scale of the diversification challenge and that there is a need
to work swiftly to make early progress and build momentum as we
work towards our long-term ambitions. We have not yet committed
to a specific way of reporting progress, as policy work is at an
early stage and the criteria for how we measure its success is
evolving in line with our policy, as I said in my opening
remarks.
However, we have made and announced a lot of progress on our
diversification strategy already: for example, on our programme
of targeted R&D support, including the future RAN open
competition, the winners of which will be announced soon. We will
continue to update on progress and are planning to launch further
policy commitments at the same time as announcing the winners of
that competition later this year. I know that noble Lords, if
they agree with us and do not insist on their amendments today,
will certainly continue to watch this issue vigilantly and find
every opportunity to pursue these important issues in your
Lordships’ House and through Parliamentary Questions and Select
Committees, and it is right that they do.
I end by thanking again the Bill team and all officials who have
been involved in the development of this important Bill. I listed
them in full last time, so I will not try the patience of the
Hansard editors by repeating their names but I will add one final
name: Daniel Wilson, who has been of great support to me and my
noble friend Lady Barran in working on this issue in private
office.
I commend the Bill to your Lordships’ House. It will create one
of the toughest telecoms security regimes in the world and ensure
the security and resilience of the UK’s telecommunications
networks and infrastructure.
Motion A agreed.
Motion B
Moved by
of Whitley Bay
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 5, to which the
Commons have disagreed for their Reason 5A.
5A: Because the Commons consider it inappropriate to specify the
steps to be taken by the Secretary of State where decisions in
relation to telecommunications vendors are taken on national
security grounds by other countries.
of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion B, and I beg to move it
formally.
Motion B agreed.
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