Publication of Independent Review into Child Sexual Abuse in Football 1970-2005

After extensive investigation, the report of the Independent Review into Child Sexual Abuse in Football between 1970 and 2005, led by Clive Sheldon QC, has been published. The report finds that:

• For much of the period of the Review there was no guidance provided to those working within football on child protection matters (Para. 5.2.42)
• Following high profile convictions of child sexual abusers in the summer of 1995 until May 2000, the FA could and should have done more to keep children safe (Para. 8.1.347)
• Between October 1995 and 2000 there was a significant delay by the FA in putting in place sufficient child protection measures in football (Para. 8.1.15)
• In that period, the FA did not do enough to keep children safe (Para. 2.24)
• This was an institutional failing by the FA, for which there is no excuse (Paras. 8.1.321-346)
• In that period, child protection was not regarded as an urgent priority for the FA (Para. 8.1.337-340)
• Even after May 2000, when the FA launched a comprehensive child protection policy and programme, mistakes were still made by the FA (Para. 2.38-2.40)
• The FA failed to ban two of the most notorious perpetrators of child sexual abuse, Barry Bennell and Bob Higgins, from involvement in football (Para. 2.40-2.41)
• There are known to be at least 240 suspects and 692 survivors (Para. 5.2.3)
• Yet relatively few people reported abuse and the actual level is likely to be far higher (Para. 5.2.1)
• Where incidents of abuse were reported to people in authority at football clubs, their responses were rarely competent or appropriate (Para. 5.2.49-5.2.50)
• Abuse within football was not commonplace. The overwhelming majority of young people were able to engage in football safely (Para. 2.26)

Clive Sheldon QC said: “I very much hope that this Report will be read carefully by all persons involved in administering the game of football today, including the FA and the clubs who were associated with perpetrators of abuse. Understanding and acknowledging the appalling abuse suffered by young players in the period covered by the Review is important for its own sake. Survivors deserve to be listened to, and their suffering deserves to be properly recognised. As well as recognising and facing up to what happened in the past, it is also important that this terrible history is not repeated, and that everything possible is done now to safeguard the current and future generations of young players. I hope that this report will make some contribution towards that.”

The Review team has put the voices of survivors at the centre of its work: the report contains 20 “Survivor Voices” (direct extracts from survivors’ testimony). The detailed accounts of 159 survivors are contained in a Confidential Annexe to the Report.

The team focussed on who knew what and when at the Football Association, as the sport’s governing body, as well as at clubs. And the team contacted all football clubs in England and Wales, professional and amateur. More detailed investigations focussed on particular incidents involving the responses of 17 major clubs and the allegations against eight of the most prolific perpetrators.

The Football Association

The Football Association, the governing body of the sport in England and Wales, has been a central focus of the work of the Review. The Review has found that for much of the period of the Review, there was no guidance provided to those working within football on child protection matters. As a result, for much of the period of the Review:

• club staff and officials were generally unaware of child protection issues;
• they were not trained in child protection issues;
• they did not identify or respond to signs of potential abuse; and
• if they were aware of the signs, they did not examine them with curiosity or suspicion.

Prior to autumn 1995, this failure to provide guidance was a failure of sport as a whole: the provision of child protection guidance was not something which was happening widely within sport.

However, from autumn 1995, following the conviction of Paul Hickson in swimming and of Barry Bennell in football, or at the latest 1996, following a major conference on child protection organised by the Sports Council and the NSPCC, the FA could and should have done more. As the report states, during this period:

“the FA should have engaged more deeply with the issue of child protection and should have acted more quickly to bring in comprehensive measures to safeguard children in the game.” (Para. 2.24 in executive summary)

“The FA acted far too slowly to introduce appropriate and sufficient child protection measures, and to ensure that safeguarding was taken sufficiently seriously by those involved in the game. These are significant institutional failings for which there is no excuse. During this period (October 1995 to May 2000, when the FA launched its comprehensive child protection programme) the FA did not do enough to keep children safe.” (Para. 2.25 in executive summary

“There are a number of interrelated reasons for the delay. Taken together, they paint a picture of an institutional failure of the FA.” (Para. 2.30 in executive summary

The reasons for this delay by the FA are

• a lack of strategic thinking,
• a lack of expertise,
• the failure to appoint a child protection champion,
• the failure to identify a dedicated child protection post, and
• in general child protection was not regarded as an urgent priority.

(Para. 2.30 onwards in executive summary):

The report also finds that:

• During this period (October 1995 to May 2000), “Child protection was not regarded as an urgent priority for the FA…Given the imperative to keep children safe in football, I consider that the FA should have ensured that child protection was given greater priority than was actually the case.” (Para. 2.33 in exec sum)

• In May 2000 the FA launched a comprehensive child protection policy and programme which was rightly considered to be world leading and was widely lauded. However, even after that, mistakes were still made by the FA. This included failures regarding two of the most notorious perpetrators of child sexual abuse:

• In 2003 following Barry Bennell’s release from prison the FA should have taken steps to seek to prevent Bennell from involving himself further in football. “The failure to do so allowed children to be put at potential risk”, although “there is no evidence that Bennell did seek to involve himself in football after his release.” (Para. 2.40 in executive summary)

• In 2003 following an FA rule change to lower the standard of proof in child sexual abuse cases, the FA should have reviewed Bob Higgins’ case to consider the earlier allegations of child sexual abuse which the FA were aware of from Higgins’ time at Southampton. (Para. 2.41 in executive summary)

Both of these were failings on the part of the FA.

Football Clubs

The Review team contacted all football clubs in England and Wales, amateur and professional. There are known to be at least 240 suspects and 692 survivors. Yet relatively few people reported abuse and the actual level is likely to be far higher. (Para. 2.3 in executive summary)

The Inquiry focussed on incidents involving eight of the most prolific offenders. The report identified the following failures:

• At Chelsea FC, in relation to Eddie Heath, steps should have been taken to protect the young player who had made a disclosure about abuse from Eddie Heath’s sexual advances and misconduct in or around 1975.

• Aston Villa FC should have reported disclosures about sexual abuse by Ted Langford to the police when his role as a scout was terminated in July 1989.

• Newcastle FC should have acted more quickly following disclosures of abuse by George Ormond at the Youth Club “Monty’s” in early 1997. Ormond was only removed from the Club many months later: in late 1997 or early 1998, and after Ormond had been permitted to travel abroad with young players. Despite being aware of the allegations no additional safeguards were put in place by the Club.

• Manchester City FC senior management were aware of rumours and concerns about Barry Bennell’s conduct in the early 1980s. The Club did not investigate these rumours. It should have done so. The Club should also have investigated the arrangements for boys staying at Bennell’s house.

• It is likely that three Directors of Crewe Alexandra FC discussed concerns about Bennell which hinted at his sexual interest in children. There is no evidence that the advice of a senior police officer to the Club’s former Chairman to keep a “watching brief” on Bennell was heeded. The Club should also have ensured that there were appropriate arrangements in place for boys staying overnight at Bennell’s house. The boys should have been spoken to periodically to check that they were being properly cared for. Had such steps been taken, this might have led to boys making disclosures to the Club.

• Stoke City FC were also aware of rumours about Bennell during his time associated with the Club in the early 1990 and steps should have been taken to monitor Bennell’s activities.

• Peterborough FC and Southampton FC were also aware of rumours about or inappropriate behaviour of Bob Higgins, and were aware that boys were staying at his home. This awareness should have resulted in greater monitoring by the clubs. Had Higgins been properly monitored this might have prevented some of his abuse of young players.

Recommendations

Child protection in sport has improved substantially since 2005. However, there is still more that can be done to keep children safe in football. The Report makes 13 recommendations in all, including:

• Recommendation 6: “one member of the FA’s Board should be assigned the role of Children’s Safeguarding Champion.”

• Recommendation 7: “That the FA should develop a five year strategy with specific intervention to support the voice of children. The strategy should be monitored during the course of and at the end of the five year period to assess its success. If issues are identified during the course of the five year period, they should be acted on speedily.”

• Recommendation 9: “That the FA should, on an annual basis, widen the system of spot-checks for grassroots clubs to review the clubs’ safeguarding policies and practices, including overnight stays, away travel and trips, use of social media, and coaching in a digital environment, as well as to obtain the views of children and young people, and to sanction those clubs that fail to comply.”

• Recommendation 10: “… The Safeguarding Officer at each of the Premier League and English Football League (“EFL”) Championship clubs should be a dedicated, full-time, salaried post, with suitable qualifications and experience. In EFL Leagues 1 & 2, the Safeguarding Officer should, as a minimum, be a part-time salaried post, with suitable qualifications and experience, and 50% of their time should be dedicated to safeguarding”.

• Recommendation 12: “That the FA should publish a safeguarding report on an annual basis, which should include a statement from the FA’s Chairman.”

• Recommendation 13: “the FA, along with the professional leagues and the County FAs, [should] devote one day of the year to a National Day of Safeguarding in Football.”