Extracts from committee proceedings (Lords) on the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill - June 16
Viscount Trenchard (Con):...I also support Amendment 27 in the name
of my noble friend Lady Altmann. Where an asset has been pledged to
a company’s defined benefit pension scheme, it should not be within
the powers of the court to release it for sale without the consent
of the Pension Protection Fund as well as, surely, the
trustees of the pension fund itself... Baroness Drake (Lab)
[V]:...I fully support the Government’s desire to assist companies
in bouncing back from...Request free
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Viscount Trenchard (Con):...I also
support Amendment 27 in the name of my noble friend Lady Altmann.
Where an asset has been pledged to a company’s defined benefit
pension scheme, it should not be within the powers of the court to
release it for sale without the consent of the Pension Protection
Fund as well as, surely, the
trustees of the pension fund itself...
Baroness Drake (Lab) [V]:...I fully support the Government’s desire to assist companies in bouncing back from Covid-19, but it is neither necessary nor desirable that such a policy should seriously weaken the position of defined benefit pension schemes and the Pension Protection Fund in the event of an insolvency or restructuring. The Bill does this in several ways: by granting super-priority status to unsecured banking and finance debt, ranking it above pension scheme debt if a company is not rescued, which introduces material detriment to the level of recoveries the PPF, acting as creditor for a scheme, can achieve through insolvency proceedings; by finance debts getting preferential treatment over pension scheme liabilities by continuing to be payable during a moratorium; and by the new moratorium and restructuring plan processes not triggering a PPF assessment period or a pension scheme’s Section 75 debt, weakening the position of the scheme and the Pension Protection Fund which would not have a seat at the table for key creditor and restructuring plan discussions and would be denied a meaningful voice on employer liability to the scheme... Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe (Lab) [V]: My Lords, until recently, I was a member of the board of the Pension Protection Fund. I will speak to Amendments 20 and 63. Like my noble friend Lady Drake, I have yet to digest the contents of the Minister’s letter from yesterday evening and we have yet to see the actual amendments, but I want to set out my concerns, so that they can be tested against the concessions he has made.
I fully support the policy intention behind the Bill: to help
otherwise financially viable companies avoid the prospect of
failure, as a result of the unprecedented disruption that
Covid-19 has caused. However, alongside its temporary measures,
the Bill includes permanent measures—the moratorium, the
restructuring plan and changes to creditor status—that will be
far-reaching. On the current drafting, there will be consequences
that have the effect of reducing the protection and rights of
underfunded pension schemes and the Pension Protection
Fund when companies are in financial
distress—protections that have been carefully built up and
developed over 16 to 17 years... The pension promises are so important for workers but, as it stands, this legislation would appear to legitimise the actions in connection with pensions that have been considered egregious over the years. The Pensions Regulator’s reports on the pension schemes of BHS or Carillion, for example, make it clear that the pension funds were at risk of being gamed by other financial creditors passing the parcel or elevating themselves ahead of the interests of the pension schemes. Amendment 27, for example, would ensure that if an insolvency was in the offing and the monitor applied to the court to remove protection from assets that were previously secured, such consent could not be given without the approval of the Pension Protection Fund. That is really important. With the provisions proposed in, for example, Amendments 63 and 64, the PPF would already have been involved because a PPF assessment would have been triggered. After a PPF assessment period is triggered, the PPF can come in and protect its own position and that of the pension fund; that is, the creditor rights.
At the moment we have a system whereby trustees carefully work
out integrated risk management proposals to ensure that the
contributions to the pension scheme demanded of employers are
reasonable and proportionate in terms of helping the company to
survive and thrive, but also protecting the scheme should the
company not do so. In that regard, many schemes have been pledged
assets belonging to the company so that, if insolvency occurs,
they will be available to boost the pension scheme. Under the
current proposals in the Bill, without Amendment 27 the assets
pledged to the scheme would potentially disappear and the banks
would potentially secure themselves a win-win situation while
jeopardising the interests not only of the pension scheme
attached to the company in question but of all other defined
benefit schemes protected by the Pension Protection
Fund and the millions of members in those schemes. I
hope that my noble friend will listen carefully and take
seriously the concerns expressed across the Committee that banks
should not be given preferential status...
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