Following up the previous Committee’s partially completed inquiry
into biosecurity in 2019, and the continued salience of such
pandemic risks with Covid-19, the Joint Committee on the National
Security Strategy is examining how biosecurity is addressed
in national security planning and resilience
implementation.
Purpose of the inquiry
The Government’s last Strategic Defence and
Security Review in 2015 categorised
‘Disease, particularly pandemic influenza, and emerging
infectious diseases’ as a tier-1 (‘highest priority’)
risk.
In March 2018, the Government’s National Security
Capability Review elevated ‘diseases and
natural hazards affecting the UK’ to be one of six principal
challenges likely to drive national security priorities over the
coming decade. Pandemics and emerging infectious diseases have
also been categorised as a top-tier risk in National Security
Risk Assessments (NSRAs).
The Committee will soon be briefed by the Government on its
latest NSRA [see Chair’s
letter to Prime Minister]. The Government published a
‘Biological security
strategy’ in July 2018, signed
by the Home Office, the Department for
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, and the Department of
Health & Social Care, and intended to
coordinate a cross-government approach to biosecurity threats,
whether they materialise naturally, accidentally or
deliberately.
The arrival of Covid-19 now presents a test case for that
Strategy and the Risk Assessment process, as well as for the UK’s
system of national security oversight and
governance. The Committee’s inquiry will take
forward its earlier examination of Biosecurity, including
the written
evidenceit received for that inquiry from
the Government in
September 2019.
The Chair of the Joint Committee,
said:
“The Committee recognised last year the importance of
pandemic diseases like Covid-19 as a national security issue,
when we started an inquiry into biosecurity.
“We are now launching a follow-up inquiry which gets to
the heart of how well pandemic risks have been addressed in the
national security machinery – the oversight by the National
Security Council; how well the lessons of exercises in the UK
were learnt by the Government; and whether risk assessments
actually drove resilience plans and resource allocations before
we faced having to deal with the sort of national emergency we
are now grappling with.”
Send us
your views
The Joint Committee is calling for written evidence, in
particular addressing:
-
The main drivers of biosecurity risks to human health in
the UK, including from pandemics and emerging infectious
diseases;
-
How, and how effectively, these risks are monitored and
assessed by the UK Government, and by whom; and whether the
specific type of risk to the UK represented by Covid-19 fell
within such monitoring and assessment processes;
-
The extent to which the Government has supported domestic
preparedness against biosecurity risks in terms of:
-
building and measuring resilience;
-
designing emergency response mechanisms;
-
testing and exercising that response, and building the
lessons from exercises into active resilience planning and
into resource allocation priorities; and
-
anticipating required public communications campaigns
and devising means to measure their effectiveness.
-
The extent to which the Government’s planning for
pandemics in the 2015 Strategic Defence & Security Review,
the subsequent National Security Capability Review and the 2018
Biosecurity Strategy helped in guiding that
preparedness;
-
The extent to which policy-making in this area draws on
cross-government input, and how well preparedness plans have
taken a genuinely ‘fusion doctrine’
approach (that should optimally combine
UK capabilities to promote ‘security’, ‘influence’ and
‘prosperity’ objectives);
-
In regard to the oversight of such policymaking and the
management of biosecurity risks within overall national
security risks: the roles and responsibilities of the National
Security Council, relevant Government departments and agencies,
and how their work is coordinated with that of the Devolved
Administrations.
Submissions should be
sent in by 22
June. You can submit
evidence here.
Later, we intend to examine progress on the
Government’s ‘Integrated Security, Defence & Foreign Policy
Review’, including how well it is addressing different ‘tiers’ of
risks, including risks such as pandemics, and how well the
national security implications of Covid-19 are being absorbed in
that Review. We anticipate our initial inquiry feeding into that
later work.