Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con) It is a pleasure
to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone. In a different context,
in weather like this many of us might have been told that we could
remove our wigs, rather than our jackets. We do not have to do that
today. It is a pleasure and an honour to present this
Justice Committee report on transforming rehabilitation. It is the
result of an...Request free trial
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(Bromley and Chislehurst)
(Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone.
In a different context, in weather like this many of us might
have been told that we could remove our wigs, rather than our
jackets. We do not have to do that today.
It is a pleasure and an honour to present this Justice
Committee report on transforming rehabilitation. It is the
result of an eight-month inquiry, during which we took
significant amounts of written and oral evidence from
providers and users from across the probation sector on the
programme initiated by the then Government in 2014-15.
The programme was a major structural reform of the probation
service, of the way probation activities are delivered, and
of what probation activity comprises. It had high ambitions.
Its key objectives were to reduce reoffending; to open up the
market in probation services, particularly to bring in more
voluntary sector providers; and to do so in a way that
achieved efficiency and value for money for the taxpayer. I
regret to say that the result of our investigation is that we
conclude that it has failed on every single one of those
measures.
Let me start by explaining why. First, reoffending rates
remain stubbornly high. They are still historically high, and
they do not bear comparison with those of our neighbours in
western Europe and other equivalent advanced democracies.
They have not been improved by the reforms. Indeed, in some
areas, it is clear that sentencers’ confidence in
non-custodial alternatives to imprisonment has declined,
rather than improved. The objective was to have a robust
system of alternatives to custody. I regret to say that we
conclude that that has not been achieved.
Secondly, our evidence shows that the involvement of
voluntary and third-sector organisations has declined, rather
than increased. There are isolated instances of good
practice, but they are precisely that: isolated, patchy and
frequently outweighed by the areas where the service is not
delivering to the standard required.
Thirdly, the programme has not driven efficiency. Contracts
were let to community rehabilitation companies on a seriously
flawed financial basis. As a result, more public money, to
the tune of several million pounds, has had to be pumped into
those companies to keep the show on the road. That is not
sustainable.
Let me set out the report’s findings in a little more detail.
The contracts are important, because the purpose of the
process was to split probation provision between the National
Probation Service, which is still in the public sector, and
the community rehabilitation companies, which are generally
owned by a consortium of large outsourcing companies, the
names of which we in the public sector are familiar with,
with the involvement of some voluntary-sector
groups—regrettably few, given what the intentions were.
The split was supposed to be based on risk: the higher-risk
offenders would be supervised by the National Probation
Service, and those of a lower risk would be supervised by the
community rehabilitation companies. We conclude that that had
two disadvantages. First, it disrupted the considerable
networks that agencies had built up at a local level.
Secondly, the community rehabilitation companies were often
not geared up in time to take on the new responsibilities. We
conclude that the introduction of the system was, frankly,
rushed. There was no attempt to pilot it or do proper
assessments before it was brought in. It is also clear from
our evidence that risk is a crude and ineffective measure for
dividing responsibilities, because an offender’s risk
profile—the level of risk they pose to the public, their risk
of reoffending and so on—changes over the course of their
journey. That is not reflected in the way the division is
currently cast.
The other very serious issue that concerns us about the
contracts is this. It is clear from the evidence that the
bids by the public-private sector consortiums were wildly
optimistic in their financial assumptions, which were based
on an assessment that the fixed cost of running the service
would be about 20%. In reality, it is 60% to 70%. They could
not have been further out. That meant that they were not
financially sustainable, and the Government faced the
prospect either of the contracts failing or of having to pump
in more money. That is not a way to run a system efficiently
or effectively.
We believe that there has to be more transparency about the
contracts, and that the Ministry has to look again at its
capacity to deal with such matters. It is clear that the
robustness of the financial model was not challenged
sufficiently at the beginning. That cannot be allowed to
happen again.
We are not satisfied that the monitoring of the performance
has achieved what was desired. A great deal of the system
depends on payment by results, but we found that in practice,
that does not work as an incentive to reduce reoffending.
Again, it is a crude measure, not least because some of the
factors that drive rehabilitation and the risk of reoffending
are outside the control of the probation providers, so it is
not a well set-up system of reward. We believe that the
Ministry of Justice should review that mechanism, just as it
must look at the split. There have been attempts to resolve
the issue, but there are basic problems with data sharing,
co-ordination and so on. They must be dealt with.
We must ensure that future contracts have specific targets
and incentives to involve the voluntary sector properly, as
was intended. The contract structure favours the big boys,
because they have the resource to put in complicated
framework bids, whereas smaller-scale operations frequently
get squeezed out. That is the reverse of what was intended,
and we believe that that needs to be changed.
Staffing morale was found to be at an all-time low in the
National Probation Service and in CRCs. Staff have higher
case loads than anticipated, and often feel that, because of
the artificial nature of the split, they are dealing with
cases for which they do not have adequate training. We think
there is a need for the Ministry to publish a probation
workforce strategy covering both the NPS and the CRCs.
We need to deal with the operation of the through-the-gate
system—the attempt to provide people with support on
release—which we find to be wholly inadequate. In the past,
people got a £46 discharge grant and nothing else. Now, they
appear to get a £46 discharge grant and a leaflet. The
follow-up supervision is woefully inadequate. In some cases,
it is a telephone call once every six weeks. That is no way
to turn lives around properly. It does a disservice not only
to the offender but to the public, because it increases the
risk.
We also need to look at the use of custody in shorter
sentences. The intention was to give sentencers confidence
that they could punish by way of community orders of one kind
or another. There is nothing wrong with having a punitive
element in them, but they must also have rehabilitative
elements. Unfortunately, because sentencers —magistrates and
judges—do not have confidence that the requirements of the
order will be properly monitored or delivered, their use has
declined, rather than increased. Instead, more shorter
custodial sentences are being imposed, despite the fact that
the all the evidence shows that short custodial sentences
have the worst outcomes in terms of stopping reoffending, so
it becomes a revolving door. We believe that there should be
a presumption against short custodial sentences, but for that
to happen, the Government must put in place a robust
alternative.
There are a number of other issues, which I will happily
touch on if asked to by hon. Members, but I hope that I have
given an overview of a serious report, which was agreed by
the Select Committee unanimously, cross-party, on the basis
of compelling evidence. All the Ministers in the team are new
to their post. They are having to pick up the pieces of
something that was misjudged, but there is a chance to put it
right. It is a question of properly reforming the system so
that it works properly, which would be to our economic
advantage, because the cost to our economy of reoffending is
£15 billion or more, but it would also benefit society,
because less reoffending means fewer victims, and that is in
everyone’s interests.
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(Delyn) (Lab)
Given the comments of the Minister of State to the Justice
Committee earlier this week, will my hon. Friend—that is what
he is in this context—confirm very strongly the Committee’s
recommendation at paragraph 46 on page 21 of the report? It
states:
“The Ministry should undertake a public consultation on any
further changes to ensure a wide range of views on
contractual arrangements. This public consultation should
consider the number of CRCs and the bodies eligible to bid
for CRC contracts.”
Given the potential changes that that Minister announced on
Tuesday, can the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the
hon. and learned Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy
Frazer), take back our strong cross-party view that that
should be consulted on?
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I very much agree. I hope—indeed, I am sure—that my hon. and
learned Friend the Minister will take that view back to her
ministerial colleagues. It is very clear that the situation
was not acceptable. Putting more and more sticking-plaster
money into the system is not a sustainable way forward. I am
glad to say that on an earlier occasion when the Minister of
State gave evidence to us, he said, as hon. Members will
recall, that removing or terminating contracts, if they were
failing, was absolutely an option on the table, and so it
should be, because the whole point of contracting out is that
if there are failures, we can take the contract away, but for
that to be done, there has to be a willingness both to do it
and to put something workable in its place. The right hon.
Member for Delyn (David Hanson), whose work I very much
appreciate, makes a most important point.
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(Banbury) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that although this report is
undoubtedly critical of the system, the evidence that we
received says that the system could be put right with work,
and is not in fact broken?
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Yes, I think that is right; I do want to be constructive.
Whether or not we would have started from here is an
interesting question for debate, but we are here. Turning
round systems such as this is a bit like turning round an
ocean liner: it takes a long time. A U-turn is not practical,
it seems to us, in these circumstances. That is why we say
that an urgent review by the Ministry is necessary right
across the piece to start identifying the areas of failure
and start working on them immediately. I hope that our report
helps to set out for the Ministry where that work needs to be
done.
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(Linlithgow and East
Falkirk) (SNP)
I thank the Select Committee for the report, and for fully
endorsing the Scottish Government policy of a presumption
against short sentences of 12 months or less. Recidivism
rates are at a near-20-year low in Scotland, following the
introduction of the prohibition. Does the Chair of the
Committee expect to see a similar reduction in reoffending in
England and Wales, or are there other, underlying issues that
need to be addressed first?
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I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for those comments. I am
not sure how far the roll-out has gone so far, but we
certainly believe that the move in Scotland is in the right
direction, and that is evidenced by the situation in many
other jurisdictions, where there has been the same effect. I
would not want to be held to specific numbers, but I think
that the direction of travel to which the hon. Gentleman
refers would be absolutely right. I do not think that there
are basic, underlying causes that make the English more
intrinsically criminal than the Scots, or more prone to
reoffending than the Scots, the Germans, the Dutch or our
other neighbours—it is tempting fate to say that to the hon.
Gentleman, but with a middle name of MacGillivray, perhaps I
can say it. I do not think that is the case, so I think we
should pursue this proposal. The key bit, I think, is
systemic failures, rather than underlying social causes.
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(Enfield,
Southgate) (Lab)
I very much welcome the report, and particularly the
recommendations in paragraphs 100, 102 and 106, which relate
to the voluntary sector. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that
there needs to be much greater voluntary sector involvement
in the rehabilitation of offenders, because those
organisations are best placed to reach offenders and address
issues relating to their offending, and that CRCs must do
more to increase the employment and engagement of the
voluntary sector in this sphere?
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The hon. Gentleman, whose work on the Select Committee is
much appreciated, is absolutely right. There are examples of
good work being done in the system. In the north-east in
particular, there are some areas where the voluntary sector
has worked well, taking a leading role within CRCs, but they
are the exception to the rule. That is why we think that the
new system must have specific targets for the voluntary
sector, and means of getting it into the system. I know from
my experience over the years that the voluntary sector is
much more flexible. It is much more able to calibrate to the
local social, economic, job-market and housing-market needs,
which are all-important in rehabilitation, and is able to
build up links at local level with the relevant agencies, in
a way that so far has tended to be lacking in the very large
and sometimes remote organisations. The hon. Gentleman is
totally right.
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(Stretford and Urmston)
(Lab)
I thank the Select Committee and its Chair for an excellent
report, which I have read from cover to cover. I particularly
agree with what the Chair said about the operation of the
through-the-gate system. Was he as surprised as I was by the
evidence given to his Committee by the Minister of State, who
said that we had all got our expectations of through the gate
wrong, and that it was simply meant to be a signposting
service? Does he agree that the Ministry of Justice should
properly assess, evaluate and embed good, systematic
through-the-gate practice that supports offenders—before, at
the point of, and after release from custody?
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That is absolutely right. My recollection is that that was
not the way through the gate was sold at the time it was
brought in. I think there is a little bit of rewriting of
history there, to be blunt. The truth is that for a long time
we have been appallingly bad at follow-up supervision of
people who are released. Through the gate actually extended
it to those serving sentences of one year or less, which
indicates that the Government thought that it was a good
thing, but that has not been delivered in practice. We do
need a wholesale review of it.
For example, if the CRC becomes involved with an offender
only about 12 weeks before their release, that is wholly
inadequate, in terms of setting that person up with the
support that they need when they come out. We suggest that
during that time, there be work to ensure that bank accounts
are set up, and that people can register for universal
credit, so that they get it on the day they leave custody,
rather than coming out with their £46 and not necessarily
having a roof over their head. The temptation for them then
is to go straight to meet their mates at the pub or the café;
they spend their £46; and then they are back into exactly the
same sort of offending—often to drive drug, alcohol or other
habits—that got them into prison in the first place. The
leaflet in their pocket, which is supposed to do the
signposting, is not much use to them in those circumstances.
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(Leeds East) (Lab)
I of course congratulate the Chair of the Justice Committee
and all its members on the great job that they have done, as
always, with their report. Current contracts with the private
CRCs were due to expire in 2022. It was very interesting that
the Prisons Minister recently said that terminating the
contracts because of underperformance was “100% absolutely an
option”. Can the Chair of the Committee shed any further
light on whether the Government would have to pay any
compensation to the CRCs if contracts were terminated early
because of underperformance?
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One problem that we have, to which we refer in the report, is
the lack of transparency around the contractual terms. One
would expect, if there were a complete failure of
performance, that there ought not to be significant payments,
as with any contract, but we do refer to the tendency—it is
not unique to the Ministry of Justice; it is across
Government—for the excuse of commercial confidentiality to be
used almost as a blanket bar to examining terms. That is why
we recommend in the report that there be much more
transparency around the letting or re-letting of contracts.
We should certainly have more transparency about the matrix
on which they are based, the financial model, the performance
criteria that are built into them and the means of
performance measuring of the CRCs themselves. We do not have
adequate information on any of that, and I think the public
are entitled to it.
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Mr (in the Chair)
I thank the Chairman of the Justice Committee for his
excellent statement. We now move to the main business.
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