Today (8 May 2018), the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders
and Immigration, David Bolt, has published his report of the
inspection of the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS).
The completed report was sent to the Home Secretary on 7 March
2018.
Mr Bolt said:
In September 2015, the Prime Minister committed the UK to
resettling 20,000 refugees from the conflict in Syria by 2020.
Departmental responsibility for meeting this commitment was
shared between the Department for International Development
(DfID), the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local
Government (MHCLG) and the Home Office, with the Home Office
retaining primary responsibility for policy and operational
delivery.
The 20,000 target represented a huge increase in resettlements
and required a major and rapid upscaling of effort from all
those involved, including the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organisation for
Migration (IOM) as the key partner agencies on the ground in
the region, and UK local authorities and their integration
delivery partners.
Everyone deserves enormous credit for what they have managed to
achieve so far, and in particular for the resettlement of over
half of the target 20,000 refugees by the end of 2017.
This inspection examined the efficiency and effectiveness of
the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (the Scheme),
looking at the dependencies and risks to successful delivery of
the 20,000 target. It found that the processes on which the
Scheme relied were essentially effective.
Identification of “the most vulnerable” refugees was delegated
to UNHCR; consideration of referrals and matching of refugees
to firm offers of accommodation and support was managed by the
Home Office; the relocation of refugees to the UK was organised
by IOM; and their reception, accommodation and initial support
was led by the receiving local authorities. As a result, there
is every reason to believe that the Scheme will achieve its
20,000 target by the government’s deadline of May 2020.
Given that the Scheme is delivering what it set out to achieve,
it may seem ‘nit-picking’ to focus on where it could do better.
Nonetheless, subject to making necessary improvements to its
data collection and management, the Home Office could do more
to analyse and evaluate the various stages of the resettlement
process, with a view to sharing ‘best practice’ and achieving
greater consistency of treatment and outcomes.
It may be too soon to assess whether those already resettled
via the Scheme have been successfully integrated in the UK. The
Home Office is taking sensible steps to study this over the
longer-term. However, there may be lessons for the
pre-departure period and first years in the UK that, if
identified now, could benefit those still in the early stages
of the process.
Furthermore, while delivering the 20,000 on schedule is the
Home Office’s overriding objective, it needs to be alive to the
effects on others of gearing its processes to ensure it can
achieve this, especially on those refugees told they have been
selected for resettlement but who have to wait months for
further news. The fact that UK resettlement process is quick
when compared to other international schemes does not fully
answer this concern.
My report makes 7 recommendations, of which the Home Office has
“accepted” 2 and “partially accepted” 5. However,
its formal
responsecommits to few if any actions and disputes or
rejects several of the report’s findings. As such, it appears
closed to the idea that there is any room for improvement.
While those responsible for delivering the VPRS have much to be
proud of, this is disappointing, for the inspection process
and, more importantly, for those relying on the Scheme.
An Inspection of the
Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme
