(CB):...On
8 November, the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a Written
Ministerial Statement to Parliament on the work to date of the
cross-agency Panama Papers Taskforce, a group of law enforcers set
up to pursue the information that related to the United Kingdom
about the illegality revealed. He said in his Statement that since
the publication of the papers the task force had: opened civil and
criminal investigations into 22 individuals for suspected tax
evasion; identified a number of leads relevant to a major
insider-trading operation; identified nine potential professional
enablers of economic crime, all with links to known criminals;
placed 43 high net worth individuals under special review while
their links to Panama were further investigated; identified two new
UK properties and a number of companies relevant to
a National Crime Agency financial
sanctions inquiry; established links to eight active Serious Fraud
Office investigations; and identified 26 offshore companies whose
beneficial ownership of UK property was previously concealed and
whose financial activity had been identified to
the National Crime Agency as
potentially suspicious. In addition to pursuing those 74
individuals, 26 companies, links to eight Serious Fraud Office
investigations and other leads on insider trading and sanctions, a
number of individuals had come forward to settle their affairs
before the task force partners took action against them...
(Con):...Clause 9 permits extensions to the
moratorium period for suspicious activity reports, and Clause 11
allows the National Crime Agency to apply for a
further information order. These powers will be available in all
the UK jurisdictions. However, we have consulted the Scottish
Government, who have confirmed that the wording in the Bill does
not accurately reflect the common-law position in Scotland, which
recognises the role of the Procurator Fiscal in directing criminal
investigations. Amendments 9, 11 and 12 reflect that principle in
Scotland so that the moratorium extension and further information
orders should be applied for only by the Procurator
Fiscal...
:
11: Clause 11, page 42, line 6, leave out “a senior National
Crime Agency officer,” and insert “the Director General of the
National Crime Agency or any other National Crime Agency officer
authorised by the Director General (whether generally or
specifically) for this purpose,”
12: Clause 11, page 42, leave out lines 10 to 15
Amendments 11 and 12 agreed.
(Con):...Why do I think the present regime
is ineffective? It is based very largely on the SAR regime—the
suspicious activity report regime. Last year, just under 400,000
SARs were delivered. In the years since the present regulations
were introduced in 2007, probably over 2 million SARs have been
recorded. Consider the cost of their preparation and analysis.
According to a freedom of information request, the outcome was that
there were no convictions at all under the regulations in the first
five years, from 2007 to 2012, and only four convictions and five
more proceedings in the five years since. The National Crime Agency managed to recover
assets totalling only £25 million last year, but claims that there
are billions passing through London illegally all the time. If that
represents success, I find it hard to think what failure would look
like.
There is a Faustian pact between, first, the regulators, who are
pressed to gather even little scraps of information, no matter
how irrelevant; secondly, the compliance departments of the
regulated firms, which are enjoying the opportunity for
untrammelled growth in their activities and personnel; and
thirdly, the professional firms that enjoy the fees earned from
checking these ever-increasing compliance activities. No one ever
steps back to get perspective and to see how this undoubtedly
important activity could be done more effectively.
In Committee, I argued that to break into the cycle
the National Crime Agency should be required
to follow the principles of best regulatory practice, as laid out
in Amendment 21, which we are discussing tonight. My noble friend
would not, I am afraid, accept this line of argument, saying
that:
“The NCA can and will act where there is criminal activity
relating to money laundering. However, it does not have a
regulatory remit, and to require it to have one would deflect it
from its purpose of tackling serious and organised
crime”.—[Official Report, 28/3/17; col. 532.]
I am not sure that I follow exactly that line of argument, but
never mind—we have moved on from there. Now, we have the new
body: the office for professional body anti-money laundering
supervision, or OPBAS. It clearly should follow the principles of
best regulatory practice. Amendment 20 requires the Government to
set this body up within six months. This is an important body
with an important role and therefore we need to get on with it,
and to give Parliament sight of its structure and remit by means
of requiring its establishment through an affirmative statutory
instrument...
...It is important to do some serious re-engineering of the
general approach to money laundering to increase its
effectiveness and public confidence in it. That the National Crime Agency can, in its annual
report, trumpet the fact that SARs went up by 7.82% over the last
year as a badge of success without any reference to the impact it
is having, shows that there is much to do. I beg to move...
To read the whole debate, CLICK
HERE
