Criminal Finances Bill Consideration of Bill, as amended in
the Public Bill Committee. New Clause 7 Unlawful conduct: gross
human rights abuses or violations ‘(1) Part 5 of the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002 (civil recovery of the proceeds etc of unlawful
conduct) is amended as follows. (2) In section 241 (meaning of
“unlawful conduct”), after subsection (2) insert— “(2A) Conduct
which— (a) occurs in a country or territory outside the
United...Request free trial
Criminal Finances Bill
Consideration of Bill, as amended in the Public Bill Committee.
New Clause 7
Unlawful conduct: gross human rights abuses or violations
‘(1) Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (civil recovery of
the proceeds etc of unlawful conduct) is amended as follows.
(2) In section 241 (meaning of “unlawful conduct”), after
subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) Conduct which—
(a) occurs in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom,
(b) constitutes, or is connected with, the commission of a gross
human rights abuse or violation (see section 241A), and
(c) if it occurred in a part of the United Kingdom, would be an
offence triable under the criminal law of that part on indictment
only or either on indictment or summarily,
is also unlawful conduct.”
(3) After that section insert—
“241A “Gross human rights abuse or violation”
(1) Conduct constitutes the commission of a gross human rights
abuse or violation if each of the following three conditions is
met.
(2) The first condition is that—
(a) the conduct constitutes the torture of a person who has
sought—
(i) to expose illegal activity carried out by a public official
or a person acting in an official capacity, or
(ii) to obtain, exercise, defend or promote human rights and
fundamental freedoms, or
(b) the conduct otherwise involves the cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment of such a person.
(3) The second condition is that the conduct is carried out in
consequence of that person having sought to do anything falling
within subsection (2)(a)(i) or (ii).
(4) The third condition is that the conduct is carried out—
(a) by a public official, or a person acting in an official
capacity, in the performance or purported performance of his or
her official duties, or
(b) by a person not falling within paragraph (a) at the
instigation or with the consent or acquiescence—
(i) of a public official, or
(ii) of a person acting in an official capacity,
who in instigating the conduct, or in consenting to or
acquiescing in it, is acting in the performance or purported
performance of his or her official duties.
(5) Conduct is connected with the commission of a gross human
rights abuse or violation if it is conduct by a person that
involves—
(a) acting as an agent for another in connection with activities
relating to conduct constituting the commission of a gross human
rights abuse or violation,
(b) directing, or sponsoring, such activities,
(c) profiting from such activities, or
(d) materially assisting such activities.
(6) Conduct that involves the intentional infliction of severe
pain or suffering on another person is conduct that constitutes
torture for the purposes of subsection (2)(a).
(7) It is immaterial whether the pain or suffering is physical or
mental and whether it is caused by an act or omission.
(8) The cases in which a person materially assists activities for
the purposes of subsection (5)(d) include those where the person—
(a) provides goods or services in support of the carrying out of
the activities, or
(b) otherwise provides any financial or technological support in
connection with their carrying out.”
(4) The amendments made by this section—
(a) apply in relation to conduct, so far as that conduct
constitutes or is connected with the torture of a person (see
section 241A(2)(a) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 as inserted
by subsection (3) above), whether the conduct occurs before or
after the coming into force of this section;
(b) apply in relation to property obtained through such conduct
whether the property is obtained before or after the coming into
force of this section;
(c) apply in relation to conduct, so far as that conduct involves
or is connected with the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment of a person (see section 241A(2)(b) of that Act as
inserted by subsection (3) above), only if the conduct occurs
after the coming into force of this section.
This is subject to subsection (5).
(5) Proceedings under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002 may not be brought in respect of property obtained
through unlawful conduct of the kind mentioned in section 241(2A)
of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as inserted by subsection (2)
above) after the end of the period of 20 years from the date on
which the conduct constituting the commission of the gross human
rights abuse or violation concerned occurs.
(6) Proceedings under that Chapter are brought in England and
Wales or Northern Ireland when—
(a) a claim form is issued,
(b) an application is made for a property freezing order under
section 245A of that Act, or
(c) an application is made for an interim receiving order under
section 246 of that Act,
whichever is the earliest.
(7) Proceedings under that Chapter are brought in Scotland when—
(a) the proceedings are served,
(b) an application is made for a prohibitory property order under
section 255A of that Act, or
(c) an application is made for an interim administration order
under section 256 of that Act,
whichever is the earliest.” —(Mr Wallace.)
This new clause extends the meaning of “unlawful conduct” for the
purposes of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, so that it
includes conduct in other countries that constitutes the gross
human rights abuse or violation of a person who has sought to
expose illegal activity of a public official or person acting in
an official capacity, or to promote etc human rights. Part 5
confers civil recovery powers in relation to property that has
been obtained through unlawful conduct.
Brought up, and read the First time.
12.52 pm
-
The Minister for Security (Mr Ben Wallace)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
-
Mr Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 1—Civil recovery: gross abuse of human rights—
‘(1) Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (civil
recovery of the proceeds etc. of unlawful conduct) is
amended as follows.
(2) In section 241 (which defines unlawful conduct), after
subsection (2), insert—
“(2A) Conduct which—
(a) occurs in a country or territory outside the United
Kingdom and has been designated as conduct by a person
connected to a gross human rights abuse in accordance with
the provisions of section 241B, and
(b) if it occurred in a part of the United Kingdom, would
be or would have been unlawful under the criminal law of
that part at the relevant time,
is also unlawful conduct.”
(3) After section 241 (which defines unlawful conduct),
insert—
“241A Conduct connected to a gross human rights abuse
(1) “Conduct connected to a gross human rights abuse”
means—
(a) involvement by a Person (“A”) in torture or other
serious breaches of human rights and fundamental freedoms
against a Person (“B”) where B sought or seeks—
(i) to expose illegal activity carried out by foreign
public officials, or
(ii) to obtain, exercise, defend or promote human rights
and fundamental freedoms,
(b) activities by a Person (“C”) as an agent in a matter
relating to an activity by A described in paragraph (a),
(c) activities by a Person (“D”) to profit from, materially
assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material or
technological support for, or goods and services in support
of, an activity by A described in paragraph (a),
(d) commission by a Person (“E”), whether or not a foreign
public official, of the illegal activity described in
paragraph (a)(i).
(2) For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial
where the conduct occurred.
(3) In this section “human rights and fundamental freedoms”
means the “Convention rights” as defined in section 1 of
the Human Rights Act 1998.
241B Designation of conduct connected to a gross human
rights abuse
‘(1) The High Court may make an order designating that the
actions of the respondent constitute conduct connected to a
gross human rights abuse and, if considered appropriate,
that—
(a) a person is prohibited from dealing with property,
funds or economic resources owned, held or controlled by
the respondent if the person knows, or has reasonable cause
to suspect, that the person is dealing with such property,
funds or economic resources,
(b) a person is prohibited from making property, funds or
financial services available (directly or indirectly) to
the respondent if the person knows, or has reasonable cause
to suspect that the person is making the funds or financial
services so available,
(c) a person is prohibited from making funds or financial
services available to any person for the benefit of the
respondent if the person knows, or has reasonable cause to
suspect, that the person is making the funds or financial
services so available.
(2) An order under subsection (1) may only be made on
application.
(3) An application for an order under subsection (1) may be
made by—
(a) the Secretary of State,
(b) an individual, or
(c) an entity, including a non-governmental organisation.
(4) An application for an order under subsection (1) must
be supported by a statement of information which addresses—
(a) the circumstances surrounding the respondent’s conduct
connected to a gross human rights abuse, and
(b) the nature and extent of the respondent’s involvement.
(5) An application for an order under subsection (1) may be
made without notice to the respondent to a judge in
chambers.
(6) The Court must be satisfied that it is in the public
interest to make an order under subsection (1).
(7) The Court shall reach a decision on an order under
subsection (1) on the balance of probabilities.
241C Duration, extension, variation and discharge of an
order
‘(1) The High Court shall specify the duration of an order
under section 241B(1) which shall not exceed two years.
(2) In determining the duration of an order, the Court
shall have regard to the likely duration of consequential
proceedings under this Part.
(3) The Court may extend an order for a maximum period to
two years at any time before it expires, if it is satisfied
that the requirements of a designation order continue to be
met.
(4) An extension application may be made without the need
for a hearing if the court considers it appropriate.
(5) An application to extend, vary or discharge an order
may be made to the court by—
(a) the Secretary of State,
(b) the applicant,
(c) the respondent, or
(d) any person affected by the order.
(6) An application to discharge a designation order must be
made by the applicant as soon as reasonably practicable in
circumstances where the requirements of an order are no
longer satisfied.
241D Appeals, etc.
‘(1) The following persons may appeal to the Court of
Appeal in respect of the High Court’s decision on matters
falling to be decided under sections 241B and 241C—
(a) the applicant,
(b) the respondent, or
(c) any person affected by the order.
(2) On an appeal under subsection (1) the Court of Appeal
may—
(a) confirm the decision, or
(b) make such orders as it believes appropriate.
(3) An appeal lies to the Supreme Court from a decision of
the Court of Appeal on an appeal under this section.
(4) An appeal under this section lies at the instance of
any person who was a party to the proceedings before the
Court of Appeal.
(5) On an appeal under this section the Supreme Court may—
(a) confirm the decision of the Court of Appeal, or
(b) make such order as it believes is appropriate.
241E Standard to be applied
All matters to be determined by a court under sections 241B
to 241D are to be decided on the balance of probabilities.
241F Costs
In the exercise of its discretion, a court may, on
application, make a costs capping order in respect of
proceedings under sections 241B to 241D.
241G Duties in respect of gross abuse of human rights
‘(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to
apply for an order under section 241B where the Secretary
of State is satisfied that—
(a) the requirements for the making of an order are met;
and
(b) it is in the public interest to make the application.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to
maintain a public register of—
(a) individuals in respect of whom orders have been made
under section 241B(1),
(b) the circumstances giving rise to the making of such
orders, and
(c) any decisions of a court under sections 241C and 241D
in relation to such orders.
(3) In any case where a relevant authority considers that
evidence is available of property being held by a person in
respect of whom an order has been made under section 241B
which may represent property obtained through unlawful
conduct, it shall be the duty of the relevant authority to
seek to initiate proceedings for civil recovery under this
Part.”
(4) In section 304 (which defines recoverable property),
after subsection (1), insert—
“(1A) Property of a person who is the subject of a
designation order under section 241B is presumed to have
been obtained through unlawful conduct unless the contrary
is shown by the respondent.””
This new clause extends the scope of unlawful conduct for
the purposes of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to
cover to certain actions connected to a gross human rights
abuse which has taken place abroad.
Government amendments 58 and 59.
-
Mr Wallace
Some time has passed since we last considered this Bill.
There was, as hon. Members will recall, a great deal of
cross-party consensus on it, both on Second Reading and in
Committee, and I hope that we will be able to continue in
that same spirit of constructive debate and healthy
scrutiny today.
This first group of amendments concerns the extremely grave
matter of gross human rights abuses or violations. The
Government are committed to promoting and strengthening
universal rights globally, and I welcome the opportunity to
debate this issue. In particular, these amendments have
been prompted by the harrowing case of Sergei Magnitsky.
Magnitsky was not a serious criminal; he was a lawyer who
tried to blow the whistle on large-scale tax fraud in
Russia, and he believed that he would be protected by the
law. Unfortunately, he died in state custody in 2009 after
suffering both mistreatment and assault, and being denied
medical attention. I share the strong feelings of many hon.
Members about this case, and I want to reassure the House
that the Government have expressed, both publicly and to
the Russian Government, our serious concerns about Mr
Magnitsky’s death. Of course, we must also remember that
his case is only one of many atrocious human rights
violations committed globally each year.
As I am sure that hon. Members will highlight, the US has
legislated to prohibit the entry of certain named
individuals to the US and to forbid them use of the US
banking system. Less than two months ago, President Obama’s
Administration extended the legislation so that it could be
applied to those involved in human rights violations,
wherever in the world they have taken place. That sends an
important signal that perpetrators of gross human rights
violations will face consequences. However, we have an
entirely different legal system, which merits a different
approach.
I pay tribute to those hon. Members who have raised this
issue by tabling new clause 1—in particular, my hon. Friend
the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab), the right hon.
Members for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), and for
Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), and the hon. Member
for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford). I am grateful
to hon. Members for giving me advance notice of the
amendment, and am pleased to have had the opportunity to
discuss it with many of its signatories.
It has always been the Government’s position that for
further legislation to be warranted on this issue, there
would need to be a real case that existing powers were
insufficient. I hope that hon. Members will agree that we
should avoid doing anything that might have an impact on
the effectiveness of our existing sanctions and civil
recovery powers. The National Crime Agency has confirmed
that it has considered all the material provided to it on
the Magnitsky case. It concluded that the individuals whom
we believe to be connected to the case do not reside in the
UK, and it has identified no assets of value in the United
Kingdom that are connected to the case, so the additional
powers proposed in new clause 1 would have no obvious
material effect on the individuals involved in this case.
-
Mr (Huntingdon)
(Con)
The point about the Magnitsky Act in the US is that it
pulls together the visa ban, the ban on using American
banks and the inability to trade there; the advantage is
that it is all pulled together. I appreciate that the
scenario is different in this country, but will the
Minister please explain how he intends to pull the links
together in this country, using the different pieces of
existing legislation?
-
Mr Wallace
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that point. I will get
to that later in my speech, but we have to recognise this
difference between the United States and the UK: here, most
of our sanctions regimes are under the European Union
umbrella. Of course, there will be time to discuss those
sanctions, and the United Kingdom’s post-Brexit
arrangements, at a later date. When it comes to sanctions,
we have slightly different dispersals of authority and
power from the United States, which often can, and does,
act entirely unilaterally in this area; we should point
that out.
One problem with new clause 1 is that we think it would be
non-compliant with our domestic human rights law, because
it contains no derogations. It would freeze all the assets
of a designated individual, so they would not have any
funds for living expenses or medical treatment, or to pay
for legal representation. The reversal of the burden of
proof, so that it would be assumed that all assets owned by
designated individuals were the proceeds of their unlawful
conduct, would also be an unprecedented step. That is
incongruous with the existing civil recovery regime and
could be judged by the courts to be disproportionate.
However, we recognise the strength of feeling on this
matter, and understand the deterrent effect that such an
amendment would have on those who seek to profit from the
gross abuse or violation of human rights overseas.
-
(Carshalton and Wallington)
(LD)
The Minister is clearly very well informed on this issue,
and I know that he has had meetings on the subject. If
assets connected to the case were identified in the UK—I
know that there is a dispute with Bill Browder, who
believes that there are such assets here—is the Minister
confident that existing legislation or his new clause 7
would enable them to be frozen?
-
Mr Wallace
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his point. I
have to respect the boundaries of our law enforcement
agencies. As a Minister, I cannot direct them to take
action; they have an operational freedom and independence
that we value greatly in this country. They have said to me
that should actionable evidence be presented to them, they
would be free to follow that up and enforce the law.
Speaking as the Minister, where actionable evidence of
gross human rights abuses or other criminal offences is
presented, of course we would like to see action taken.
This is not about trying to shelter people who have been
involved in those offences; it is about trying to make sure
that the appropriate action is taken when the correct
evidence is presented. I absolutely concur with the right
hon. Gentleman’s point: it is important to understand that
we need to act on the evidence. If there is evidence, we
could take action, even without this legislation. I
certainly urge our law enforcement agencies to take action
to make sure that people are held to account for the
atrocious murder in Russia of Mr Magnitsky.
We have tried to come some way towards meeting many of the
concerns of hon. Members by tabling new clause 7 and the
consequential amendments 58 and 59. They would widen the
definition of “unlawful conduct” in part 5 of the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002 to include torture or
“the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”
of those exposing corruption, or obtaining, exercising,
defending or promoting human rights, including in cases
where that conduct was not an offence in the jurisdiction
in which it took place. That would allow any assets held in
the UK that were deemed to be the proceeds of such activity
to be recovered under the provisions in part 5.
-
(Rhondda) (Lab)
The Government’s new clause 7 contains no duty on the
Government to act at all; they can simply ignore the
provisions. That is one of the key differences between new
clause 7 and new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for
Esher and Walton (Mr Raab).
1.00 pm
-
Mr Wallace
The hon. Gentleman talks about duty, but there are lots of
criminal offences on the statute books on which the
Government do not have a duty to act. We leave it to the
interpretation and freedom of our law enforcement agencies
to act. Are we to say that the duty in this case is greater
than the duty on the police to act on burglary or on a
whole range of other criminal offences? The fundamental
issue is that the hon. Gentleman wants to put a duty on the
Government for one specific type of criminal offence, which
would, I am afraid, hinder the freedom of our law
enforcement agencies to take the appropriate action when
the evidence was presented to them.
-
But in the Government’s new clause, as opposed to new
clause 1, there is no provision for third parties to bring
a case to the courts to allow the seizure of assets, so,
yet again, the Government are closing off the options for
tackling money laundering in London and the UK.
-
Mr Wallace
I am afraid we are not. The National Crime Agency, the
Serious Fraud Office and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
are not full of people who do not want to do their job.
They want to enforce the law: they want to go out and catch
the criminals and stop money laundering. It is slightly
insulting to imply that if we did not put a duty on them,
they would not do it. They would do it. The problem with
new clause 1 is that it would allow non-governmental
organisations and individuals—it does not define whether
those NGOs or individuals are foreign or from the UK—to go
to the court, with limited liability, to force the
Government to take action, without a high threshold at all.
For example, under new clause 1 a Cuban exile living in
Florida who does not like the rapprochement with the Cuban
Government could come to our courts to allege human rights
abuse and make an application against the Cuban
ambassador’s assets in this country, and actually
confiscate or freeze those assets. It would not only
preclude us from making peace or moving on with some
countries, but would allow massive amounts of vexatious
claims based on gimmick politics. That is why we have to
respect the professionalism and independence of our law
enforcement agencies and allow them to make the case based
on the evidence presented to them.
-
That is simply not the case. For example, we already
regularly have lots of vexatious applications from Russia
for the extradition of Russians who are now resident in the
United Kingdom, but the court decides. New clause 1 would
not allow an individual to decide that somebody’s assets
must be frozen; a court would decide.
-
Mr Wallace
First, the hon. Gentleman misses the point that courts do
not like vexatious complaints. They do not like
time-wasting applications with what would be in the case of
new clause 1 limited liability for those people who want to
use the court’s time to make a statement. Secondly,
applications for deportation are often made by the state.
The hon. Gentleman would open it up to individuals all over
the world to come to our courts, without liability, to make
the case for or to make a gesture out of freezing
individuals’ assets, without any recourse to the state or
even necessarily to evidence. That would open up a whole
can of worms for countries around the world.
I shall give another example. We have sponsored and
supported the peace deal in Colombia. Should the Colombian
Government at some stage choose to send somebody with a
background in the FARC to represent them or to be a
cultural attaché in their embassy or something, and
somebody in Colombia does not like that, under new clause 1
they could, as an individual, come to a court here and make
a tokenistic application. The judiciary might throw it out,
but there is capped liability, so the court’s time could be
wasted writ large by lots of people making statements and
blocking the courts.
-
Mr Djanogly
Have the Government considered whether any application
should go first to the Attorney General before being
allowed to proceed? That might stop the abuse that the
Minister is suggesting.
-
Mr Wallace
We did consider that in consultation with the office of the
Attorney General and the Solicitor General, but it was felt
that there was not the appropriate need for that, so we
progressed with new clause 7 as it is drafted. We should
remember that we are putting on the statute book a new
power to take action based on gross human rights abuse,
torture and degrading treatment. We have not done that
before and it is a major step. It is a major signal to
countries around the world that if evidence is presented,
we could interdict with their assets. That sends the
powerful message that London and the United Kingdom are not
bases for them to put their assets or ill-gotten gains from
such behaviour.
-
Sir (Brentwood and Ongar)
(Con)
Surely that is the substantive point. The concern would be
that we would get not only vexatious complaints, but
complaints designed for publicity, in the almost certain
knowledge that such complaints would not be seen through by
the courts and there would be virtually no cost to the
people making the complaint. New clause 7 provides the
opportunity to nab the guilty, and it says to people that
bloodstained dictators have no place putting their money in
this country.
-
Mr Wallace
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right that it sends a
message, but it also respects the independence of our law
enforcement agencies so that they can apply the law and
take action when they are presented with evidence, which
will ensure that the courts’ time is not wasted and that we
get successful results when we deal with these individuals.
It will also ensure that it is done in a way such that the
Executive retains the initiative to carry out the process
and prevent vexatious complaints. Judges will tell us that
they do not want their courtrooms to become public
relations arenas in which people can make vexatious
applications; they want their courts to be able to decide
on the basis of evidence. Under new clause 7, they will be
able to do that, but we respect the operational
independence of our law enforcement agencies.
All that explains why we tabled the new clause. As I have
said, it would allow any assets held in the UK that were
deemed to be the proceeds of the activities I outlined to
be recovered under the provisions in part 5. Of course, any
civil recovery would be subject to all the existing
processes and legal safeguards in the Proceeds of Crime Act
2002. The court would need to be satisfied, on the balance
of probabilities, that the property in question was the
proceeds of crime, or was likely to be used to fund further
criminal activity. Law enforcement agencies would, as ever,
need to consider which of their powers to utilise on a
case-by-case basis.
I hope Members will agree that the new clause would send a
clear statement that the UK will not stand by and allow
those who have committed gross abuses or violations around
the world to launder their money here. I have been the
Minister in charge of the Bill, from the beginning, and
when colleagues from either side of the House have tabled
amendments, I have asked my officials, “Do they have a
point?” I have asked my officials about the evidence set
against Mr Magnitsky’s killers and to find out whether we
have actually done the work we say we are doing. I make
sure; I do not just take things at face value. It is
important to say that I am confident that we have not taken
action in this case because we have not yet had the
evidence to do so or the assets have not been located in
the right place. I have checked that out and verified it.
I have come to the House today with an attempt to put a
compromise in statute—to put gross human rights abuse on
record for the first time. I hope we can send the right
message to the regimes, criminals and individuals around
the world, while at the same time respecting the law
enforcement agencies so that they can carry out their job
unhindered by political interference, or by third-party
groups or anyone else who might want to use publicity
rather than actual evidence to further their cause. That is
really important. I shall pause my comments there and wait
to hear from other Members, and then respond at the end of
the debate.
-
(Dumfries and
Galloway) (SNP)
It is not fair for us to live in a world in which criminals
are free to generate cash and spend it without fear of
repercussion. Given what I have learned during the progress
of the Bill, I think all Members on both sides of the House
would agree with that sentiment. There simply must be a
level playing field for the vast majority in society who
chose to play by the rules.
Until now, provisions on financial crime have been focused
on anti-money laundering regulations and proceeds of crime
legislation, which have been specifically geared towards
dealing with the proceeds of drug traffickers and bank
robbers. In many senses, it has worked. It is not as easy
to launder money in 2017 as it used to be, although, sadly,
it is not impossible. It used to be the perception of
criminals that if they could evade capture and not flash
the cash, they could eventually spend their ill-gotten
gains. In many cases, criminals looked forward to spending
the gains when they were released.
Thankfully, the world has moved on, and this Bill is an
attempt to move us another step ahead of the criminals, so
that we as a society are fit to attack the finances of
criminals in 2017 and beyond. We cannot buy into the rule
of law unless we can agree to the evolution of regulations
surrounding the financial industry that has happened over
the years. Today, we face the threat of grand corruption,
particularly in relation to politically exposed people,
which is facilitated for the most part—perhaps
unwittingly—by the City of London.
Last year, The Guardian revealed, through the Panama
papers, how a powerful member of Gaddafi’s inner circle had
built a multi-million pound portfolio of boutique hotels in
Scotland and luxury homes in Mayfair, Marylebone and
Hampstead in London. He was head of Libya’s infrastructure
fund for a decade and has been accused by Government
prosecutors in Tripoli of plundering money intended for
schools, hospitals and infrastructure projects.
Scottish police have confirmed that they are investigating
the matter. Libya has made a request for an asset freeze,
but, as far as I understand it, the freeze has not been
implemented. With the powers contained in the Bill, we
could have dealt with such an injustice much more swiftly,
so, in general terms, we welcome its provisions. However,
as I intimated earlier in this process, our issue is not
with what is in the Bill, but with what is not in the Bill.
None the less, that list has narrowed as this process has
continued.
The Bill does not satisfactorily address corporate economic
crime—which we will discuss in the third group of new
clauses, which includes proposals on Scottish limited
partnerships, on which my hon. Friend the Member for
Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Roger Mullin) has done so much
to campaign—and the real facilitator of criminal finances:
the profit-seeking, responsibility-shedding and
self-serving banking culture that we have in the UK and the
wider western world. Until we challenge the attitude of the
banks that house these moneys, we will never absolutely
deal with the criminality. The Bill attempts to deal with
the symptoms of the criminality—getting at the assets and
seizing them—but it does not deal with the facilitators,
the banks, which is a great shame.
New clauses 1 and 7 have been touched on by the Minister,
and much of the talk has been about the scope for
applicants to bring an application under these provisions.
In general terms, those new clauses seek to extend the
scope of unlawful conduct. That makes sense in that a
public official—or someone acting with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official—who is depositing funds
in the UK should not be safe on account of that criminality
having occurred abroad. I think that most people would
agree with that sentiment; it is a sensible and logical
step, and one that we support in principle.
The protection of human rights is a profoundly good thing.
Violations of human rights should not be allowed to remain
hidden behind international borders—they should be there
for the world to see—and the consequences of such
violations should be global consequences. With the adoption
of either new clause 1 or new clause 7, the UK will no
longer be a hiding place in that respect, and that is worth
lauding.
What are the differences between the new clauses? As has
been suggested, there is wider scope for more applicants to
make applications under new clause 1. The Government say
that that is not necessary, as the judiciary would vet
those claims; it would be up to the court, not the
applicant, to decide their merits. One other difference is
that the ambit of new clause 1 is wider with regard to
potential respondents, as it includes more people connected
to criminality. Will the Minister touch on the scope of
respondents as well as the scope of applicants and the
differences between new clauses 1 and 7?
Furthermore, new clause 7 contains a provision, which is
mirrored in amendments 58 and 59, to set the limitation
period for actions under unlawful conduct to 20 years. In
one sense, we welcome that, because without it the standard
limitation periods of five and six years would apply.
However, given that we are talking about gross violations
of human rights—torture and the like—should a perpetrator
ever be free from those crimes? Are we saying that, 20
years after someone has committed a gross violation of
human rights, their money should be safe? Given that some
of these abuses take years to come to light, are there
unintended consequences that could let some of the
criminals off the hook?
1.15 pm
I have a number of other simple questions for the Minister. Under
new clause 7, is a mere suspicion of the acts that constitute
gross violation enough? It seems to me that a conviction in
either jurisdiction would not be necessary, but would suspicion
be enough, and how does he see that playing out? If he is not
minded to accept new clause 1, will he explain specifically why
new clause 7 is better for the applicant and the potential
respondent? I would be grateful if he picked up on the point of
limitation as well, but I have a lot more points to make on the
next two groups.
-
Mr (Esher and Walton)
(Con)
I rise to speak to new clause 1, which is known as the
Magnitsky amendment, and to touch on the Government’s new
clause 7 in the process.
New clause 1 was tabled by me, the right hon. Member for
Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) and 50 hon. Members
representing eight different political parties across the
House. That is testimony to the cross-party nature of our
ambition, which was kindled by the tragic murder, on the
instructions of the Russian state, of the young Russian
lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky. In November 2008, Magnitsky was
arrested and detained. His crime was to identify the
perpetrators of the biggest tax fraud in Russian history,
which was committed by the Russian Government against the
investment firm, Hermitage Capital, that employed Magnitsky
and against the Russian taxpayer to the tune of a
mind-boggling $230 million.
For his courage, Sergei Magnitsky was jailed and tortured
for almost a year, and then ultimately murdered. The crime
was perpetrated by some of the very officials whom
Magnitsky had identified. Although those appalling crimes
were documented by two Russian investigations, no one has
ever been brought to justice in Russia. Perversely, it was
Magnitsky who was convicted, posthumously, of fraud—a
sickening snapshot of the corrupt and venal state of the
Russian justice system today.
Large amounts of the stolen money were subsequently
laundered out of Russia, and Hermitage Capital submitted to
all the relevant UK authorities detailed evidence of $30
million that was sent to the UK between 2008 and 2012,
including to firms run or owned by the Russian mafia.
Despite receiving that evidence, the Metropolitan police,
the Serious Organised Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud
Office, HMRC and the National Crime Agency have never
opened a single investigation. Notwithstanding the
Minister’s comments, this case also shines a light on the
weaknesses of our own justice system, which is what we are
here to address today. We should be clear in this House
that, although Magnitsky has been the standard-bearing case
for reform, it is by no means an isolated case. According
to the Home Affairs Committee’s 2016 report on the proceeds
of crime, an astonishing £100 billion is laundered through
UK banks alone each year, and we know from the NCA that
only around 0.2% of that figure is currently frozen.
No one wants Britain to be a competitive global hub that
attracts investment and is open to international talent
more than I do, but I also want us to be known the world
over for our integrity, our commitment to the rule of law
and our adherence to the most basic of moral principles. We
therefore have to stop turning a blind eye to the blood
money of butchers and despots that, frankly, flows all too
freely through some UK businesses, banks and property. New
clause 1 is designed to address the weaknesses in the
current UK asset-freezing regime. I pay tribute to Jonathan
Fisher QC, the expert in this field—one of the leading
experts in public law and human rights law—who carefully
helped us to craft the mechanism.
New clause 1 would enable the Secretary of State, an
individual or a non-governmental organisation to convince
the High Court to make an order to empower the UK
authorities to freeze assets where it can be demonstrated,
on the balance of probabilities, to a senior judge that
those assets relate to an individual involved in, or
profiting from, gross human rights abuses. The clause would
put a duty on the Secretary of State to pursue such an
order when there is sufficient evidence and when it is in
the public interest to do so—there is a measure of
flexibility—and would establish a public register of those
who are subject to such orders, all against the backdrop of
appropriate safeguards and due process in law.
The Government have responded with their own proposal, new
clause 7. In fairness, it is only right and proper to pay
tribute to the Security Minister and the Foreign Secretary
for engaging so seriously with the issue and, ultimately,
for being willing to act. New clause 7 would, indeed, mark
a significant step forward, principally because it would
provide specific statutory grounds for an asset-freezing
order based on gross human rights abuses and would target
individuals responsible for, or profiting from, such crimes
against whistleblowers and defenders of human rights
abroad.
My view is that new clause 7 is not as robust as new clause
1, mainly because it does not impose a duty on UK law
enforcement agencies to act subject to the flexibility I
described, and it omits the third-party application
procedure and removes the public register. In each of those
three cases, I understand and recognise the Minister’s
reasons why that is the Government’s position—it is
probably to be expected—and I do not want to let the best
be the enemy of the good, but I retain at least a measure
of underlying concern. My concern touches on something that
is so often the case with criminal justice legislation: the
extent to which the new power will be enforced in practice.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) touched on that,
and the concern is probably shared across the House.
If I may be so bold, I would like to elicit some further
reassurances from the Minister—which he may feel free to
indicate during my speech or his winding-up speech—on the
issue of enforcement. First, will he commit to the
Government to collecting data on the exercise of the new
clause, say, annually, so that the House and the public can
properly scrutinise the extent to which it is being
exercised in practice? I recognise and understand the
Minister’s point that the success of the clause should not
be judged only by how many times it is exercised but by its
deterrent effect, but I still think that would be a
valuable source of reassurance.
-
Mr Wallace
I am delighted to tell my hon. Friend that I will commit to
collecting those stats and ensuring that they are published
annually alongside other stats on the proceeds of crime.
-
Mr Raab
I thank the Minister for such an immediate, swift and
decisive acceptance and provision of assurance. That would
be extremely useful. There is only one other aspect on
which it would be useful to have some reassurance. I
understand that there is a wider ongoing review of UK-wide
asset-freezing powers. I can well appreciate why the
Government may be reticent about reinventing a bespoke
procedural mechanism for one new power, given its
relationship with other wider proposals that may be
forthcoming, but I hope that the Minister will undertake to
factor the proposals made in new clause 1 into the review
process and to ensure that any future new proposals on
enforcement include the most robust and rigorous mechanism
available under UK law applying to new clause 7. If the
Minister can give that assurance on top of the one he has
just given, I am inclined to accept new clause 7 and to not
press new clause 1, heartened by the Government’s
commitment to strive to make the new power work as
effectively as possible in practice.
For those of us who have campaigned for change, there
remains the further issue of visa bans, but that is for
another day. Today, the House has the opportunity to lay
down some moral red lines in UK foreign policy and to take
a lead in denying safe haven to the dirty money of those
profiting from the most appalling of international crimes.
-
Mr Djanogly
My hon. Friend says that visa bans are for another day, but
of course visa bans already exist as a possibility. Would
it not be helpful to know how the existing visa ban system
will complement the new proposal?
-
Mr Raab
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We will need a separate
legislative vehicle to address the wider question of visa
bans, but he makes his point and has been tenacious in
powerfully campaigning for this. We will want to move on to
that issue at the appropriate time. Today is really about
the asset-freezing side of things. We have in this last
analysis the opportunity to send a message of solidarity to
those who are fighting for the liberty that we in this
country hold so dear. We have the opportunity to nurture
the flame of freedom on behalf of those brave souls, such
as Sergei Magnitsky, who suffered the very worst crimes
when standing up for the very highest principles.
-
Dr (Ealing Central and Acton)
(Lab)
As I rise to speak to this group of amendments, it looks as
though new clause 1 might not be moved in favour of
Government new clause 7. The Minister started by saying
that the Bill has so far enjoyed a degree of cross-party
consensus in its parliamentary passage, so I would like to
say that Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition will not stand in
the way of new clause 7 and will not stand in the way of
new clause 1 if it is moved.
I welcome new clauses targeting asset seizure for those
guilty of human rights abuses outside Britain who seek to
use the UK to conceal their wealth. New clause 1 has become
known colloquially as the Magnitsky amendment, and we have
heard some of the tragic details of that case. It would
bolster the Bill’s aim to tackle the growing concern about
money laundering, terrorist financing and corruption. The
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank estimate
that the annual loss through money laundered globally is
between 2% to 5% of global GDP—a staggering $800 billion to
$2 trillion. We do not know the true figures because this
is all hidden, white-collar crime.
It is estimated that serious and organised crime on our own
doorstep costs the UK economy at least £24 billion
annually. The amount of money laundered here every year is
between £36 billion and £90 billion. That is a loss to our
Exchequer, so it is only right that we tighten up the
legislation with this Bill, and such an amendment would
tighten them up further. Quite simply, those who have blood
on their hands from the worst human rights abuses should
not be able to funnel their dirty money through our
country. In a recent article in The New York Times, the
journalist Ben Judah uses quite colourful language to
attest:
“Just because there aren’t bodies on the streets of London
doesn’t mean London isn’t abetting those who pile them up
elsewhere. The British establishment has long feigned
ignorance of the business, but the London Laundromat is
destroying the country’s reputation.”
Under new clause 1, the names of individuals who have been
involved in or profited from human rights abuses would be
published, and Ministers would be obliged to apply for a
freezing order of up to two years if they are presented
with compelling evidence of abuse and it is in the public
interest to do so. That would make dictators and despots
think twice about using the UK as a safe place to stash
their dirty cash. By creating personal costs for the
perpetrators of human rights abuses, we can protect
whistleblowers around the world, which would be a fitting
tribute to the legacy of Sergei Magnitsky.
-
Mr Djanogly
I am pleased to be given the opportunity to speak to this
significant legislation, which will certainly help the
overall objective of stopping the UK being used as a safe
harbour for illegal proceeds, as it currently is all too
frequently.
1.30 pm
Like Sergei Magnitsky, I practised as a corporate lawyer, and I
have asked myself whether, in his situation in Russia, uncovering
the largest tax fraud, I would have risked reporting it to the
authorities. Would I then have refused to withdraw my statement,
while being imprisoned, beaten and denied medical help—and,
indeed, while being abused by the very perpetrators of the crime
I had blown the whistle on? All this was happening with the
backing and connivance of politicians, judges, tax authorities,
prosecutors and police—all the people who are meant to be there
to keep us, the honest citizens, safe. I would like to think that
I would stand up for what is right, but I appreciate that it is
easier for me to say that living here in the UK under the rule of
law, rather than in the vicious, pernicious kleptocracy that
modern Russia has become and that did for Sergei Magnitsky.
New clause 1, to which I have added my name, and Government new
clause 7 deal with individuals who have directly or indirectly
committed gross human rights abuses overseas against
whistleblowers or defenders of human rights. Of course, these
provisions do not stop with Magnitsky, or, indeed, Russia, and
not all Russians are bad people, but Russia is as good an example
as any to show how the new clauses, in different ways, address a
glaring omission in our laws—an omission that has, for too long,
allowed the perpetrators of vicious crimes against humanity to
then happily base themselves and their ill-gotten gains in the UK
as though nothing had happened, under the unwritten law that they
do nothing illegal while in the UK.
While the new clauses deal with individuals’ actions, these
people will almost invariably come from countries where the
crimes of the person are mixed up with crimes of the state.
Russia operates a repressive, nasty society where human rights
are often ignored, where the media are suppressed and journalists
are killed, where democratic opposition is ruthlessly suppressed
and where even businessmen have a glass ceiling beyond which they
are told who to pay and how to toe the line. Russia has an
undiversified, oil-reliant, poor economy and a political system
controlled by a dictator, who, like most dictators, looks to
address his failures at home with wins through threats and wars
abroad. Georgia and Ukraine are therefore partially occupied, and
the west faces espionage, cyber-attacks and so on—and all this
from a country with an economy smaller than that of Italy.
How do Putin and his gang get away with it? At least with
communism there was belief, an ideology and a raison d’être,
however misguided. Now, there is no belief in anything, except
one thing: money. Modern Russia is a kleptocracy, with small
numbers of very rich people making the decisions and bound
together through their thieves’ honour. However, I have heard
many experts say that if the thieves collectively thought that
President Putin was not going to let them keep their money
overseas, he would not last very long. That is one good reason to
follow the black money through to the UK and to seize it. In
other words, by not acting against the thieves and torturers in
the UK, we are indirectly bolstering many of the worst regimes in
the world.
The other point is that thieves rarely steal for the sake of it;
they steal because they wish to enjoy the benefits of their
ill-gotten gains. But where should they spend it, and how should
they keep it safe until they do? That is the challenge. The best
place, obviously, is somewhere like the UK, where the rule of law
and property rights are sacrosanct. That is why, as the Home
Affairs Committee pointed out, £100 billion of black money is
being laundered in the UK every year. It is why Russian and other
human rights abusers’ black money has been pouring into London
property, Bond Street shops, country estates and prized British
education.
I recently went on a parliamentary trip to Hong Kong and heard—I
have to say, unofficially—that after the recent Beijing
corruption crackdown, the takings of the Hong Kong couture and
jewellery shops were reduced by up to 60%. As a result, Hong Kong
commercial and residential property prices have also stopped
rocketing.
Likewise, many criminals coming to London will be happy to pay
top property prices if they feel their money is, say, 80% less
likely to be confiscated in London than in their home countries,
should they fall out of favour with the powers that be. Even with
higher stamp duty and the annual company overseas tax—the annual
residential property tax—the security of anonymously owning
property in London in an offshore company can be worth paying the
taxes for.
But the question is: do we want that kind of money here? In other
words, we as a country have a decision to make: do we value the
tax revenue and work coming via black money more than dealing
with the human rights abuses and/or illegality it is connected
with? I would suggest not. As we prepare to leave the EU, this
issue will only become more relevant, as we necessarily attempt
to negotiate free trade agreements and cosy up to all sorts of
regimes around the world.
We need to set a marker, and new clause 1 provides the mechanics
for action. Moreover, it makes a statement against the rotten
values of torturers and other criminals who might see us as an
easy drop-off point for their assets. That this new clause has
been initiated by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton
(Mr Raab), and that the Home Secretary’s new clause 7 recognises
that it raises an important issue—albeit one to be addressed in a
more narrow way—is highly commendable, and I do want to put on
record my congratulations to the Security Minister and his
Department for listening to the case and coming forward with a
meaningful compromise, but further questions arise.
Government new clause 7, of course, falls way short of the US
Magnitsky Act, which has a specific list of undesirables
attached. Furthermore, the Government clearly wish to keep for
themselves the choice of whom to prosecute and asset-seize. I am
minded to go along with that, given that many, if not most,
seizures would have political implications, and I doubt such
things should be left to non-governmental organisations, for
instance, to prosecute. However, I would be happy with the
proposed powers only if I were given comfort that the Government
intend actually to use them once the Bill is passed.
On the question of a list, we are missing a trick here. One of
the strongest aspects of the US Magnitsky list is that hundreds
of thousands of people have seen exactly who is blamed and for
what. Indeed, I note that the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control updated the list only last month. If we
search-engine the US Magnitsky Act, we see each of the sanctioned
individuals and their job titles. Naming and shaming is a huge
negative issue for human rights abusers who wish to live in the
security of criminal darkness. It is also a strong deterrent to
others who might consider such abuse. Has the Minister considered
publishing lists of those who will be prosecuted under these
provisions? I am not sure whether that would be included in the
stats he said he would be publishing, so a bit of clarification
would be helpful.
My reading of new clause 1 is that it is more like the US
Magnitsky Act, and that it looks not only to seize assets but to
stop the undesirables travelling to the UK, trading in the UK,
using UK banks and buying UK property. Could the Minister say
whether such issues would be dealt with through new clause 7 or
perhaps through other legislation that could be used at the same
time?
-
Mr Wallace
Perhaps I can inform my hon. Friend and the rest of the
House on the visa issue. We can refuse a visa to a person
who does not meet the immigration rules. Evidence that a
person has been involved in organised crime or in human
rights abuses or violations would be taken into account
when considering a visa application. We can already do
that; the power is there with the Government, and we have
exercised it in the past.
-
Mr Djanogly
I am grateful for the Minister’s clarification. It would be
helpful if he could say that it is the Government’s
position that, when a prosecution is taken under these new
provisions, the court should consider a visa exclusion
automatically and not as a possible add-on.
Clearly, if the sanctioned person had his or her assets
confiscated but could then go on to buy more assets or to
conduct business in the UK, new clause 7 may lack the
required teeth.
New clause 7(5) refers to proceedings needing to be brought
within 20 years, which seems like a short period in any
event. Furthermore, it looks to be 20 years from the
commission of the gross human rights abuse. Why is it not
from the end of the abuse? In other words, if someone has
been abused for 20 years plus one day, would the right to
prosecute the abuser fail?
Would the court be required to connect the human rights
abuse to the assets being seized? For instance, where the
individual is accused of organising the torture of three
people but steals from only one of the three and then moves
the stolen goods into the UK, would the seizure have to be
tied to the one incidence of torture that relates to the
stolen goods?
My final question is this: after the legislation is put in
place, do the Government actually intend to act? Many
foreign nationals—not least Russians—really want to live
here, rather than in, say, the US, so we have significant
influence in setting the standards of civilised behaviour
we expect from people who live or stay here. I ask the
Minister, as I think my hon. Friend the Member for Esher
and Walton did, whether we are now going to say to those
who have been merciless in their own countries and who then
look to store their ill-gotten gains in the UK, “We do not
want you here. We do not want your money here” and,
importantly, “If you do come here, we will act.” If that is
the Minister’s position—I think he said it was, but perhaps
he could clarify that—I am minded to support Government new
clause 7 rather than new clause 1.
-
I want to pay tribute to two people, the first of whom is
the Minister for introducing this Bill. I think we all
accept, in all parts of the House, that the corrupt money
that swishes around in the British financial system is part
of a type of crime and corruption across the whole world.
Unfortunately, it also has a very detrimental effect on the
housing market in the UK in that large numbers of houses
are bought not to live in but as an investment vehicle and
a means of laundering money. While some of those properties
are at the high end of the market and there might be no
effect on the majority of our constituents, in some cases
these people have been buying property portfolios all the
way down the housing market—and by increasing the value of
the top end of the market they are affecting the whole
market. If we want to get serious about the housing market
in this country, we have to tackle the issue of corrupt
money in the British system coming from overseas. I welcome
the main provisions of the Bill. I applaud the Minister for
trying to get some way towards a provision that might be
termed the Magnitsky clause, as he suggests in his new
clause 7.
I also pay tribute to the hon. Member for Esher and Walton
(Mr Raab). He and I have had very many conversations on
this subject for a long time, but we still have not managed
to decide how to say the name “Sergei”. One of the most
depressing things to add to the long list that he outlined
is that Sergei Magnitsky was prosecuted posthumously, which
must be a new low in putting two fingers up to the normal
standards of criminal prosecution around the world.
I am absolutely certain that significant numbers of the
people who are prohibited from entering the United States
of America under the Magnitsky list have entered the United
Kingdom since his death. That is why the Minister really
needs to think again about visa bans. I do look to the
United States of America in this regard. Several hon.
Members, including the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr
Djanogly), have already said that the United States of
America has gone much further than we have. The Minister
tried to argue that the Americans have a very different
legal system. Yes, they do, but it is based on the same
fundamental principles as ours and, I would have thought,
on the same values as ours. That is why we ought to be
going at least as far as the United States of America. When
the Commons debated this on 13 December 2010, the motion
stating that we should proceed with a Magnitsky Act was
carried unanimously. The Minister at the time, who is a
thoroughly charming chap, said that we had to wait to see
what the United States of America does. Well, I think we
have all decided that we are not going to wait to see what
the United States of America does on anything at the
moment, and we might choose to set our own path in relation
to these matters. I sometimes feel as though the UK is
dragging its heels on this issue.
Sergei Magnitsky was killed just before 2010, when I was
Minister for Europe in the Foreign Office, and most of the
debate about this has happened since then. My personal
perception was that both and President Obama
were very reluctant to show a strong arm to Russia because
they thought that by pressing the reset button—this was
Obama’s view—we would somehow manage to get major
concessions out of Putin. That has not proved to be an
effective strategy. In every single regard, Putin has
simply taken those moments as a sign of weakness and
proceeded to use force to a greater degree. On the day that
became leader of the
Conservative party, the first thing he did was to go to
Georgia to stand with the Georgians against Putin’s
invasion of that country. Yet there are still Russian
troops in Georgia, and since then we have had the issues in
Ukraine.
There is now clear evidence of direct Russian corrupt
involvement in elections in France, in Germany, in the
United States of America, and, I would argue, in this
country. Many believe that some of the highest-level
decisions affecting security in the United Kingdom, in
Germany, in France and in the United States of America are
now compromised by Russian infiltration. The murder of
Sergei Magnitsky and his then being posthumously put on
trial shows that Russia is, in effect, a kleptocracy—a
country ruled by people who have stolen from the people and
used every means in their power to protect themselves and
guard their position with jealousy. It is, in essence, the
politics of jealousy writ large. I fear that this has
infected the United Kingdom, and also one of our closest
allies in Europe, Cyprus, where much Russian money is
currently stored away corruptly and laundered illegally.
1.45 pm
A sign of the problem we face is that it is impossible to
extradite anybody from Russia because Russia will not allow in
its law—in its constitution—the extradition of any Russian
national. We are therefore unable to prosecute in many of the
cases that we are talking about. I am still mystified about why
the authorities in this country have failed to act in relation to
any of the assets belonging to those in this country who were
involved in the murder of Sergei Magnitsky and in the corruption
that he unveiled. Many people have pointed to some £30
million-worth of such assets, none of which has yet been seized
or frozen, while in 11 other countries around the world $43
million-worth has been seized and frozen. It feels as though this
country is reluctant to move on this, or has inadequate laws to
be able to do so.
However, this Bill is necessary not only in relation to Magnitsky
and to Russia. Rakhat Aliyev was reckoned to have some £147
million-worth of London property. He was the former secret police
chief in Kazakhstan. He went on to have two tours of duty as
ambassador to Austria, and then to Austria-Macedonia, Serbia, and
Slovenia. During the time that he did those jobs, he amassed an
enormous fortune from areas such as banking, oil refinery, and
telecommunications—virtually every form of state monopoly that he
could manage to peculate from. He was the son-in-law of the
former president Nazarbayev. He was charged with money laundering
through the British Virgin Islands—another reason we need to take
more concerted action. He was charged in Austria with the torture
of two bodyguards and the murder of the opposition leader in
Kazakhstan and of a Kazakh journalist. He committed suicide in
2015. Up until that moment, there was still no system in the
United Kingdom that would have enabled us to tackle his financial
assets in the United Kingdom and seek recovery of them. Indeed,
there is now an issue about what we should do about those who
have inherited those substantial assets. They would certainly not
be covered by the Government’s new clause but would be covered by
the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Esher and Walton.
That is why I still support it, even if he is not going to press
it to a vote.
The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Richard Arkless)
referred to Libya, where there is a major issue because the
transitional Libyan Government found that some $10 billion had
been peculated from the Libyan people, depriving schools,
hospitals, and the whole of the Libyan state infrastructure under
Colonel Gaddafi. A lot of that money has clearly come to the
United Kingdom. Indeed, the Libyan authorities have been trying
to pursue it here but have found it phenomenally difficult to do
so. So far, as far as I am aware, the only asset that has yet
been recovered is a £10 million townhouse.
The Minister suggested that the threshold in new clause 1 was too
low and that it would be too easy for people to be able to bring
prosecutions, meaning that it would fall foul of the Human Rights
Act. Incidentally, I hope that we are keeping the Human Rights
Act. I would argue quite the reverse. In fact, as the hon. Member
for Esher and Walton pointed out, this has to go to a senior
judge in the High Court. It is not a case of someone simply
turning up and saying, “I want to have this chap’s assets frozen,
please”—they have to make a proper argument. Secondly, it is on
the balance of probabilities, which is a standard evidential
basis in most civil actions. It is true that new clause 1 places
a duty on the Secretary of State to pursue such matters, but only
where it is in the public interest so to do. There are plenty of
cavils and protections against the abuse that the Minister seemed
to suggest might otherwise apply.
There are significant differences between the two new clauses, as
the hon. Member for Huntingdon mentioned. First, the Government’s
new clause applies only to abuses by public officials. The
definition of public official in the UK is already established in
statute law, and that is a significant limitation. Secondly, as I
have said, there is no duty for the prosecuting authorities or
the Government to initiate civil recovery proceedings at all.
Third parties cannot apply under the Government’s new clause, and
there will be no public register of human rights abusers who are
subject to recovery proceedings. There will be no designation
orders, so it will be quite easy for people who think that they
are about to be proceeded against to squirrel their assets away
to another domain fairly quickly, because there is no system for
freezing those assets before recovery proceedings can start.
The Government’s new clause applies only to new degrading
treatment or punishment after the commencement of the Act, rather
than to events that have already taken place. As Members have
already said, the Government’s new clause will not apply to human
rights abuses that happened more than 20 years ago. I hope that
the Minister will respond to the point that was made by the hon.
Member for Huntingdon about when the 20 years begins and ends.
It seems as though the Government still believe that they can
somehow or other appease some of these people from around the
world. They seem to want to pussyfoot around the issue. I just do
not think that that meets the present danger and need,
particularly in view of the risk to the financial propriety and
reputation of this country. We cannot prosper if we allow bribery
and corruption to flourish through the back door. We should be
saying that none of these people, whether they are from Russia or
from any other country, are welcome in the United Kingdom.
I have already said that I believe that many of those involved in
the murder of Sergei Magnitsky and the corruption that he
unveiled have visited the United Kingdom, notwithstanding the
Minister’s statement that such people can be refused a visa. That
may be the case, but we cannot be certain that they have been
excluded, and they cannot know that they are being excluded. It
would be far more useful to be able to bring the two issues
together with a visa ban and a proper Magnitsky Act like the one
in the United States of America.
My final point is that we are, as I think the Minister said
earlier, operating under a set of circumstances that exist
because we are in the European Union. The Prime Minister has
regularly said on her return from European Council meetings, “It
has been great to be able to get tough sanctions against Russia
imposed by the European Union.” If we are the only country that
has argued for tough sanctions in those meetings, it will be much
more difficult for us to prosecute the foreign policy that we
want, particularly in relation to Russia, when we are no longer
there.
The hon. Member for Esher and Walton has a completely different
view on that last point, but I hope that he—and the whole
House—will agree that we have to find new mechanisms to enable us
to ensure that we do not become the sink spot for international
corruption and bribery, and for human rights abusers who want to
abuse the rights and privileges of owning property and living in
the United Kingdom.
-
Sir
It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for
Rhondda (Chris Bryant). I agred with much of what he
said—some I did not, but we will put that to one side for a
moment.
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and
Walton (Mr Raab)—never forget Walton in his patch—because
he has achieved enormous progress. When he started this
process, I did not think that he had a chance of getting
his measure through, but the Government have made quite an
unusual concession, if the Minister does not mind my saying
so. Usually concessions arise out of panic about defeat,
but I do not think that there was any possibility of that.
This concession is due to the power of my hon. Friend’s
arguments about righting a wrong and including in British
law something that I think will make a difference. I am
sure that the House is grateful for what he has done.
I stand before you, Madam Deputy Speaker, as the UK
Government’s champion on anti-corruption. When I was
appointed by , I came out to find
that he had described me as the anti-corruption tsar. The
Daily Mirror shortened that to corruption tsar, and I felt
that that was one step too close to the Romanovs, so I am
happy to use the word “champion”.
In that capacity, I went to an Organisation for Security
and Co-operation in Europe anti-corruption conference in
Paris. One of the speakers talked about taking a lorry full
of time-sensitive goods through customs and being asked for
a private facilitation payment. They asked how many of the
people present would make such a payment. To my
amazement—and, I suspect, to the greater amazement of the
person who asked the question—a good 60% of hands went up.
I was proud to say that if that lorry driver had been
British, not only would he have committed a crime, but he
would have been prosecuted for it on his return to the UK
and so would his company.
New clause 7 and the excellent new clause 1 have to be seen
in that context. We have been gradually triangulating this
crime. I am old enough to remember listening to a
Minister—a Conservative Minister, I am ashamed to
say—saying on the radio a number of years ago, “I want
British companies to bribe. Everybody bribes, and I want
Britain to be among those that do so.” That was a ludicrous
thing to say, but it was the kind of reaction that we got
to the Bribery Act 2010. People said, “Everybody’s doing
it. All we are doing is putting British companies at
peculiar risk.” That has not been the case. Because of the
Bribery Act, board members have put in place due diligence
to ensure that they do not face that problem. That was part
of the process of triangulating the crime, and I do not
think that there has been any drop-off for British
business. The new clauses have to be seen in the context of
the call for consultation on economic crimes and the place
of boards in relation to economic crimes. They should be
seen in the context of transparency over beneficial
ownership of property in this country by those who want to
trade with the Government, and I hope to see something
positive come out of that.
Given the degree of consensus that seems to be breaking out
about the proposals, I will make a slightly shorter speech
than I intended. New clause 7 should help us to deal with
bloodstained dictators and those on the take in
kleptocracies around the world. I entirely agree that a
posthumous conviction for dishonesty and theft is as
ridiculous as the practice during the French revolution of
putting animals on trial. We have to understand that there
are parts of the world in which Governments and private
business move hand in hand, and they make the Tudor court
look like the epitome of puritan restraint. To those
people, we are sending out a clear message that their
assets will be seized and their lives interrupted, and that
those who seek to buy expensive flats and jewellery will
face a problem.
We have dealt with the worry about third parties making
vexatious claims. I will not go over that again, but a
further point needs to be emphasised. Non-governmental
organisations, especially, often play an enormous part in
getting prosecutions together and bringing evidence to the
authorities. I have had the privilege, as I suspect the
Minister has, of seeing how the Serious Fraud Office works.
A lot of its cases are complex and take a lot of time, and
there is a risk that if third parties were allowed to make
applications, they might actively tip off those involved in
an ongoing investigation. That is another compelling reason
why states, and more particularly prosecution authorities,
should bring such cases.
2.00 pm
I want to end by agreeing with my hon. Friend the Member for
Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly), who made the powerful point that such
provisions are pointless and useless unless there are
prosecutions. I have had the honour of talking to various
Governments around the world. They often show what marvellous
laws they have and demonstrate how they are dealing with bribery,
but we find that a large number of prosecutions are not made or
seen through. When I was in one country, which I shall not name,
and pressed its Government on this, they managed to say that a
local government official was prosecuted for making a profit from
taking away television aerials, yet the place was riddled with
corruption. Unless the people at the top have their collars felt,
the process will not be effective.
New clause 7, along with other new clauses and amendments, should
make a difference, so I am pleased to support the Government. I
end by again congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Esher
and Walton on seeing this through.
-
I thank the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) for
putting together the proposal in new clause 1 and the
Minister for responding positively. I have been in the
House for long enough to know that Ministers rarely respond
positively to approaches, even cross-party ones, so it is
welcome that the Minister has taken on board the spirit of
the proposal. I also pay tribute to Bill Browder—many
Members in the Chamber will have met him—who has really led
the charge on this issue. However, I am sure that Bill
wants not a tribute but action.
I share some of the reservations of the hon. Member for
Rhondda (Chris Bryant). In other countries, assets have
been seized in relation to the Magnitsky case, but it seems
that that is not so in London. Many Members would accept
that London is a place where many Russians, sometimes of
rather dubious backgrounds, like to put their assets, so it
seems strange, while assets are being seized almost
everywhere else around the world in relation to this case,
for London to be the one place where they have not been
seized.
The Minister reassured us that the prosecuting
authorities—of course he cannot put pressure on them, but
he has confirmed this—would prosecute if there was
evidence. I assure Bill Browder and others that they will
have the support of the House if evidence—or further or
more detailed evidence—is forthcoming, as the Minister for
one endorsed the need for very firm action. He said that
action might be taken under existing legislation, but that
it could be taken even more effectively under Government
new clause 7.
Like other Members, I would prefer new clause 1 to the
Government’s proposal, but I understand why the Minister
preferred to table his own new clause. Unfortunately, I
suspect that we would not have the numbers in the House to
win a Division today on cross-party new clause 1. We will
therefore have to follow the matter very closely, and I
welcome the fact that the Minister will publish statistics.
Several hon. Members referred to the Magnitsky Act. If they
want to see the list of names, they could read my early-day
motion 1344—it has been signed by a number of Members—which
lists Russian citizens subject to the Magnitsky Act in
America. The hon. Member for Rhondda reminded me that I
need to retable my early-day motion because, as he said,
new names have been added to the American list. The
information is there if Members need to refer to it.
I welcome the fact that the Government have moved on this
issue, but the proof of the pudding will be in the eating.
If evidence is forthcoming that such assets are in this
country, in the way that Bill Browder and others believe is
the case, the Government must ensure that those responsible
are prosecuted and brought to justice for the gross human
rights violations they have committed.
-
Mr (Sutton
Coldfield) (Con)
I, as a signatory of new clause 1, can be very brief
because my right hon. and hon. Friends, and indeed
Opposition Members, have made the case with such eloquence
on what is known as the Magnitsky amendment. It seems to
me, as such a signatory, that the Government have listened.
The Minister has quite rightly heard the cross-party voice
on these issues and tabled new clause 7, and I certainly
congratulate him on having achieved that.
My hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab),
who has done such a good job on this issue, pointed out, in
accepting the Government new clause, that we must not allow
the best to be the enemy of the good. The story that my
right hon. Friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Sir
Eric Pickles), the anti-corruption tsar, told us about his
Paris meeting reminds me of just how complex is the attack
on corruption, of which we must all be a part.
I remember a very eminent New York anti-corruption lawyer,
who had been involved in a variety of anti-corruption
mechanisms, telling me that he was once invited to
Afghanistan to give a lecture on how to tackle corruption,
and a vast number of Afghan officials turned up in the
auditorium. To his horror, observing the Rolex watches on
the wrists of so many of those officials, he suddenly
realised halfway through the lecture that they had turned
up to learn not how to tackle corruption, but how to evade
the tackling of corruption.
Corruption is a cancer: it is insidious in a whole variety
of ways. One of the good things about the Bill is that it
seeks, in a very complex area, to make progress on some
very clear aspects of the issue. The former Prime Minister,
the former Chancellor of the Exchequer and other Government
Members have also made a very big contribution in the fight
to tackle corruption in this area.
I want to make two brief final points. The first is that in
the Magnitsky case, as I think the Minister has
recognised—I know Bill Browder and I was absolutely
horrified to hear the tale of the experience he has
undergone—it is clear that the British law enforcement
agencies have shown, to put it no more strongly than this,
a degree of confusion, delay and obfuscation in their
handling of such matters. There are issues of
administrative co-ordination and effectiveness, and I very
much hope that the Minister ensures that tackling this
issue remains clearly on his agenda.
My second and final point is that Britain needs to send a
very clear signal about the approach we take to human
rights abuses and money laundering. The failure to send a
very clear signal—I hope that that will be ended by the
decision the House will take this afternoon—damages our
international relations. Britain’s relations and dealings
with Russia are very complex. We need to work with Russia
on a number of matters on which we have a common interest,
but we also need to be absolutely clear where we stand on
the issues—my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr
Djanogly) set them out so eloquently in his speech—so that
there is no misunderstanding about where the British
Government stand on many of the horrific aspects of Russian
governance and conduct. I have been a strong critic in this
House of Russian abuses of human rights and, indeed, of war
crimes in Syria. Given the other dimension of areas on
which we must be able to work constructively with Russia,
it is extremely important that we in this House are
absolutely clear with the Government about where stand on
human rights issues.
-
Mr Wallace
We have had a very important and well-informed debate. I am
very grateful to colleagues for their contributions, in
particular my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton
(Mr Raab). As Minister, I have done my best throughout the
process to speak to as many colleagues as possible and to
listen to their concerns. I have gone back to the law
enforcement agencies and asked them tough questions. I
cannot say whether my predecessors did that or not, but I
take the view that our job as Ministers is to go beyond the
briefing papers we all receive, test their resolve and send
a very clear message. I have told the agencies that when
the Bill is passed by Parliament and becomes an Act, we
want to see prosecutions and we want the powers to be used.
I will not interfere in how they choose to apply those
powers, and I will not choose which powers they use to
achieve the right effect.
The main aim is to ensure that we say loud and clear that
we do not want money launderers in this country. We do not
want organised criminals. We do not want those who abuse
people through torture and inhumane treatment. We want to
say, “You are not welcome in this country and nor is your
dirty money. If you come to this country, we will try to
have you and we will certainly try to have your money. If
we can return that money back to the regimes it has been
stolen from, we shall do that.” We have already started
that process by returning £27 million to Macau recently and
signing a memorandum of understanding with Nigeria. If we
can do that, we will. Both Government new clause 7 and new
clause 1—there are many things I agree with in the spirit
of new clause 1—say that loud and clear. I think that our
new clause will help to achieve that in relation to the
people who want to exploit laws around the world, whether
through immunities, state sponsorship, state umbrella or
tacit support.
I highlighted to my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and
Walton that annual reporting will cover the use of this
provision. The Government have already agreed, in our
response to the Public Accounts Committee and the Home
Affairs Committee, to publish a set of annual asset
recovery statistics. As I made clear in Committee, it will
cover the annual use of unexplained wealth orders. I am
also pleased to commit today that it will include the use
of this provision.
-
Mr Djanogly
Will it also include the names and titles of people from
whom the assets have been taken?
-
Mr Wallace
I will have to check and get back to my hon. Friend, but
any court action is a matter of public record. If someone
is prosecuted under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 or has
their assets frozen, that will become a matter of public
record available to all—that is very important.
To reiterate the point about sanctions, the Government are
undertaking an assessment of existing sanctions policy
post-Brexit to ensure we can continue our proactive
approach. It is right that any changes to our sanctions
regime are considered in that context, rather than making
changes at this point. We will of course continue a
dialogue with parliamentary colleagues on this work, and I
will absolutely ensure that the spirit of new clause 1,
tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton,
is carried forward in those discussions. The time to do
that, however, is not with this legislation; it is when an
assessment is made post-Brexit to consider sanctions in the
wider picture.
I want to talk about the duty of law enforcement agencies
to use the powers. Part of the rule of law and the strength
of our system, as opposed to perhaps some other regimes we
have talked about today, is that our agencies are
operationally independent. As a Minister, I do not sit
behind a desk and use the agencies to pick on people or
political rivals I do not like. We leave the agencies, as
much as possible, to be operationally independent. That is
a part of the balance and safeguards in our society.
-
But if the prosecuting authorities were, for a corrupt
reason, to choose not to prosecute, there are powers,
through the courts, to ensure that they do so.
2.15 pm
-
Mr Wallace
I am afraid I have too positive a view of the integrity of
our law enforcement agencies to say—or even allude to the
fact—that there could be some corrupt reason they may not
use their powers. We all have constituents who write to us
and say, “I made a complaint to the police and they didn’t
take any action.” Sometimes that is valid and we try to get
a better result for them. Hon. Members who have met Bill
Browder have brought their evidence to this House and made
representations to the National Crime Agency. They
cross-examined a National Crime Agency witness in
Committee. However, we also have constituents who do not
like the outcome of their complaint—that a crime has not
been judged to have been committed. That is a
disappointment they sometimes have to live with and it is
our job as Members of Parliament to tell them, “I’m afraid
it does not constitute a crime.” Sometimes the police have
to make that case. Sometimes constituents may seek to deal
with that by changing the law to create a crime that may be
appropriate or up to date. However, it is important to
respect operational independence, tempting as it may be
sometimes to wish to reprioritise their priorities to suit
the issue of the day.
-
rose—
-
Mr Wallace
I really do have to press on. Hon. Members have made a
considerable number of valid queries and I have a small
book, handed to me from the Box, to get through.
The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Richard Arkless)
raised a number of issues relating to the unlimited nature
of retrospective offences. Torture is an offence where the
UK applies universal jurisdiction. On that basis, the
provisions are retrospective insofar as they relate to
torture, even where it occurs prior to the enactment of the
Bill. However, the Government new clause would cover
conduct constituting cruel, inhumane and degrading
treatment only after the Act comes into force.
We have already taken significant legal steps to suspend
the requirement for dual criminality; that is, providing
for civil recovery to be pursued against property not
necessarily unlawfully obtained in the country in which the
conduct took place. We think this is a suitably
proportionate approach. We have already gone further than
we do in some other areas. We can take action where the
unlawful event took place when it was not in this country.
That is something we have to balance.
The recovery of proceeds of crime is generally subject to a
20-year limitation period under the Limitation Act 1980.
The hon. Members for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) and for
Dumfries and Galloway asked about the timescale for
claiming the proceeds of crime. Under POCA, it starts when
the property is obtained through unlawful conduct. Under
new clause 1 it seems to run from the date of the conduct
itself, so that could possibly mean a shorter timescale
than that under Government new clause 7. I reassure the
hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway that new clause 7
covers conduct linked to torture, such as: assisting it,
directing it, facilitating it or profiting from it even
when that linked conduct is not conducted by a public
official. It therefore goes wider than some have feared.
We must also consider what evidence is needed to allow for
assets to be recovered. Any civil recovery would be subject
to all existing processes and legal safeguards in the
Proceeds of Crime Act. The court would need to be
satisfied, on the balance of probability, that the property
in question was the proceeds of crime or was likely to be
used to fund further criminal activity. Law enforcement
agencies would, as ever, need to consider which of their
powers to utilise on a case-by-case basis. It would also
apply to inherited wealth. That would not be excluded.
Inherited wealth would be covered by the ability to recover
assets, so I hope I can reassure the hon. Member for
Rhondda on that point.
I reiterate to my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and
Walton that the Government agree with the spirit of his new
clause. We want to say loud and clear that organised
criminals, crooks and corrupt individuals are not welcome
in this country, and neither is their money. I was pleased
to contribute to the implementation of the Bribery Act
2010, introduced by the last Labour Government, and its
statutory guidance, under the previous Conservative
Government. That is part of this whole package: the Bill
comes alongside the Bribery Act and some other measures. I
do not want London and the UK to be fuelled by dirty money,
and I do not want people to be profiting from it. One of
the best ways of making London and the UK open for business
is through the rule of law—and, I would say, a competitive
tax base. People should want to come to the UK for those
reasons, not because they can hide or launder their money.
It does not make us a better host for these individuals. I
hope that the new powers in the Bill will help us tackle
the problem, and I am keen to ensure that upon its
enactment we start to deal with these individuals and get
the money back to where it belongs.
There was little in the well-articulated speech of my hon.
Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) that I did
not agree with. He is absolutely right about sending a
message. There are regimes around the world that
deliberately take advantage of Britain’s openness, the
quality of places to live and what we have to offer, and
they need to be sent a message that we are serious and that
they should go elsewhere—although we would like to catch
them first and put them in prison, to be brutally honest.
I think I have clarified the point from the hon. Member for
Rhondda about inherited wealth. On the worries about the
London property market, I must add that it is not just nice
townhouses in Knightsbridge being bought up, but huge
portfolios up and down the country, and it does not just
apply to overseas citizens either. For instance, other
parts of the Bill deal with drug dealers, including those
in my part of the world, in the north-west, the north-east
and Northern Ireland, funnelling money into property.
As part of the Government’s work on the implementation of
the fourth anti-money laundering directive, they have
consulted on whether estate agents should carry out checks
on the buyers of properties as well as the sellers. I was
surprised, as I suspect were colleagues, to find out that
currently they only carry out such checks on sellers. We
intend to publish the response to the consultation
“imminently”—that is what my note says—and I think that we
will all be looking at it carefully.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about freezing orders and
people quickly moving the money. Part 5 of the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002 provides for interim freezing orders,
allowing for the freezing of property while the courts
consider the case. I recognise that the Home Affairs
Committee report on the proceeds of crime and the recovery
of assets pointed out some valid problems in the system,
however, and I have asked that the Department set about
being timely when making cases for the confiscation of
funds and assets so that the gaps do not allow criminals
and bad people to move the money beforehand.
The hon. Member for Rhondda and my right hon. Friend the
Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Sir Eric Pickles), the
anti-corruption tsar, will recognise that within Government
we always have to satisfy the competing concerns of
Departments. They will both know—the hon. Gentleman was a
Foreign Office Minister and my right hon. Friend is a
former Secretary of State for Communities and Local
Government—of the competing interests within Government
when it comes to legislating, and inevitably amendments
have to walk a fine line between several challenging
diplomatic and political issues, but I trust that the House
agrees that the Government have taken a constructive
approach. I have been determined to listen to colleagues
and produce something that sends a strong message while
also providing powers to allow us to act against people who
abuse human rights.
I want to finish by congratulating my hon. Friend the
Member for Esher and Walton on tabling new clause 1. It was
important that we have this debate. He is a formidable
campaigner and has successfully articulated the case and
imbued the Bill with the spirit of his new clause. I hope
that the House will support Government new clause 7.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 7 accordingly read a Second time, and added to
the Bill.
New Clause 8
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs: removal of restrictions
‘(1) The following provisions, which impose restrictions on
the exercise of certain powers conferred on officers of
Revenue and Customs, are amended as follows.
(2) In section 23A of the Criminal Law (Consolidation)
(Scotland) Act 1995 (investigation of offences by Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs), omit the following—
(a) in subsection (2), the words “Subject to subsection (3)
below,” and the words from “other than” to the end of the
subsection;
(b) subsection (3).
(3) In section 307 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act
1995 (interpretation), omit the following—
(a) in subsection (1), in paragraph (ba) of the definition
of “officer of law”, the words “subject to subsection (1A)
below,”;
(b) subsection (1A).
(4) In the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 omit the following—
(a) in section 289 (searches), subsections (5)(ba) and
(5A);
(b) in section 294 (seizure of cash), subsections (2A),
(2B) and (2C);
(c) section 375C (restriction on exercise of certain powers
conferred on officers of Revenue and Customs);
(d) section 408C (restriction on exercise of certain powers
conferred on officers of Revenue and Customs).
(5) In the Finance Act 2007, in section 84 (sections 82 and
83: supplementary), omit subsection (3).”
This new clause, together with amendments 20, 25 and 28,
removes restrictions on the exercise of certain powers by
HMRC officers. The restrictions prevented the powers being
exercised in relation to certain former Inland Revenue
functions.—(Mr Wallace.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
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Mr Wallace
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
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Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 5—Unexplained Wealth Orders: award of costs—
“In Chapter 2 of Part 8 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002,
after section 362H insert—
‘362HB Unexplained Wealth Orders: award of costs
(1) Pursuant to Part 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules (The
Court’s Case Management Powers) the High Court must make a
costs capping order, in respect of—
(a) unexplained wealth orders under section 362A of this
Act;
(b) interim freezing orders under section 262I of this Act.
(2) The High Court shall not have power to make an award
for costs on the indemnity basis against enforcement
authorities who bring an unsuccessful application for—
(a) unexplained wealth orders under section 362A of this
Act;
(b) interim freezing orders under section 262I of this Act.
(3) For the purposes of this section “enforcement agencies”
has the same meaning as in subsection 362A(7).’”
This new clause would prevent the courts from awarding
uncapped costs on the indemnity basis against enforcement
agencies where they have brought unsuccessful applications
for unexplained wealth orders or interim freezing orders.
It seeks to define such civil actions as within
“exceptional circumstances” required for the purposes of
Practice Direction 3F to Part 3 of the Civil Procedure
Rules under which the court has the power to make a cost
capping order.
Amendment 1, page 3, clause 1, leave out line 29.
This amendment would allow unexplained wealth orders to be
issued to politically exposed persons in the United Kingdom
and EEA States.
Government amendments 2 to 19.
Motion to transfer clause 12(3).
Government amendments 20 to 57 and 60 to 72.
-
Mr Wallace
We now come to a group of amendments relating to law
enforcement investigative and recovery powers. It is
primarily composed of Government amendments that I hope the
House will agree are, for the most part, technical and
uncontroversial. I therefore do not intend to linger on
each of them, but I will quickly summarise the key
amendments for the benefit of hon. Members.
New clause 8 and other consequential amendments remove the
restriction on HMRC’s criminal powers being used for former
revenue functions. This ring fence arose following the
merger of Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise and the Inland
Revenue in 2005. In the intervening period, legislative
changes have brought most major taxes within the scope of
HMRC’s criminal justice powers, but there remain some
anomalies. For example, investigators cannot use certain
powers to fight stamp duty tax fraud. Fraud is a crime,
regardless of which function of HMRC it is committed
against, and the amendments will ensure that the necessary
powers are available in all such cases. They do not provide
HMRC with any new criminal justice powers.
Amendments 2 to 15, 70 and 71 relate to the power in clause
9 to allow an extension of the moratorium period in which
law enforcement agencies can investigate a suspicious
activity report before a transaction is allowed to proceed.
These amendments will deliver a number of minor and
technical improvements to this provision: they will allow
an automatic extension to the moratorium period while a
court hearing is awaited to make a decision on an
application; they will help to ensure that a company does
not provide any information to the customer whose
transaction is subject to a suspicious activity report,
other than the fact that an SAR has been made; they will
allow immigration officers to apply for an extension; and
they will allow for an explicit right of appeal in Northern
Ireland.
The majority of the remaining amendments in this
group—amendments 22 to 24, 26, 27, 29 to 38, 46, 47, 49 to
57, 60 to 69 and 72—clarify the operation of the seizure
and forfeiture powers that the Bill adds to the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002 and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001. Many of these changes are extremely technical in
nature, but I will highlight a few of the more significant
ones. They will allow the director general of the National
Crime Agency to designate the level of senior officer that
can authorise the use of certain powers—unlike in the
police, no such designation currently exists in law. They
will ensure that any interest accrued on forfeited funds
while in the agency’s account is returned to the owner of
the funds if that person successfully appeals against the
forfeiture. They provide that, where the NCA has used the
powers, and a court determines compensation should be paid,
the NCA will be responsible for paying that compensation.
They will introduce a duty on the police and others to
consult with the Treasury to ensure that the full range of
terrorist asset-freezing powers are considered before
exercising the related power provided by the Bill. They
will require consultation with the devolved Administrations
before the provisions in clause 12 relating to the seizure
of gaming vouchers and betting slips are commenced. This
will ensure that the provisions are implemented effectively
in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
On the devolved Administrations, we hope the Scottish
Parliament will approve their legislative consent motion on
the Bill shortly. Although the Government assert that none
of the provisions are devolved with respect to Wales, I
note that the Assembly has already provided such a motion.
The Government have had extensive discussions with the
Northern Ireland Executive about the Bill, and plans were
in place for a legislative consent motion to be considered
by the Assembly—law enforcement authorities in Northern
Ireland are keen to ensure they have access to the powers
in the Bill—but the suspension of the Assembly prior to
elections has prevented the motion from being pursued at
this time. These are clearly extremely unusual
circumstances, but the Government remain committed to the
central principles of the Sewel convention. We will
therefore commit not to commence provisions on matters
devolved to Northern Ireland without the appropriate
consents having been obtained. It is our intention to pick
this up with the Executive, following those elections. It
may not be possible to resolve this before the Bill
receives Royal Assent. We are most likely to make further
amendments to the Bill in the House of Lords to put beyond
doubt that all the relevant provisions can be commenced at
separate times for different areas of the United Kingdom.
2.30 pm
-
(Belfast East)
(DUP)
The Minister will be aware that although the aspiration is
to see an early return to the Stormont Executive, the
likelihood of that happening in the immediate future is
somewhat fraught. Given that the Bill will inevitably
conclude before we see the return to the institutions of
Stormont, will he outline what steps will be taken to
regularise issues, once the Assembly has been restored?
-
Mr Wallace
We are in ongoing discussions with the Northern Ireland
Assembly, and we hope that the Northern Ireland Assembly
elections are completed and that Stormont takes up the
reins again, so that devolution returns to Northern
Ireland. That is our starting-point, and it is what we all
wish. There was a good cross-party consensus for these
provisions for Northern Ireland in the Assembly earlier. I
cannot remember the exact date of the election—the hon.
Gentleman might have to remind me. Let us plan for
normality in Northern Ireland and make sure that we get to
a good position.
-
The election is planned for 2 March. I agree with the
aspiration to see a return to Stormont as soon as possible,
but does the Minister believe that there would be some
merit in at least corresponding with the leaders of each
political party to attain affirmation for the measures at
this stage, for fear that we do not see a return in a
reasonable period?
-
Mr Wallace
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and I will certainly
put that suggestion to officials. My view would be that
pre-suspension of the Assembly is the place we are at, and
although there has been a change of a leader, I am not sure
that we have had any signal that it has gone backwards. The
date of 2 March gives me some good hope. I have never known
the other place move at the speed of light, so I hope we
shall have time to make sure that this gets through.
Finally, this group includes two proposals concerning
unexplained wealth orders: new clause 5, in the name of a
number of the officers of the all-party parliamentary
groups on anti-corruption and responsible tax, and
Opposition amendment 1. I will allow hon. Members the
opportunity to speak to those amendments and will respond
to them in my closing remarks.
-
(Swansea East)
(Lab)
We on the Opposition side support the spirit of the Bill
and broadly support this group of amendments. We welcome
new provisions to prosecute those professionals who fail to
prevent tax evasion, as well as welcoming unexplained
wealth orders, under which assets can be seized if owners
are unable to explain how they were funded. We, of course,
support the Government’s effort to tighten up state powers
against white-collar crime, but we have concerns that they
are squandering the opportunity that the Bill provides to
stamp out the everyday corruption of the super-rich who are
getting a free ride at the expense of the wider society,
thereby fuelling inequality.
Another problem is that, amid the Government’s cuts to
public services, the Bill could be very difficult to
enforce. Although I understand the giving of new powers to
HMRC, are the Government not concerned about how HMRC will
carry out its new duties? Given that the coalition
Government decimated HMRC’s budgets by £100 million and
that HMRC is set to lose 137 of its offices by 2027, there
seems little point in creating laws that cannot be
enforced—unless, of course, it is to give the impression
that the Government are doing something. This, I fear, is a
theme that has sadly run through our proceedings on the
Bill so far.
We Opposition Members argue that it is crucial for the
agencies involved in civil recovery powers to have
sufficient resources to do their jobs properly. We
therefore request a distinct and clear annual report that
details the resources allocated to the agencies that are
concerned solely with the task of carrying out these
recovery powers.
In previous stages, the Government objected on the grounds
that the asset recovery incentivisation scheme would allow
frontline agencies to keep 100% of what they recover, but
this argument is seriously flawed. In theory, yes, the
agencies could retain the total value recovered, but as the
Public Accounts Committee made clear in its progress review
of confiscation orders and as the Home Affairs Select
Committee made clear in its review of the Proceeds of Crime
Act 2002, these agencies’ recovery rates have been
typically poor. Consequently, it remains to be seen how
these agencies will improve their rate of recovery to
benefit from the new incentivisation scheme.
Another reason that the Government gave is that anyone who
wanted to find out this information could in theory obtain
it by going to a number of different sources. Yet again,
this is flawed. We previously argued for a detailed
reporting of resources, specifically for these agencies, in
the exercise of the powers laid down in the Bill and the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
The Government have already blocked a number of measures
that Labour has proposed to make this a meaningful and
effective Bill. We proposed a corporate probation order. If
a company was found to have committed a failure to prevent
offence, it would have been subject to an independent
review of its compliance procedures and it would have had
to pay the full costs of such a review. This was coupled
with allowing for the removal of directors from companies
who failed to ensure that proper procedures were in place
to prevent UK and foreign tax evasion offences from taking
place. The Government believed that this was unnecessary
because UK law could already deal with such cases of
negligence. Although there may be a case for some UK law to
be used to a similar effect, it would not be an identical
effect.
While there is an implied threat to the EU that the
Government could change the UK’s economic model into one of
a tax haven, there is a strong case for legislation to
protect both UK citizens and citizens from around the
world. With the potential for a race to the bottom and the
destruction of workers’ rights and the slashing of
corporation tax, it could be argued that a Brexiteer
Government would foster an environment where tax evasion
was implicitly encouraged.
As my colleagues have said, and will no doubt say again,
the Bill must do more to tackle the deeply entrenched and
extraordinarily costly phenomenon of tax avoidance. Tax
avoidance is, in effect, living to the letter of the law,
but not in the spirit of the law. Repeated investigations
of companies that sail close to the wind but know that they
have bought the lawyers and accountants to make their tax
abuse legal is both very frustrating and extremely costly.
As the UK general anti-abuse rules show, there are ways to
minimise the risk of corporate abuse of the tax system, and
these should be absorbed into the Bill.
Spain, Canada and Australia each have a single agency
responsible for supervising and enforcing anti-money
laundering regulations—Britain has 22. Worse still,
according to Transparency International UK, 15 of these 22
supervisors also lobby on behalf of the interests of their
sector, creating clear conflicts of interest and a system
inefficient to its core. The Government raised this problem
in their action plan that preceded the Bill, but they were
not concerned enough to convert this into proposed
legislation. The system needs reform and the Bill needs to
reflect this. Unless the Government accept all these
concerns and indeed all the changes suggested in the
Opposition amendments, the Bill is likely to fail on the
intention to clean up money laundering and tax evasion.
-
(Amber Valley)
(Con)
It is a pleasure to speak to new clause 5, which, as the
Minister said, stands in my name and those of colleagues in
the all-party parliamentary anti-corruption group. The
reason for tabling new clause 5 was to probe the Government
on the issue and make sure that we make full use of the
unexplained wealth orders and the interim freezing orders
that we envisage in passing this Bill. I fear that if we
are not careful, the various authorities that can use the
orders may be a little concerned about the possibility that
the people against whom they want to use them—who, in some
cases, will no doubt be very rich and powerful and will not
take the freezing or restriction of their wealth
lightly—will seek to frustrate the process and oppose the
orders with every means available to them. They might, for
instance, incur huge costs—perhaps well above what could be
considered reasonable in the circumstances—and try to force
them on to the taxpayer at a later date if they succeeded
in resisting the orders.
Although it is absolutely right for people to be able to
recover reasonable costs if the state tries to impose
orders and fails, it would be unreasonable for them to
engage numerous very highly paid barristers and incur costs
that were wholly disproportionate, which the taxpayer would
end up having to pay. The real risk is that bodies trying
to use these powers would be deterred from doing so,
because they would fear that very rich people might take
large chunks of their budgets for a long period while
resisting the orders.
The aim of new clause 5 is to establish whether the
existing powers for the courts to restrict the amount of
costs recovered can be described as applying to efforts to
obtain the orders that are specified in the Bill, so that
it is plain to everyone that the various state authorities,
acting competently and reasonably clearly in trying to use
the orders, cannot be unreasonably opposed and end up with
excessive costs. It would be helpful if the Minister
explained how he thinks the orders would work and what he
thinks about the interaction with the existing capping
rules for the courts.
This is not an entirely theoretical issue. In the past,
very significant costs have been awarded against the
Serious Fraud Office. I am not pretending that the
circumstances were similar to those that we are discussing
in this instance—I think that that may not have been the
finest hour of the Serious Fraud Office—but there is
clearly evidence that the sort of people with whom we are
dealing might try to obtain costs that would have a
deterrent effect on the use of the orders. It would be
useful to hear from the Minister whether he thinks that the
courts can and should use various cost-capping measures to
ensure that we are not unreasonably exposed to very high
costs.
-
I want to talk briefly about what I must admit is probably
my favourite section of the Bill—the part that deals with
unexplained wealth orders. I think it is an excellent
provision, which is likely to drive a Trojan horse right
through the assets of criminals who choose to lodge them in
the United Kingdom.
The hon. Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills) made some
very valid points about new clause 5. Indemnity costs can
be easily translated to mean, in layman’s terms, full
costs. In other words, every single hour and every penny of
the expense on the file can be charged to the losing party,
with no assessment of whether those costs are reasonable.
Given that we are talking about politically exposed people,
potentially in other jurisdictions, we can imagine the
number of officials travelling back and forth on flights.
All that will find its way on to a costs sheet, and all of
it will be recoverable to the payee in indemnity costs. We
could end up with an inequality of arms, not in favour of
the Government but in favour of the respondents, which I
think would be very dangerous.
The threat of indemnity costs acts as a major litigation
risk for the claimants or pursuers, or, in this case, the
applicants. If they know that they are likely to be in for
a bigger bill, they will think twice about making
applications. These are our law enforcement agencies, and I
believe that they should be able to pursue their
applications with determination, without fear or favour,
and without the risk of incurring indemnity costs which
would be deeply disproportionate. That would be very
bizarre and counterproductive.
I thank the hon. Member for Amber Valley for tabling his
probing new clause, and I shall be pleased to hear what the
Government have to say about it. As a boring, pedantic
lawyer, I think it worth mentioning that indemnity costs
are very rare, and arguably arise only in proportionate
circumstances. However, we are talking about politically
exposed people with potentially limitless funds. The better
they can make their case in court, the more likely it is
that they will be awarded indemnity costs if they are
successful, and I think that we should take that risk out
of the equation.
As I have said, the unexplained wealth orders provision is
an excellent feature of the Bill. Let me explain exactly
how the orders would work. The Bill will enable a court in
Scotland—the Court of Session—on application by Scottish
Ministers to make an unexplained wealth order. Such orders
will require individuals or organisations to explain the
origin of their assets if there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that they may have been involved in criminality,
or intend to use that wealth for criminal purposes, and if
the value of the assets exceeds £100,000. During earlier
stages of the Bill, the Minister and I discussed that
threshold, and I should be pleased if he could update me on
his thoughts about it.
-
Mr Wallace
In response to what has been said about the issue, and the
sensible suggestions made by the hon. Gentleman, we are
considering options for potentially lower thresholds, to be
dealt with in the other place. We will of course inform him
when there is agreement across the Government.
2.45 pm
-
That is very co-operative of the Minister, and I greatly
appreciate it. I may not have his confidence in the other
place, but we will wait with bated breath.
Unexplained wealth orders will be available to the courts
when assets appear disproportionate to known legitimate
income. For example, it was reported recently that a taxi
driver owned a £1 million fish tank. That is not to say
that taxi driving is not a potentially lucrative trade, but
the asset could certainly be disproportionate to that
person’s income. Failure to provide a response to an order
and explain the legitimate source of funds would give rise
to a presumption that the property was recoverable, which
would make any subsequent civil recovery action much
easier.
I must say, as a lawyer, that the notion of reversing the
burden of proof does not automatically sit very comfortably
with me, but, as in other areas, I consider it to be
proportionate to the issue at stake. Sound legal principles
such as the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof being on the Crown, should not inadvertently protect
criminals, which I suspect may have been the case thus far.
The key aspect of this provision is that a criminal
conviction will no longer be necessary before law
enforcement can pierce the criminal’s veil that camouflages
his wealth. Getting away with the crime itself will no
longer protect a criminal’s wealth. The Bill will allow
this power to be applied to foreign politicians and
officials or those associated with them, known as
politically exposed people. That will enable the issue to
be tackled substantively and determinedly for the first
time.
I agree with some of what was said by the hon. Member for
Swansea East (Carolyn Harris) about resources. Part of the
reason for introducing provisions for unexplained wealth
orders is the fact that many law enforcement agencies think
that there is a raft of applications, ready to be made
immediately. There are properties and asset groups and
accumulations in this country, and in some cases we do not
know where they come from. If the Act receives Royal
Assent, this power will land on the desks of law
enforcement agencies that potentially have applications
piled up. I think that, in those circumstances, resources
are a very viable concern.
I hope that the Minister will be able to give us some
reassurance, which unfortunately he has not been able to
give thus far during the Bill’s passage, that enough
resources will be allocated to make unexplained wealth
orders work. This is probably the best part of the Bill,
and it needs to work. If it does work, we shall make huge
strides in ensuring that this country cannot be used as a
safe haven for dirty money.
-
Mr Wallace
This has been a short and helpful part of our proceedings
today. I am pleased that Members in all parts of the House
agree in principle with the concept of the unexplained
wealth order. I think that it will be an incredibly useful
tool. The first group of amendments dealt with another tool
that could be used to ask people to explain where their
wealth came from, even without the evidence or the
intelligence that would link them to the offence of gross
human rights abuse that we are seeking to introduce.
The use of unexplained wealth orders to put the onus on
individuals to tell us where they acquired their wealth
will obviously be a strong step towards clearing the United
Kingdom of people who seek to harbour their ill-gotten
gains here, but we should not forget that it will also deal
with criminals in the UK who are “washing” their wealth and
depositing it elsewhere in the community. Such people
sometimes hide in plain sight.
What I am about to say is no different from what I have
said to the National Crime Agency. I would like to see this
provision used sooner rather than later. We in Parliament
always get lobbied for new offences—lots of people come
along and lobby us, and there is always either a Home
Office Bill or a Ministry of Justice Bill going through
this House—and a lesson I have learned in my 12 years in
Parliament is that if offences are not used sooner rather
than later, many of them just sit on shelves. It is
therefore important that the law enforcement agencies hear
Parliament today say, “We are—hopefully—going to give you
these powers; we want them to be used.”
-
Given that we want to start using these orders immediately,
resource is a key issue. It is difficult to put a price on
this, but has any assessment been made within Government of
what this is going to cost in the next two to three months
after Royal Assent, because there are a lot of applications
ready to be made and we need the resources to make them?
-
Mr Wallace
I can reassure the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for
Swansea East (Carolyn Harris) that one part of government
that has not seen a significant reduction in its budgets is
the area of the regional organised crime units, the
national crime agencies and the security and intelligence
agencies, which assist us in tackling organised crime and
money laundering. The National Crime Agency has a capital
budget of £50 million this year, with £427 million of
funding. It is supported in England and Wales by the
regional organised crime units, which have got £519 million
of funding. The figures for the Serious Fraud Office are
£45 million, with £5 million of capital this year, and the
figures for HMRC are £3.8 billion in resource and £242
million in capital. Of course, in terms of crime-fighting,
the question is, “How long is a piece of string?”
-
Dr Huq
I am listening intently to what the Minister is saying, and
I am reminded of an Evening Standard report—from earlier
this year, I think—headed: “Home Office reveals new
Criminal Finances Bill will target just 20 tycoons a year.”
The report says that is based on the Home Office’s own
impact assessment which
“predicts that the power will remain unused in its first
year ‘as part of the learning curve’, and thereafter will
be used in only 20 cases each year.”
That is because of resource implications, which is
precisely the point raised by the hon. Member for Dumfries
and Galloway (Richard Arkless). Does the Minister have any
comment to make on that?
-
Mr Wallace
The impact assessment is not linked to access to funds. The
impact assessment is a judgment as to how it would see
these powers being used. Probably like the hon. Lady, I
would like to see them used an awful lot more, but that is
an impact assessment, and the NCA does not follow the
impact assessment. If the evidence is presented or the
cases are put before it that allow it to do 100, it will do
100. It is not restricted by the impact assessment. I would
therefore not be too distracted by the London Evening
Standard and the impact assessment.
Instead, I would focus on the fact that we have well
resourced our law enforcement agencies to tackle this, and
this Bill will give them the power. They have the political
support of both sides of the House to exercise that power,
so let us see how far we go. However, I would be delighted
to join the hon. Lady in asking, in 12 months’ time or
whenever the Bill goes through, why we have not used them
more; I will be asking the NCA and all the other
organisations to try to make sure they have done so.
The hon. Member for Swansea East made a point about the
asset recovery incentivisation scheme, or ARIS, funding for
the recovery of assets not really being worth the paper it
was printed on—I think that was what she was trying to say,
if she will forgive me for putting words in her mouth.
However, since 2006, under an arrangement under her last
Government, £764 million has gone into funding those law
enforcement agencies, and in the last three years £257
million has gone in. Hopefully, with the new arrangement,
above the baseline of, I think, £146 million—I will correct
that in writing if it is not £146 million—100% will be
kept.
We are also following on from the excellent reports from
the Home Affairs Committee and the Public Accounts
Committee looking into why we have not achieved enough in
terms of confiscation orders and recovery of assets. I have
told officials I am particularly concerned that it was
suggested in one of those reports that the focus seemed to
be on small assets—the collection rate was higher for
smaller amounts of money, but lower among millionaires—and
I have specifically directed officials that we must look at
turning the tables. I want all assets collected that are
subject to confiscation, but those reports are a good
guideline and we did not ignore that specific point. We
will certainly make sure that we build on it and improve on
it, because there is money in it for us all, should we do
it, and I am very keen that we should.
New clause 5, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Amber
Valley (Nigel Mills), seeks to prevent the courts from
awarding uncapped costs against enforcement agencies when
they have brought unsuccessful applications for unexplained
wealth orders or related interim freezing orders. I
appreciate that this is to ensure that law enforcement
agencies do not feel constrained in their ability to apply
for an unexplained wealth order, for fear of incurring
financial liability. But, as law enforcement
representatives told the Public Bill Committee in November,
this is a natural part of the state wielding its
investigative powers, and they are certainly not pressing
for a provision of this type. It is a well-established
principle that the losing party pays the winning party’s
legal costs. This is an important check and balance on
parties bringing spurious claims, or the state using its
powers erroneously.
At the same time, the civil procedure rules do already
allow for capping in exceptional circumstances, so law
enforcement agencies would be able, as things stand, to
apply for a cost-capping order in appropriate cases. I
undertake to ensure that this point is included in the code
of practice that will support the use of these orders. I
trust that Members will agree that this is a far more
sensible way forward than a blanket rule for all
unexplained wealth order cases.
It is crucial that the initial cases are thoroughly
developed to ensure that the orders have the greatest
possible impact. We are already actively engaging with law
enforcement officers and prosecutors to encourage the use
of the new powers being introduced by the Bill. Ultimately,
it will be for the enforcement authorities to decide when
to use them, but we will—as, no doubt, will Her Majesty’s
loyal Opposition—monitor and review the use of the orders
once they have been introduced. This will inform future
support or changes that may be needed to ensure that they
are being used to maximum effect.
The hon. Member for Swansea East explained from the
Opposition Front Bench the objective behind her amendment
1. However, as I explained when this issue arose in
Committee, politically exposed persons in the UK and
European economic area can, in fact, already be made
subject to an unexplained wealth order. These orders can be
made in two situations: first, where an individual is
suspected of involvement in serious crime; and secondly, in
relation to non-EEA politically exposed persons. An
unexplained wealth order can thus be made in relation to
politicians and senior officials in Europe, when they are
suspected of being involved in serious criminality. In such
an investigation, if evidence exists of links to serious
organised crime, it should be available, obtainable and
readily provided, and it would be unreasonable and
disproportionate, for example, for Members of this House to
be made subject to an order without any evidence of
criminality.
However, for investigations into grand corruption involving
countries outside Europe, including the developing world,
that evidence is far less likely to be available. It will
be much harder in some countries where corruption is
endemic to get the evidence to bring to the court at first
about wealth hidden in London. That is why we have chosen
to have a lower threshold for evidence when applied to
countries outside the EEA.
We should not forget that unexplained wealth orders are not
an end in themselves; they are part of a process leading
eventually, should those concerned not be able to give
satisfactory answers, to another action in court to
confiscate the assets. As I said when I met the right hon.
Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) to
discuss this, I do not want unexplained wealth orders also
to produce a lot of derelict empty buildings that are
caught up in legal dispute and sitting around London being
no good for anyone. I want these them to be used and be
placed on people whom we have linked to serious crime, and
then, should they not be able to satisfy the court, for us
then to go to the next step and recover that asset, so that
the houses and the housing market are freed up, and any
money is returned to whoever it has been stolen from—a
country, or other people. An order is therefore a step in
the process, not an end in itself.
I hope that I have sufficiently reassured the House on
these points, and that the Opposition will feel inclined to
withdraw their amendment.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 8 accordingly read a Second time, and added to
the Bill.
New Clause 2
Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal Offence
“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a
person commits an economic criminal offence when acting in
the capacity of a person associated with (B).
(2) For the criminal purposes of this clause—
“economic criminal offence” means any of the offences
listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act
2013.
“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person
associated with B” has the same meaning as in section 39.
(3) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic
criminal offence was committed—
(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was
reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in
place, or
(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to
expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.
(4) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means
procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the
capacity of a person associated with B from committing an
economic criminal offence.
(5) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section
is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,
(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland,
to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.
(6) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section
whether—
(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or
(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant
criminal financial offence takes place in the United
Kingdom or elsewhere.
(7) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of
State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures
that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons
acting in the capacity of an associated person from
committing an economic criminal offence.”—(Sir .)
This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing
to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to the
offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and
Courts Act 2013.
Brought up, and read the First time.
3.00 pm
-
Sir (Harborough)
(Con)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
-
Madam Deputy Speaker (Natascha Engel)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 3—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal
Offence (No. 2)—
“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a
person commits a economic criminal offence when acting in
the capacity of a person associated with (B).
(2) For the purposes of this clause—
“economic criminal offence” means one of the following—
(a) a common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;
(b) an offence under section 1, 5 or 7 of Fraud Act 2006;
(c) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act
1968 (theft, false accounting and destruction of
documents);
(d) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006
(fraudulent trading);
(e) an offence under sections 346, 397 and 398 of the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (providing false
statements to auditors, misleading statements, and
misleading the FCA);
(f) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (concealing criminal property,
facilitating acquisition, acquisition and use of criminal
property).
“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person
associated with B” has the same meaning as in section 39.
(3) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic
criminal offence was committed—
(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was
reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in
place, or
(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to
expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.
(4) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means
procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the
capacity of a person associated with B from committing an
economic criminal offence.
(5) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section
is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,
(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland,
to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.
(6) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section
whether—
(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or
(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant
criminal financial offence takes place in the United
Kingdom or elsewhere.
(7) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of
State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures
that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons
acting in the capacity of an associated person from
committing an economic criminal offence.”
This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing
to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to certain
offences listed in subsection (2).
New clause 4—Failure to prevent criminal financial offences
in the UK—
“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a
person commits a criminal financial offence when acting in
the capacity of a person associated with B.
(2) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the criminal
financial offence was committed—
(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was
reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in
place, or
(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to
expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.
(3) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means
procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the
capacity of a person associated with B from committing
criminal financial offences.
(4) For the purposes of this clause—
“criminal financial offence” means an offence listed in
Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013
[that could not be prosecuted under the offences created by
sections 7 and 38 of this Act],
or, one of the offences listed below—
(a) an offence under section 1, 6 or 7 of the Fraud Act
2006;
(b) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act
1968;
(c) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006;
(d) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
(e) the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;
“relevant body” has the same meaning as in section 36.
(5) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section
is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,
(b) on summary conviction in England, to a fine,
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland,
to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.
(6) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section
whether—
(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or
(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant
criminal financial offence takes place in the United
Kingdom or elsewhere.”
This New Clause would create an offence of failing to
prevent any financial offence listed in Part 2 of Schedule
17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013.
New clause 6—Public registers of beneficial ownership of
companies registered in the Overseas Territories—
“(1) In Part 1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
(introductory), after section 2A, insert—
“2AA Duty of Secretary of State: Public registers of
beneficial ownership of companies registered in Overseas
Territories
(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in
furtherance of the purposes of—
(a) this Act; and
(b) Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017
to take the steps set out in this section.
(2) The first step is, no later than 31 December 2018, to
provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of the
UK’s Overseas Territories to enable each of those
Governments to establish a publicly accessible register of
the beneficial ownership of companies registered in that
Government’s jurisdiction.
(3) The second step is, no later than 31 December 2019, to
prepare an Order in Council and take all reasonable steps
to ensure its implementation, in respect of any Overseas
Territory that has not yet introduced a publicly accessible
register of the beneficial ownership of companies within
their jurisdiction. This Order would require the Overseas
Territory to adopt such a register.
(4) In this section “a publicly accessible register of the
beneficial ownership of companies” means a register which,
in the opinion of the Secretary of State, provides
information broadly equivalent to that available in
accordance with the provisions of Part 21A of the Companies
Act 2006.””
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to
take steps to provide that Overseas Territories establish
publicly accessible registers of the beneficial ownership
of companies, for the purposes of the Proceeds of Crime Act
2002 and Part 3 of the Bill (corporate offences of failure
to prevent facilitation of tax evasion).
New clause 10—Duty to prevent use of new Limited
Partnerships for financial criminal activity—
“(1) The Treasury may not lay regulations before Parliament
on new Limited Partnerships before the Secretary of State
has completed and published a review of the proposed
regulations.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to
review draft regulations which would allow the creations of
new Limited Partnerships, in order to prevent the use of
new Limited Partnerships for financial criminal activity.
(3) In performing that duty the Secretary of State must, in
particular, have regard to the contribution transparency
may make in tackling tax evasion, money laundering,
national and cross border criminality, and terrorist
financing.
(4) Following any review under subsection (2) the Secretary
of State must lay a report before Parliament on what steps
the Government will take to prevent new Limited
Partnerships being used for criminal purposes.
(5) In conducting the review the Secretary of State must
consult—
(a) the Scottish Government,
(b) the National Crime Agency,
(c) the Serious Fraud Office,
(d) the Financial Conduct Authority,
(e) HMRC,
(f) interested third sector organisations, and
(g) any other persons the Secretary of State deems
relevant.”
This new clause sets a duty on the Secretary of State to
review Treasury proposals for new Limited Partnerships to
prevent their use for financial criminal activity,
including tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist
financing. In carrying out the review the Secretary of
State will be required to consult those groups listed in
subsection (5) and lay a report before Parliament.
New clause 11—Failure to prevent facilitation of tax
evasion offences: consultation on other jurisdictions—
“(1) Within 12 months of this Act receiving Royal Assent,
the Secretary of State must conduct a public consultation
on the issues listed in subsection (2).
(2) The issues are—
(a) the desirability of the Crown Dependencies and Overseas
Territories introducing equivalent offences to those
introduced by sections 40 and 41 of this Act; and
(b) the steps that would need to be taken for the Crown
Dependencies and Overseas Territories to introduce
equivalent offences to those introduced by sections 40 and
41 of this Act.
(3) As part of this consultation the Secretary of State
must seek views from—
(a) the governments of the Crown Dependencies and Overseas
Territories,
(b) such bodies as the Secretary of State or the
governments specified in subsection (3)(a) consider
appropriate,
(c) any other person or body who the Secretary of State
deems relevant, with particular regard to non-governmental
bodies and private sector entities.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of
Parliament a report setting out the outcome of this
consultation within 24 months of this Act receiving Royal
Assent.”
New clause 12—Failure to prevent facilitation of tax
evasion offences: publication of convictions—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report
listing all bodies and organisations that have been found
guilty of a failure to prevent facilitation of a UK foreign
tax evasion offence within the previous five years.”
New clause 13—Failure to prevent tax evasion offences:
sentencing guideline—
“(1) The Secretary of State must produce sentencing
guidelines for the level of fine to be imposed on bodies
found guilty of failure to prevent facilitation of a UK
foreign tax evasion offence.
(2) Such guidance must stipulate that the maximum level of
the fine cannot be greater than the total value of the tax
whose evasion was facilitated.”
New clause 14—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal
Offence (No. 3)—
“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a
person commits an economic criminal offence when acting in
the capacity of a person associated with (B).
(2) For the criminal purposes of this clause—
“economic criminal offence” means any of the offences
listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act
2013.
“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person
associated with B” have the same meaning as in section 39.
(3) B is guilty of an offence under this section if a
person associated with B commits an economic criminal
offence intending—
(a) to obtain or retain business for B; or
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of
business for B or otherwise for the financial benefit of B.
(4) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic
criminal offence was committed—
(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was
reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in
place, or
(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to
expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.
(5) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means
procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the
capacity of a person associated with B from committing an
economic criminal offence.
(6) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section
is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,
(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland,
to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.
(7) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section
whether—
(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or
(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant
criminal financial offence takes place in the United
Kingdom or elsewhere.
(8) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of
State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures
that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons
acting in the capacity of an associated person from
committing an economic criminal offence.”
This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing
to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to the
offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and
Courts Act 2013.
New clause 15—Failure to Prevent an Economic Criminal
Offence (No. 4)—
“(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a
person commits an economic criminal offence when acting in
the capacity of a person associated with (B).
(2) For the criminal purposes of this clause—
“economic criminal offence” means one of the following—
(a) a common law offence of conspiracy to defraud;
(b) an offence under section 1, 5 or 7 of Fraud Act 2006;
(c) an offence under section 1, 17 or 20 of the Theft Act
1968 (theft, false accounting and destruction of
documents);
(d) an offence under section 993 of the Companies Act 2006
(fraudulent trading);
(e) an offence under sections 346, 397 and 398 of the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (providing false
statements to auditors, misleading statements, and
misleading the FCA);
(f) an offence under section 327, 328 and 329 of the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (concealing criminal property,
facilitating acquisition, acquisition and use of criminal
property).
“relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person
associated with B” have the same meaning as in section 39.
(3) B is guilty of an offence under this section if a
person associated with B commits an economic criminal
offence intending—
(a) to obtain or retain business for B; or
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of
business for B or otherwise for the financial benefit of B.
(4) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the economic
criminal offence was committed—
(a) B had in place such prevention procedures as it was
reasonable in all the circumstances to expect B to have in
place, or
(b) it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to
expect B to have any prevention procedures in place.
(5) In subsection (2) “prevention procedures” means
procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the
capacity of a person associated with B from committing an
economic criminal offence.
(6) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section
is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine,
(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine,
(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland,
to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.
(7) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section
whether—
(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or
(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant
criminal financial offence takes place in the United
Kingdom or elsewhere.
(8) The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of
State must prepare and publish guidance about procedures
that relevant bodies can put in place to prevent persons
acting in the capacity of an associated person from
committing an economic criminal offence.”
This new clause would create a corporate offence of failing
to prevent economic crime, defined by reference to the
offences listed in Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and
Courts Act 2013.
New clause 16—Conversion of platforms to centralised
registers: review—
“(1) Within one year of this Act receiving Royal Assent the
Secretary of State must establish a review of the
operational efficacy of closed beneficial ownership
platforms created by Crown Dependencies or British Overseas
Territories that are subject to the automatic exchange of
beneficial ownership information with Her Majesty’s
Government for the purpose of combating illicit financial
activity.
(2) The aim of the review will be to gather information to
equip Her Majesty’s Government to take all steps necessary
to provide financial, administrative or any other support
to assist Crown Dependencies and British Overseas
Territories in converting all such beneficial ownership
platforms into closed centralised registers of beneficial
ownership.
(3) In the course of the review the Secretary of State must
consult—
(a) the governments of any Crown Dependencies and Overseas
Territories which have created closed beneficial ownership
platforms and which are subject to the automatic exchange
of information with Her Majesty’s Government for the
purpose of combating illicit financial activity; and
(b) such bodies as the Secretary of State or governments
under subsection (3)(a) deem appropriate.
(4) The review shall be completed and laid before
Parliament within one year of its establishment.
(5) No later than one year after the review has been laid
before Parliament, Her Majesty’s Government must have taken
all steps necessary to assist relevant Crown Dependencies
and British Overseas Territories in the establishment of
closed centralised registers of beneficial ownership.
(6) Her Majesty’s Government shall supply quarterly reports
to Parliament of the progress of steps taken under
subsection (5), and such reports shall set out—
(a) concerns expressed by relevant Crown Dependencies and
British Overseas Territories about conversion of beneficial
ownership platforms to centralised registers, and
(b) an assessment by Her Majesty’s Government of the extent
to which objections to the creation of centralised
registers can be justified on a constitutional, economic,
administrative or any other operational basis.”
New clause 17—Public registers of beneficial ownership of
companies registered in Crown dependencies—
“(1) In Part 1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
(introductory), after section 2A, insert—
“2AA Duty of Secretary of State: Public registers of
beneficial ownership of companies registered in Crown
dependencies
(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in
furtherance of the purposes of—
(a) this Act; and
(b) Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017
to take the actions set out in this section.
(2) The first action is, no later than 31 December 2017, to
provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of
Crown Dependencies to enable each of those Governments to
establish a publicly accessible register of the beneficial
ownership of companies registered in that Government’s
jurisdiction.
(3) The second action is, no later than 31 December 2019,
to publish legislative proposals to require the Government
of any Crown dependency that has not already established a
publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of
companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction to
do so.
(4) In this section—
“a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership
of companies” means a register which, in the opinion of the
Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent
to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part
21A of the Companies Act 2006.
“legislative proposals” means either—
(a) a draft Order in Council; or
(b) a Bill presented to either House of Parliament.”
New clause 18—Whistleblowing in relation to failure to
prevent facilitation of tax evasion and money laundering—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall conduct a review of
arrangements to facilitate whistleblowing in the banking
and financial services sector in relation to the disclosure
of suspected corporate failure to prevent facilitation of
tax evasion and money laundering.
(2) The review must consider, but shall not be limited to—
(a) arrangements to protect the anonymity of persons
disclosing suspected corporate failure to prevent
facilitation of tax evasion and money laundering;
(b) the efficacy of current penalties for institutions that
treat whistleblowers unfairly, and proposals for future
criminal penalties.
(3) In conducting the review the Secretary of State must
consult—
(a) whistleblowers in the banking and financial services
sector,
(b) devolved administrations,
(c) interested charities,
(d) the relevant regulators, and
(e) any other persons the Secretary of State deems
relevant.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay the report to
Parliament within six months of the passing of this Act.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to conduct
a review of arrangements to facilitate whistleblowing in
the banking and financial services sector, in consultation
with those groups listed in subsection (3), and then lay a
report before Parliament on steps the Government will take
to bring forward penalties for institutions that fail to
protect whistleblowers.
New clause 19—The culture of the banking industry and
failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion—
“(1) The Secretary of State must undertake a review into
the extent to which banking culture contributed to the
failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion in the
banking sector.
(2) The review must consider, but shall not be limited to,
the following issues—
(a) the impact of culture change on decision making senior
executive and board level;
(b) the pressure on staff to meet performance targets;
(c) how allegations of tax evasion are reported and acted
on.
(3) The review must set out what steps the UK Government
intends to take to ensure that banking culture is not
facilitating tax evasion.
(4) In carrying out this review, the Secretary of State
must consult—
(a) devolved administrations;
(b) HMRC;
(c) the Serious Fraud Office;
(d) the Financial Conduct Authority;
(e) interested charities, and
(f) anyone else the Secretary of State deems appropriate.
(5) The Secretary of State shall lay a copy of the review
before the House of Commons within six months of this Act
receiving Royal Assent.”
New clause 20—Report on the impact of the criminal offences
relating to offshore income, assets and activities—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall, within one year
of the coming into force of the provisions in Tax
Management Act 1970 relating to criminal offences relating
to offshore income, assets and activities introduced by
section 165 of the Finance Act 2016 publish a report on the
impact of the introduction of these offences.
(2) The report must include, but need not be limited to,
information about—
(a) the number of persons who have been charged with
offences under each of sections 106B, 106C and 106D of the
Tax Management Act 1970;
(b) the number of persons who have been convicted of any
such offence;
(c) the average fine imposed; and
(d) the number of people upon whom a custodial sentence has
been imposed for any such offence.”
New clause 21—Report on income lost to tax evasion—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall, within one year
of the passing of this Act, prepare and publish a report,
in consultation with stakeholders, on the value of income
lost to the Exchequer from tax evasion offences.
(2) The report must include the following—
(a) the value of the income lost to the Exchequer from tax
evasion offences in the financial years—
(i) 2015-16;
(ii) 2014-15;
(iii) 2013-14;
(iv) 2012-13; and
(v) 2011-12;
(b) a detailed summary of the model used by HMRC for
estimating income lost to the Exchequer from tax evasion
offences.
(c) an assessment of the efficacy of HMRC’s performance in
relation to dealing with tax evasion, including—
(i) a breakdown of specific HMRC departments or units
dealing with investigation and enforcement of tax evasion
matters;
(ii) details of the numbers of staff in each of the years
listed in paragraph (a) who are located within departments
or units dealing with investigation and enforcement matters
in relation to tax evasion;
(iii) details of the budgets allocated to departments or
units dealing with investigation above; and
(iv) details of the numbers of prosecutions or the amount
of tax recovered in each financial year listed in paragraph
(a) as a result of the work of HMRC departments or units
dealing with investigation and enforcement matters in
relation to tax evasion in those financial years.”
-
Sir
I shall be relatively brief in introducing this group of
new clauses. In moving new clause 2, which stands in my
name and those of a number of hon. Members on both sides of
the House and which mirrors new clauses 3, 4, 14 and 15, I
want to introduce a debate about the future of corporate
criminal liability in this jurisdiction. I must declare an
interest, as over the past few years I have been instructed
by the Serious Fraud Office in a number of cases involving
the prosecution of large international companies. One of
the problems that prosecutors and, no doubt, investigators
have found in this jurisdiction when dealing with the
modern corporate landscape—to use that hideous
jargon—involves trying to fix liability on a company
suspected of criminal activity, as a matter of criminal
law. It is not difficult to fix criminal liability on an
individual if the evidence is there: the person either did
or did not do it, and they either did or did not have the
necessary criminal intent.
Under current English law, however, fixing criminal
liability on a corporation involves resorting to what is
called the identification principle. This involves finding
someone of sufficient seniority within a corporation who
can act as or be described as the directing mind of the
company. Through that identified person, we can then move
on to fix criminal liability on the corporation. That was
fine in the Victorian era, when most companies had one or
two directors. An example would be a small business in a
market town in the 1860s or 1870s, which would have been
owned and directed by two or three men—it was always men in
those days. If a fraud was committed on behalf of the
company, it would have been perfectly easy to find the
directing mind of that company among the small group of
directors.
As the industrial revolution and corporate legal
development proceeded during the late 19th century and
early 20th century, however, it became clear that companies
were getting bigger. An increase in international trade
meant that companies based in this country had offices, and
directing minds, in other parts of the world. In 1912, the
United States dealt with this by doing away with the
identification principle involving the directing mind and,
through case law, by developing a principle in criminal law
that a company could be vicariously liable for the criminal
acts of its employees on the basis that they were
conducting criminal activities for the benefit and on
behalf of the company.
We in this country reached the stage long ago at which we
needed to reform the way in which we look at corporate
criminal liability. The hon. Member for Dumfries and
Galloway (Richard Arkless), with his Scottish legal
experience, will no doubt inform us whether the situation
is the same in Scotland as it is in England, but I believe
that it is uncontroversial to say that the Victorian
identification principle is no longer apt to deal with
international corporations. I am not picking on the company
that I am about to mention because I think it has committed
a criminal offence; quite the contrary—I just want to use
it as an example of a large international company. British
Telecommunications is a huge company that employs hundreds
of thousands of people all around the globe doing various
things in the telecoms world, all of them entirely
legitimate and beneficial to the company, its shareholders
and our national economy. Surely, however, it is a matter
of common sense to say that it would be extremely difficult
nowadays to fix upon an individual or small group of
individuals as representing the directing mind of that
company if it was suspected that an offence had been
committed many miles away from the main board and the
headquarters of the company in London. I repeat that I have
used British Telecommunications simply as an example of a
large international company with operations right around
the world.
Of course it would be perfectly possible to fix upon an
individual, a human being, who had committed an offence. It
might well be that that individual had committed an offence
for the benefit of the international corporation, but
unless that person was of sufficient seniority within the
hierarchy of that great big international company, it would
be very difficult to fix criminal liability for that
person’s offence on the corporation as well. As I have
said, the United States has been getting round that problem
for more than 100 years by using the principle of vicarious
liability, which we are used to dealing with in this
country in civil law but not in criminal law.
I believe that there are two ways in which we can approach
this question, and this is the whole point of the new
clauses that I and others have tabled. First, we could use
the American system of vicarious liability, and there are
plenty of good arguments for doing so. Secondly, we could
approach the problem—as we have done in the new clauses—by
using the failure to prevent regime, in which, when a
company fails to prevent someone or another body associated
with it from committing a specified offence, it thereby
becomes liable for the criminal offence itself. We already
have that provision on the statute book in section 7 of the
Bribery Act 2010, and it is about to be added to the
statute book through the existing provisions in this Bill
relating to tax offences. That follows ’s speech to the
corruption summit at Lancaster House last summer.
In pushing forward these new clauses, I want to invite
Parliament, in this House and the other place, and the
Government—by which I mean not only the political
Government but the non-political Government: the officials
who run the Government day by day and advise on matters of
policy—to consider whether extending the failure to prevent
regime would be an easier and better way to deal with this
than turning the whole thing on its head by adopting the
vicarious liability principle wholesale.
There are plenty of arguments for and against the extension
of the section 7 failure to prevent bribery model. I have
attended a number of meetings with criminal lawyers who are
far more experienced than I am. Indeed, I see one sitting
just two Benches in front of me, behind the Minister. My
hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria
Atkins) will know, as I have come to learn over the past
few years since I have taken an interest in corporate
crime, that a number of difficulties are created by the
failure to prevent model. I will not rehearse them all now,
but some of those difficulties were set out on Friday 13
January 2017 in the Ministry of Justice’s “Call for
evidence” paper, which sets out five options for a failure
to prevent regime.
I favour the failure to prevent model over the vicarious
liability model because it is already set within our
system. The new clauses would not extend the principle but
merely extend the ambit of the criminal offences that could
come within a failure to prevent system. The provisions
will not be brought into this Bill because it is highly
unlikely that the Government would accept any of
them—albeit they may nod politely at them—when the Ministry
of Justice’s call for evidence process is still open.
However, I hope that the Government will look carefully at
the shape and design of the new clauses with a view to
considering vigorously whether what we have proposed as a
matter of principle is worthy of greater thought.
The intention of new clause 2 is to create a corporate
offence of failing to prevent economic crime, as defined by
reference to the offences listed in part 2 of schedule 17
to the Crime and Courts Act 2013. Again, I will do my best
to be brief. That schedule brought in the deferred
prosecution agreement system for dealing with errant
companies. I declare an interest, with both capital and
small letters, in that not only have I been instructed by
the SFO in two of the three deferred prosecution agreements
that have so far taken place, but I brought the system into
law when I was Solicitor General—at least I began it before
I got the sack. There is a cloud in every silver lining, is
there not?
-
Sir (North West
Norfolk) (Con)
Very few in this case.
-
Sir
Very few. I am diverting myself, because I deliberately
said “a cloud in every silver lining” not “a silver lining
in every cloud.”
The short point is that schedule 17 to the 2013 Act
contains about 50 economic and financial criminal offences
that can be dealt with through deferred prosecution
agreements between either the Crown Prosecution Service or
the SFO on the one hand and corporations—that is to say
respondents and defendants that are not human beings—on the
other. Those offences are perfectly capable of being moved
across into the failure to prevent regime. As I said,
section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 makes it an offence to
fail to prevent bribery, and we are about to have an
offence of failing to prevent a tax offence, so why not—I
ask rhetorically on this occasion—extend the failure to
prevent regime across to these other offences? New clause 3
does exactly the same, save that it limits the offences to
those set out in its subsection (2).
New clauses 4, 14 and 15 contain provisions suggested by
the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North (Catherine
McKinnell) that broadly address the same issue that I am
discussing. I will not press new clause 2 to a Division,
because these are probing amendments designed to create a
public discussion, and I hope that they will inform the
Ministry of Justice’s discussion paper. I also hope that
they will encourage the Home Office and the Minister, with
whom I have had some useful discussions about this and
other matters to do with the Bill, to consider carefully
and positively the extension of the failure to prevent
regime.
3.15 pm
The wheels of Whitehall move extremely slowly. Everyone has to be
consulted nowadays and nobody is allowed to have an idea of their
own without it being beaten up and pushed through the roller by
every other Department that thinks it has an interest or half an
interest in what somebody else wants to do. People should try to
produce a piece of legislation as a Law Officer. Law Officers are
not supposed to have any policies; they are simply supposed to
sit in a cupboard, the door of which is occasionally opened to
get an answer and then shut again with them inside. Fortunately,
however, I was able to bring forward deferred prosecution
agreements. I hope, as a very much ex-Law Officer, that I will
encourage the Government to take a positive view of the
principles behind the new clauses, not only because I want that
but because they represent an efficient and effective way of
assisting the SFO, which is one of the most valuable and
effective prosecution agencies in the western world, to do its
job of ensuring that both bad people and bad companies are
brought to justice. I hope to hear positive things from my hon.
Friend the Minister, from whom I have never heard anything else.
-
(Kirkcaldy and
Cowdenbeath) (SNP)
I start by thanking the Security Minister and the
Government for responding to the campaign on Scottish
limited partnerships in which I have been involved for
about a year. We are all grateful that the Government
recently announced that they will conduct a review, which
means that the amendment that I have regularly been tabling
to Bills over the past year is no longer necessary.
However, I have found myself having to table a different
new clause; I will explain why and why it troubles me
greatly that I am forced to do so.
For Members who are unfamiliar with why my colleagues and I
have been so concerned about these things called Scottish
limited partnerships, let me point out that they do
remarkable reputational damage to Scotland and probably to
the UK’s financial sector. They are a front for some of the
worst international crime, money laundering and hiding of
criminal assets to be found. Without going into great
detail of how they manage to do that, it might interest the
House to know just a few of the types of crime for which
they have been used.
SLPs have been at the centre of Ukrainian arms deals,
kick-backs and a major Moldovan banking fraud. They have
been at the heart of a major corruption scandal in Latvia
involving the nephew of Uzbekistan’s President Islam
Karimov. They have been used to run international mail
frauds, including that of a French psychic who has been
targeting vulnerable elderly people with offers of
spiritual insights for significant amounts of cash. They
are involved in a $1 billion copyright infringement case
that is taking place in the United States. They have been
involved in criminal activity such as setting up paedophile
websites and raising money through such horrible
activities. The list goes on and on. SLPs, and other
limited partnerships to some extent, have been utilised as
a way of hiding billions of pounds of criminal money. Often
that money does not necessarily come here, as we find it in
tax havens. The legitimation of a UK or Scottish limited
partnership is used as a means of hiding the beneficiaries
of such criminal activity.
For those reasons, I am particularly grateful that the
Minister has been willing to speak seriously about this. He
has done more than any other Minister to move the
Government to respond to some of our concerns, so why did I
table new clause 10? I did so because SLPs and limited
partnerships are based on a 1907 Act, of which probably few
people are aware, that amended the Partnership Act 1890, of
which even fewer people are aware. By some chance, I sit on
the Regulatory Reform Committee, which is so popular that
in December it held its second meeting since I joined it in
January 2016. Why did we have our second meeting in
December? Because we were told that the Treasury was
introducing a legislative reform order. And what was that
legislative reform order for? At the same time as the
Government announced a much-welcomed review of limited
partnerships, the Treasury sought to create a new form of
limited partnership—private fund limited partnerships —not
on the Floor of the House, but through a device that is
supposed to be used only for non-controversial matters of
legislative reform. I can hardly think of anything more
controversial than a mechanism that has been used for
international criminal assets and money laundering, but I
have even greater concerns.
I will have to leave the debate in about an hour to attend
a meeting of the Regulatory Reform Committee to take
evidence on the Treasury’s proposals—[Interruption.] I hear
Members suggesting they are jealous, but I am sure that
they are not. Under the proposals, there are four areas
with which even SLPs have to comply that these new private
fund limited partnerships will not. For example, the
jurisdiction in which the general partners are registered
no longer needs to be divulged. The registration numbers of
the general partners no longer need to be divulged. The
jurisdiction in which the limited partners are registered
no longer needs to be divulged, and the registration
numbers of the limited partners, if they are corporations,
no longer need to be divulged.
Not only are we creating a new form of limited partnership,
but we are doing so with considerably less regulation than
is in place for existing limited partnerships that have
been a front for international criminality. As I have such
great faith in the Minister for Security, our new clause
would require the Home Office to conduct a review before
the Treasury introduces any legislation to create a new
form of limited partnership so that we can ensure that
those limited partnerships will not be subject to the type
of criminal abuse and illegality that we have found with
Scottish limited partnerships.
There is also a broader question to be answered. Why are
this Government using a device such as a legislative reform
order to try to quickly establish something in such a
controversial area? Surely this is something that should be
fully and properly debated on the Floor of the House. That
is why, when I go to the Committee shortly, I will
certainly not be agreeing that the proposal makes progress.
I will do my best to require that this matter is brought
back to the Floor of the House so that it can receive
proper and urgent scrutiny. In the light of my arguments, I
commend new clause 10 to the House.
-
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate. I rise to address
the new clauses that my right hon. and learned Friend the
Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) spoke about and
new clause 6. I will begin by speaking to the new clauses
tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend and the measures
tabled by the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North
(Catherine McKinnell), who co-chairs the all-party group on
anti-corruption, on the failure to prevent economic crime.
The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Roger
Mullin) knows far more about such things than I do, and he
made his argument well, but I reinforce the point that
there is a strong feeling among the public, because if
large companies are seen to be part of some very serious
criminal activity, people are confused about why those
companies and the senior people within them have not been
prosecuted for those serious offences. If people look
across the Atlantic, they see that America does manage to
prosecute senior bankers for such offences, so they think,
“We see all our banks being fined in America for being
guilty of rigging various markets, yet why are no senior
directors of those companies being prosecuted here? Why are
those banks not being prosecuted?” That exposes the fact
that our law, as the hon. Gentleman explained, has become
out of date. It seems horribly unfair that the Serious
Fraud Office finds it comparatively easy to prosecute very
small companies and their directors, when it is clear who
the controlling minds are, but that when we see far more
serious offences being committed by, on behalf of, or for
the benefit of much larger companies, we cannot quite find
enough evidence to prosecute those companies or their very
senior directors.
-
(Cities of London and
Westminster) (Con)
In the US context, does my hon. Friend accept that there is
often a political element there, despite the division of
power? The prosecutor is often looking to make a name for
himself by taking on a big bank—often, it has to be said, a
big non-US bank. It is a particular concern—not just in the
banking world but beyond—that overseas companies tend to be
fair game as far as prosecutions are concerned. There is
actually a rather different regime there, and it might not
necessarily point to a desire and a need for a change in UK
law.
-
I agree with my right hon. Friend’s point. It is
interesting that the United States seems to favour
prosecuting large banks and large companies that are
internationally owned rather than US-owned. I am sure that
the Foreign Office is trying to work out whether that is an
unfair, anti-competitive move by the US. He is right that
we should not try to read too much across from the US
system into ours, but I was trying to make the point that
people are confused about why people are prosecuted in the
US but not over here.
That takes me back to the point that it seems unfair that
while we can prosecute directors of small businesses, we
cannot prosecute when we see much more serious offences in
large businesses. That is why I support extending the model
of the failure to prevent that we already have in place for
bribery and that we are adding for tax evasion. We are
talking about other very serious economic crimes, and it is
hard to make a distinction as to why we would rank some of
these offences as less important or serious such that we do
not take the power to prosecute so that we prevent serious
fraud, for instance.
I welcome the Government’s consultation on those issues,
and it is right that it would be somewhat premature to
legislate before we get the outcome of the consultation, as
that might make a mockery of the idea of consulting. It is
a real pity that although this Bill is the ideal vehicle in
which to act, we cannot, because of the timing, make the
change that want. We will be relying on another relevant
Bill being introduced later in this Parliament so that we
can finally make the change. As my right hon. and learned
Friend the Member for Harborough said, it would be helpful
if the Minister would make some encouraging noises about
how seriously the Government take such matters and when we
might expect to see some progress following the
consultation, if the Government were minded to proceed with
legislation.
I will take a bit of a leap from that topic to the subject
of new clause 6—our grouping is interesting. For quite a
long while, I thought that I was supporting Government
policy by encouraging our overseas territories and Crown
dependencies to adopt the same transparency regarding
beneficial ownership that we are putting in place for the
UK through the Bill. The previous Prime Minister was
absolutely right to make efforts to get those territories
and dependencies to agree to having transparent registers.
I think that we all welcome the fact that the territories
have moved a fair way in agreeing to have registers and
reliable information on the beneficial owners of companies
operating there. We all congratulate them on that, and look
forward to that being in place; we all recognise that it
will be a great step forward for various law enforcement
authorities to be able to get that information relatively
speedily to help prosecutions here. However, that does not
go far enough, and we recognise that by saying in new
clause 6 that we want a transparent register.
3.30 pm
In our debate on the first group of amendments, the Minister
strongly made the case that what attracted businesses to the UK
was the rule of law and our favourable tax regime. I suspect that
those are the main advantages that all our overseas territories
have—people go there and establish various companies, trusts and
so on because they recognise that they have a strong rule of law,
which is based on our rule of law, and can get the favourable tax
treatment that they want. What we are trying to say in new clause
6 is that those territories can rightly market themselves as
advantageous places from which to do business, because they have
a stable rule of law and the right tax treatment, but that we do
not want them to market themselves as, or to be used as, ways of
hiding dirty money and being a way around the rules that we are
putting in place, and that other countries around the world have.
We want those territories to have the same transparency as us.
When they lobby us and say, “We don’t need to do that, and if we
did it before Delaware, Panama or wherever, it would move all
these people elsewhere and that would make our business model
inviable,” they always seem to add, “We don’t want dirty, corrupt
or criminal money in our territory. We take action if we spot
that.” I can never quite get the reason why they are so opposed
to having a transparent register. If people are not operating in
those territories but using entities in them, why are the
territories so concerned about having a transparent register that
would show that and allow us all to see it? It just leaves a
suspicion that they might be getting a bit of money coming
through that perhaps ought not to be going there. It would be
greatly to the advantage of the reputation of those territories,
and that of the UK as a whole, if this transparency were in
place. That is why I support the efforts of the right hon. Member
for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) to draft the new clause and get
it in order.
It clearly would not be right for this House to legislate for all
those territories—those days passed a few decades ago—but it is
clearly right for us to send out a strong message that although
there are many advantages to being one of our Crown dependencies
or overseas territories, those advantages come with obligations,
one of which is that we want those places to be beacons of the
right way of doing business and investing, and of attracting the
right kind of money. We are saying, “Over the next couple of
years, we want you to get these transparent registers. We don’t
want to destroy your business model or national income, but we
want it to be clear that you are taking clean, legitimate money.
There is no reason for those who are operating like that to want
to hide.” If any of the territories are acting as a conduit to
get money into the UK, we will know who the beneficial owner is,
because that will be published here, so one of the main
advantages that they have is probably no argument against the new
clause.
I feel strongly about this because we are affected when there are
stories about money being hidden in these territories. I was in
Tajikistan on a parliamentary visit, where a very effective toll
road has been built between the two main cities. The only problem
is that the revenue from the tolls end up in a British Virgin
Islands company. Nobody quite knows who owns it, but let us just
say that it is owned in such a way that it is unlikely that the
Tajik authorities will be scrutinising it too hard. People say,
“It’s you; the UK is allowing our toll money, which we pay, to be
stolen and siphoned off to one of these strange territories.”
That may or may not be true.
-
My hon. Friend makes a strong and powerful case, but does
he not recognise the distinction between privacy and
secrecy? No one wants an entirely secret element, but most
people who indulge in banking, whether in an overseas
territory or anywhere else, expect a certain amount of
privacy. There is no question but that we would expect law
enforcement, the police and the tax authorities to have
access to these registers. My hon. Friend has been fair in
making the point that ultimately a lot of these issues
should be constitutional questions for the territories;
these measures should not be imposed on them by the UK. On
the notion that anyone should have access to that
information beyond the authorities I mentioned, as they
would in his Tajikistan example, surely he can understand
the reluctance for that to happen, particularly in the
globalised financial world in which we live, and
particularly if the same does not apply elsewhere.
-
I accept that we hear the privacy argument a lot—I am sure
that it is made in the UK context as well—but we have taken
the decision to have transparent registers so that we know
who the ultimate beneficial owners of these entities are.
If I think through the scenarios in which people would have
a right to privacy, I can perhaps see that there might be a
good reason not to publish if there is a real issue of
individual safety, but I struggle to find many other
situations for which there is a good argument for people
being able to establish entities or other bodies in the
overseas territories without being clear about who the
ultimate owner is. If someone owns a company here or is a
shareholder, that has to be public. That transparency
exists for any kind of entity here, so I am not sure why a
different argument ought to apply for our dependencies. In
weighing the right to privacy against the right to ensure
that we are not letting dirty, corrupt, criminal money into
the system, we have to err on the latter side of the
equation.
-
Mr Wallace
My hon. Friend gave the example of a toll road in
Tajikistan. Because of where we are now, with a commitment
to central registers and automatic access for our law
enforcement agencies to those registers in countries such
as the BVI, we could investigate his example and those
responsible could be tracked down. Because it is an offence
under the Bill to encourage tax evasion, even in another
country—I guess the people who siphon off the toll money
are not paying taxes in Tajikistan—we could take action if
the BVI bank had a British nexus. We have now gone a long
way towards tackling that type of crime because of this
Bill and where we have got to since ’s summit.
-
I am grateful to the Minister for making those points, but
we should be careful that we do not focus only on one
example. There might be good commercial reasons in that
case and it might just be a rumour from that country. I was
highlighting the question of whether there are sufficient
resources in the various law enforcement bodies, either
here or elsewhere, to pursue inquiries through the
labyrinth of corporate structures that tend to be involved
when it comes to the most complex money-laundering or
corruption situations.
The advantage of transparency, and one reason why we have
chosen to have it here, is that it puts the information
into the public domain so that various NGOs or other bodies
can do some of the initial investigation, piece together
the corporate chains and links, break the corporate veils,
and thereby work out where this money is coming from and
where it has got to. I am a little sceptical that our law
enforcement bodies will ever have the resources to start
that process in the vast majority of cases. If we can get
the information into the public domain and give people the
chance to trace it all the way through and find the
answers, that new information can be used by the law
enforcement bodies. That is what we are trying to achieve,
because enabling transparency will make it much harder to
hide the money through a complex structure going through
multiple territories and however many different trusts and
entities.
It is entirely right and welcome that law enforcement
bodies will have timely access to information, but that
will not be enough to enable the full tackling of this
scourge that we would like to see. That is why I support
the effort that has been made with new clause 6 to find a
way to send a very strong signal to our territories that we
want transparent registers. That is the right thing to do
and it is the right direction of travel for the regimes in
question. We want our territories to take the lead, rather
than waiting for everybody else to do something first. Let
us set an example and move first, and not wait for the
herd.
-
(Don Valley)
(Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Amber Valley
(Nigel Mills). I almost feel like not making a speech and
sitting down now—but I will not—because he made such
excellent points about why public registers of beneficial
ownership in our overseas territories are so important. I
look forward to working with him on this issue and on
public country-by-country reporting, as well as with the
many other colleagues from both sides of the House and from
eight political parties who support new clause 6. Despite
some Government pressure, several Conservative MPs support
the new clause, including the former International
Development Secretary, the right hon. Member for Sutton
Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), who I understand hopes to catch
your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker. I also pay tribute to my
right hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret
Hodge) for her hard work on this important amendment. I am
really sorry—and she is too—that she cannot be here today
to speak in this debate. I hope that, on this occasion,
Members will not mind me dubbing new clause 6 “the Hodge
amendment”.
I welcome the Government’s Criminal Finances Bill. Its aims
of tackling corruption, tax evasion and terrorist financing
are really important and should be commended. However, the
absence of any mention of the overseas territories is
remarkable. As Christian Aid has said, the No. 1 thing that
the Government can do to tackle corruption, money
laundering, and tax evasion is to ensure transparency in
their overseas territories. Unfortunately, the secrecy that
those territories trade in facilitates the corruption and
the aggressive tax avoidance and tax evasion that we are
all trying to stamp out.
The amendment is supported by the all-party groups on
responsible tax and on anti-corruption, Christian Aid,
Global Witness, Transparency International, Action Aid,
Publish What You Pay, Save the Children, Oxfam and many
others. We all know from numerous polls that this matter is
something that the British public really care about. Two
thirds of them want the Government to insist on public
registers of beneficial ownership in the overseas
territories.
As the hon. Member for Amber Valley mentioned, we have,
with this amendment, responded to concerns raised earlier
at different points of debate on this Bill. We are focusing
purely on the overseas territories where the constitutional
issues are more clear cut. We recognise that the overseas
territories are taking steps towards private registers of
beneficial ownership, so we have allowed a generous
timeline for them to move from that to make these registers
publicly accessible.
The overseas territories need to have these private
registers in place by June of this year. This amendment
would give them another two and a half years after that,
which is within the lifetime of this Parliament, simply to
make those private registers public. Such a move would be a
major step forward.
New clause 6 is important not only for us in the UK, but
for developing countries, which is why so many NGOs are
supporting it. According to the UN Conference on Trade and
Development, developing countries lose at least $100
billion every year as a result of tax havens. Around 8% to
15% of the world’s wealth is being held offshore in low tax
jurisdictions, many of which come under our jurisdiction. A
World Bank review of 213 big corruption cases found that
more than 70% of them relied on secret company ownership.
Company service providers registered in UK territories were
second on the list in providing these companies. Oxfam has
said recently that around one third of rich Africans’
wealth is currently sitting in offshore tax havens. If all
that wealth was held in Africa and taxed properly, we would
be able to pay for enough teachers to educate every child
in Africa.
It damages our reputation, as the hon. Member for Amber
Valley said, that the British Virgin Islands was the most
mentioned tax haven in the Panama papers. We know that
future leaks are coming, so why cannot we get ahead of the
game and ensure transparency now?
In a recent debate on the Commonwealth Development
Corporation Bill, the Minister of State, Department for
International Development, the hon. Member for Penrith and
The Border (Rory Stewart), said that the CDC would never
invest through Anguilla or the British Virgin Islands. If a
DFID Minister and the CDC can say that, what does it say
about our responsibility today to change that
reputation—British Ministers are clearly considering
this—and do something to help those territories become more
transparent?
-
(Cardiff South and
Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)
My right hon. Friend is making an incredibly strong point.
I, too, was pleased to add my name to new clause 6—I am
sorry that I have not been able to join her for much of
this debate. Does she agree that this is all about the
consistency of approach? We talk about trying to reduce the
need for aid in certain countries, and a key way in which
to do that is to ensure that countries can generate their
own revenues by having tax paid properly in their own
jurisdictions?
-
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend and I thank him for
his support and for putting his name to new clause 6. Aid
is important, but more important is the question of how to
create self-sufficiency so that more countries that are
recipients of aid can stand on their own two feet.
Transparency regarding overseas territories and our own
system is an important part of that, as is good governance
in the countries in question. Unfortunately, some countries
to which we supply aid could do a hell of a lot more to
help their own citizens. This is an area where we can have
a direct impact and start making significant changes right
now.
3.45 pm
Sadly, we have seen a somewhat disappointing climb-down from
Ministers in recent weeks. The Government’s new line is that as
public registers emerge as the global standard, they would expect
the overseas territories to follow suit. I applaud the fact that
the UK Government have made considerable progress on this agenda
but although the UK is 15th on the financial secrecy index, when
combined with our overseas territories and Crown dependencies, we
are at the top of the list. We cannot hide from that. Other
countries probably use that fact as an excuse for not adopting
public registers. We should be aware that we are bound to the
overseas territories and Crown dependencies in such a way that
other countries in which we want to see progress can use it as an
excuse not to take steps forward on this important matter.
deserves praise—I do not
often say that—for his leadership at the 2013 G8 summit, yet we
cannot claim global leadership in this area until we get our own
house in order. Why is it so important that the registers are
publicly available? First, that is the only way in which people
in developing countries can access the information properly.
Secondly, beyond the law enforcement agencies, which will have
access as a result of progress that has been made, public
registers will allow NGOs and civil society to interrogate the
data as they have with the Panama papers. Transparency is far
more efficient than endless systems of information exchange
between Governments.
-
Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is a conflict
here? On the one hand, different Labour and Conservative
Governments have been very sensible in supporting tax
systems and tax authorities in many developing countries.
However, if transparency of information—on companies, how
they are incorporated and so on—is not available, even if
we are giving them support, they cannot get to the bottom
of where their taxes are actually going.
-
If we do not have the tools to make the difference, we are
not going to see the change that I think everyone across
the House wants to see. Without full access to transparent
information, investigators will not know what information
to request through these agreements, and that is
fundamental. That is why public access to the data is
important and why was exactly right to
demand it.
When the Minister responds, I expect him to say that the
overseas territories are making real progress on this
agenda and that including them in the legislation is not
necessary. Let us be clear about the progress that has been
made since the former Prime Minister first asked the
overseas territories to consider public registers of
beneficial ownership back in October 2013. More than three
years on, just one overseas territory, Montserrat, has
committed to a public register. Hooray for Montserrat! The
rest have delayed at every step. Is the Minister satisfied
with that outcome, and how does he account for why progress
has been so slow?
In April 2014, the then Prime Minister wrote to overseas
territory leaders, asking them to consult on public
registers. Not all of them even did that. In July 2015, the
current Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the right hon.
Member for South West Hertfordshire (Mr Gauke) asked those
overseas territories with financial centres to develop
plans for central registers by November 2015. That deadline
was not hit. Press reports last year said that the overseas
territories were ignoring Foreign Office Ministers’ letters
and meeting requests. At the most recent meeting with
overseas territories’ leaders in November 2016, public
registers of beneficial ownership were not even mentioned
in the final communiqué. That raises the question whether
we would have made as much progress as we have if the
Panama papers had not been released.
-
Mr Wallace
The right hon. Lady is not being very charitable. Actually,
we have achieved an awful lot since ’s summit. While the
registers are not public, we will this year achieve a
central register of beneficial ownership in all the
overseas territories and Crown dependencies, and where they
have needed help in getting there, we have given them help.
The hon. Lady said that the issue of the public register
had not even been raised. I can tell her that I had a
meeting with the overseas territories and Crown
dependencies two weeks ago, and I raised it then.
-
I thank the Minister for that information, because I did go
and read the final communiqué from the meeting in 2016, and
while there was some mention of beneficial ownership and
private registers, nothing in the communiqué mentioned any
journey from private to public registers—the point I made a
little earlier. I do welcome the progress that has been
made, but, as I will go on to suggest, unless we link the
efforts being made on private registers to the endgame of
public registers, I fear that we will still have some of
the problems that so many people on both sides of the House
and outside it have been worried about for some years.
-
(Foyle) (SDLP)
The Minister has just told us that he did raise the issue
of making the register of ownership public. If he was
prepared to raise that issue two weeks ago, and if he is
prepared to adopt that role of encouragement, would it not
be better for him if he was supported in future by this
Parliament through the very new clause we are debating?
-
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. Part of
having this debate, and part of looking at ways to rephrase
the original amendment, is about strengthening the arm of
Ministers to say, “Look, we welcome the efforts on central
registers, private registers and the automatic exchange of
information, but we are on a journey. This is not the
endgame; this is part of a journey to where we want to get
to.” It would be helpful to hear from the Minister what the
reaction was to the discussion of public registers at the
meeting he mentioned.
The issue of central registers is important because, while
there may be private registers, information may be held in
different places. Private central registers are important
because it helps to make things clearer, even in the
private situation, if those who ask for information are
able to get it. Also, if we do not have central registers,
it will be even harder to make that journey to public
registers if we want to do that in the future.
So how many of our overseas territories will provide
central registers? Will the British Virgin Islands register
be central? Not all of the overseas territories have
indicated that this is the route they want to go down. That
is why Ministers should be talking to them now about the
journey to public registers. This is about the journey we
are on. The way the private registers are put together, how
they are held and how easy it is to access them for those
who are going to have to ask for access are all pertinent
to a future where public registers are available.
When the Minister responds to the new clause, I expect him
to say how complicated this all is constitutionally. None
of us who has signed the new clause wants the Orders in
Council to be used. They are there as a backstop if the
Government are unsuccessful in persuading the overseas
territories to publish their registers. As I have said
before, the new clause gives the overseas territories until
the end of 2019 to act on their own.
However, the fact is that we cannot remove the possibility
of using Orders in Council if we want to see more progress
on the transparency agenda. The constitutional position on
the overseas territories is very clear. A 2012 Government
White Paper said:
“As a matter of constitutional law the UK Parliament has
unlimited power to legislate for the Territories.”
There are multiple examples of the UK legislating for its
overseas territories. In 2009, the UK imposed direct rule
in the Turks and Caicos Islands, following allegations of
corruption. In 2000, the UK Government decriminalised
homosexual acts in the overseas territories using Orders in
Council. In 1991, the UK Government, by Order in Council,
abolished capital punishment for the crime of murder in
Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands,
Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. The exception
was Bermuda, which is generally considered the most
autonomous overseas territory, but the UK Government
threatened to impose change, which had the desired effect
of ensuring changes in domestic legislation.
On Second Reading and in Committee, the Minister was very
clear that he wanted to see public registers in the
overseas territories and was working to get them, so why
has he scaled back on his ambitions in recent weeks?
Undoubtedly, the UK Government need to work closely with
our overseas territories to help them to diversify their
economies away from a unique selling point of secrecy, and
that will require a great deal of support.
As we look ahead to a global, post-Brexit Britain, let us
seek to lead the world rather than just follow. Let us
ensure that transparency is increased. Let us ensure a fair
playing field for businesses and individuals across the
world. Let us ensure that tax cheats, corrupt individuals,
terrorists and organised criminals have nowhere to hide.
For the benefit of UK taxpayers, for people in the
developing world, and for the UK’s reputation and that of
our overseas territories, let us not miss this opportunity.
For all these reasons, I urge the House to support new
clause 6.
-
Mr Mitchell
New clause 6 is an important probing amendment. I very much
look forward to hearing what the Minister says before I
decide whether to vote for it. One of the most important
aspects of the Bill is tackling corruption and standing up
for openness and transparency. The Government deserve
enormous praise for the work that they have done—landmark
work, really—not only here but in the G20, in trying to
tackle corruption. That is what this new clause is about.
Conservative Members join the right hon. Member for Don
Valley (Caroline Flint), who spoke to the new clause very
eloquently, in saying how much we regret that the right
hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) cannot be
here today. Given the reason for that, I hope that she will
send the right hon. Lady the House’s best wishes. I should
correct her on one point. She said that Back Benchers
signing this new clause might have been leant on by the
Government or were signing it in spite of being leant on. I
am happy to confirm to the House that no one has tried to
lean on me in this respect.
I think that the Minister will have to do a little better
than in his response to my hon. Friend the Member for Amber
Valley (Nigel Mills) on his Tajikistan bridge example,
because my hon. Friend was absolutely correct. The
Administration of Tajikistan may well be colluding with the
owners of the bridge, but that is not the point—the point
is to enable civic society to hold the powerful to account.
That is why we support transparency. That is why, when I
had the privilege of being Secretary of State for
International Development, we introduced the transparency
initiative. We put everything we possibly could into the
public domain. It is why we should all support a free
press. Although it may be rumbustious and unruly from time
to time, a free press is nevertheless a bastion of our
liberties. Sunlight is the best disinfectant. A lot of the
stuff that is the subject of this new clause leaks out
anyway in the back pages of Private Eye or whatever. It is
much better to put the whole thing on a formal setting and
have it made public. The Government, particularly the
former Prime Minister and the former Chancellor, my right
hon. Friend the Member for Tatton (Mr Osborne), and my
right hon. Friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Sir
Eric Pickles) in his capacity as the anti-corruption tsar,
have made huge progress on this.
Will the Minister give us the flavour of the Government’s
thinking on the slightly differing treatment of the
overseas territories and the Crown dependencies? It would
be helpful for the House to understand that. During the
run-up to the tabling of this new clause, I was visited by
officials of no fewer than five of the dependent
territories, supported by the Falkland Islands, although I think
that that was a matter of solidarity rather than direct
interest. They made some very important points, which no
doubt we will hear about from my hon. Friend the Member for
North West Norfolk (Sir Henry Bellingham), who chairs the
all-party British Virgin Islands group. First, they say
that if they have an open public register, they will suffer
a competitive disadvantage—and that is true. Their answer
is that if they are going to do it—they do not have an
objection in principle to doing so—they think that everyone
else should do it as well. They point out that the
potential effect on their income, which could reduce quite
substantially, might well push them back into dependency.
That is a fair point. The Government’s answer should be to
try at all times to narrow the footprint of the areas that
can hide behind secrecy.
4.00 pm
Certainly, it is a step forward to have a register, albeit not a
public one, but we need to hear from the Government how long they
intend to allow the register to remain private and whether they
expect the dependent territories and the Crown dependencies to
make the register public in due course. If the register remains
private, although it may be accessible to law enforcement
agencies—that is, obviously, right—crime fighters will be
confronting corruption with one hand behind their back. Under
British law, we completely accept the argument that allowing law
enforcement agencies to see all the entries makes the fight
against crime and corruption much easier. That is why in the UK
we have a public register. I hope that the Minister will explain
to the House how he thinks progress will be made towards a public
register, and whether he is saying that the Crown dependencies
want more time—a point that their representatives made when they
came to see me—or whether he takes a different view.
Finally, the Africa Progress Panel looked recently at the extent
of the siphoning off of revenue from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. It is a rich irony that in the DRC some of the poorest
people in the world live on top of some of the richest real
estate. The Africa Progress Panel identified nearly £1.5 billion
of lost revenue—more than the country’s total health and
education budgets during the period in question—in the area at
which it looked. According to credible studies by the World Bank,
the extent of the money stolen or concealed as unpaid tax in
Africa each year dwarfs the totality of the flows of
international aid and development money. The House today has the
opportunity to go with the grain of the Bill, and with the grain
of British leadership internationally, on transparency and
openness. Unless the Minister has a very strong argument —he is
the sort of Minister who may well have—the effect of our saying
that we will not impose the same standards on dependent
territories, with all the advantages that they gain from that
status, will be to damage our credibility on these matters not
only here in Britain but internationally.
-
(Bromley and
Chislehurst) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow my right hon. Friend the Member
for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), who speaks with great
authority and commitment on these matters. I will come on
to a practical matter on which I disagree with him,
although I do not disagree with the objective that he seeks
to achieve.
I endorse the thrust of the Bill, as my right hon. Friend
has just done, and the observation—it is worth repeating,
and it is all the more important as we look towards the
world as it will be after we have left the European
Union—that Britain is a world leader in transparency and
effectiveness at dealing with financial crime. My right
hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir
Edward Garnier) was right to stress the value of the
Serious Fraud Office’s work. It is extremely successful and
highly regarded the world over, not least because it is
operationally independent of any investigating authority.
Many of us believe that it would be quite wrong to do
anything to change that arrangement. The SFO works well as
currently constituted, and it has an international
reputation as a leader precisely because of that important
independence.
I turn to new clause 6. I have much sympathy with what the
right hon. Member for Don Valley (Caroline Flint) has said,
but I do not think that new clause 6 is an appropriate or
proportionate way to achieve the desired objective. Let me
set out why. Before I do so, I should declare an interest
as the secretary of the all-party group on Gibraltar, one
of the British overseas territories, and I am also a member
of the all-party group on the Channel Islands, which are
Crown dependencies. Crown dependencies are not covered by
new clause 6, but they are covered by other new clauses.
My concern is that the way the argument is put assumes that
all the overseas territories should be lumped in together,
which I do not think is fair. I particularly want to
address the position of Gibraltar. Its position is
different, first, because of the nature of its constitution
and, secondly, because unlike other overseas territories—I
do not criticise or make any comment about them—it is, in
effect, part of the European Union. As part of the European
Union, it has had to comply, and has done so willingly,
with international and EU standards in the same way as the
UK.
It is important not to lump Gibraltar in with other
jurisdictions where there has been controversy. I say that
specifically—it is important for the House to have this on
the record—because I am afraid that some politicians on the
other side of the land border in Spain unscrupulously seek
regularly to slander Gibraltar and its constitutional and
legal arrangements, doing so wholly unfairly to advance an
unjustified claim against Gibraltar. I would not want
anything said in this House in any way to give comfort to
people seeking to do down a loyal and effective British
territory, so we need to draw such a distinction.
There is a twofold point to be made about Gibraltar.
Although I accept the 2010 White Paper’s observations about
what can be done, I argue that it is undesirable to
contemplate legislating, certainly in Gibraltar’s case,
because to do so, even by Orders in Council, would have the
effect of abrogating the 2006 Gibraltar constitution. The
constitution gives Gibraltar, and the democratic and
elected Gibraltar Parliament, entire home rule in matters
relating to its economy and domestic legislation, save only
those matters reserved to be exercised by the Governor on
behalf of the British Crown.
-
I thank the right hon. Gentleman—
-
Not yet.
-
I apologise to the hon. Gentleman, who should be “right
honourable”. I absolutely agree that it is very welcome
that Gibraltar has complied not only with the EU
initiative, but with the OECD as well. I would gently ask
him, however, why Gibraltar is not in favour of following
the UK route of having a public register of beneficial
ownership?
-
The reason was very properly and sensibly set out by my
right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield. There is
a risk of a competitive disadvantage, and as I have said,
we must bear in mind the situation in which Gibraltar finds
itself. I suggest it would be inappropriate for it to be at
a competitive disadvantage compared with other
Mediterranean jurisdictions, some of which are not well
disposed towards it.
Gibraltar has done a great deal, and continuing dialogue is
a sensible way forward. It would not be appropriate to
legislate, particularly as undermining Gibraltar’s
constitution, even if it was legally possible
theoretically—I suspect it would be challenged in the
courts—would be most undesirable politically, because our
commitment to Gibraltar must be made particularly clear as
we leave the European Union.
It is worth adding that Gibraltar has taken very
considerable practical steps and has been recognised
internationally for doing so. It is worth simply saying
that it has transposed all the necessary EU directives into
its law—perfectly willingly, without any difficulty and of
its own volition—and it has also complied with all OECD
initiatives in this regard. It has gone beyond that
establish a central register, under the terms of the fourth
anti-money laundering directive, for which the deadline is
this June. It has entered into an exchange of notes to
accelerate access to all UK authorities for investigative
purposes. It has agreed to the EU5 proposal for the
automatic exchange of beneficial ownership with
participating countries, covering all EU countries,
including Spain. Gibraltar has therefore been extremely
willing to co-operate, even with countries that do not
always behave well towards it, and that needs to be
recognised. The Gibraltar Government are actively looking
at the 5 July 2016 EU proposal to amend the fourth
anti-money laundering directive by introducing a register,
and that ought to be their decision. As I think the
Minister would confirm, Her Majesty’s Government have
worked very closely with Her Majesty’s Government of
Gibraltar on this issue. A constructive dialogue is taking
place, which is the right way to deal with it.
Finally, before I move on to Crown dependencies, it is
worth saying that Gibraltar’s record of effectiveness in
the exchange of information was recognised by the 2014 OECD
“Phase 2” review, when it was ranked as largely compliant.
That is actually a very high ranking, which ranks Gibraltar
as being as good in terms of compliance as the United
Kingdom, the United States and Germany. Gibraltar,
therefore, is doing the job. That really needs to be
stressed, so that others do not misuse the linkage, which,
in Gibraltar’s case, is not borne out by the evidence: it
has some 135 tax information exchange mechanisms with some
80 countries; it has already implemented the Financial
Action Task Force recommendations with the United States
and the United Kingdom; and it is implementing common
reporting standards, the global standard, along with the UK
and other countries. I therefore suggest it would be
heavy-handed and inappropriate to involve Gibraltar in this
approach when it is already doing so much.
I would like to touch on the Crown dependencies, as did my
right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield. Frankly,
I think the constitutional position is more difficult
because they are not, and never have been, subject to the
United Kingdom. Their allegiance is purely to the British
Crown, not the United Kingdom. The difficulty of attempting
to legislate for them would be real and profound in
constitutional terms. That is why the relationship falls
under the Ministry of Justice and their legislation is
signed off by the Privy Council. The new clauses that seek
to bring them into the position here are not well-conceived
legally in that regard. That is the key issue.
It is also worth observing, since the Justice Committee
recently visited all three Crown dependencies as part of an
inquiry, that they, too, are up to the highest standards of
reporting and ensuring information is readily available to
the authorities. It is worth saying in relation to Jersey,
but it applies to them all, that a report by Moneyval, an
established body of international repute, stated:
“Jersey’s combination of a central register of the UBO with
a high level of vetting/evaluation not found elsewhere and
regulation of TCSPs of a standard found in few other
jurisdictions has been widely recognised by international
organisations and individual jurisdictions as placing
Jersey in a leading position in meeting standards of
beneficial ownership transparency.”
Similar provisions, in different legislative forms, have
also been made in the two other Crown dependencies. Again,
it would be unfair, inappropriate and disproportionate to
lump the Crown dependencies in with this issue.
We all share the same objective. We want to make sure there
is maximum transparency and honest money in our system. For
the reasons I have set out, however, I hope those who
support the new clause, and other new clauses that have not
yet been moved, will reflect and conclude that this is not
the appropriate legislative vehicle to achieve that
objective.
-
Sir
I, too, would like to say a few brief words on new clause
6. I declare an interest: I chaired the all-party British
Virgin Islands group and I am a former Minister with
responsibility for the overseas territories.
I am well aware of the challenges in Africa. My right hon.
Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell)
mentioned the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He and I
will remember when Tullow Oil had its licences expropriated
by the Kabila Government. It transpired that the interface
company was a BVI-registered shell company in which Kabila,
and part of Zuma’s family, had shares. It would have been
very useful if we had been able to confirm that at the
time.
I entirely accept that looking to the future and envisaging
public registers across the world makes a lot of sense.
What I am very worried about—this is the only point I am
going to make—is that if new clause 6 is passed and
territories like the BVI lose their business model, there
would be a massive exodus by legal services, accountancy
firms, banks and so on. They would have to then rely on
tourism, and it could well be that they move back to being
dependencies.
The other issue is this: would it solve the problem? No.
The companies registered in the BVI, the Cayman Islands or
the Turks and Caicos Islands would simply register
elsewhere in countries that do not have public registers.
They would go to Panama or Colombia. Indeed, I saw recently
that the United States, Hong Kong and Singapore have said
specifically that they will not bring in public registers
until the rest of the world moves on. New clause 6 is well
intentioned, but we should be very mindful of the
unintended consequences.
Apart from the BVI losing its business model, those
unintended consequences would include, above all else, the
loss of some excellent intelligence and exchange of
information arrangements. For example, the BVI has in place
a beneficial ownership secured search system that enables
our crime and fraud agencies to co-operate immediately and
confidentially to get the information required. If these
companies were registered elsewhere in the world, we would
lose that crime-busting capability.
4.15 pm
For those reasons, I hope that the Minister will reject new
clause 6, well intentioned though it is, and instead work with
right hon. and hon. Members concerned about this whole issue and
make sure that in due course we persuade more and more countries
around the world to work together and ensure a uniform approach
in the future.
-
(Arundel and South
Downs) (Con)
I rise to support new clause 6, to which I added my name in
the full confidence that I was merely endorsing what I
understood to be Government policy on ensuring transparency
on these matters in the overseas territories, that policy
having been announced by the previous Prime Minister. I
find myself genuinely puzzled, therefore, about why that is
apparently no longer Government policy, and I wish to raise
some issues and put some questions that I hope the Minister
can answer so as to reassure me and other hon. Members who
have supported the new clause in good faith that there are
good reasons why it should not go forward.
First, I thought that the argument about transparency had
been established. My right hon. Friend the Member for
Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) suggested
that transparency would, in itself, be an undesirable thing
for the overseas territories to have to undertake, but it
seems to me that we might well have applied that argument
to the position in the UK. Had we accepted that argument,
we would not have taken action here in the UK to require
transparency.
-
It is fair enough that I be allowed to defend myself. I was
making the point that while I favoured full transparency
towards law enforcement agencies and the tax authorities, I
did not support there being a full, open and public
register at this stage, because I supported the idea of
banking privacy.
-
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for clarifying what
he said, but my point still stands, which is that we have
taken action in the UK to require such publication. Why is
it right in the UK but wrong in the overseas territories?
That was the point I was seeking to make. Perhaps the
Minister can explain.
Secondly, I understand that constitutional objections have
been raised to the new clause. The argument is that it
would be wrong to insist that the overseas territories take
action. If so, why did we propose it in the first place? As
a result, hon. Members like me now find themselves on the
wrong side of the Government’s opinion, when we thought we
were supporting a policy in our manifesto. If there is a
constitutional objection, was it not surprising that the
previous Prime Minister announced the policy of
transparency for the overseas territories?
Is it even right that the British Government never impose
policies on our overseas territories? In 2000, the
Government, by Order in Council, decriminalised
homosexuality in the overseas territories. I doubt that
many Members would oppose that policy, although I suspect
it was opposed in many of the overseas territories. Do hon.
Members say that the British Government were wrong to do
that? Murder might still be a capital offence in some of
the overseas territories had the Government not insisted on
the abolition of such capital crimes in 1991. The principle
is established that the Government are constitutionally
entitled and have in practice, where there is an overriding
public policy justification, legislated in relation to the
overseas territories.
The third argument advanced against this measure is that
the overseas territories are doing it anyway. We are told
that it is not necessary to back new clause 6 because the
overseas territories are well on their way to doing the
right thing, but that takes us back to the question of what
it is that they are doing. If they are producing registers,
that is welcome, but my question still stands: why did we
think transparency was a good thing, but now no longer
believe that it is a good thing? We have reset that bar. We
are now saying that the overseas territories are on their
way to doing the right thing, but the right thing is now
defined merely as the register, and it is no longer
transparency.
I think the reason this has happened has been revealed by
some of my hon. Friends for entirely honourable reasons,
and it is that some of these overseas territories and
therefore some of my hon. Friends fear that there will be a
competitive disadvantage for the overseas territories if
they are required to produce a public register as the new
clause suggests, in the way they will eventually be
required to do, and as the Government suggested at one
point that they should.
However, let me say simply that if we accept the argument
that being at a competitive disadvantage is an obstacle to
taking measures against tax evasion or corruption, this
House would do very little on those issues. It can always
be argued that we could be putting our own banking
arrangements or those of other countries at risk by taking
steps deemed to be in the public interest on the grounds
that they could produce corruption. To turn that around, if
we accept the argument on competitive disadvantage, there
would be no reason why the House should not reverse all the
measures taken on banking transparency and establish some
sort of regime that used to pertain in countries like as
Switzerland where there would be wholesale banking secrecy,
because that would be good for business and it would place
us at a competitive advantage by comparison with other
countries. It could be argued that such a thing would be
entirely acceptable.
Clearly, that would not be acceptable. We have taken the
opposite view: there is a reason to demand transparency and
that transparency is essential in order to tackle
corruption. We are talking about measures that are
necessary to protect not just the UK taxpayer but the
poorest countries in the world, which are disadvantaged and
penalised because people are able to siphon off funds
unlawfully and immorally and shelter them in various
regimes. We are apparently saying that we are willing to
accept that, because if we take action against it, some
other regime will perform that immoral task. That seems to
me to be a wrong position for the House of Commons to take,
and if it were accepted, we would not have a Bill such as
this one or any transparency measures at all.
I therefore hope that the Government will reconsider their
position. New clause 6 is entirely reasonable, providing a
period of time for the overseas territories to comply with
the transparency requirement. I, for one, will take a great
deal of convincing that something that was held by the
Government to be desirable and that we hold to be desirable
and right in our own country is wrong for the overseas
territories.
-
I have spent the last 16 years as the Member for Cities of
London and Westminster, and six of those years as an
adviser to an international law firm with a substantial
Isle of Man presence—Cains. Over the last two years, I have
been the vice-chairman for international affairs for my
party and have therefore had many dealings with and much
knowledge of these sorts of issues.
I fervently agree with the right hon. Member for Don Valley
(Caroline Flint) and my right hon. Friend the Member for
Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) that there has been a
significant journey—indeed, a massive change—with respect
to the mentality around beneficial ownership, getting
registers together and having a certain openness about
those registers. It is a journey that is ongoing.
I think it realistic to believe—my hon. Friends the Members
for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) and for North
West Norfolk (Sir Henry Bellingham) presented some powerful
arguments in this regard—that there is a real risk of
competitive disadvantage applying to a number of the
overseas territories. As my hon. Friend the Member for
Bromley and Chislehurst pointed out, and as was recognised
by the right hon. Member for Don Valley, the Crown
dependencies are in a different legal and constitutional
position. They are not part of the United Kingdom. They
have their own legitimate and democratic Governments, and I
think it would be entirely wrong for the Government to
railroad them, whether by means of Orders in Council or
through the Bill.
My instinct is that we shall return to these issues. I
support the Government: I do not think that the time is
ripe for a provision such as new clause 6. It would,
however, be wrong to assume that a huge amount of work has
not been done quietly behind the scenes. I know from my own
experience, and the experience of many other people, that
in recent years there has been a sea change in the
attitudes of a number of the overseas territories, and
certainly in those of the Crown dependencies, many of which
are ahead of the game when it comes to elements of the
transparency agenda. I think there is a real risk—which was
very well described by my hon. Friend the Member for North
West Norfolk—that if we were to impose this provision on
the overseas territories in such short order, a huge amount
of business would leave those shores. Some would say,
perhaps with some legitimacy, “We do not want to have this
business here.”
I believe that we should continue the work of recent years,
and consider global protocols that would prevent
competitive disadvantage from coming into play. Surely that
would be a better regime. I think it entirely wrong to
perceive all our overseas territories as terrible tax
havens where illicit work goes on. They have an astonishing
amount of technology, which I have seen at first hand in,
among others, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman
Islands, to enable them to co-operate instantaneously with
law enforcement and tax authorities in the event of any
suspicious transactions.
I hope that new clause 6 will not be pressed to a vote, or
that the Government will win if it is. However, I also hope
that the Minister will give us some idea of how he sees the
future, given the ongoing conversations about a global
protocol that we could all support.
-
It is an honour to follow the right hon. Member for Cities
of London and Westminster (Mark Field). His homeward
commutes on Thursday evenings fill me with the utmost envy.
Perhaps he would enjoy my regular seven-hour journeys up
and down. However, he made a very interesting speech.
Indeed, the contributions from Members on both sides of the
House have been very informed and enlightening.
I do not want to take up too much time, but I want to touch
briefly on some of the new clauses before I hand over to
the other Front Benchers. New clauses 2, 3, 14, 15 and 4
extend the principle of corporate economic crime, which has
been discussed at length today. The Bill incorporates a
failure to prevent such crime, but only in relation to tax
evasion. As others have said, it would appear sensible,
given the current climate and the public mood, to extend
that provision so that the liability reaches the tops of
organisations.
I have mentioned this in the House before, but, as a lawyer
who had some in-house experience working for a large retail
bank, I can say with the utmost certainty that sticking
one’s head above the parapet and telling the bank that it
is wrong is not the course of action that is most conducive
to one’s career. I did not fall foul of that myself—I
avoided that particular pitfall—but I think that I probably
would have done so at some future time.
I think the public would demand that the concept of
corporate economic crime be extended beyond tax evasion. I
think they would be surprised to learn that the bank would
not be held liable for LIBOR-rigging, for instance. Of
course, the individuals concerned were prosecuted under
different laws, but there was no corporate criminal
liability for the boards of directors or for the banks
themselves. I do not think the public would thank us for a
corporate economic offence that extended only to tax
evasion. It is tax evasion, for goodness’ sake. I think the
public would expect companies such as banks and other large
organisations to be held criminally liable for something as
obvious as tax evasion. It is a great shame that the Bill
has not grasped the nettle. The Minister may, of course,
have something miraculous to say. I suspect, however, that
we are not going to have an extension of corporate economic
crime, which is a real shame.
4.30 pm
Even if it were to come to pass, I would still have issues about
some of the provisions in the failure to prevent model. If a bank
can show that it had reasonable processes and protocols, that is
an absolute defence. There is also a defence if, in the
circumstances, it is deemed that the bank ought not to have any
reasonable processes in place. I know from bitter first-hand
experience of commencing litigation against banks that in the
eleventh hour they will miraculously pull together volumes and
volumes of training manuals, protocols and processes that seemed
completely absent when the alleged offence was being committed to
convince the judge that they have all the processes necessary.
Call me a cynic, but even if the failure to prevent was extended
along the lines of the incorporated new clauses, I still think
there is an opportunity for a bank to—to put it in colloquial
terms—wriggle out of that potential responsibility.
I do not have a great deal to add to what has been said on new
clause 6, which we will support. We are pleased that the Crown
dependencies are not part of new clause 6. Given that I am a
Scottish National party MP, it is part of my political definition
that I do not want this place to legislate on places or
jurisdictions where it does not have authority. We understand
that there is more of a case for the overseas territories, and we
will support the amendment on that basis, but the Chair of the
Select Committee on Justice, the hon. Member for Bromley and
Chislehurst (Robert Neill), was absolutely right to make the
distinction between, for example, Gibraltar and the overseas
territories. Throughout this process I have been puzzled about
why Gibraltar is considered an overseas territory and not a Crown
dependency; that is probably not within the Minister’s remit, but
it has occurred to me over the last few months.
Transparency is key. If this Government’s policy is transparency
and we all agree that transparency would facilitate a fairer
banking and financial system, there ought to be no good reasons
why those jurisdictions should not have public registers the same
as we have. But I corroborate other Members’ views that that is
the clear direction of travel. Whether or not it is right to
legislate to compel jurisdictions over which we perhaps do not
have authority is another question, but on the basis of
transparency and the fact that I think it reflects the public
mood, we will support new clause 6.
New clause 11 asks the Government to go through a consultation
process to persuade and cajole the Crown dependencies to adopt
legislation that, frankly, ought to be determined by their own
Parliaments in their own jurisdictions. New clause 6 is easier to
deal with as it deals with transparency and things we really want
to get done, but new clause 11 seems to be a wish-wash of “Let’s
have a chat with them,” and “Let’s see if we can persuade them to
do anything,” when that really ought to be up to them, as it
ought to be up to the Scottish Parliament, and up to the Welsh
Parliament or whatever jurisdiction holds those powers. I
therefore would have constitutional jurisdictional problems with
new clause 11, but, again, I accept the basis behind it. However,
I think we will find that as time goes on the overseas
territories and Crown dependencies will be willing to have that
conversation about the effectiveness of their registers.
We have tabled three new clauses in this group. The first is on
Scottish limited partnerships, and I have nothing to add to what
was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and
Cowdenbeath (Roger Mullin), who is no longer in his place as he
had to go to the second meeting of the rather popular Committee
he mentioned. He articulated the case very well. It would be our
intention to press new clause 10 to a vote this evening, but that
will turn completely on what the Minister has to say when summing
up—so, no pressure, and we look forward to hearing what the
Minister has to say, or we will, without question, press new
clause 10 to a vote.
New clause 19 gets to the heart of the issue surrounding criminal
finances: what I would describe as the responsibility-shedding,
banking sales-driven culture that we have in the UK. The banks
are the facilitators of criminal finance; they facilitate all the
wrongdoing in the financial system. The reason we had the crash
in 2007-08 was that the pendulum had swung from banks being
professional organisations looking after their clients’ interests
to being completely sales-driven, profit-seeking organisations. I
think the pendulum has swung too far, and it was the swinging of
that pendulum that created the mess almost 10 years ago. Unless
we deal with that culture, we will not be able to deal properly
with the facilitating that big companies and banks can give to
criminal finances. It is a shame that that opportunity has not
been taken in the Bill.
Not long after I was elected to this place, I was dismayed to
learn that the Financial Conduct Authority had withdrawn its
promise to look into the banking culture. Why? That was the most
obvious thing to do if we were to clean up the financial system.
The public were demanding it, and I think that business ethics
were demanding it, and I simply cannot understand why neither the
FCA nor the Government would carry out a review into the very
thing that had facilitated the crash and that could indeed
facilitate another crash if we are not careful.
Our new clause 18 deals with protection for whistleblowers. Given
what I understand about the culture of banks, I know that it is
very difficult for a bank employee to put their head above the
parapet. People who work in those organisations and who have
information that law enforcement agencies could use to address
and pursue criminality should have protection. Quite simply, if
anyone in a bank raises their head above the parapet and tells
all and sundry that the bank is committing or facilitating
criminal finance acts, their career is over, not only in that
bank but more generally in the financial services sector. The
consequence of honesty and transparency should not be that such
people lose their jobs and their livelihoods. There should be
some form of protection, which is why we have tabled that new
clause.
That concludes my submissions on the new clauses that we have
tabled, other than to say again—ad nauseam —that we support the
principles of the Bill but we do not believe that it goes far
enough in certain areas. We applaud the direction of travel in
which it will take the UK economy, and we hope that we will be
able to go further. We hope that its provisions will not be
caught up in red tape and bureaucracy, and that they will
actually work so that we can get at the bad guys’ money and the
rest of us who play by the rules can have a fair crack of the
whip.
-
Dr Huq
This group of new clauses contains a fair few of ours, so I
shall take a bit longer than I did last time. I want to
speak to new clauses 6, 16 and 17 and I want to press new
clause 17 to a vote.
Tax evasion was big news in 2016 following the publication
of the Panama papers, which threw light on certain opaque
offshore companies. Following the leaking of those papers,
the overwhelming sentiment was that something needed to be
done, and this Bill is that something—or rather, it
introduces a set of somethings to deal with the problem. It
introduces new corporate offences that will no longer be
reliant on the defunct guiding mind principle, it creates
unexplained wealth orders and it contains some other
eye-catching stuff including the failure to prevent
offences under the category of a politically exposed
person. It also makes necessary amendments to our
pre-existing anti-terrorist legislation. The Minister has
pointed out that the Bill builds on a raft of
Labour-initiated legislation, including the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002, the Bribery Act 2010 and the Terrorism Acts
of 2000 and 2006. On the whole, we support the Bill, and
all this stuff is not to be sniffed at.
I also want to mention the new additional monitoring, which
the Minister announced on the spot a little earlier,
relating to the human rights abuses mentioned in our debate
on the first group of new clauses.
As the Bill has progressed, however, it has become apparent
that there are chinks in the armoury for fighting money
laundering. We welcome what is in it, but concerns are
being expressed not only in my party but by a range of
charities and non-governmental organisations such as
Amnesty International, Christian Aid, Traidcraft,
Transparency International, CAFOD and the ONE Campaign.
They are concerned about what the Bill does not contain,
and the elephant in the room is the issue of beneficial
ownership and the UK’s inaction in tackling the financially
secretive companies and practices that lie at the heart of
the economies of many of our overseas territories and Crown
dependencies. Beneficial ownership is entirely not present
in the Bill. It is conspicuous by its absence. In other
words, I am referring to our “tax havens.” The silence
seems bizarre given that we are talking about money
laundering, tax evasion and terrorist financing. Whether
the Government like it or not, the matter must be
addressed. The issue falls within the Bill’s remit because
overseas territories are facilitating, aiding and abetting
financial crime. The last time I was at the Dispatch Box I
said that the UK, along with its overseas territories and
Crown dependencies, is the biggest secretive financial
jurisdiction in the world, so we have a special
responsibility to act and to lead on this agenda, not to be
slightly less bad than everyone else. The UK is
facilitating some of the largest and most well-known tax
havens, so we should be leading not following.
When the Government have been told that they need to “get
real” not just by me in Committee but by the court of
public opinion after the scandalous events of last year,
they need to toughen up and get a grip on overseas
territories and Crown dependencies because they facilitate
illicit financial activity on a global scale, but the same
excuses follow and have been trotted out today: the UK does
not have the constitutional legitimacy for the overseas
territories and Crown dependencies; and the territories are
supposedly adhering to international standards anyway, so
making them adopt public registers of beneficial ownership
is not necessary. We are also told that the Government do
want the territories and dependencies to adopt such
registers, that they are working towards that, and that in
the light of the progress made the threat of an Order in
Council is unnecessary.
The Government say that the time will be right when the
rest of world follows the UK’s lead and that they will set
a global benchmark for financial territories. At the sixth
sitting of the Bill Committee, the Minister told us that
only when the time is right and only when there is an
international standard for public registers of beneficial
ownership will it be imperative for our overseas
territories and Crown dependencies to follow suit. He
actually claimed that the Crown dependencies and overseas
territories with financial centres are already way ahead of
“most jurisdictions”, including most G20 nations, on tax
transparency. We were told that they are doing enough and
that now was not the time to upset the applecart with
public registers, particularly when they have agreed to
adopt centralised registers. The Minister may recognise his
own words from Committee in response to an amendment of
mine that was pretty much identical to new clause 6:
“I certainly think that these places”—
the overseas territories and Crown dependencies—
“have come 90% of the way, and we should see whether that
works for us. We all have the intention”—
to adopt public registers—
“and the United Kingdom is leading by example.”
In response to our threat of an Order in Council, he said:
“The new clause is a very strong measure. We should not
impose our will on the overseas territories and Crown
dependencies when they have come so far.”
This is the interesting bit:
“It is important to recognise that we have got where we
have through cajoling, working together and peer group
pressure, which…makes a real difference.”––[Official
Report, Criminal Finance Public Bill Committee, 22 November
2016; c. 199-200.]
That already seems slightly contradictory.
On the one hand, we hear that we cannot legislate for the
dependencies. In fact, I remember the Minister calling
me—someone whose parents suffered the worst excesses of the
British empire—a neo-imperialist. It was certainly the
first time that anyone has called me a neo-colonialist or
whatever it was. At the same time, however, we clearly are
able to do something and have the option to stop turning a
blind eye and to turn inactivity into activity. The
Minister himself insisted that the proposal was a “strong
measure” that is less preferable to his own formula of
cajoling and behind-the-scenes pressure.
-
Mr Wallace
Will the hon. Lady recognise for once that through cajoling
and peer group pressure all Crown dependencies and overseas
territories will by this year have central registers of
beneficial ownership or similar? That is ahead of many G20
countries that do not even have central registers. We have
actually come a long way and a lot further than when Labour
was in government.
-
Dr Huq
I listened carefully to what the Minister said, and he said
something similar in response to my right hon. Friend the
Member for Don Valley (Caroline Flint). I will literally
eat my hat—not that I am wearing one—if that happens. The
registers must be in a format that is easily convertible to
public registers.
We are not there yet. As someone who conducted empirical
social science research, I wonder where the 90% figure came
from. I know such things are often said across the Dispatch
Box—in this case, it was in a Public Bill Committee—on the
hoof, in the heat of the moment, and I would not want to
label the Minister as a purveyor of fake news, but does he
really think that we are 90% of the way there? Even if
Government Members say that we do not normally do this,
there is always a time when, if needed, we can step in, and
the Labour party would argue that that time is now.
4.45 pm
Rather worryingly, the Government recently replied to the report
of the International Development Committee, “Tackling corruption
overseas”, by emphatically rejecting the claim that they need to
do more to ensure that the overseas territories and Crown
dependencies adopt centralised public registers. That is rather
different from the rhetoric we are hearing today. There is
evidence that, behind the scenes—I am sorry to say this—the
Government have not, to use the Minister’s words, really
“cajoled” the Governments of the Crown dependencies.
Alternatively, perhaps they have not been cajoling those
Governments hard enough, because if this Government really had, I
would not have to cite the following statement by the Chief
Minister of Jersey from Jersey’s Hansard. When asked by a
Deputy—they are not called MPs—when the public registers of
beneficial interest would become a reality, he answered:
“The U.K. Government accepts, and has accepted in conversations
with us, that our approach meets the policy aims that they are
trying to meet and international bodies, standard setters and
reviewers, have acknowledged that our approach is a leading
approach and is superior to some other approaches taken.”
It is hard to see how the Government can cajole someone to do
something while simultaneously telling them that they do not need
to do it—that speaks for itself.
The Government seem a bit confused about whether they do or do
not want to play their part in creating a fair, ethical and
transparent finance system. As for the suggestion that the UK
lacks the constitutional power to legislate for the Crown
dependencies, we have heard examples from both sides of the House
of when such powers have been used.
-
The specific problem is about legislating for the overseas
territories rather than the Crown dependencies. I think it
is understood across the board that this does not apply to
the Crown dependencies. We all recognise that significant
progress has been made in recent years, so will the hon.
Lady pledge at this juncture not to press new clause 6 to a
Division? Let us see further progress in the months and
years to come that will hopefully ensure that we move
towards a global protocol that keeps everyone happy.
-
Dr Huq
First, I would like to finish what I was trying to say. I
was coming to the Crown dependencies and overseas
territories, which I realise are two different things. I
would also like to hear what the Minister has to say,
because at earlier stages of the Bill he was conciliatory
and we backed down on some things.
We are dealing with not just new clause 6 but new clause
17. We are looking at both overseas territories and Crown
dependencies because, internationally, the UK will be able
to lecture and persuade others to adopt transparent finance
practices only if its overseas territories and Crown
dependencies stop engaging in—
-
Will the hon. Lady give way?
-
Dr Huq
I will carry on for the moment because I want to make some
progress—I am not able to get a sentence out at the moment.
The hon. Gentleman will be referenced later in my speech.
We worked well together under his excellent stewardship of
the Justice Committee.
The previous coalition Government’s White Paper on the
overseas territories has already been quoted by my right
hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley. It referred to how,
as a matter of constitutional law, the UK Parliament has
unlimited power to legislate for the overseas territories.
The phrase “unlimited power” is pretty clear. On the Crown
dependencies, which the right hon. Member for Cities of
London and Westminster (Mark Field) mentioned, it appears
that not only the Government but the SNP, given the remarks
of the hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Richard
Arkless), who was a member of the Justice Committee with
me, have accepted, or been cowed into believing, that the
Crown dependencies are somehow untouchable.
I want to quote from a report by the hon. Member for
Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill). The Justice
Committee’s 2010 report on the Crown dependencies stated:
“the restrictive formulation of the power of the UK
Government to intervene in insular affairs on the ground of
good government is accepted by both the UK and the Crown
Dependency governments”.
A list of examples was given, but the hon. Gentleman
probably knows it better than I did, because he wrote it.
-
It would not be unreasonable for the hon. Lady to note that
I was not Chair of the Justice Committee at that time. Can
she give me any example of a time when the United Kingdom
has specifically legislated for a Crown dependency, as
opposed to acting under the prerogative power through the
lieutenant governors, which indeed itself has not been done
in many years? The overseas territories are not the same as
the Crown dependencies legally. I honestly urge her to
reflect on that, because she is genuinely on shaky legal
ground.
-
Dr Huq
As I have said, there seems to be a lack of will. The hon.
Gentleman talked at length about Gibraltar—[Interruption.]
If he will listen to what I say back to him, that might be
useful. There is a lack of will to act. People have been
lobbying all of us, probably including him. The fact that
we have the power to make a change is more significant than
examples—if this is needed, it can be done. New clause 16
does not coerce anyone to do anything, but it sets out
steps that would facilitate matters.
-
Given the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, it is of
course open to this place to legislate on Scotland. Is the
hon. Lady suggesting that she would legislate on matters
that are devolved to the Scottish Parliament?
-
Dr Huq
No, I did not say that. If the hon. Gentleman had listened,
he would know that I did not mention Scotland at all.
-
Several hon. Members rose—
-
Dr Huq
I would like to make progress. I will not take any more
interventions, because I am still at the very beginning of
my speech and the Whips are telling me that they want me to
conclude.
The question is not, “Can we do this?” but, “Is it right to
do this?” It will come as no surprise that I think that the
answer is yes. The Government’s White Paper made it clear
that when the law is not working, or there has been a
breakdown in order—corruption was mentioned —the UK has the
power to act.
-
Sir
rose—
-
Dr Huq
I have said that I am not giving way any more.
-
Sir
I didn’t hear you.
-
Dr Huq
It would help if Members were listening to me. How many
times have I given way? Numerous times—more than anyone
else in our proceedings, which have been going on for many
hours—so I would like to make some progress.
Even if, as has been mentioned, it is the British Virgin
Islands and the Cayman Islands that are prolific
offenders—I think that the British Virgin Islands come up
the greatest number of times in the Panama papers—it does
not completely absolve the Crown dependencies. Several
Members have tried to untangle the difference between Crown
dependencies and overseas territories. The Isle of Man
managed to rack up 8,000 entries in the Panama papers and
is being singled out by the Canadian revenue authorities
for investigation. Let us not forget that in October 2015,
HMRC defeated the Isle of Man on a tax avoidance scheme
that took place from 2001 to 2008 and left a hole in our
finances of £200 million. That is a not insignificant sum,
and it is money going from our Exchequer. How many
hospitals and schools could we have built for that? I do
not know the precise answer; it is a rhetorical question.
In 2007, the tax havens of Guernsey and Jersey were
investigated by our Serious Fraud Office in one of the
biggest corruption investigations in African history. These
things often join up; the money moves around.
The point is clear: the very structure of the laws
pertaining to finance in these places, coupled with their
deliberate adoption of complex and opaque institutional
structures, is crying out for reform. Globally, these
dependencies are at the heart of undermining the rule of
law—something that we hold dear—in other countries due to
the corruption that they facilitate. Their laws therefore
clearly need to be changed, and there is undeniable scope
for us to change them. As my right hon. Friend the Member
for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), who is sadly absent, has
said, there is a moral case for us to act, even if there
might not be an identical incident in which we have so
acted. My right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley
referred to polling that shows enormous public support for
such an approach—some 80% of people in a recent poll.
The Bill Committee was told that public registers are not
an international norm and that our Crown dependencies and
overseas territories are somehow exemplars because they
have adopted closed registers of beneficial ownership.
Lamentably, that might look like a bit of an alternative
fact—dare I say that. I have here a piece of paper—in fact,
it is three sheets stapled together—with a list of 46
jurisdictions. Those countries are all dependencies of G20
nation states, so they are in a similar constitutional
position to our overseas territories and Crown
dependencies, and they all have centralised registers of
beneficial ownership. Shall I read out all 46, or does the
House want just a smattering? They are: the Ashmore and
Cartier Islands, Christmas Island, the Cocos Keeling
Islands, the Coral Sea Islands—
-
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
Order. The hon. Lady is not going to read out all 46, is
she? She has made her point most eloquently, so there is no
need to list all 46. We do not read long lists in this
Chamber, and the House has got the point she is making.
-
Dr Huq
I am most grateful for that clarification, Madam Deputy
Speaker. Some of those on the list are the DOM-TOMs—the
départements d’outre-mer and the territoires d’outre-mer—so
there is a long list, including Guadeloupe and Martinique,
but I shall move on.
It is a bit of a nonsense for the Conservative party to
claim that the overseas territories and Crown dependencies
are leading the world in financial transparency because of
the creation of central registers if 46 other dependencies
are doing that already. Not only have some been incredibly
slow to catch up with the aforementioned countries, but
some of our Crown dependencies and overseas territories are
among the worst offenders and have not adopted centralised
registers, let alone made them public. More accurately,
they have adopted platforms.
The Government ask us to believe that the British Virgin
Islands or the Cayman Islands will be able to police their
own financial businesses by relying on those businesses,
which facilitate crime. It is asking them to mark their own
homework and to be judge and jury. Call me a cynic, but I
doubt that that is a workable solution. Do we really
believe that anonymous companies in the British Virgin
Islands—which, for example, allowed the former wife of a
Taiwanese President to illicitly purchase $1.6 million of
property in Manhattan—would be capable of policing
themselves?
There are several other examples. Would Alcoa, the world’s
third largest producer of aluminium, be capable of policing
itself when it has used an anonymous company in the British
Virgin Islands to transfer millions of dollars in bribes to
Bahraini officials? Would the anonymous British Virgin
Islands-based company used by Teodorin Obiang, the son of
the President of Equatorial Guinea, really be capable of
policing itself when it allowed him to squirrel away $38
million of state money to buy a private jet? It was thanks
to the US Justice Department that he was caught. The
Government’s protestation that we are working with the
territories and dependencies, and that we are 90% of the
way there, is at best highly questionable.
-
Is that it?
-
Dr Huq
No, there is more.
The main point I want to make is that our Government should
be at the forefront of the push to cast off the cloak of
secrecy under which terrorists have previously been able to
fund their attacks and gangsters have stored their
ill-gotten gains. We should not be dragging our feet on
this. Some of these jurisdictions, including the British
Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, have hidden behind
the fig leaf of the consultation.
I shall dispense with the rest of what I was going to say,
but we wish to press new clause 17 to a
Division—[Interruption.] If anyone had listened to me, they
would know that I was largely talking about the Crown
dependencies.
In conclusion, we could have gone all the way and become
the gold standard for other Governments to follow. We could
also have dealt with the public disquiet over perceived
levels of tax evasion, which the former Prime Minister, to
his credit, wanted to tackle. This massive oversight
undermines not only the claims made by the former Member
for Witney, but citizens in some of the poorest developing
countries of the world, which are at the end of these
complex supply chains of criminality. Those citizens are
the main losers in all of this.
The Home Office’s press release that accompanied the
publication of the Bill said that the new offences were
aimed at
“sending out a clear message that anyone doing business in
and with the UK must have the highest possible compliance
standards.”
Although we agree with large parts of the Bill, it does,
none the less, fall short. New clause 17, which Her
Majesty’s Loyal Opposition wish to press to a Division,
would go some way towards addressing a number of these
issues.
5.00 pm
-
Mr Wallace
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Ealing
Central and Acton (Dr Huq). I will take this opportunity to
respond to the many points that have been raised in this
debate. It is a regret that the right hon. Member for
Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) is not in her place, but it
is for fully understandable reasons. I pay tribute to her
for the work she has done in campaigning for tax
transparency, and I send her my best wishes at this time.
Let me now turn to the main thrust of this debate. What has
dominated our proceedings is this question of whether our
British overseas territories and Crown dependencies should
have public registers of beneficial ownership. I am a
supporter of transparency. I was the first Member of this
House to publish my expenses—long before that was required.
It was not a popular thing to do at the time, but I am a
great believer in transparency. I learned that from my time
in the Scottish Parliament, because I am also a great
believer in respecting devolution and respecting
constitutional arrangements.
Let me say to my right hon. Friend the Member for Arundel
and South Downs (Nick Herbert) that we have not changed our
ambition. Our ambition is still to have public registers of
beneficial ownership in the overseas territories and Crown
dependencies. I repeated that to the leaders of those
territories and dependencies just two weeks ago, but how we
get there is where there are differences. We must recognise
that, ever since held that
anti-corruption summit, we have come a long way—I am not
sure whether it is 90%, 89%, or 85%. I do not know the
percentage—I did not do the same course as the hon. Member
for Ealing Central and Acton. None the less, we now have a
commitment to keep either central registers or linked
registers. My hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley
(Nigel Mills) needs to recognise that it is perfectly
possible to link registers and to interrogate them
centrally. We aim to fulfil that commitment by June 2017.
We are also committed to allowing our law enforcement
agencies to have automatic access to those registers. We
already do that in some of those territories, with requests
coming back within hours. As a Home Office Minister, I am
charged with ensuring that we see off organised crime,
tackle corruption, and deal with money laundering. I
believe that our arrangements do allow us to deal with
potential crime and tax evasion. If I did not think that, I
would not be here making the point that now is not the time
to impose that on our overseas territories and Crown
dependencies. I have faith that, at the moment, the
capabilities of our law enforcement agencies enable us to
interrogate those systems and to follow up and prosecute
those people who encourage tax evasion not only in this
country, but in other countries. This Bill gives us that
extra territorial reach that many other countries do not
have.
-
Ian Paisley (North Antrim) (DUP)
Can the Minister give the House a categorical assurance
that none of the money made from ill-gotten gains of
criminal activity, through fuel fraud in Northern Ireland
and the Republic of Ireland, is illicitly put into those
countries?
-
Mr Wallace
We find criminals using banking systems all over the world
to hide their money, whether that is in Northern Ireland,
London, the Republic of Ireland, Crown dependencies or
elsewhere. Such places have agreed to work with our law
enforcement agencies, and we will allow their law
enforcement agencies access to our databases in order to
follow up such activity.
The hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton underplays the
success of the United Kingdom’s leadership role. Without
imposing on democratically elected Governments in those
countries and without imposing our will in some sort of
post-colonial way, we have achieved linked registers and
access to registers for our law enforcement agencies across
many Crown dependencies and overseas territories. We might
compare ourselves with our nearest neighbours, the major
economies—with all due respect, I do not mean Christmas
Island—such as Germany and other European neighbours such
as Spain. We are the ones with a public register and we,
not them, are the ones ready to have a unified central
register. Perhaps we should start by looking at the major
economies, rather than sailing out on a gunboat to impose
our will on overseas territories that have done an awful
lot so far in getting to a position in which I am confident
that our law enforcement agencies can bring people to
justice. That is the fundamental point of this principle.
We have not abandoned our ambition. We have decided that
the way to do it is not to impose our will on overseas
territories.
The Labour party’s new clause 17 is probably
constitutionally bankrupt, if I may use that phrase. It
would certainly cause all sorts of problems, although I am
not sure that we can actually impose our will on a Crown
dependency like that. All the good words of the hon. Member
for Ealing Central and Acton seem to have disappeared
because the new clause leaves out overseas territories and
would apply only to Crown dependencies. If Labour Members
think that such a provision is right for Crown
dependencies, why is it not right for overseas territories?
I do not understand why they have left that out, although I
suspect it is because, when it really comes to it, Labour
Members do not know what they are talking about. If the
Labour party wanted to be successful with this, it might
have done it in its 13 years in Government.
I respect devolution and constitutional arrangements, and
it is important to do that at this stage. Crucially, if we
do this in partnership, we will get there. When we see
people being prosecuted and the system of information
exchange between law enforcement agencies working, we will
have arrived at a successful point. I am confident that we
will get there. I do not shy away from telling the overseas
territories and Crown dependencies that our ambition is for
transparency but, first and foremost, our ambition is for a
central register that is easily interrogated by our law
enforcement agencies.
-
I welcome my hon. Friend’s restatement that the Government
remain committed to transparency. Will he give some kind of
indication of a timetable, once his policy of registers is
fully in place, by which he expects the overseas
territories to be able to move to full transparency?
-
Mr Wallace
The first commitment is for the central register to be in
place by June this year. Where overseas territories have
trouble fulfilling that—for example, they just do not have
the capacity to do it—we have offered help to allow them to
do so. Hopefully that means that we will keep on target. As
for setting a date for the public register, we first have
to complete our own, and get it up and running. Once we
know what challenges are involved in doing that and seeing
how it works, we can have a grown-up discussion with our
G20 partners about when they will do that. We should not
just focus on the overseas territories and Crown
dependencies. Major economies, including our own, are
guilty of allowing people to hide illicit funds, which is
why we introduced this Bill. I suspect we will find many
funds laundered not in those small overseas territories,
but in some major economies in the G20. That is important.
-
A number of the Minister’s hon. Friends used the argument
of competitive disadvantage when speaking against new
clause 6. That is not an argument that the Minister has
addressed at the Dispatch Box. Will he assure us that he is
not saying that, when the time might be right in the
future, and as long as any of the territories cite concerns
about competitive disadvantage, the British Government
would just back off?
-
Mr Wallace
We do have to recognise that there is a difference between
secrecy and privacy; we have to respect that and to
understand when privacy is an advantage and when it is
being used secretly, to create a disadvantage or to avoid
detection. So the difference between secrecy and privacy is
not as straightforward as it would seem. In our lives, we
all deserve some element of privacy. Shareholdings in some
very major private companies, for example, are not
listed—they have to be declared—and that has been
established for many years.
-
Just to clarify the point, some of the Minister’s hon.
Friends said that their grounds for not supporting new
clause 6 were that these territories would be put at a
competitive disadvantage if they had to move to public
registers. Is that the Government’s case, or is that
argument being made by his hon. Friends, but not from the
Dispatch Box?
-
Mr Wallace
The United Kingdom Government do not think they are at a
competitive disadvantage, and that is why we are
progressing with a public register ourselves. However, we
will lead by example and by peer-group pressure; we will
not lead by imposition. That is fundamentally the
difference between the Government and some Members of the
House. That is how we are going to get there.
-
Will the Minister give way?
-
Mr Wallace
No, I have to press on. I am sorry.
The damage caused by economic crime perpetrated on behalf,
or in the name, of companies to individuals, businesses,
the wider economy and the reputation of the United Kingdom
as a place to do business is a very serious matter, and it
comes within the area of corporate failure to prevent
economic crime.
The Government have already taken action in respect of
bribery committed in pursuit of corporate business
objectives, and the Bill will introduce similar offences in
relation to tax evasion. Both sets of offences followed
lengthy public consultations, as is appropriate for such
matters, which involve complex legal and policy issues.
That is why I confirmed in Committee that the Government
would be launching a public call for evidence on corporate
criminal liability for economic crime. That call for
evidence was published on 13 January and is open until 24
March. It will form part of a potentially two-part
consultation process. It openly examines evidence for and
against the case for reform, and seeks views on a number of
possible options, such as the “failure to prevent” model.
Should the responses we receive justify changes to the law,
the Government would then consult on a firm proposal. It
would be wrong to rush into legislation in this area, but I
hope hon. Members will recognise that the Government are
looking closely at this issue, and I encourage them to
contribute to the consultation process.
Let me move on to the issue of limited partnerships, which
was raised by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath
(Roger Mullin) and more generally by members of the
Scottish National party. I am grateful for the work they
have done alongside the Glasgow Herald in highlighting the
abuse of the Scottish limited partnership by criminals
internationally and domestically, and it is important that
we address that issue. We take these allegations very
seriously—only recently, the hon. Gentleman highlighted
another offence to me—and that is why a call for evidence
was issued on 16 January by the Department for Business,
Energy and Industrial Strategy on the need for further
action.
The “Review of limited partnership law” is an exciting
document—I am afraid the graphics man was clearly not in on
the day it was created—but I urge members of the Scottish
National party to respond to it, and I know they have
already done so. They will be interested in one of the
questions, which asks:
“What could the UK government do to reduce the potential of
Limited Partnerships registered in Scotland being used as
an enabler of criminal activity, whilst retaining some or
all of the aspects of those Scottish Limited Partnership
structures which are beneficial?”
I know the Scottish National party will respond to that.
-
What can the Minister tell us about the mystery Committee
that is sitting for one hour today and proposing a new type
of limited partnership that will, in theory, step into the
place of SLPs? That is the sticking issue for me. Is there
anything he can say on that point?
-
Mr Wallace
Well, apart from asking the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and
Cowdenbeath how he has enjoyed his hour on the Committee,
which he has gone off to attend, I think we should look at
this in chronological order. The review is taking place
now. Whatever it produces will, of course, be responded to.
If it is responded to in legislation, that will succeed
whatever is being discussed in that Committee now.
I come now to the issue of tax evasion and the Opposition’s
new clause 11, which returns us to the question of
corporate transparency in overseas territories. I should
stress that the new offences in part 3 of the Bill already
apply in those jurisdictions. First, the domestic tax
evasion offence applies to any entity based anywhere in the
world that fails to prevent a person acting for it, or on
its behalf, from criminally facilitating the evasion of UK
taxes. The overseas offence applies to any entity that
carries out at least part of their business in the United
Kingdom. The only circumstances in which a company is
outside of the scope of these offences is where there is no
connection to the UK: no UK tax loss, no criminal
facilitation from within the UK, and no corporation
carrying out any business. In those situations, it is for
the country suffering the tax loss, and not for the UK, to
respond. The corporate offences are by no means a
one-size-fits-all solution for every country. However, I am
pleased to report that Government officials have spoken to
revenue authorities, regulators and businesses from across
the world about the new corporate offences, and there has
been significant interest in them.
New clause 13 would require the Secretary of State to
produce sentencing guidelines that would stipulate a
maximum financial penalty no greater than the tax evaded.
As hon. Members may be aware, it is the role of Sentencing
Council, under the presidency of the Lord Chief Justice, to
produce sentencing guidelines. The council has already
published a definitive guide of fraud, bribery, and money
laundering offences, including a section on corporate
offenders. Therefore, while I agree that there is merit in
a sentencing guideline for the new corporate offences, it
would not be for the Government to produce it. This could
undermine the independence of the judiciary.
I have sought to cover as many of the concerns that have
been raised as possible. I am grateful to the House for its
patience and for enabling discussion of so many significant
topics. I trust that right hon. and hon. Members are
suitably reassured that we have reflected on all the
amendments in this group and will agree that legislation is
not necessary or appropriate for the reasons I have set
out. I remain open to discussing these matters or any
others with colleagues, and I am sure that we will return
to some of them in the House of Lords. At this stage, I
hope that I have addressed hon. Members’ concerns and
invite them not to press their amendments.
-
I will not press new clause 6 to a vote. I do not believe
that the Minister has really answered the points that have
been made by hon. Members across the House. I am sure that
this matter will be picked up in the other place, and I
reserve the right to pick it up once again with my right
hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge)
when it returns to this place.
-
Sir
My new clause 2 was drafted and tabled before Christmas.
Since then, I have had a number of meetings with my hon.
Friend the Minister and we have also seen the Ministry of
Justice’s call for evidence in relation to corporate
criminal liability. In the light of what he has said this
afternoon, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 17
Public Registers of Beneficial Ownership of Companies
registered in Crown Dependencies
‘(1) In Part 1 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
(introductory), after section 2A, insert—
“2AA Duty of Secretary of State: Public registers of
beneficial ownership of companies registered in Crown
dependencies
(1) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in
furtherance of the purposes of—
(a) this Act; and
(b) Part 3 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017
to take the actions set out in this section.
(2) The first action is, no later than 31 December 2017, to
provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of
Crown Dependencies to enable each of those Governments to
establish a publicly accessible register of the beneficial
ownership of companies registered in that Government’s
jurisdiction.
(3) The second action is, no later than 31 December 2019,
to publish legislative proposals to require the Government
of any Crown dependency that has not already established a
publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership of
companies registered in that Government’s jurisdiction to
do so.
(4) In this section—
“a publicly accessible register of the beneficial ownership
of companies” means a register which, in the opinion of the
Secretary of State, provides information broadly equivalent
to that available in accordance with the provisions of Part
21A of the Companies Act 2006.
“legislative proposals” means either—
(a) a draft Order in Council; or
(b) a Bill presented to either House of Parliament.” —(Dr
Huq.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Division 162
21 February 2017 5.18 pm
The House divided:
Ayes: 180 Noes: 301 Ayes: 180 Noes: 301
Question accordingly negatived.
View Details
New Clause 19
The Culture of the Banking Industry and Failure to Prevent the
Facilitation of Tax Evasion
(1) The Secretary of State must undertake a review into the
extent to which banking culture contributed to the failure to
prevent the facilitation of tax evasion in the banking sector.
(2) The review must consider, but shall not be limited to, the
following issues—
(a) the impact of culture change on decision making senior
executive and board level;
(b) the pressure on staff to meet performance targets;
(c) how allegations of tax evasion are reported and acted on.
(3) The review must set out what steps the UK Government intends
to take to ensure that banking culture is not facilitating tax
evasion.
(4) In carrying out this review, the Secretary of State must
consult—
(a) devolved administrations;
(b) HMRC;
(c) the Serious Fraud Office;
(d) the Financial Conduct Authority;
(e) interested charities, and
(f) anyone else the Secretary of State deems appropriate.
(5) The Secretary of State shall lay a copy of the review before
the House of Commons within six months of this Act receiving
Royal Assent.”—(Richard Arkless.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Division 163
21 February 2017 5.32 pm
The House divided:
Ayes: 241 Noes: 300 Ayes: 241 Noes: 300
Question accordingly negatived.
View Details
Clause 9
Power to extend moratorium period
Amendments made: 2, page 27, line 12, at end
insert “, and
(b) section 336BA, which provides for an automatic extension of
the moratorium period in certain cases (period extended if it
would otherwise end before determination of application or appeal
proceedings etc).”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 9.
Amendment 3, page 27, line 15, at end insert
“, and
(b) section 336BA, which provides for an automatic extension of
the moratorium period in certain cases (period extended if it
would otherwise end before determination of application or appeal
proceedings etc).”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 9.
Amendment 4, page 27, line 35, at end insert—
‘( ) A moratorium period extended in accordance with subsection
(2) or (4) of section 336BA may also be further extended by the
court on the making of an application under this section.”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 9 and clarifies that
where a moratorium period has been extended automatically under
subsection (2) or (4) of new section 336BA it may be further
extended by the court on the making of an application under
section 336A.
Amendment 5, page 28, line 3, at end insert—
“(8) An application under this section may be made by an
immigration officer only if the officer has reasonable grounds
for suspecting that conduct constituting the prohibited act in
relation to which the moratorium period in question applies—
(a) relates to the entitlement of one or more persons who are not
nationals of the United Kingdom to enter, transit across, or be
in, the United Kingdom (including conduct which relates to
conditions or other controls on any such entitlement), or
(b) is undertaken for the purposes of, or otherwise in relation
to, a relevant nationality enactment.
(9) In subsection (8)—
“prohibited act” has the meaning given by section 335(8) or (as
the case may be) section 336(10);
“relevant nationality enactment” means any enactment in—
(a) the British Nationality Act 1981,
(b) the Hong Kong Act 1985,
(c) the Hong Kong (War Wives and Widows) Act 1996,
(d) the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act 1997,
(e) the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, or
(f) an instrument made under any of those Acts.”
This amendment is consequential on amendments 13 and 14 and
ensures that immigration officers may exercise their powers to
make applications to extend the moratorium period only for the
purposes of their immigration functions.
Amendment 6, page 28, line 6, at end insert—
“( ) The court must determine the proceedings as soon as
reasonably practicable.”
This amendment requires the court to determine proceedings on
applications to extend the moratorium period as quickly as
possible.
Amendment 7, page 28, line 31, leave out from
“appeal” to “may” in line 33 and insert “lies to the appropriate
appeal court on a point of law arising from a decision made by
the Crown Court in Northern Ireland or by the sheriff.
‘( ) The appropriate appeal court”.
This amendment provides for rights of appeals on applications to
extend the moratorium period in Northern Ireland or Scotland.
Rights of appeal in relation to England and Wales are already
available under section 28 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.
Amendment 8, page 28, line 35, at end insert—
‘( ) The appropriate appeal court is—
(a) in the case of a decision of the Crown Court in Northern
Ireland, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland;
(b) in the case of a decision of the sheriff, the Sheriff Appeal
Court.
( ) For rights of appeal in the case of decisions made by the
Crown Court in England and Wales, see section 28 of the Senior
Courts Act 1981 (appeals from Crown Court and inferior courts).”
This amendment provides for the meaning of “appropriate appeal
court” for the purposes of amendment 7.
Amendment 9, page 28, line 35, at end insert—
“336BA Extension of moratorium period pending determination of
proceedings etc
(1) A moratorium period is extended in accordance with subsection
(2) where—
(a) an application is made to the court under section 336A for
the extension (or further extension) of the moratorium period,
and
(b) the period would (apart from that subsection) end before the
court determines the application or it is otherwise disposed of.
(2) The moratorium period is extended from the time when it would
otherwise end until the court determines the application or it is
otherwise disposed of.
(3) A moratorium period is extended in accordance with subsection
(4) where—
(a) proceedings on an appeal in respect of a decision on an
application under section 336A have been brought, and
(b) the period would (apart from that subsection) end before the
proceedings are finally determined or otherwise disposed of.
(4) The moratorium period is extended from the time when it would
otherwise end until the proceedings are finally determined or
otherwise disposed of.
(5) But the maximum period by which the moratorium period is
extended by virtue of subsection (2) or (4) is 31 days beginning
with the day after the day on which the period would otherwise
have ended.
(6) A moratorium period is extended in accordance with subsection
(7) where—
(a) an application is made to the court under section 336A for an
extension of the period,
(b) the court refuses to grant the application, and
(c) the period would (apart from that subsection) end before the
end of the 5 day period.
(7) The moratorium period is extended from the time when it would
otherwise end until—
(a) the end of the 5 day period, or
(b) if proceedings on an appeal against the decision are brought
before the end of the 5 day period, the time when those
proceedings are brought.
(8) The “5 day period” is the period of 5 working days beginning
with the day on which the court refuses to grant the application.
(9) This restriction on the overall extension of a moratorium
period mentioned in section 336A(6) applies to an extension of a
moratorium period in accordance with any provision of this
section as it applies to an extension under an order of the
court.”
This amendment provides for the automatic extension of the
moratorium period (up to a maximum of 31 days) in circumstances
where an application for its extension has been made under new
section 336A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 but proceedings on
that application have not been determined before the period would
otherwise end or where an appeal has been brought in relation to
such an application that has yet to be determined when the period
would otherwise end. It also provides for a 5 day extension where
a court refuses a section 336A application for the purposes of
enabling the applicant to bring appeal proceedings before the
period would otherwise end.
Amendment 10, page 28, line 36, leave out
“and 336B” and insert “to 336BA”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 9.
Amendment 11, page 28, line 38, leave out
“and 336B” and insert “to 336BA”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 9.
Amendment 12, page 29, line 6, at end insert
“or in accordance with any provision of section 336BA”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 9.
Amendment 13, page 29, line 27, at end
insert—
“() an immigration officer who is not below such grade as is
designated by the Secretary of State as equivalent to that rank,”
This amendment enables senior immigration officers to make
applications in England and Wales and Northern Ireland to extend
the moratorium period under new section 336A of the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002.
Amendment 14, page 29, line 46, at end
insert—
“() an immigration officer who is not below such grade as is
designated by the Secretary of State as equivalent to that rank.”
This amendment enables senior immigration officers to make
applications in Scotland to extend the moratorium period under
new section 336A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
Amendment 15, page 29, line 46, at end
insert—
“( ) “Working day” means a day other than—
(a) a Saturday,
(b) a Sunday,
(c) Christmas Day,
(d) Good Friday, or
(e) a day which is a bank holiday under the Banking and Financial
Dealings Act 1971 in the part of the United Kingdom in which the
application in question under section 336A is made.”—(Mr
Wallace.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 9.
Clause 11
Further information notices and orders
Amendments made: 16, page 35, line 16, after
“notice” insert “under this section”.
This is a minor drafting amendment that ensures stylistic
consistency with corresponding provisions in the Bill.
Amendment 17, page 35, line 17, after
“notice” insert “under this section”.
This is a minor drafting amendment that ensures stylistic
consistency with corresponding provisions in the Bill.
Amendment 18, page 37, line 32, leave out
from “order” to “may” in line 33 and insert “made by a
magistrates’ court, the magistrates’ court”.
This amendment has the effect that the power to impose a civil
penalty for failing to comply with a further information order
made under new section 339ZJ of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
(inserted by clause 11) would not apply in relation to Scotland
to orders made by the sheriff.
Amendment 19, page 37, line 35, leave out
from beginning to second “the”.—(Mr Wallace.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 18.
Ordered,
That subsection (3) of clause 12 be transferred to the end of
line 19 on page 92.—(Mr Wallace.)
This is to move the amendment of Schedule 1 to the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001from clause 12 into
clause 34. Clause 34 makes other amendments of that Schedule, all
of which also relate to the forfeiture of terrorist cash.
Clause 13
Forfeiture of certain personal (or moveable) property
Amendments made: 20, page 42, line 21, leave
out from “only” to end of line 23 and insert “if the officer has
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the unlawful conduct in
question relates to an assigned matter (within the meaning of the
Customs and Excise Management Act 1979);”.
In addition to removing the restriction on powers discussed in
the explanatory statement for NC8, this amendment provides that
where an HMRC officer exercises the new powers (inserted by
clause 13 into the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) to search for a
listed asset the officer must suspect that the unlawful conduct
in question would relate to an assigned matter (that is, any
matter in relation to which HMRC has powers or duties other than
in relation to devolved tax matters). This is in line with the
powers to search for cash in section 289 of the 2002 Act (as
amended by mendment 67).
Amendment 21, page 42, leave out lines 32 to 35.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 20.
Amendment 22, page 43, line 10, at end
insert—
“(\ca) in relation to the exercise of a power by a National Crime
Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency
or any other National Crime Agency officer authorised by the
Director General (whether generally or specifically) for this
purpose;”.
It is intended that National Crime Agency officers will access
the powers conferred by new Chapter 3A of Part 5 of the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002 by being designated under section 10 of the
Crime and Courts Act 2013 as having the powers and privileges of
a constable or by being accredited financial investigators. This
amendment sets out who is to be a “senior officer” for the
purposes of Chapter 3A when a power is exercised by such an NCA
officer.
Amendment 23, page 43, line 22, leave out
“paragraph (d)” and insert “any of the preceding paragraphs”.
This amendment is partly consequential on amendment 22. It also
caters for the possibility that an accredited financial
investigator could fall within any of existing paragraphs (a) to
(c) of new section 303E(4) and not just paragraph (d).
Amendment 24, page 45, line 6, at end insert—
“(2A) The Secretary of State must also consult the Attorney
General about the draft in its application to the exercise of
powers by SFO officers and the Director of the Serious Fraud
Office.”
This amendment inserts into the provision about the making of a
code of practice by the Secretary of State the equivalent of new
subsection (2A) of section 292 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
that is inserted by paragraph 14(3) of Schedule 1 to the Bill.
Amendment 25, page 47, leave out lines 13 to 21.
See the explanatory statement for NC8.
Amendment 26, page 56, line 41, at end
insert—
“( ) If the property was seized by a National Crime Agency
officer, the compensation is to be paid by the National Crime
Agency.”
This amendment sets out by whom compensation is to be paid under
new section 303W of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 if property
seized under new Chapter 3A of Part 5 of that Act was seized by a
National Crime Agency officer. See also the explanatory statement
for amendment 22.
Amendment 27, page 56, line 44, after
“officer” insert “or a National Crime Agency officer”.—(Mr
Wallace.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 26.
Clause 14
Forfeiture of money held in bank and building society accounts
Amendments made: 28, page 59, leave out lines 32 to 40.
See the explanatory statement for New Clause NC8.
Amendment 29, page 60, line 5, at end insert—
“( ) the Director General of the National Crime Agency or any
other National Crime Agency officer authorised by the Director
General (whether generally or specifically) for this purpose,
or”.
It is intended that National Crime Agency officers will access
the powers conferred by new Chapter 3B of Part 5 of the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002 by being designated under section 10 of the
Crime and Courts Act 2013 as having the powers and privileges of
a constable or by being accredited financial investigators. This
amendment sets out who within the NCA is to be a “senior officer”
for the purposes of Chapter 3B.
Amendment 30, page 65, line 34, at end
insert—
“( ) Where money is released by virtue of subsection (6)(a),
there must be added to the money on its release any interest
accrued on it whilst in the account referred to in section
303Z9(6)(b).”
If, under new section 303Z12 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, a
court sets aside the forfeiture of money pursuant to an account
forfeiture notice, this amendment provides that there must be
added to the money that is released any interest accrued on that
money in the period since its forfeiture.
Amendment 31, page 67, line 33, at end
insert—
“( ) Where money is released by virtue of subsection (4), there
must be added to the money on its release any interest accrued on
it whilst in the account referred to in section 303Z14(7)(a).”
If, under new section 303Z16 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, a
court upholds an appeal against the making of a forfeiture order
and orders the release of all or part of the forfeited money,
this amendment provides that there must be added to the money
that is released any interest accrued on that money in the period
since its forfeiture.
Amendment 32, page 68, line 33, at end
insert—
“( ) If the account freezing order was applied for by a National
Crime Agency officer, the compensation is to be paid by the
National Crime Agency.”
This amendment sets out by whom compensation is to be paid under
new section 303Z18 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 if an
account freezing order made under new Chapter 3B of Part 5 of
that Act was applied for by a National Crime Agency officer. See
also the explanatory statement for amendment 29.
Amendment 33, page 68, line 36, after
“officer” insert “or a National Crime Agency officer”.—(Mr
Wallace.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 32.
Clause 28
Accredited financial investigators
Amendments made: 34, page 80, line 6, leave
out paragraph (b).
The amendment made by the provision that is left out now forms
part of the amendment made by amendment 64.
Amendment 35, page 80, line 15, leave out
paragraph (b).
The amendment made by the provision that is left out now forms
part of the amendment made by amendment 65.
Amendment 36, page 80, line 32, leave out
paragraph (b). —(Mr Wallace.)
The amendment made by the provision that is left out now forms
part of the amendment made by amendment 68.
Clause 30
Confiscation orders and civil recovery: minor amendments
Amendments made: 37, page 80, line 44, at end
insert—
“(3A) In section 230 (free property: Northern Ireland), in
subsection (3)(b) for “or 297D” substitute “, 297D or 298(4)”.”
Clause 30(2) and (3) amends sections 82 and 148 of the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002, which determine what constitutes “free
property”, in relation to confiscation proceedings in England and
Wales and Scotland respectively, by providing that property
detained under section 298(4) of the 2002 Act is not free
property. This amendment provides for a corresponding change to
be made to section 230, which applies in the case of confiscation
proceedings in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 38, page 81, line 4, at end insert—
“( ) In section 290 (prior approval to exercise of section 289
search powers), in subsection (4), after paragraph (aa) (inserted
by Schedule 1 to this Act) insert—
“(ab) in relation to the exercise of a power by a National Crime
Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency
or any other National Crime Agency officer authorised by the
Director General (whether generally or specifically) for this
purpose,”.
( ) In section 297A (forfeiture notice), in subsection (6), after
paragraph (ba) (inserted by Schedule 1 to this Act, but before
the “or” at the end of that paragraph) insert—
“(bb) the Director General of the National Crime Agency or any
other National Crime Agency officer authorised by the Director
General (whether generally or specifically) for this purpose,”.
( ) In section 302 (compensation), after subsection (7ZA)
(inserted by Schedule 1 to this Act) insert—
“(7ZB) If the cash was seized by a National Crime Agency officer,
the compensation is to be paid by the National Crime
Agency.””—(Mr Wallace.)
This amendment clarifies the way in which Chapter 3 of Part 5 of
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is to operate when powers are
exercised by a National Crime Agency officer who has been
designated under section 10 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 as
having the powers and privileges of a constable or who is an
accredited financial investigator.
Clause 33
Further information notices and orders
Amendments made: 39, page 87, line 40, after
first “notice” insert “under this section”.
This is a minor drafting amendment that ensures stylistic
consistency with corresponding provisions in the Bill.
Amendment 40, page 88, line 1, after “notice”
insert “under this section”.
This is a minor drafting amendment that ensures stylistic
consistency with corresponding provisions in the Bill.
Amendment 41, page 88, line 2, after “notice”
insert “under this section”.
This is a minor drafting amendment that ensures stylistic
consistency with corresponding provisions in the Bill.
Amendment 42, page 90, line 20, leave out
from “order” to “may” in line 21 and insert “made by a
magistrates’ court, the magistrates’ court”.
This amendment has the effect that the power to impose a civil
penalty for failing to comply with a further information order
made under new section 22D of the Terrorism Act 2000 (inserted by
clause 33) would not apply in relation to Scotland to orders made
by the sheriff.
Amendment 43, page 90, line 23, leave out
from beginning to second “the”.—(Mr Wallace.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 42.
Clause 52
Extent
Amendments made: 44, page 109, line 20, at
end insert—
“() section (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs: removal of
restrictions)(4)(c);”.
This amendment is consequential on NC8.
Amendment 45, page 109, line 30, at end
insert—
“() section (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs: removal of
restrictions)(2), (3) and (4)(d);”.
This amendment is consequential on NC8.
Amendment 46, page 109, line 39, at end
insert—
“() section30(3A).”—(Mr Wallace.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 37.
Clause 53
Commencement
Amendments made: 47, page 110, line 10, after
“28(3)” insert “and 30(3A)”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 37.
Amendment 48, page 110, line 13, after
“Sections” insert “(Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs: removal of
restrictions),”.
This amendment provides for NC8 to come into force two months
after Royal Assent.
Amendment 49, page 111, line 1, at end
insert—
“( ) section12(1) and (2);”.
This amendment provides for consultation with the Scottish
Ministers before the Secretary of State makes regulations
commencing clause 12(1) and (2) of the Bill.
Amendment 50, page 111, line 13, at end
insert—
“( ) section12(1) and (2);”.—(Mr Wallace.)
This amendment provides for consultation with the Department of
Justice in Northern Ireland before the Secretary of State makes
regulations commencing clause 12(1) and (2) of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Powers of members of staff of Serious Fraud Office
Amendment made: 51, page 114, line 32, leave
out sub-paragraph (3).—(Mr Wallace.)
The amendment made by the provision that is left out now forms
part of the amendment made by amendment 69.
Schedule 3
Forfeiture of certain personal (or moveable) property
Amendment made: 52, page 124, line 44, after
first “to” insert “a magistrates’ court,”. —(Mr Wallace.)
The amendment mirrors for new Part 4A of Schedule 1 to the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 the change being made
to existing Schedule 1 to the 2001 Act by amendment 60.
Schedule 4
Forfeiture of money held in bank and building society accounts
Amendments made: 53, page 135, line 35, after
“But” insert “—
(a)”
The amendment is consequential on amendment 54.
Amendment 54, page 135, line 37, at end
insert “, and
(b) the senior officer must consult the Treasury before making
the application for the order or (as the case may be) authorising
the application to be made, unless in the circumstances it is not
reasonably practicable to do so.”
The amendment introduces a consultation requirement into the
process of applying for an account freezing order under new Part
4B of Schedule 1 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001. The requirement to consult will enable the Treasury to
consider whether it is a case in which it should be exercising
its powers under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010.
Amendment 55, page 140, line 28, after
“aside” insert “(or recalling)”.
This amendment takes account of the fact that in Scotland an
account freezing order will be recalled rather than set aside.
Amendment 56, page 142, line 7, at end
insert—
“( ) Where money is released by virtue of sub-paragraph (6)(a),
there must be added to the money on its release any interest
accrued on it whilst in the account referred to in paragraph
10W(6)(b).”
If, under new paragraph 10Z of Schedule 1 to the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001, a court sets aside the forfeiture of
money pursuant to an account forfeiture notice, this amendment
provides that there must be added to the money that is released
any interest accrued on that money in the period since its
forfeiture.
Amendment 57, page 144, line 20, at end
insert—
“( ) Where money is released by virtue of sub-paragraph (5),
there must be added to the money on its release any interest
accrued on it whilst in the account referred to in paragraph
10Z2(7)(a).”— (Mr Wallace.)
If, under new paragraph 10Z4 of Schedule 1 to the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001, a court upholds an appeal against
the making of a forfeiture order and orders the release of all or
part of the forfeited money, this amendment provides that there
must be added to the money that is released any interest accrued
on that money in the period since its forfeiture.
Schedule 5
Minor and consequential amendments
Amendments made: 60, page 148, line 18, at
end insert—
“( ) In paragraph 3(3A), in the words before paragraph (a), after
“application to” insert “a magistrates’ court,”
This amendment inserts a reference to a magistrates’ court into
paragraph 3(3A) of Schedule 1 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001, which concerns the making of the first
application to extend a period of detention of seized cash and
allows the application to be made and heard without notice and
heard and determined in private.
Amendment 61, page 149, line 4, at end
insert—
“( ) After paragraph 10Z8 (inserted by section 38) insert—
Part 4D
Proceedings under this Schedule
Powers for prosecutors to appear in proceedings
10Z9 (1) The Director of Public Prosecutions or the Director of
Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland may appear for a person
mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) in proceedings under this Schedule
if the Director—
(a) is asked by, or on behalf of, the person to do so, and
(b) considers it appropriate to do so.
(2) The persons referred to in sub-paragraph (1) are—
(a) a constable;
(b) a counter-terrorism financial investigator;
(c) the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs;
(d) an officer of Revenue and Customs;
(e) an immigration officer.
(3) The Director of Public Prosecutions may authorise a person
(generally or specifically) to carry out the functions of the
Director under sub-paragraph (1) if the person is—
(a) a member of the Director’s staff;
(b) a person providing services under arrangements made by the
Director.
(4) The Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director of
Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland may charge fees for the
provision of services under this paragraph.””
This amendment inserts an additional Part into Schedule 1 to the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, conferring power on
the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director of Public
Prosecutions for Northern Ireland to appear in proceedings under
the Schedule. It is the equivalent of section 302A of the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, read with section 2C of that Act.
Amendment 62, page 149, line 18, leave out
“In section 2C (prosecuting authorities), in” and insert—
“(1) Section 2C (prosecuting authorities) is amended as follows.
(2) In”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 63.
Amendment 63, page 149, line 18, at end
insert—
“(3) In subsection (3A), after “302A” insert “, 303X or 303Z19”.”
This amendment inserts into Schedule 5 to the Bill an amendment
of section 2C(3A) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 which is
consequential on clauses 13 and 14 of the Bill. Section 2C(3A)
prevents section 2C(3) from applying to the functions that the
Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland has under
section 302A of the 2002 Act. New sections 303X and 303Z19 of
that Act, which are added to section 2C(3A) by the amendment,
mirror section 302A.
Amendment 64, page 149, line 27, at end
insert—
“17A In section 47G (appropriate approval for exercise of search
and seizure powers in England and Wales), in subsection (3)(c),
after “investigator”, in the first place it occurs, insert “who
does not fall within any of the preceding paragraphs”.”
This amendment clarifies that an accredited financial
investigator could fall within any of paragraphs (a) to new (ba)
of section 47G(3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. See also the
explanatory statement for amendment 34.
Amendment 65, page 150, line 26, at end
insert—
“21A In section 195G (appropriate approval for exercise of search
and seizure powers in Northern Ireland), in subsection (3)(c),
after “investigator”, in the first place it occurs, insert “who
does not fall within any of the preceding paragraphs”.”
This amendment clarifies that an accredited financial
investigator could fall within any of paragraphs (a) to new (ba)
of section 195G(3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. See also
the explanatory statement for amendment 35.
Amendment 66, page 150, line 33, at end
insert—
“( ) in paragraph (b) (as amended by section 30(3A) of this Act),
for “or 298(4)” substitute “, 298(4) or 303O(5)”;”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 37.
Amendment 67, page 151, line 19, at end
insert—
“25A In section 289 (searches), in subsection (5)(b) for “a
customs officer” substitute “an officer of Revenue and Customs”.”
This amendment corrects an out of date reference to a customs
officer.
Amendment 68, page 151, leave out line 20 and insert—
“26 (1) Section 290 (prior approval) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (4)(c), after “investigator”, in the first
place it occurs, insert “who does not fall within any of the
preceding paragraphs”.
(3) After subsection (6) insert—”.
This amendment is partly consequential on amendment 38. It also
clarifies that an accredited financial investigator could fall
within any of paragraphs (a) to new (ba) of section 290(4) of the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. See also the explanatory statement
for amendment 36.
Amendment 69, page 151, line 25, at end
insert—
“26A In section 302 (compensation), in subsection (7A), for “or a
constable” substitute “, a constable, an SFO officer or a
National Crime Agency officer”.”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 38. See also the
explanatory statement for amendment 51.
Amendment 70, page 152, line 33, leave out
from beginning to “in” and insert—
“(1) Section 333D (tipping off: other permitted disclosures) is
amended as follows.
(2)”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 71.
Amendment 71, page 152, line 39, at end
insert—
“( ) After subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) Where an application is made to extend a moratorium period
under section 336A, a person does not commit an offence under
section 333A if—
(a) the disclosure is made to a customer or client of the person,
(b) the customer or client appears to the person making the
disclosure to have an interest in the relevant property, and
(c) the disclosure contains only such information as is necessary
for the purposes of notifying the customer or client that the
application under section 336A has been made.
“Moratorium period” and “relevant property” have the meanings
given in section 336C.’”
This amendment provides that a person carrying on a business in
the regulated sector does not commit a tipping off offence under
section 333A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 simply by telling
a customer that an application to extend a moratorium period,
which would prevent a transaction with the customer being
concluded, has been made.
Amendment 72, page 162, line 21, at end
insert—
“68A In section 445 (external investigations), omit subsection
(3).” —(Mr Wallace.)
Section 445 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 confers a power
enabling orders to be made corresponding to those under Part 8 of
that Act in connection with external investigations. Subsection
(3) of that section provides that the power cannot be exercised
so as to enable a disclosure order to be made for the purposes of
an external investigation into whether a money laundering offence
has been committed. This amendment removes that restriction, in
line with clauses 7 and 8.
-
(Workington) (Lab)
On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I wonder whether you could
advise me. I have been to Downing Street today, along with
a constituent who had travelled all the way from west
Cumbria to hand in a petition. Unfortunately, we were
turned away at the gates. I was told that I would not be
allowed to go to Downing Street to hand in a petition that
had been booked in through the proper procedures. We had
been offered a time to hand in a petition about health
services, so it was understood what the petition was about.
However, when I asked the security officer from No. 10
Downing Street why I was not allowed to hand in the
petition, as had been agreed, he told me that today was
“not a good day”. When I pressed him, he told me that I
could hand in the petition “after Thursday”.
I am concerned that I have been prevented from handing in a
petition that was properly booked in, through the proper
procedures, because of a by-election, and that this has
been politicised. Can you advise me, Mr Speaker, on what is
my best course of action?
-
Mr Speaker
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her point of order and
for giving me a moment’s notice of it. She is clearly
concerned and aggrieved. My initial response is to say to
her that this is not a point of order for the Chair, or,
for that matter, a subject for the House authorities. I
understand her concern, not least in terms of personal
inconvenience, and I trust that her point of order has been
heard on the Treasury Bench. It is very much a matter for
Ministers, with whom it has not been registered, but I
repeat that it is not a matter for the Chair.
Third Reading
5.48 pm
-
Mr Wallace
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Financial profit is at the heart of almost all forms of
serious and organised crime, which directly affects the
most vulnerable in society. The Bill will significantly
improve our ability to tackle money laundering, corruption,
tax evasion and terrorist financing. It is a key part of
the Government’s critical work to reduce the flow of dirty
money into the City and to cut off the funding streams to
the fraudsters, money launderers and kleptocrats.
This country is the largest centre for cross-border
banking. The UK is, and will remain, a good place to do
business. However, the National Crime Agency estimates that
up to £90 billion may be laundered here each year. I have
made it clear—as has my right hon. Friend the Prime
Minister and, indeed, her predecessor—that we need to make
the UK a hostile environment for those seeking to move,
hide and use the proceeds of crime and corruption. In an
increasingly competitive international marketplace, the UK
simply cannot afford to be seen as a haven for dirty money.
We must not turn a blind eye to the money of corrupt
officials that flows through businesses, banks and
property, and that is why the Bill is so important.
I thank the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member
for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), and the
hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq), as well
as the hon. Members for Dumfries and Galloway (Richard
Arkless) and for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Roger Mullin),
for their input throughout the Bill’s passage so far. Other
hon. Members have also brought considerable knowledge and
expertise to the proceedings.
The Government, and I as the Minister concerned, have been
determined to be open to input from all parties, and I am
pleased that we have made some concessions towards
addressing the issues raised. I know we have not dealt with
all the concerns raised, but I hope that I have made sure
that the Bill leaving this place is better than when it was
introduced and that it has taken on the points raised by
both the Labour party and the SNP, and indeed by my hon.
Friends on the Conservative Back Benches.
We had further detailed debate of the Bill on Report today,
with many well-informed contributions from all parts of the
House. The debate has covered the scope of the unexplained
wealth orders and other powers in part 1 of the Bill, as
well as the corporate offences regarding the failure to
prevent the facilitation of tax evasion.
Of course much of today’s debate has focused on issues that
were not part of the Bill itself, notably the new clause in
the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton
(Mr Raab) and the right hon. Member for Barking (Dame
Margaret Hodge) and others, which sought to impose
sanctions on those involved in gross human rights abuse or
violations overseas. The strength of feeling on this issue
is clear, and the treatment of Sergei Magnitsky was
undeniably deplorable.
This Government are committed to promoting and
strengthening universal human rights globally. Our approach
focuses on holding to account those states responsible for
the worst violations of human rights and working with those
states determined to strengthen protections against abuse.
But we have listened to the House, and our amendment will
allow for the recovery of property connected with torture
or cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment overseas. This
sends out the strong message that those seeking to profit
from torture and other serious abuses will not be able to
do so in the UK.
The House also debated the commitments made by the overseas
territories to tackling corruption and money laundering in
their financial systems. The UK is at the forefront of the
global approach to increasing corporate transparency and
tackling tax evasion and corruption. That work started
under , and it continues.
I share the desire for the Crown dependencies and overseas
territories to take further steps towards full corporate
transparency. That is why this Government continue to work
closely with them towards that goal, but we must recognise
the significant progress they have already made, putting
them well ahead of many other jurisdictions.
The Bill and the wider package of measures of which it is a
part will give agencies the powers they need to ensure that
crime does not pay in a Britain that works for everyone. It
is important that these powers are available to all parts
of the UK, but, as I have said, we will await the outcome
of elections in Northern Ireland before we commence the
provisions there.
The need for this legislation is significant and
particularly timely as we negotiate our future relationship
with the European Union. Now, more than ever, we must
showcase the UK as one of the best places in the world to
do business, as we form new ties with international friends
and partners.
Serious and organised crime costs the UK at least £24
billion annually and deprives people of their security and
prosperity. We task our law enforcement agencies with
combating the evolving threat from both criminals and
terrorists, and I pay credit to those agencies for all the
work they do on our behalf, but without the necessary
powers to pursue and prevent these illicit activities, they
fight a losing battle.
This Government have done more than any other to tackle
money laundering and terrorist financing, but the scale of
the threat is clear and we must do more. This Bill sends
the clear message that we will not stand for money
laundering or the funding of terrorism through the UK, and
I commend it to the House.
5.53 pm
-
Ms (Hackney North and Stoke
Newington) (Lab)
We in the Opposition broadly support the thrust of this
legislation, and we have noted that the Minister has proved
to be a listening Minister, which we welcome.
Tax avoidance and money laundering are the opposite of
victimless crimes. In the first instance, there are inflated
asset prices in the territories where the money is laundered,
and there is no bigger example of that than the housing
market in this country, particularly in London. In some of
the most expensive parts of London, we can walk down streets
where most of the houses are completely empty. Some might be
empty because it is the wrong time of year for their owner to
be there, and others because they have been bought as an
investment, but increasing numbers of those properties are
being used to launder money, and if this legislation can bear
down on that, it will be of value not least to people who are
victims of the wildly inflated London housing market.
Tax avoidance and money laundering mean a loss of tax for
some of the poorest communities in the world. I was in Ghana
last year looking at tax avoidance and evasion, and I was
struck by the fact that a woman selling drinks by the side of
the road could pay proportionally more tax than some of the
biggest drinks manufacturers in the world. These are
distorted systems of taxation, and if this legislation can
bear down on that type of tax avoidance, it is to be
welcomed. I was pleased to hear the Minister say that we are
beginning to return money to some of those territories,
notably Macau. I believe that we have also signed an accord
with Nigeria. Above all, this legislation is important for
suppressing corruption. It is not just a law-enforcement
measure; it is also, indirectly, an anti-corruption measure.
I remind the House that the genesis of the Bill was the
Panama papers, which revealed extremely widespread and highly
lucrative avoidance of tax on an industrial scale. There were
11 million leaked files, and Britain was the second most
prominent country in which the law firms’ middlemen operated.
It was second only to Hong Kong. One British overseas
territory, the British Virgin Islands, was by far the most
popular tax haven state used by the firms in the documents.
The Minister has said that we are at the forefront of taking
action on tax avoidance and money laundering, and so we
should be. The UK has sovereignty over one third of tax
havens internationally.
We welcome the Government’s new clause 7, which will bear
down on money recycled as a consequence of human rights
abuses elsewhere. We still believe that there is insufficient
scope for the civil recovery of assets, and the enforcement
powers in the civil recovery provisions could be improved.
There are particularly important omissions regarding the
penalties for offences relating to the facilitation of tax
avoidance, involving middlemen such as lawyers, accountants
and straightforward spivs such as those identified in the
Panama papers.
On the disclosure of beneficial ownership, we feel that there
is a major problem, as the lack of disclosure can help to
facilitate money laundering and corruption. Let us take an
example. In the Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills consultation paper published in March 2016, the
Government said that between 2004 and 2014, more than £180
million-worth of property in the UK was being investigated by
UK law enforcement agencies as it was suspected of being
funded by the proceeds of corruption. Moreover, more than 75%
of those properties had offshore corporate ownership. That is
believed to be the tip of the iceberg in terms of scale and
of the proceeds of corruption being invested in UK property
through offshore companies.
On the British overseas territories and Crown dependencies, I
understand the technical argument that we cannot apply the
same regime to those areas, but the moral issue is
substantially the same. Some Members have spoken as though
the populations of those territories as a whole benefit from
financial services, but that is not the case. Only in recent
years has the financial services industry been open to
employing people born and bred on those islands in advisory,
legal and management positions. Just because the political
elites in those countries argue for light-touch regulation,
let us not delude ourselves that financial services are
helping the territories as a whole. We believe that the
argument that we cannot impose proper standards on those
territories is false. UK jurisdiction applies in all matters
of defence and security, and the House has a right and a duty
to see how best to impose those laws.
The people who are benefiting from the secrecy and the lack
of regulation are the tax evaders and avoiders, the money
launderers, the major criminal enterprises and the terrorist
networks. We urge the Government to move forward on those
issues. If legislation is required for onshore activity here
in the UK, most reasonable people would argue that it is even
more pressing to include overseas territories and Crown
dependencies.
The Opposition are calling for a wide-ranging review of the
UK tax gap, including an assessment of the loss of income tax
due to tax evasion. As several Members on both sides of the
House have said, if the legislation simply rests on the
statute book and does not result in commensurate
prosecutions, it will be a dead letter. We note that the
Minister has listened thus far, and I hope that the
Government and the appropriate Departments are listening when
I urge them to ensure that the legislation amounts to more
than just good intentions and that it is actively used to
bear down on tax evasion, money laundering and corruption.
-
Mr Speaker
This debate has been concluded with notable speed.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
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