Delivered to the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna, 10 September
2026. Agenda item: Transfer of the nuclear materials in the
context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT.
"Chair,
I take the floor on behalf of the United Kingdom, Australia and
the United States to reject the claims we have just heard about
Australia's acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered
submarines through AUKUS. Australia's decision to develop this
capability is fully consistent with the letter and spirit of the
NPT and the global safeguards framework.
We have just heard certain statements that are designed to sow
doubt in your mind about whether or not this is legitimate. We
have heard unsubstantiated claims about our activities that try
to falsely imply a compliance issue where none exists. China has
repeatedly used this Board agenda item to promote a political
narrative.
The repeated inclusion of this item undermines the right of all
Member States to engage directly and in-confidence with the IAEA
on safeguards and verification arrangements. For all these
reasons, we must take the floor on this item at every Board to
challenge such interference and call it out for what it is.
We continue to question the utility of China's item. It is
politically motivated and has never enjoyed consensus. It adds
unnecessary time and cost to the Board's operations, and it
undermines the Director General's independent technical mandate
on Australia's naval nuclear propulsion programme. This is in
none of our interests.
Chair,
The Board has repeatedly heard allegations that ignore
information provided by AUKUS partners in good faith and
contradict the Director General's statements.
The facts are clear:
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AUKUS partners are fully complying with their respective
international obligations, including under the NPT, the
Treaty of Rarotonga and its Protocols, and Australia's IAEA
safeguards agreements.
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The IAEA Statute authorises the Agency to negotiate
safeguards and verification arrangements directly and
confidentially with Member States. Political interference
such as that proposed would weaken its independence and
technical authority and should concern us all.
-
Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the
NPT. Article 14 of the IAEA's model CSA (INFCIRC/153) on
which Australia's CSA is based is the specific provision
enabling States Parties to use nuclear material in Naval
Nuclear Propulsion, within the safeguards framework.
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The NPT permits the transfer of nuclear material at any
enrichment level provided the transfer is not for nuclear
weapons and is carried out in a manner consistent with any
relevant safeguards obligations. Australia's programme will
be subject to a robust package of safeguards and verification
measures, consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation
obligations. Australia's Article 14 arrangement will enable
the Agency to continue meeting its technical objectives.
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Once Australia and the Secretariat agree an Article 14
arrangement, it will come to the Board for appropriate
action. Suggestions that the Board will be bypassed are
categorically false.
-
Contrary to the false assertions we have heard, AUKUS
partners have been transparent in updating this Board about
our work to support Australia's preparations to operate
conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
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As we have informed the Board, UK and US submarine visits to
Australia, including through Submarine Rotational Force-West
from 2027, are central to preparing Australia to operate,
maintain and steward nuclear-powered submarines safely and
securely. Direct experience alongside AUKUS partners is the
most effective way to build this capability. These visits are
consistent with AUKUS partners' international obligations. We
will update the Board again about recent developments under
Any Other Business.
Chair,
Since AUKUS was first announced in 2021, AUKUS partners have
provided extensive updates at every regular Board, all of which
are available online. We encourage China and others to review
these and raise any further questions directly with AUKUS
partners, rather than taking up the Board's valuable time on
issues that have already been addressed.
We will continue our open and transparent engagement on AUKUS,
update the Board under Any Other Business, and welcome further
reports from the Director General when he considers them
appropriate.
Thank you, Chair."
