New research from the Institute of
Economic Affairs (IEA) by economist Jessop examines two of the most
widely blamed causes of the UK's poor economic performance over
the past decade and a half: fiscal "austerity" after 2010 and the
2016 vote to leave the European Union. It concludes that the
evidence for either being a major drag on growth is much weaker
than commonly assumed.
Austerity: necessary
restraint, not "savage cuts
Claims of lasting damage to growth or
productivity caused by austerity' are not well supported by the
evidence. The 2010s is widely mischaracterised as a decade of
savage cuts that undermined the foundations of the economy. But
the degree of cuts is overstated; spending restraint was
necessary to protect fiscal credibility; and there is nothing to
suggest that spending more would have been
growth-enhancing.
Public spending was held broadly
steady in real terms between 2010-11 and 2019-20. The fall in
spending as a share of GDP simply took it back to the levels
which were normal before the Global Financial Crisis. Moreover,
this was a period of relatively rapid growth in public services
productivity.
Fiscal consolidation succeeded in
bringing borrowing under control. The annual budget deficit fell
from 8.7% to 2.6% of GDP, and the cyclically-adjusted current
budget deficit was nearly
eliminated.
Jessop does show that capital budgets
took a bigger hit and argues that some of the cuts to
environmental protection, defence and justice now look
short-sighted. But he also argues that a major programme of
public works in the 2010s could have been just as wasteful as HS2
is proving to be now.
Brexit: a "bewildering range"
of estimates
The paper presents similar scepticism
of claims about the economic cost of Brexit. It shows that the
OBR's assumption of a 4% long-run hit to productivity was a crude
average of 13 external studies, nine of which suggested a smaller
impact, and that the OBR's assumption of a 15% fall in the UK's
total trade in goods and services has simply not
happened.
More recent "top-down" studies fare no
better in the paper's assessment. A 2025 NBER paper estimated
Brexit had reduced UK GDP per head by 8% using economic
"doppelgänger" comparisons, and by 6% using firm-level survey
data.
The paper argues these approaches
simply cannot separate out the impact of Brexit from other
reasons why some economies have grown more quickly (or slowly)
than the UK since 2016, including the impact of Covid and the
energy crisis. Some of the UK's peers, notably the US, Italy and
Spain, have benefitted from local factors that have nothing to do
with Brexit.
It is more helpful to compare the
performance of the UK to individual countries with similar
characteristics and at similar stages in the economic cycle, such
as France, Germany and Canada. This approach shows that Brexit
has largely been a non-event in macroeconomic
terms.
Moreover, while Brexit has had some
upfront costs, including disruption to labour markets and
weakness in business investment, these headwinds are already
fading as the initial uncertainty has eased and firms
adapt.
Indeed, the real story is how little
economic impact that leaving the EU has had. This makes sense,
because relatively little has actually
changed.
This briefing is part of a series
published by the IEA on Britain's 'Great Stagnation', diagnosing
Britain's growth problem. The next briefings in the series will
be published in the coming weeks and will be compiled into a full
book published in September.
Paper author and Economics
Fellow at the IEA, Jessop said:
"Austerity and Brexit have become
convenient scapegoats for problems that have much deeper roots.
The data show that public spending was never cut as savagely as
claimed, and that most of the economic harm attributed to Brexit
simply hasn't materialised. It's time we stopped blaming these
two shocks and had a more honest conversation about what's really
holding the UK economy back."
Great
Stagnation Briefing No. 7: 'Austerity and Brexit' can be accessed
here
This publication was made possible
through the support of grant [#63661] from the John Templeton
Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
John Templeton Foundation.