Right of Reply on behalf of AUKUS partners.
"Chair,
I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States to respond to false narratives about
Australia's acquisition of conventionally-armed,
nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS
partnership. Once again, we have heard unsubstantiated
claims which purposefully mischaracterise a legal and legitimate
use of nuclear power, foreseen by the drafters of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and
taking place within the safeguards framework.
I reiterate that Australia's cooperation with the UK and US
on this matter is being undertaken in full compliance
with our respective international obligations under the
NPT, South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and its
protocols, and Australia's safeguards agreements with the
IAEA.
The repeated attempts by China to add the
current item to this meeting's agenda falsely imply an
active compliance problem where none exists and make
plain its intent to manipulate the Board's agenda
solely for political purposes. To be
clear, this unnecessary item has not been adopted
as a standing agenda item by this Board and has never enjoyed
consensus support.
Recognising the many other pressing concerns requiring the
Board's attention, it is disappointing that valuable time
continues to be taken up by the need to respond to this agenda
item – an item which shows a grave lack of respect for
the Director General's exercise of his independent, technical
mandate in relation to
Australia's Naval Nuclear Propulsion
program. It may soon be time to seriously
consider the utility of this politically
motivated agenda item.
Chair,
Under this item, the Board has repeatedly heard unfounded
allegations that ignore or misrepresent the information we
have provided in good faith, and assertions that disregard the
statements made by the IAEA Director General, including
his most recent report published last November. As you will
recall, the report indicated that Australia
has continued to fulfil all reporting requirements under its CSA,
Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Arrangements.
In response to some of the points we have heard today, I
would also like to remind the Board that:
-
The IAEA has the clear authority under its Statute to
negotiate directly and in-confidence with individual Member
States on the establishment and application of safeguards and
verification arrangements. Attempted interference should
be a cause of concern to the entire Board.
-
Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the
NPT, as the IAEA Director General has repeatedly
confirmed. Article 14 of the IAEA's model CSA
(INFCIRC/153) – on which Australia's CSA is based – is the
specific provision enabling CSA States to use nuclear
material in NNP, within the legal framework for safeguards
implementation. Under Australia's Article 14
arrangement, the IAEA will be enabled to continue meeting its
technical objectives at all stages of the
submarines' lifecycle.
-
Once the Article 14 arrangement is agreed between Australia
and the IAEA Secretariat, and
as he has repeatedly stated, the Director
General will transmit it to the Board for
‘appropriate action', which AUKUS partners fully support. To
suggest that the Board will somehow be bypassed
is completely false.
-
The NPT permits the transfer of nuclear material at
any enrichment level provided the transfer is carried out in
a manner consistent
with any relevant safeguards obligations. Australia's
conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine program will
be subject to a robust package of verification measures,
consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation
obligations.
-
The UK's Submarine Maintenance Period in Australia was
also raised. I would like to put on the record the
fact that it has been the case, and will remain the
case, that all activities under AUKUS are fully in line with
all three partners' respective international
obligations. These include, where applicable, those
under the Treaty of Rarotonga.
Chair,
Our three countries continue to oppose any proposal for this item
to be a standing agenda item or any deliberate attempts
to undermine and politicise the technical mandate of the
IAEA.
Consistent with our approach to maintaining open and
transparent engagement, we will provide an update to the Board
under ‘Any Other Business' and welcome the Director General's
continued commitment to provide updates on naval nuclear
propulsion, as and when
he deems appropriate.
Thank you, Chair."
