Delivered to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of
Governors extraordinary meeting on 30 January 2026.
"Chair,
The United Kingdom expresses deep gratitude to IAEA staff, who
continue to operate in the most challenging
circumstances, for their professionalism and courage in their
ongoing work supporting nuclear safety, security and
safeguards in Ukraine.
Chair,
Russia's sustained and reckless attacks on Ukraine's energy
infrastructure are deliberately degrading the electrical systems
that nuclear facilities rely on for safety.
These actions fail to meet the expectations set by this
Board, including the December 2024 resolution
on Implications of Unstable Energy Infrastructure Critical
to Safety and Security of Nuclear Power Plants and the
November 2025 statement supported by 57 countries. Despite these
clear messages, Russia has only escalated its actions.
This is why we supported convening this
Board: the Director General's warnings make clear we
cannot wait until March while the situation deteriorates at pace.
As we have said before at this Board, Russia is directly
accountable for the nuclear safety and security challenges
Ukraine faces.
Chair,
The Governor of the Russian Federation claims the situation has
not changed fundamentally since November. The same reports from
the DG he encouraged us to read paint a different
picture - a clear and accelerating deterioration.
On 5 December, the DG highlighted the risks of
“continued degradation of the grid” and growing instability,
emphasising that the substations being hit are “absolutely
indispensable” for reactor cooling.
By 11 December, he reported power disruptions were causing
fluctuating outputs, temporary disconnections and forced outages
at Ukraine's Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), making the fragile grid
“one of the biggest challenges” to nuclear safety.
On 19 December, ZNPP suffered its 12th total loss of
offsite power, with the DG noting that strikes against the grid
appear “coordinated to maximise disruption”,
causing “cumulative impacts on NPP operations”
Just days later, on 23 December, Khmelnytskyy and Rivne
NPPs were again forced to reduce output after several critical
substations were hit. IAEA monitors confirmed the grid was now
in “its worst condition since the Agency began
monitoring.”
In January, the DG has continued to document further
degradation: damage to additional substations, repeated
line disconnections at Chornobyl, multiple emergency diesel
generator activations, and operating NPPs once again compelled to
cut output. He reiterated that “deterioration of Ukraine's
power grid from persistent military activity has direct
implications for nuclear safety.”
Against this backdrop, Russia's hypocrisy is stark: on 19
January, the head of ROSATOM warned that ZNPP's
reliance on a single power line was “a critical situation
for the safety of the plant”, even as wider military
activity continues to undermine the stability of the grid he says
is essential.
Russia also argues that these are minor issues, that monitoring
substations falls outside the Agency's mandate, and that losses
of offsite power are “insignificant”. Again, we prefer to
rely on the IAEA's reporting which shows Ukraine's grid is
degrading rapidly as a result of Russian attacks, with
repeated disruptions to NPP offsite power and growing dependence
on backup systems. This Board requested that reporting
because offsite power is essential to nuclear safety. If the grid
continues to weaken, the margin for safely cooling reactors and
spent fuel becomes thinner with every outage. This is a clear
risk to the safe operation of nuclear facilities.
Chair,
The United Kingdom condemns Russia's reckless disregard for
nuclear safety. We urge Russia to heed the Director General's
warnings and the multiple warnings from this Board.
Thank you."
