Government not adequately prepared for the most severe animal disease outbreaks, PAC warns

- Report finds hard work in response to ongoing current outbreaks has diverted resources away from preparation for the future

Government is not adequately prepared for the most severe animal disease outbreaks. In a report on resilience to animal diseases such as bird flu, which pose a significant threat to the UK's health, communities, wildlife, economy, trade and agriculture, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has found that government would find responding to such outbreaks would be extremely stretching, with over a quarter of local public services not confident in their outbreak capabilities.

The PAC's inquiry heard that the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra) and the Animal & Plant Health Agency (APHA) have worked hard to manage the current five-year-long outbreak of bird flu and the past year's current outbreak of bluetongue. However, resources have been diverted away from other work to prepare for future outbreaks by the semi-permanent response mode government has moved into as a result. This, as well as the post-Brexit loss of access to the EU's animal diseases intelligence system, has also caused a reduction in vital surveillance to help detect new and re-emerging disease threats quickly and stop their spread.

Another factor limiting the nation's ability to protect itself is APHA's struggle to recruit and retain enough vets, with a vacancy rate of 15% in September 2025. Issues driving the shortage include mental health issues relating to activities such as culling animals; pay and conditions; and working hours. The PAC's report calls for a veterinary workforce strategy to be produced in the next year to address the shortage.

The National Biosecurity Centre at Weybridge is critical to the management of threats from animal diseases – but is in poor condition, presenting significant interim risks as the facility continues to age, with its c.£2.8bn redevelopment not set for completion for a decade. The PAC is calling for a 10-year plan for the Weybridge Centre's redevelopment, given its strategic importance and the existential risk that a major failure there could pose to an emergency response to an outbreak.

The report further examines the issue of illegally imported meat, and finds that border controls to prevent a new disease arriving in the UK as a result are insufficient to address the level of risk. Dover Port Health Authority currently only receives funding to allow it to complete proactive illegal meat checks 20% of the time. There has been a fifty-five-fold increase in the seizures of illegal meat imports from January 2023 to January 2025, but government does not know whether this is due to an increase in actual imports, or better enforcement.

The report finds that Defra has no strategy to tackle shortages in animal vaccines, and the PAC recommends that one should be developed over the next year. The Committee is also concerned about the future efficacy of policy changes for managing bovine TB. The badger cull has now been largely terminated, which the PAC understands has been effective in reducing the disease, but a new cattle vaccine is some years away.

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, said: “The bill for the major foot and mouth disease outbreak in 2001 ran into multiple billions for the public and private sector. Serious animal disease outbreaks pose a severe threat to wildlife, and the farming sector, and in the case of zoonotic diseases, to human health. Our latest report should therefore be of the deepest concern to all of us. Hard work has been done to respond to the current outbreaks of bird flu and, amongst sheep and cattle, bluetongue virus. But the necessity for a semi-permanent response to these current outbreaks has pulled government away from vital preparations for future threats – which have to be treated as a matter of when, not if.

“Government needs to act now to prepare a full strategy to ensure preparedness for such events in the future, and we look forward to the results of Exercise Pegasus and Exercise Aspen this year – two major rehearsals carried out by government to test preparedness for a zoonotic disease pandemic and a foot and mouth outbreak. The government must use these exercises to fully evaluate our nation's preparedness, swiftly address the underlying factors driving the vet vacancy rate, and make sure it has eyes and ears on the ground to detect oncoming threats quickly. A similar strategy is required for animal vaccines - farmers have been left in a very difficult position with the prospect of bovine TB becoming worse once again, and a new cattle vaccine seemingly years away. Government has been strongly focused on the immediate-term threats – it must now develop the bandwidth to look to the long-term as well.”

PAC report conclusions and recommendations 

The Department and APHA are not adequately prepared for the most severe – or more serious concurrent – animal disease outbreaks. Over recent years the Department and APHA have been in a state of semi-permanent response to medium-severity outbreaks of avian influenza (also known as bird flu) and bluetongue virus, and have worked hard to manage these outbreaks. This has diverted resources away from other work to prepare for future outbreaks, such as updating specific control strategies for high-risk diseases. The Department and APHA acknowledge that responding to the most severe disease outbreak, or more serious concurrent outbreaks, would be extremely stretching, despite the potential ability to call on help from other departments and nations. Local capacity is also a concern, with 27% of local resilience forums not confident in their outbreak capabilities. The government is planning to test its preparedness to respond to outbreaks with two major exercises during 2025.

Recommendation 1.    The Department and APHA must act now to improve preparedness for a major outbreak by:

1. a) Updating all specific exotic disease control strategies over the next year.
2. b) Working with local resilience forums to understand barriers to preparedness,  and provide support to overcome these.
3. c) Using upcoming exercises to fully evaluate the UK's preparedness for severe outbreaks, including the scenario where the response becomes overwhelmed.

Not enough is being done to tackle the high level of vet vacancies within APHA, which limits its ability to respond to an outbreak.APHA struggles to recruit and retain sufficient vets. APHA's vet vacancy rate fluctuates - it was 20% in April 2025, but it had fallen to 15% in September 2025. The reasons for difficulties recruiting and retaining government vets are not unique to APHA, or the UK. Major factors include:  mental health issues relating to activities such as culling animals; pay and conditions; and working hours. APHA has introduced several strategies to improve the situation such as specialist pay provisions and mental health support, but recognises it needs to do more to attract and retain vets. The Department is considering updating the Veterinary Surgeons Act to enable other professionals, such as trained veterinary nurses, to undertake work under vet supervision.

Recommendation 2. APHA should in the next year produce a veterinary workforce strategy to address vet vacancies. This should set out its understanding of the underlying issues, and how it will make most effective use of tools/solutions including: using other technical staff; learning from previous schemes; and how other countries are approaching this issue.

APHA's surveillance activities to detect disease outbreaks early are not sufficiently comprehensive or risk-based. Surveillance work, or 'eyes and ears on the ground', is vital to help detect new and re-emerging disease threats quickly and stop their spread. But APHA's focus on responding to current outbreaks has resulted in a reduction in some of its surveillance activities. The Department is also concerned about the capacity of local authority trading standards officers to undertake routine surveillance work.  APHA is starting the process of making its surveillance work more risk-based, efficient and supported by appropriate management information, but this will take several years. Following EU exit, the UK lost access to the EU's animal diseases intelligence system which provided almost real-time intelligence on animal diseases within the EU. This has resulted in the UK getting information more slowly and in less detail.

Recommendation 3. To ensure its surveillance activities provide the maximum benefits from the resources available, APHA should set out in the next six months a clear plan and milestones for delivering the updates to its surveillance processes that are needed to ensure they are risk-based, efficient and supported by good management information.

APHA has not made fast enough progress with modernising its systems and processes, to allow it to better deploy its resources.Many of APHA's systems and processes are outdated and inefficient. For example, its vets in the field must complete paper-based forms, which are scanned and manually deciphered before being added to a database. This results in slower response and more risk of errors. Vital modernisation has been delayed by APHA's focus on responding to recent outbreaks. The Department has confirmed funding of £62.8 million over the period to 2029-30 for APHA to undertake a modernisation programme. However, APHA will still not be fully paperless by the end of this period. By comparison, APHA's bee and plant inspectors are now using digital technology, with it reporting efficiencies of about 30% as a result.

Recommendation 4. APHA should ensure that modernising its systems and processes for animal diseases is a key strategic objective. This needs to be supported by a clear delivery plan and milestones for when new services will be phased in and when the transformation will be completed.

The Department has secured vital funding for the National Biosecurity Centre at Weybridge, but must manage significant interim risks until the redevelopment is completed in 10 years. The Weybridge facility is a critical national asset for managing threats from animal diseases but is in poor condition with ageing buildings that need major repair and replacement. The government committed £1 billion over the spending review period 2025-26 to 2029-30 to continue the redevelopment of Weybridge. The overall redevelopment programme will be completed in 2034-35 at a total estimated cost of £2.8 billion. APHA has contingency plans to ensure operations are maintained over the 10 years until the redevelopment is completed. It also has the use of its regional laboratories and other laboratories such as the Pirbright Institute. However, APHA acknowledges that managing this process will become more difficult as the Weybridge facility continues to age. Any major failure at Weybridge could mean that APHA is unable to deliver its emergency response during an animal disease outbreak.

Recommendation 5. Given the strategic importance of the National Biosecurity Centre redevelopment at Weybridge, the Department should publish a 10-year plan against which it should provide the Committee with an annual update on its progress. This should include how interim risks are being managed and mitigated, and any key risks to delivering the redevelopment programme on time and budget.

The Department's progress delivering a multi-species livestock tracing system has been extremely slow and may not provide an integrated system for the UK. Tracing animal movements quickly - to understand where disease may have spread - is key in responding effectively to contain an outbreak. Current UK animal tracing is fragmented, with different systems for different species, and relies on very old and fragile systems. The Department first started work to create a digital, multi-species, UK-wide tracing system in 2013. The original concept of using an off-the-shelf solution for a single species and adapting that for multiple species was flawed, and the plans needed to be reset. Despite spending £181 million from 2019 to March 2025, the Department does not expect to have an integrated system completed until winter 2027. Animal diseases do not respect national borders, but the Department could not confirm to us if its new system would be fully integrated across the devolved administrations.

Recommendation 6. The Department should ensure that progress against its revised timetable is maintained, and that its approach to developing its multi-species livestock tracing system is fully aligned across all devolved administrations.

Controls at the border to prevent a new disease arriving in the UK via illegal meat imports are insufficient to the level of risk. Dover Port Health Authority (DPHA) reported a fifty-five-fold increase in the seizures of illegal meat imports from January 2023 to January 2025. The Department is not clear whether this is due to an increase in actual imports, or better surveillance and enforcement activities. The Department provides DPHA with some funding to complete proactive illegal meat checks, but this only allows DPHA to undertake this work for 20% of the time. Future funding allocations are subject to the Department's upcoming business planning processes. The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee has also raised several concerns about the increase in illegal meat imports.

Recommendation 7. The Department should:

1. a) undertake research to understand the reasons for the apparent increase in illegal meat imports to the UK to inform future policy and funding decisions; and
2. b) when determining the resources made available to DPHA and Border Force at Dover to tackle illegal meat imports, weigh this against the significant costs a major disease outbreak could have if introduced through the port of Dover.
3. c) The Department should set out what more can be done to educate travellers not to bring illegal food products into the UK and that high fines are imposed on those that do.

The Department does not have a strategy to tackle shortages in animal vaccines. Vaccines play an important role in preventative health and disease control programmes in animals, including managing antimicrobial resistance. However, there have increasingly been supply shortages of animal vaccines in the past two years, affected by global market issues and limited incentives for the private sector. We are concerned about the lack of a UK strategy to address these problems and ensure vaccines are available. In September 2025, the Veterinary Medicines Directorate published a Statement of Intent on UK Veterinary Vaccine Availability. We are also concerned about the future efficacy of policy changes for managing Bovine TB. The badger cull, which we understand seems to have been effective in reducing Bovine TB, has been largely terminated. Yet, a new cattle vaccine seems to be years away. This hiatus leaves farmers in a very difficult position with the prospect of TB reactors becoming worse again.

Recommendation 8. Building on the Veterinary Medicines Directorate's Statement of Intent, the Department should, working with the Veterinary Medicines Directorate and other stakeholders, develop over the next year a long-term strategy and plan for securing adequate animal vaccine supply to the UK.

The Department does not have an overarching long-term strategy for strengthening resilience to the increasing risk from animal diseases. The Department has several strategic programmes underway to strengthen resilience to animal diseases, including the redevelopment of the National Biosecurity Centre and developing an integrated animal tracing system. However, there is no overarching strategy and plan which brings this work together in a comprehensive and integrated way. The Department plans to develop such a strategy over the next 18 months.

Recommendation 9. The Department should provide the Committee with an update in 18 months' time on its progress in developing a long-term strategy for animal diseases. The strategy should be sufficiently comprehensive and reflect interdependencies with the other areas of the Department's work, such as on plant health and honeybees.