Statement by Australia, the UK and the US to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on IAEA safeguards
and AUKUS.
"Thank you, Chair.
I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States to respond to continued false claims that
purposefully mischaracterize AUKUS partners' intentions and
attempt to undermine the independence, integrity, and authority
of the IAEA.
We reiterate that this item has not been adopted as a standing
agenda item by the Board and does not have consensus support
among Board members. It is a distraction from the Board's
important work on other pressing issues. We support discussion of
naval nuclear propulsion at the appropriate time, such as when
the Director General releases reports on the topic. As we have
always said, Australia's arrangement will be referred to the
Board for appropriate action guided by the DG's technical
assessment of the arrangement's nonproliferation provisions when
the time is right.
AUKUS partners remain committed to transparency as we work to set
the highest nonproliferation standard, and Director General
Grossi has repeatedly expressed satisfaction with AUKUS partners'
engagement and transparency. As a demonstration of our commitment
to transparency, I would like to highlight the side event held at
the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York on 1 May. AUKUS
partners value sessions such as these to openly offer clarity on
how we are developing the non-proliferation approach for
Australia's program, consistent with our respective international
obligations.
As we have said, when we discuss setting the highest
nonproliferation standard, we are not seeking to establish a
model arrangement for others. Australia's arrangement, once
finalized, will demonstrate that it is possible to apply the
highest non-proliferation standard to naval nuclear propulsion
under an Article 14 arrangement in a way that will allow the IAEA
to fulfill its technical objectives: verifying there has been no
diversion of nuclear material, no misuse of nuclear facilities,
and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia.
For other Member States seeking naval nuclear propulsion
programs, it will be up to them to negotiate directly with the
IAEA on appropriate verification arrangements based on the unique
nature of the program. Although, we trust that other such Member
States likewise will support a high standard and respect the
integrity and independence of the IAEA.
The commitment to a robust Article 14 arrangement was included in
our countries' legal obligations in the AUKUS Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Agreement (ANNPA), including through the requirement
that the United States and UK not transfer any nuclear material
to Australia for naval nuclear propulsion until Australia and the
IAEA have such an arrangement in place. As we have prioritized
since the start of the AUKUS partnership in 2021, ANNPA, which
entered into force in January, is yet another way that we are
demonstrating our commitment to setting the highest standard of
nonproliferation in an open and transparent manner.
Chair,
Some countries continue to make the same false claims about the
AUKUS partnership. We have spent considerable time addressing
these in the past, both here at the Board and in other venues. To
be clear, AUKUS in no way involves cooperation on nuclear
weapons. The AUKUS partnership is fully consistent with partners'
respective international obligations under the NPT and safeguards
agreements. Again, the transfer of nuclear material under the
AUKUS partnership will only proceed once we can ensure it is done
in a manner consistent with the highest nonproliferation
standard.
We will continue our open and transparent approach, including by
providing an update under Any Other Business, and will engage in
good faith with Member States on genuine questions as we continue
to develop our partnership.
Thank you, Chair."
