Lords consideration of regulations relating to 1) PACE and 2) Sentencing - Dec 12

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Codes A, B, C, D and H and New Code I) Order 2023

Moved by

Lord Sharpe of Epsom

That the Grand Committee do consider the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Codes A, B, C, D and H and New Code I) Order 2023.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)

My Lords, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Codes A, B, C, D and H and New Code I) Order 2023 was laid before this House on 16 October 2023. This debate follows a debate that I took part in on 4 December regarding three instruments related to the National Security Act that were also laid on 16 October.
Turning to the order we are discussing today, Section 66 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, or PACE, requires the Home Secretary to issue codes of practice which govern the use of police powers, including the associated rights and safeguards for suspects and the public in England and Wales. The revised and new codes of practice before us ensure that those codes reflect the provisions of both the National Security Act 2023 and the Public Order Act 2023.

Before getting into the detail of the changes, I begin by noting that, as per Section 67(4) of PACE, two separate consultations on these changes were carried out, one in relation to each of the new Acts. These were carried out from 20 July to 31 August this year. The responses were generally positive about the changes proposed and the Government considered and incorporated suggestions for further amendments to the codes of practice following these consultations. The full details of the consultations and the Government’s response can be found on GOV.UK.

I will now briefly outline the changes made through this order—first, those to PACE Code A required as a result of amendments to stop and search powers made in the Public Order Act 2023 and the Government’s commitment to streamline stop and search guidance. Following Royal Assent of the Public Order Act 2023, PACE Code A required modifications to emphasise that the suspicion-led stop and search power introduced in Section 10 of the Public Order Act is afforded the safeguards contained in Code A. The suspicionless powers in Section 11 of the same Act authorise the police to stop and search individuals and vehicles to find objects made, adapted or intended to be used in connection with protest-related offences.

We are also changing PACE Code A to include provisions to improve community relations and data collection as currently found in the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme guidance. Communicating the use of suspicionless search powers such as Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and Section 11 of the Public Order Act 2023, where it is operationally beneficial to do so, and embedding a data collection requirement within the code, will build on the existing trust and confidence between the police and the community they serve.

Finally, changes proposed to PACE Code A include an updated start date for the serious violence reduction order pilot, which commenced in April this year, and an update to the ethnicity list found in Annexe B to reflect the latest categories from the 2021 census.

The amendments related to the National Security Act concern PACE Codes A, B, C, D and H, along with a new PACE Code I. In summary, the amendments to Code A are required to govern how searches of individuals subject to prevention and investigation measures under Part 2 of the Act should be carried out. These changes mirror the existing provisions in Code A for the equivalent terrorism measures.

The amendments to Code B, which covers search, seizure and retention powers, are required to account for the new search and seizure powers introduced by Schedule 2 to the National Security Act. They largely replicate those already contained in Code B for similar powers.
The changes to PACE Codes C and D make it clear that those codes do not apply to relevant provisions in the National Security Act or Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, such as detention provisions. This is because separate codes—including the new PACE Code I—deal with those provisions.

Both Codes A and D are also amended to exempt an officer having to give their name in the case of inquiries linked to national security. This extends the approach currently taken towards terrorism investigations and provides a crucial change to protect the identities of police officers from state actors who may seek to do them harm.

The changes to Code H implement recommendations made by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, which the Government have accepted. They largely reflect amendments to Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 made via the National Security Act—for example, making it clear that time spent in detention under certain other detention powers will be accounted for when calculating the maximum period of detention.

Finally, this order brings into operation a new PACE Code I to govern the detention, treatment and questioning of individuals arrested under Section 27 of the National Security Act. This code contains various operational procedural matters, such as how to arrange for an interpreter for the suspect, what information must be documented in the custody record, how to provide cautions and what to do with the detainee’s property upon arrest. The code is based very closely on PACE Code H, which provides guidance for the detention and treatment of persons arrested under terrorism legislation, including the updates I have just set out.

I point out that the changes to these codes are supported by Counter Terrorism Policing and the Crown Prosecution Service. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has also specifically supported the changes to Code H.

I hope I have made it clear that changes made by this order are supportive of primary legislation that has already been agreed by Parliament. These revised codes promote the fundamental principles to be observed by the police and help preserve the effectiveness of, and public confidence in, the use of their legislative powers.

I very much hope noble Lords will support these revisions to the PACE codes of practice. I commend the order to the Committee, and I beg to move.

Baroness Doocey (LD)

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction. As he said, the changes have already been debated at length and approved by Parliament, and we will not oppose them. However, I would like to make some specific points. Perhaps the Minister could address them in his summation.

We do, of course, understand the importance of ensuring, at a time of heightened and ongoing risk from hostile state actors, that the powers we give our police are a match for those people who seek to harm us. We also appreciate the need to give officers on the ground clear guidance, but there must be a balance between allowing the police to do their job and protecting civil liberties. We welcome attempts to keep the public informed about what the police are doing in relation to suspicionless stop and search. We hope this will go some way to re-establish trust among those citizens most commonly subjected to this practice, namely members of the black community.

We note concerns raised during the consultation process about when the public will be alerted to the use of suspicionless stop and search. The concern is that the term “operationally beneficial” is simply not clear enough to define when it will be in operation. Everyone recognises the importance of police operational autonomy, but can the Minister confirm that this particular concern has been taken into account?

We welcome the new data collection requirement in Code A, particularly given that the ethnicity of 20% of those subjected to stop and search in the year ending March 2022 remains unknown because it was not recorded. However, our key concern remains the extension of police powers to stop and search someone without reasonable grounds for suspicion. We have made our concerns clear that extending these powers now is fundamentally incompatible with the findings of the Casey review and the recent IOPC report, both of which found that progress in tackling racial disparity in stop and search still has a very long way to go.

In light of this, what signal are we sending to these communities in giving the police even greater leeway to carry on that practice, despite the well-documented racial bias still evident in it? Sadly, I suspect that, for many, it says that we are just not listening.

4.30pm
Lord Coaker (Lab)

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction to these revisions to the PACE codes. He outlined the reasons for the changes, which reflect the various provisions of the National Security Act 2023 and the Public Order Act 2023. As such, the various rights and wrongs of the provisions have been debated, and they have been included in primary legislation. There is no need to rehearse these debates, but I will ask some questions about the resulting changes to the PACE codes.

PACE Code A is to be changed to include provisions to improve community relations and data collection. Given the importance, as we heard from the noble Baroness, of confidence and trust around suspicionless stop and search in particular, can the Minister say what these changes are and whether they help deal with issues such as disproportionality and the maintenance of community trust, which we all wish to see in the code? The changes say that they do that, so it would be interesting to know how.

More generally, is there any difference under these codes in the treatment of children or do they apply to everyone regardless of age? Some clarification on that would be helpful. Although the Minister said that these changes come from the National Security Act and the Public Order Act, given some of the questions around the use of stop and search, could other changes be made using this as a vehicle? One example mentioned here is strip-search. We have guidance for strip-search here, but we know what controversy there has been around it. I sometimes wonder whether the machine says, “We’ve had the National Security Act and the Public Order Act, so we need these changes to the PACE code that flow from that”, but there may be a missed opportunity to reflect more widely on some of the issues around what is sensible.

I think the Minister did so, but can he confirm that the stop and search powers in Sections 10 and 11 of the Public Order Act are now fully covered by these revised PACE codes?

The revised codes also include a date for the start of the serious violence reduction order pilot. When will this start and, given that it is a pilot, where will it take place? The Minister in the other place said that this was an updated start date. What caused the delay in the first place? I think the original intention, according to the statement of the Minister in the other place, was for it to start this April.

We support the various changes in the amended codes and the introduction of the new Code I, following the National Security Act 2023. As the Minister helpfully pointed out, the consultation showed that there was general support from not only the police and the CPS but the independent reviewer for the various revisions to the codes in terms of how persons are detained and treated when arrested under terrorism legislation.

Given that terrorism legislation is not devolved, but these PACE codes deal with England and Wales, will the Minister say what discussions have taken place with Northern Ireland—I presume with officials there—and Scotland, and how the PACE codes have been updated? The Minister spent some time talking about the welcome changes that were made to the PACE codes with respect to terrorism, but these codes refer to England and Wales and not to Scotland and Northern Ireland. How has that been dealt with? It would be interesting to hear from the Minister about what has happened there.

PACE Codes A and D are amended so that an officer does not have to give their name in the case of inquiries linked to national security. I understand that—it is for sensible and obvious reasons, as the Government said—but how would it work if somebody wanted to complain or get a review of their treatment? I appreciate that the name should not be given, but could a number be given, or is there some other method by which anonymity could be protected while recognising that sometimes issues arise and somebody may wish to complain or take forward something that has occurred in an interview? They may have been interviewed and perhaps even arrested and then released and wish to make some complaint about it. How will that be dealt with?

We accept these changes and recognise the importance of striking the balance between individual rights and security. Public confidence and trust are everything, even in challenging circumstances. I urge the Government to do everything in their power to ensure that we maintain that confidence and trust with respect to the implementation of this order. We do not oppose these important codes, but some clarifications would be helpful for us all.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions. I will do my best to deal with the points raised.
The noble Lord finished on the subject of whether it is proportionate, in effect, to allow police officers to not give their names in inquiries linked to national security, as per Codes A and D. The Government have amended Codes A and D to exempt officers from having to give their name in cases of inquiries linked to national security, which extends the approach currently taken towards terrorism investigations. It is a crucial change to protect police officers from being obliged to reveal their identity to state actors who may be highly trained and seek to use such knowledge to conduct harmful activity against them. It is difficult to see how an individual might write a complaint against an officer who is interfering with them, but I will look into it, and if I can find anything useful to enlighten the noble Lord, I will come back to him.

The noble Lord also asked whether we have been consulting the devolved Administrations. The answer is yes. We have been consulting them extensively. When PACE Northern Ireland will be published is a matter for the Northern Ireland Executive. However, they are undertaking a review of the PACE Northern Ireland codes of practice and are apparently about to revise them. As soon as I have those revisions, I will let the noble Lord know.

Lord Coaker (Lab)

Given that the Executive and the Assembly are not functioning, does he mean that officials are doing that?

Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)

I assume so, but I will find out and come back to the noble Lord.

The Government also obtained concurrence from the Lord Advocate for the part of this that applies to Scotland. We engaged with the Scottish Government and Scottish policing throughout the process of creating this code. I believe that one or two of the changes made reflect Scottish policing’s comments on it.

On disproportionality, which was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, as well as the noble Lord, of course I understand the concerns around disproportionality and the impact of stop and search, particularly on members of the black community. Nobody should be targeted because of their race. Extensive safeguards such as statutory codes of practice and body-worn video exist to ensure this does not happen.

It is worth pointing out that, although disparities in the use of stop and search remain, it is positive that they have continued to decrease for the past four years. The proposals set out in these changes, such as the communication of the suspicionless stop and search authorisation will, in my view, improve the relationship between black and ethnic minority groups and the police. Of course, the phraseology behind that—“where operationally beneficial” in particular—was very carefully considered to sort out this issue.

It is also worth saying that the Home Office now publishes more data than ever before on police powers, including the use of stop and search. As part of the inclusive Britain strategy, the Home Office Race Disparity Unit and Office for National Statistics have worked to improve the way stop and search data is reported and to enable more accurate comparisons to be made between different police force areas. The proposed change on data in this updated code would reflect the power given to the Home Secretary under Section 44 of the Police Act 1996, but this data is collected and published online as part of a statistics bulletin.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about protections for children. There are safeguards in this code as well. Children detained will have to have an appropriate adult assigned to represent their best interests.

The noble Lord also asked whether there was a delay—there was. It was supposed to be rolled out on 17 January this year but ended up commencing on 19 April. The reason for that was the difficulty of getting the training in place in time. The four pilot areas are the West Midlands, Thames Valley, Merseyside and Sussex.

With that, I think I have answered the questions that were asked of me. I reiterate that the updated and new PACE codes of practice will help the police to use their powers in a proportionate and consistent manner in accordance with the primary legislation. As such, I commend this order to the Committee and thank both noble Lords for their support.

Motion agreed.

Sentencing Act 2020 (Amendment of Schedule 21) Regulations 2023

Moved by

Lord Bellamy

That the Grand Committee do consider the Sentencing Act 2020 (Amendment of Schedule 21) Regulations 2023.

Relevant document: 1st Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)

My Lords, around a quarter of homicides in this country are domestic homicides, where one spouse or partner, or ex-spouse or ex-partner, is killed by the other. In recent years, there has rightly been a considerable focus on these tragic cases. We have had a number of particularly tragic instances, such as when Poppy Waterhouse and Ellie Gould were killed by their ex-boyfriends in 2018 and 2019 respectively, and that of Sally Challen, who killed her husband after years of domestic abuse and whose conviction for murder was replaced by a conviction for manslaughter in 2019.

The law of murder in such cases is currently being reviewed by the Law Commission at the request of the Lord Chancellor. Today, we are concerned not with the law itself but with sentencing. The statutory framework for sentencing in murder cases is to be found in Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, replacing earlier legislation, as supplemented by guidelines of the Sentencing Council. However, hitherto, nothing in Schedule 21 has specifically addressed domestic homicide.

In the light of all this background, in 2021 the Government asked Clare Wade KC to conduct an independent review of domestic homicide sentencing. The Wade review was published in March 2023, and the Government’s final response was published in July 2023. Today’s instrument takes forward Clare Wade’s recommendations 5 and 8.

Regulation 3 of this statutory instrument deals with a murder that has occurred where there is coercive and controlling behaviour in a domestic context by the offender. It provides that such behaviour will be an aggravating factor for the purposes of paragraph 9 of Schedule 21, which sets out the statutory framework for dealing with aggravating factors. The instrument further provides that, where the situation is the other way round, and the coercive and controlling behaviour has been on the victim’s part—typically, where it is the woman who has killed the man—the fact that the woman has killed having been subject to coercive and controlling behaviour shall be a statutory mitigating factor for the offender subject to such behaviour for the purposes of paragraph 10 of Schedule 21.

In addition, regulation 3 of the draft instrument implements recommendation 8 of the Wade report, which deals with a situation known in shorthand—and, I must say, completely inadequately described—as “overkill”. This arises in cases, particularly at the end of a relationship, where the offender, typically the man, kills the woman in circumstances of extreme violence, defined in the instrument as “sustained and excessive violence”. That too will be a statutory aggravating factor. As I understand it, some 40% of domestic homicide cases occur at the end of a relationship, when the rage and anger are so intense that these very unfortunate and excessive situations arise.

Lord Beith (LD)

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the Minister while he is introducing the regulations. I am slightly worried that there is confusion over the ending of a relationship, which was a separate recommendation of the Wade report that is not dealt with in these instruments.

Lord Bellamy (Con)

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for that intervention. There is a further aspect of information that I would like to share with the Committee to deal with the very point the noble Lord has raised, for which I thank him.

I have explained the statutory instrument before us, but I need to complete the picture for the Committee. In the Criminal Justice Bill, which is already before the other place, there is a provision that deals explicitly with murders committed at the end of a relationship, defining it as in itself an aggravating factor. Your Lordships may well ask whether it seems a little bit piecemeal that we have this statutory instrument and something in the forthcoming Bill. That point was quite understandably made by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in its consideration of this instrument. What happened was that the two recommendations that we are dealing with were accepted in the Government’s interim report by the previous Lord Chancellor, and when the present Lord Chancellor succeeded to the post he thought that we should go further. Therefore, it is in the forthcoming Bill.

However, that is not quite the end of the story—this is a continuing story—so I tell your Lordships for information and by way of background that there is another aspect of the sentencing exercise called the starting point: the level of the “tariff” at which you start. For these kinds of domestic murders, the Government commenced a consultation in November to consider the possible reform of the provisions dealing with the starting point in Schedule 21 to the 2020 Act. I should say that these developments are in response to continuing concerns by stakeholders, particularly victims and their families, about the response of the law to these very difficult cases. The Government are listening to those concerns and continuing to address the issue. However, as I indicated, the statutory instrument before us adopts the two recommendations of the Wade report. I therefore commend the instrument to the Committee and beg to move.
Lord Beith (LD)

I am very grateful to the Minister for his introduction and his helpful and illuminating response on the matters that I raised in my intervention. As he said, these regulations carry out the intention to address murder related to domestic violence and coercion. The intention was expressed in Schedule 23 to the Sentencing Act 2020 and follows the Clare Wade report. We support these provisions, which take into account the context of controlling and coercive behaviour in relationships, treating them as an aggravating factor in sentencing for murder or, in the case of a murder by a victim of a controlling relationship, as a mitigating factor.

The regulations introduce the concept of overkill—a word which bothers me as much as it did the Minister as being inadequate to describe the use of violence in excess of what would have been required to kill the victim—as an aggravating factor, not least because of the deeply distressing impact of some of these horrific murders on victims’ families.

However, I have some concerns. I begin with those raised by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, one of which has been referred to by the Minister. The reference to consultation with the Sentencing Council blandly and misleadingly fails to mention the council’s concerns, including about the wording of the overkill provision. The Explanatory Memorandum should explain using all the relevant facts. It should not obscure by omission. I presume the revised wording has met some of the council’s concerns, but I would be grateful for some clarification of that as it was raised quite forcefully by the scrutiny committee.

The scrutiny committee also questioned the failure to include other provisions proposed in the Government’s response to the Wade review. We had a helpful explanation from the Minister that things are moving on and that the new Lord Chancellor has indeed taken up the concerns and included them in draft legislation. Indeed, I was a bit surprised by the Government’s defence that the earlier omission of some of the recommendations was because these statutory instruments were an interim response, but I will not criticise further because there is obviously progress on that front. I rather agree with the committee that

“in general, it is better policymaking to make all related changes at the same time”.

More than that, I argue that it makes for more coherent legislation if you put things in the same piece of legislation.

In supporting these provisions, I must, however, make clear what they cannot do. In the first case, they cannot and should not remove the judge’s ability to take into account all the relevant circumstances of the case when passing sentence. Justice should not be blind or deaf to the many different issues that may emerge in evidence or in mitigation. The judge must justify deviation from the guidelines but must be free to do justice.

Secondly, we should not deceive ourselves or the public with the pretence that these provisions will have a powerful deterrent effect. Justice has many purposes, including punishment and rehabilitation, but deterrence is scarcely a major factor for this kind of crime. Someone who, having used enough violence to kill the victim, carries on to inflict more violence is not going to think, “Oh, I’ll get a slightly longer sentence, won’t I, because of that statutory instrument?” That is not the real world; it is not the mindset of those who would carry out such terrible and vengeful acts.

That brings me to my final point. For the murders we are talking about, the murderers need in many cases to be imprisoned for long periods for public safety, including the safety of other potential victims of the same kind of crime, but adding a few more years to the sentence may only marginally, if at all, add to public safety and will do nothing to protect safety when they are eventually released. The extra years are added to recognise the greater severity of the offence, and we add them because they are almost the only means we know of recognising that severity and marking it with a more severe penalty. It would appear ethically bland if we treated different murders in exactly the same way, but what we actually do is allocate significant resources to keeping somebody in prison for a bit longer in a hopelessly overcrowded prison system, in which resources are desperately needed for rehabilitation to reduce the risk of reoffending when offenders are released.

As a society, we need to look for more effective ways of recognising and challenging crimes of varying degree and asserting that they will not be tolerated, otherwise we are condemned to endless sentence inflation because sentences for one crime affect sentences for another. It will not be long before comparison is made between these crimes and some other crimes and an argument for longer sentences for them. We have a problem as a society in finding ways of recognising the greater severity of some crimes than others that do not simply commit resources in an ineffective way when those resources are needed to secure public safety.

As I said, we support these provisions, but room must be left for judicial discretion and there must be some recognition that we do not cure crimes simply by passing statutory instruments such as this.

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument. The Labour Party supports these regulations.

As we have just had explained to us, the instrument introduces two additional statutory aggravating factors and one additional statutory mitigating factor in the determination of the minimum term relating to the mandatory life sentence for murder. The new aggravating factors are the fact that the offender had repeatedly or continuously engaged in behaviour towards the victim that was controlling or coercive and the use of sustained and excessive violence towards the victim. The new mitigating factor is the fact that the victim had repeatedly or continuously engaged in behaviour towards the offender that was controlling or coercive.

5.30pm

The noble Lord, Lord Beith, very adequately covered the points made by the Secondary Legislation Select Committee on its reservations about the piecemeal approach to these various changes. The Minister answered those points and acknowledged the point made by the SLSC, so I will not dwell on that point again.

However, I want to dwell on some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, made in his speech just now. We all come at this with different experiences of the criminal justice system. As noble Lords know, I sit as a magistrate and have done so for about 18 years now. I see domestic violence permeate so much of the work I do as a magistrate. I see that in youth courts, family courts and adult courts. We are more conscious of it than when I first started 18 years ago. Of course, we are talking about an extreme here—murder—but it is absolutely not unusual for women, usually, to make allegations about partners or former partners, and that is a dominating factor in the cases which we hear in those various environments in which I sit.

I agree with the point which the noble Lord made about how these guidelines should not remove the ability of judges to sentence and deviate from the guidelines. Of course they should give reasons if they do that, but each case is different, and guidelines are guidelines, not tramlines, as we all know. That point is worth repeating. I also agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that in these particular cases, deterrence is unlikely to affect the ultimate outcome. We need to be realistic about that. It is difficult to acknowledge, but it is reality, that different types of murder need to be treated differently, and the way the judge sums up the murder and gives the reason for the sentence reflects society’s view of the way that murder should be treated. So this is useful for judges. Of course, they make extremely difficult decisions, and guidance which is up to date and acknowledges the reality of many people’s lives, particularly women’s lives, is a good thing.

In conclusion, I will talk about sentence inflation. In fact, just before this session, I listened to the Lord Chancellor addressing the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Penal Affairs about his general approach. I think it is fair to say that everyone in the room thought it was a breath of fresh air compared to some recent previous Lords Chancellor. There are some very real and substantial problems within the wider prison estate, and there is a problem with overcrowding, of which we are well aware. I was comforted by the fact that the Lord Chancellor understands these problems very well. As I said, the Labour Party is happy to support these changes which we are talking about in this SI because it is right that the overwhelming importance of domestic violence should be acknowledged and properly reflected in sentencing guidelines. As the Minister said in opening—I will just repeat the stat he gave—one-quarter of all homicides in this country are domestic-related. That is a terrible fact, but I suspect it has not changed for many, many years, although it has been acknowledged more only in recent years.

Lord Bellamy (Con)

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their important contributions. I venture to suggest that we all in many ways share an analysis of the nature of the problem and that we are working, I hope collaboratively, to arrive at solutions on very difficult issues.

I will deal in so far as I can with the various points made. I can tell your Lordships that there was a very full exchange with the Sentencing Council. As I understand, it was concerned among other things with exactly how “overkill” is defined, or that sort of point. The question is: how far should you go into all that in the Explanatory Memorandum? Maybe it was a bit skimpy; if so, the Government will take that very much into account. However, the Sentencing Council’s views have been fully taken into account and they are reflected in the instrument. I do not anticipate any disagreement from the Sentencing Council’s point of view with this statutory instrument.

Secondly, as both noble Lords have rightly said, these regulations do not in any way cut down the discretion of the judge in a particular case to consider all the circumstances that he thinks fit. They will always take into account all relevant circumstances, but they provide important statutory reinforcement of the approach that should be made in domestic homicide cases. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, rightly said, and as I think is common knowledge, we have had domestic violence cases as a substantial proportion of all murder cases for years and years—probably for centuries. However, we have become much better informed. I nearly said we have also become much better equipped, but I do not quite mean that; we have become much more able to understand the situation—I will put it like that—and draw appropriate conclusions than perhaps has been the case in the past.

As I think I said in opening, this is still work in progress. We are still working on aspects of this—on sentencing and, in due course, we will be working on aspects of the law of murder itself, whether we should have just one law for murder, or ways of distinguishing better between different circumstances. That, I think, is a question for another day.

On the general question of sentencing, I want to say, respectfully, that I acknowledge the force of the careful remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, on this issue. I think, respectfully, that today is not the day for a general debate on sentencing policy, but we have very difficult issues in this area. There are always the questions of public safety, deterrence and rehabilitation, but there are also questions of public outrage and anguish. How do we deal with those?

From a personal point of view, it is very nearly impossible to disregard public outrage and anguish as factors in the circumstances when the court comes to consider what it should do. That is a fact. We are certainly in a situation where, for some time now, sentences have been growing longer. That has produced pressures on the prison estate, which have been further complicated by Covid and by the increased numbers of police officers, who are arresting more people than they were before. We have all sorts of things to deal with. These are difficult matters, which will merit full debate on another occasion. I have endeavoured to deal as far as I can—otherwise, I hope your Lordships will forgive me—with the points made this afternoon. I commend this instrument to the Committee.

Motion agreed.