Background to the report
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) publishes its Equipment Plan (the
Plan) each year, setting out its intended investment in equipment
and support projects over the next 10 years. The Plan assesses
whether the intended investment is affordable within the
available budget. It covers a 10-year period because of the
long-term nature of large, complex defence projects.
The latest Plan, for which the supporting analysis is published
alongside this report, covers the period 2023–2033. It shows that
the MoD has allocated a budget of £288.6 billion, 49% of its
entire forecast defence budget, to fund the Plan. This is a
larger proportion than last year’s 46%. This year’s Plan includes
more than 1,800 projects, including the future nuclear deterrent,
F35-B Lightning II aircraft and new information and communication
technologies. It also includes budgets to support and maintain
military capabilities.
Scope of the report
This report examines:
the MoD’s assessment of the affordability of its 2023–2033
Equipment Plan
cost pressures affecting MoD, and the implications of these for
the Plan
This report does not consider the value for money of the MoD’s
equipment expenditure or of the specific projects mentioned, nor
does it comment on the policy choices that the MoD makes to
develop a Plan which meets its future needs. This report also
does not consider the UK’s support to Ukraine, the additional
costs of which have to date been funded by HM Treasury through
the Reserve.
Our review examines the MoD’s approach to producing the Plan. We
focus on its approach to cost forecasting and the reasonableness,
consistency and reliability of the assumptions underpinning its
assessment of affordability.
Conclusions
The MoD acknowledges that its Equipment Plan for 2023–2033 is
unaffordable, with forecast costs exceeding its current budget by
£16.9 billion. This is a marked deterioration in the financial
position since the previous Plan in 2022, which the MoD judged to
be affordable.
In part, this is because inflation, which we highlighted last
year as not being fully reflected, is now showing its effect. But
more importantly, the costs of delivering major priorities have
increased significantly as the MoD has sought to show more
clearly the gap between the available budget and the ambitions
expressed in the 2023 update of the Integrated Review and the
associated Defence Command Paper, the consequences of which MoD
is still working through.
Deficits between forecast costs and budgets have increased in the
DNE because MoD has brought forward costs to deliver the nuclear
deterrent to schedule, and also in non-nuclear areas including
the RAF, the UK Strategic Command, the Strategic Programmes
Directorate, and the Navy’s conventional capabilities. Only the
Army has not shown an increased deficit, although this is because
the Army has only included forecast costs that it can afford,
which means it is accepting greater risks that its capabilities
will not meet government’s objectives.
The MoD is using the 2023 Equipment Plan to set the baseline for
its capability requirements ahead of the next government-wide
Spending Review, which it expects is likely in 2024, and has
chosen to defer any choices on spending priorities until then.
This approach, while understandable given the ambitions expressed
in the updated Integrated Review, risks poor value for money if
spending continues in the meantime on programmes which are then
cancelled, descoped or deferred because they are unaffordable. It
also means that the Plan does not provide a reliable assessment
of the affordability of MoD’s equipment programme or demonstrate
to Parliament how it will manage its funding to deliver equipment
projects.