Government must better guide and support Whitehall to reset failing projects, say MPs
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- PAC report finds new risks created by resetting programmes not
always effectively managed - Lack of transparent and honest
culture in projects creates obstacles to necessary resets of major
schemes The resetting of failing major programmes by Whitehall is
made more difficult by a lack of guidance and structure from
Government. In a wide-ranging report published today on the issue
of resetting Government programmes, the Public Accounts Committee
(PAC) finds that...Request free trial
- PAC report finds new risks created by resetting programmes not always effectively managed - Lack of transparent and honest culture in projects creates obstacles to necessary resets of major schemes The resetting of failing major programmes by Whitehall is made more difficult by a lack of guidance and structure from Government. In a wide-ranging report published today on the issue of resetting Government programmes, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) finds that there is no specific guidance for departments on how to reset complex multi-billion pound schemes. The Government must get better at learning from and recognising the value of resets, which vary from fundamental changes to significant revisions of cost and time estimates. When successfully carried out, resets help projects get back on track – but the new risks that resets can create are not always effectively managed. The lack of a definition for what constitutes a reset also causes confusion, and can hinder lesson-learning. For example, the number of resets to date of the Ajax armoured vehicle programme remains unclear, but is at least two and probably three. The Ministry of Defence’s failure to recognise the new risks and opportunities created by resetting (such as changes to commercial relationships) then necessitated a further reset. In some projects, the lack of a transparent and honest culture results in resets happening later than needed. For example, the PAC found evidence of a culture where there was insufficient candour in the Crossrail programme, meaning it started to believe its own ‘on-time, on-budget’ mantra, and stopping many people raising issues. Not having the right environment to encourage diverse views has also created problems identifying and managing resets, with more progress to be made in improving diversity in both central Government and the programme profession. Government departments do not always have the specific skills needed to undertake a reset, including not always having the right leadership. The PAC has previously commented on programmes’ leadership moving on too quickly. The report finds that while the situation is improving, there are challenges in encouraging senior leaders to stay in their roles, given a lack of civil service pay incentives. The PAC calls on Cabinet Office and HM Treasury to work with departments to ensure they use any available levers where it is best to incentivise continuity of leadership. Dame Meg Hillier MP, Chair of the Committee, said: “It can be hard to admit for any high-stakes endeavour when it is time to change direction. This is especially so for officials in the glare of publicity at the helm of innovative and risky projects with budgets of many billions, under pressure for delivery both from politicians and the public’s understandable expectations for improvements. If the Government does not provide senior leaders in Whitehall with the necessary support, clear-eyed and hard decisions will not be made when required. “No one wants to see such high-cost projects designed to benefit the public fail, so a robust culture of openness and honesty with diverse points of view must be present to successfully course-correct a progamme which looks at risk. Our report finds a range of ways resets can go wrong – they can be rushed, avoided until too late, even create new problems. There are invaluable lessons to be found for the future in how to strike the right balance.” PAC report conclusions and recommendations A lack of guidance and structure around programme resets means they are not always identified so a failing programme does not get back on track. Government does not have a standard definition for resets, with no specific guidance available. This creates confusion as to what constitutes a reset alongside challenges identifying, and therefore learning lessons from, reset experiences. For example, the number of resets relating to the Ajax programme remains unclear, but is at least two and probably three. Also, without a definition, and therefore recognition of their value, resets are often viewed negatively, which can create challenges for the programme team. We were pleased that the IPA said it would look to codify guidance and that HM Treasury suggested revisiting its approvals process and guidance. While programme teams may be best placed to identify triggers for a reset, the IPA and SROs told us the IPA assurance process can act as a robust trigger for resets. We have previously recommended the IPA makes more effective use of its insights across programmes. Recommendation 1:
Resets could have been avoided with more realistic upfront planning, including to better reflect the backdrop against which government programmes operate. We continually see poor planning as a deep-rooted problem across programmes, which can lead to resets. We would hope to see fewer programmes needing to be reset in the future as the IPA strengthens its assurance regime and its focus on setting up programmes for success. Although some resets are avoidable, for example through investing in up-front planning, other resets will be harder to avoid given the long delivery horizon and complex nature of major programmes. Resets may be a natural consequence for long-term programmes because of macro changes in the economy, technology sector or across society. Political factors, such as changes in ministers or the government composition, may also impact programmes. We heard how Universal Credit had been overseen by around nine secretaries of state since the current Senior Responsible Owner started his role in 2014. Recommendation 2:
Not having the right environment to encourage diverse views, transparency and constructive challenge has created problems in identifying and managing resets. A transparent and honest culture helps create an environment which supports constructive challenge and open conversations. This will encourage risks and issues, such as the potential need for a reset, to be discussed early with a full consideration of options, including if a programme should be stopped. We have seen programmes, such as Crossrail, with a good news culture, and resets being undertaken later than needed. Having a diverse range of individuals, such as non-executive directors, to provide views contributes to creating an effective environment and leads to better decision-making. There is more progress to be made in improving diversity amongst those in central government as well as across the programme profession. Recommendation 3: The Infrastructure and Projects Authority should encourage and support departments in developing an environment of openness and transparency across programmes. Alongside the Treasury Minute response to this report, it should write to the Committee setting out how it plans to do this and monitor diversity across all aspects of the profession against targets. This should include its pool of assessors, non-executives and practitioners. On too many occasions, programmes have suffered from resets being done too quickly.The time needed to undertake a successful reset will vary case-by-case, influenced by factors such as the programme complexity and breadth of the reset. Resets of government programmes have on occasion taken less than three months and sometimes more than a year. Teams can underestimate how much time a reset can take. There can be pressures to complete resets quickly, with teams not being given the space and time to think about the next steps; if a reset is being undertaken it must be done properly, otherwise it simply increases the risk of further resets. Recommendation 4: By June 2024, HM Treasury and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority should have drawn together and shared with the profession its insights on the factors influencing the time needed to undertake a reset and encourage programme teams to be realistic on the time they need. In doing this they should review their own processes to ensure they do not introduce milestones that incentivise rushed resets. Broader programme-related good practice, such as having the skills, leadership and governance relevant to the programme stage, has not always been applied. Government departments do not always have the specific skills needed to undertake a reset. This includes not always having the right leadership with an appropriate SRO, the importance of which we have regularly highlighted, to oversee the reset or future programme. Although we are told there has been less churn of SROs than there used to be, civil service pay and promotion constraints can impact an SROs incentive to stay in post and provide continuity if needed. The IPA recognises governance as an area where it needs to sharpen its focus. Recommendation 5: The Infrastructure and Projects Authority should set out its progress, and the actions it has and is taking, to:
Resetting programmes can create new risks that are not always effectively managed. A programme reset is much more than the routine change management expected within any large programme. To help address the root causes of any underlying issues, a reset will necessarily significantly change what or how a programme delivers. This will introduce new risks and opportunities that need to be identified and managed such as creating new commercial relationships or changing existing ones. In not recognising these challenges, on its Ajax programme, the Ministry of Defence had to undertake a further reset. It is vital that departments fully appreciate the new risk landscape. Recommendation 6: The Infrastructure and Projects Authority should encourage and support departments to understand the full risks when resetting a programme. Alongside the Treasury Minute response to this report, the IPA should write to us setting out how it is considering this as part of its ongoing assurance and review of major programmes. |