Motion A Moved by Lord Johnson of Lainston That this House do
disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 23A and do propose
Amendments 23B and 23C in lieu— 23A: As an amendment to Lords
Amendment 23, leave out lines 84 to 96 23BAs an amendment to Lords
Amendment 23, in the text inserted by subsection (5) of the new
Clause, leave out section 113C (required information about members:
nominees) 23C: As an amendment to Lords Amendment 178, in the text
to...Request free trial
Motion A
Moved by
That this House do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment
23A and do propose Amendments 23B and 23C in lieu—
23A: As an amendment to Lords Amendment 23, leave out lines 84 to
96
23BAs an amendment to Lords Amendment 23, in the text inserted by
subsection (5) of the new Clause, leave out section 113C
(required information about members: nominees)
23C: As an amendment to Lords Amendment 178, in the text to be
inserted, after paragraph 12A insert—
“12B After section 790I insert—
“Power to impose further duties
790IAPower to impose further duties involving nominee
shareholders
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make further
provision for the purpose of enabling a company to which this
Part applies to find out about anyone who has become or ceased to
be a person who is—
(a) a registrable person in relation to the company by virtue of
shares being held by a nominee, or
(b) a registrable relevant legal entity in relation to the
company by virtue of shares being held by a nominee.
(2) The regulations may, in particular—
(a) impose obligations on a company with a view to obtaining—
(i) information about whether a person has become or ceased to be
a nominee shareholder;
(ii) if they have, information about: (A) the shareholding; (B)
the nominee; (C) the person for whom the nominee holds or held
the shares;
(iii) any other information required by the regulations;
(b) impose obligations on others (including nominees or former
nominees) with a view to providing the company with—
(i) information of a kind described in paragraph (a)(i)
or (ii);
(ii) any other information required by the regulations.
(3) The regulations may, in particular, make provision similar or
corresponding to any of the preceding provisions of this
Chapter.
(4) The provision that may be made by regulations under
subsection (1) includes provision amending this Chapter.
(5) Regulations under this section are subject to affirmative
resolution procedure.””
The Minister of State, Department for Business and Trade () (Con)
My Lords, I shall also speak to Motions B, C, D and D1. I thank
noble Lords for their extraordinarily high level of constructive
input over the last few days as we have come to this point. I
believe that together, across the House, we have created a truly
powerful piece of legislation that will have a meaningful impact
on how Companies House operates, how we deal with financial crime
and how we make our system safer and cleaner.
I should declare my interests. I have interests in limited
companies and other companies, but I do not believe there is any
conflict of interest in this process today.
Motion A relates to Lords Amendment 23, tabled on Report by the
noble Lord, , which would
require members of all UK companies to declare whether they were
holding shares on behalf of, or subject to the direction of,
another person or persons as a nominee and, if so, to provide
details of the person or persons. We have been in conversation
over the last few days about that amendment. While we understand
the intention to tackle what we perceive to be an industry of
nominee service providers prone to acting unlawfully, I am afraid
we do not believe that the amendment is the appropriate way to
achieve that goal.
However, the Government, via Motion A, have therefore tabled
Amendments 23B and 23C in lieu of Commons Amendment 23A. I hope
that is making sense to the noble Lord. The new amendments allow
the Secretary of State to make regulations to make further
provision for the purpose of enabling a company to find out who
its PSCs are—that is, people of significant control—in cases
where shares are held by a nominee. That could include, among
other things, imposing further obligations on companies to find
out if they have nominee shareholders and, if so, for whom they
are holding shares, or imposing further obligations on nominee
shareholders to disclose their status and for whom they are
holding shares.
It is important that we make it clear that the reason for tabling
the new amendments rather than accepting the noble Lord’s revised
amendment is that we are slightly wary of imposing
disproportionate burdens on business. There are a vast variety of
nominee types which we need to make sure we have taken into
account when ensuring that we are getting the right information
from the right types of nominees. As I have said to the noble
lord—at this Dispatch Box, I believe—the commitment in principle
to try better to understand the route between the nominee and the
beneficiary is an important one. We want to do it in the right
way, and these amendments would give the Secretary of State the
powers to do that. I hope that the noble Lord can agree that that
is the right approach to take and, assuming that is so, can
support the Government in this new amendment and consider
withdrawing his own.
I turn to Motion B.
(Con)
My Lords, I apologise to my noble friend the Minister. I had been
told that I needed to address my Motion D1 while Motion A was
under discussion. I am very happy to wait but those were the
instructions I had from the Table. Would anyone like to
clarify?
(Con)
I am told that I should continue, and we will hear from my noble
friend at a later stage—which I welcome and look forward to
greatly.
Motion B is a technical Motion that allows the power to modify
who is able to file with Companies House on others’ behalf, to
ensure it is consistent for all types of filings. I hope the
House is assured that these amendments are minor but sensible
modifications to the Bill.
Motion C relates to Lords Amendment 115, also tabled by the noble
Lord, Lord Vaux, at Report. This will introduce two new duties
for overseas entities, the first requiring event-driven updates
on beneficial ownership information, and the second requiring
overseas entities to update their records no more than 14 days
before the completion of a land transaction. We believe that
requiring event-driven updates for the Register of Overseas
Entities will not work in principle. I would like to reassure
noble Lords that we have done an enormous amount of highly
collaborative work with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on this issue.
We are concerned that this would create additional risk for
purchasers of properties involved with overseas entities.
However, as I hope I have made clear to noble Lords, we are
extremely committed to working further on this subject. The
Government commit to keeping under review the question of the
update period for the Register of Overseas Entities. That is
extremely important, and I personally commit to that on behalf of
the Government. We will have more evidence at our disposal as the
first set of annual updates comes through. If we felt it
necessary to change the reporting requirements, and if there were
not the risks that we feel may be presented by the noble Lord’s
proposal, then we would look to consult on that. For that reason,
we will not be supporting that amendment.
I turn to Motion D, which my noble friend Lord Agnew will then
speak to. Again, I am very grateful to my noble friend for his
extraordinarily high level of commitment to making sure that the
Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill is genuinely
powerful legislation that will enable us to achieve the goals we
wish to achieve. Ultimately, transparency is at the core of our
ambition. However, we are concerned, in that his amendment would
make information about trusts submitted to the Register of
Overseas Entities publicly available by removing it from the list
of material listed as unavailable for public inspection. I note
that my noble friend has also tabled a further amendment.
However, it is important to come back to these points, because
they are very relevant to our ambitions. We are resolute in
saying that we will not unilaterally change the rules relating to
these trusts, and I think Members of the House understand why.
However, we have committed already to launching a full public
consultation before the end of the year on how we can further
improve the transparency of trust information. Following further
discussion with my noble friend, I would like to make it clear
that the public consultation to which we are committed is a
separate exercise from the commitment to make regulations that I
have discussed already. The consultation will look at the case
for broader transparency regarding trusts. The Government’s
ambition is to increase and improve transparency. We commit
absolutely that we will undertake this consultation and that it
will be launched before Christmas of this year and run for no
more than 12 weeks. That is in line with discussions we had with
my noble friend.
I reassure my noble friend that Ministers across departments are
committed to meeting this deadline and acting swiftly on the
consultation’s findings. I would be very happy to meet with my
noble friend, and indeed any noble Lords, soon after the
consultation closes to discuss how we can move forward at pace.
We therefore oppose my noble friend’s amendment, but I hope he
can take the commitments I have made today at the Dispatch Box as
sufficient reassurance to persuade him to withdraw his amendment.
I beg to move.
3.45pm
Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)
Moved by
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do agree with the
Commons in their Amendment 23A, and do propose Amendment 23D to
Lords Amendment 23 in place of the words left out by Amendment
23A—
23D: Line 83, at end insert—
“113C Required information about members: nominees
If a member holds 5% or more of the share capital or voting
rights of the company, the required information about a member
includes a statement by the individual, or where the member is a
body corporate, or a firm that is a legal person under the law by
which it is governed, by an officer of that body corporate or
firm, as to whether or not they are holding the shares on behalf
of, or subject to the direction of, another person or persons,
and if they are—
(a) where any such person is an individual, and the shares held
on that person’s behalf or subject to their direction amount to
3% or more of the share capital or voting rights of the company,
the information required by section 113A in relation to that
individual;
(b) where any such person is a body corporate or firm that is a
legal person under the law by which it is governed, and the
shares held on that person’s behalf or subject to their direction
amount to 3% or more of the share capital or voting rights of the
company, the information required by section 113B in relation to
that body corporate or firm; or
(c) a statement that the member is not holding shares on behalf
of, or subject to the direction of, such person that amount to 3%
or more of the share capital or voting rights of the
company.””
(CB)
My Lords, I hope that Motion A1 is clear. Before I start, I
remind the House of my interest as a non-practising chartered
accountant.
On Report, your Lordships agreed Amendment 23, which included a
requirement that shareholders should have to state whether they
are holding shares on someone else’s behalf and, if so, on whose
behalf they are holding them. This requirement was rejected, as
we have heard, by the other place. Motion A1 aims to reverse
that, while trying to take on board some of the matters raised in
debate in the other place. If I may, given that the debate we had
in this House was now some months ago, I will briefly remind the
House of the issue that that amendment was trying to resolve.
One of the easiest ways to hide the true identity of an owner of
a company is to use a nominee—somebody whose name will appear on
the register of members but who is in fact acting under the
instruction of and for the benefit of the actual beneficial
owner. A substantial industry has grown up to provide these
nominee services. There are of course legitimate reasons for
using a nominee, such as an asset manager holding and managing a
range of shareholdings, but it is quite revealing to do a Google
search of nominee shareholding services.
A near-endless list of such services appears, and these services
are usually sold very clearly as being primarily about creating
anonymity for the true shareholder. Let me quote from one of
them:
“The beneficial owner may choose to appoint a Nominee Shareholder
because they do not want to register the shares in their own
name. A Nominee Shareholder is a great way to keep shareholder
information away from public records”.
Another one states:
“In the United Kingdom, the purpose of using nominees is
confidentiality. Because of the confidentiality requirements,
owners are reluctant to associate themselves with beneficial
ownership, and the practice of nominating shareholders will hide
their association”.
Most nominee service providers market their services in the same
vein. A few of them refer to the PSC—persons with significant
control—rules or to anti-money laundering in the marketing
literature, but they are very much in the minority. As I said,
there are legitimate reasons for holding shares through a
nominee, but not wanting to register the shares in their own name
and keeping shareholder information away from public records are
not legitimate reasons. In fact, that is precisely what this Bill
is trying to stop.
The amendment originally passed by this House was intended to
strengthen the Bill to prevent the misuse of nominees to hide the
true ownership. I continue to believe that this is a very real
issue and, as a result, I have tabled Motion Al, which tries to
reintroduce the original amendment, but changed to reflect some
of the reasons for rejecting it made in the other place—in
particular, the question of undue burden that the Minister
referred to a moment ago.
However, since I tabled my Motion A1, I am very pleased to say
that the Government has tabled Amendment 23C within their Motion
A. It shows that they now recognise that there is a genuine issue
here and, in particular, that the enabling industry needs to be
incentivised to clean up its act. I especially welcome the fact
that proposed new subsection (2)(b) will specifically allow the
Government to impose obligations directly on those who act as
nominees. The real flaw in the current rules is that those
enablers face no real risk at all when acting as they do. I hope
that this specific mention in the Government’s Amendment 23C will
cause the nominee industry to take note and clean up its act, in
the knowledge that if it does not, it will face regulation.
While I would have preferred to have taken action now and
introduced something in the Bill, the fact that the Government
recognise the issue and are proposing a regulating power to deal
with it is most welcome. I very much welcome the commitments made
by the Minister a moment ago. I thank him and, given that and
what he has just said, I will not press Motion A1. I thank him
and his officials for their continuing very constructive
engagement, which has been the case throughout the Bill. I look
forward to seeing the proposed regulations before too long—he
will know that I will not be dropping the issue until we see the
regulations.
I shall also comment very briefly on Motion C, which moves an
amendment passed in this House that aimed to fix an anomaly in
the register of overseas entities, which is that it has to be
updated only annually. First, I point out the reason given by the
Commons:
“Because it would alter the financial arrangements made by the
Commons, and the Commons do not offer any further Reason”.
That, frankly, is totally inadequate and nonsensical in this
case. It has to be updated only annually. Other registers, such
as the register of persons with significant control, have to be
updated within 14 days of any change being identified. This
anomaly means that the register of overseas entities can be up to
a year out of date at any time. That introduces the risk that an
innocent part might unknowingly find themselves entering into a
transaction with a sanctioned person, for example.
Unfortunately, because of the way the register works in
conjunction with the registration of property, this all becomes
extremely complex. I thank the Law Society for its helpful and
constructive engagement in many meetings over the Recess to try
to find a solution to this. While we did find a possible way
through, it was so convoluted as to be impractical—so I am not
going to oppose the removal of this amendment, even if the issue
it was trying to solve remains real.
The register of overseas entities is still in its early stage.
While it has been successful up to a point, as I am sure we are
going to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, there are still
many properties the ownership of which is, at best, unclear. I am
very pleased to hear the commitment the Minister made in his
speech just now that they will keep this anomaly of annual
updating under review. In the meantime, I caution any person who
is buying or selling property from or to an overseas entity, or
who is entering into a lease over a property with an overseas
entity, to require it to be a condition of the transaction that
the entity’s entry in the register is updated immediately prior
to the transaction completing. Only by doing that can the
innocent party know who they are actually transacting with. With
that, I beg to move.
(Con)
My Lords, I shall speak in favour of my Motion D. I am grateful
to my noble friend the Minister for his ongoing dialogue with me
as we grind to the end of this Bill: he has been patient and
courteous, as ever. My problem is that the Government continue to
say one thing and then do something different. Just to remind
noble Lords, the reason I pressed my original amendment was that
a gaping hole had opened up in this newly created register of
overseas interests. It is barely a year old and we have more than
50,000 properties owned by an entity whose beneficial owners are
withheld from public view. That is approaching one-third of all
entries. It is rapidly becoming the default advice from cute law
firms to their overseas clients to use a trust structure that is
opaque.
In rejecting my original Commons amendment, the Government
claimed refuge behind the principle of financial privilege. This
is bizarre, if not worse, but in a spirit of collaboration I will
not use the word that I had planned to use. The costs to
Companies House of publishing trust information are estimated on
the back of an illusory envelope at between £600,000 and £2.8
million—a figure supported by absolutely no methodology—but under
the Bill, Companies House funding is going to rise exponentially.
The current filing fee of £13 will rise to anywhere between £60
and £90 if the guidance we have been given is followed. Taking
the bottom-end number, £60 means an increase of £47 a year times
4 million companies, or £188 million a year, against this odd
figure of £600,000 to £2.8 million. Even if the higher filing
fees deterred some company creation or dissolution for non-viable
entities, the additional cost, frankly, is a rounding error.
Indeed, if the Government were to approach this logically and
calculated that as a transparency cost, it would be around about
70p per registered company per year, or about 1.25%.
I give this example only because I continually worry that I get
very clear assurances from the Minister but the actions taken by
the Government are rather different. I accept through gritted
teeth that we cannot debate that amendment as I was blocked from
tabling it. This leaves us with a much watered-down proposal to
try to hold the Government to account to get on with the
consultation they say they need to ensure that there are no legal
challenges. The Government have accepted that they need to start
straightaway, in this calendar year, but they do not yet accept
the principle of my proposed new subsection (2) that the
consultation includes the principle of public access to protected
data on a bulk basis.
This sounds arcane, but it is crucial because currently HMRC is
not providing the information when requested, and it can be
requested only on a case-by-case basis. As I have shown, there
are already more than 50,000 hidden owners where the public are
being denied the information, so doing it individually is simply
not practical. I have consistently said that those with a bona
fide need for confidentiality should have it, but this would be a
very small proportion of the 50,000.
On the terms of the consultation, there are a couple of elephant
traps that the Government should be aware of. A few years ago,
when the consultation was issued to tighten up the non-dom
loopholes, the lawyers’ excuse for not tightening them up was
that anyone who declared non-dom status should have a reasonable
expectation that it should last in perpetuity. That sounds pretty
sinister to me, but apparently that argument has already been
rolled out to civil servants on the issue of more transparency
with trusts. I warn the Minister to be alert because, as I
understand it, civil servants have already expressed their
compliance with this idea. I hope that we as politicians are
still running the country, not the civil servants.
We have heard from my noble friend the Minister and he has given
commitments, which I very much appreciate. However, I hope he
understands why I am extremely nervous: what he says and what the
Government do are not always totally aligned. I will take his
words exactly as he says them, though, and I ask him to keep a
very careful eye on this process over the next few months. I
think he has learned enough about me to know that, for all my
many weaknesses, one thing I am is dogged. We will keep a careful
eye on this. On that basis, I will withdraw my amendment.
(Lab)
My Lords, I strongly support the amendment from the noble Lord,
Lord Agnew. I do this as a former chair of the Jersey Financial
Services Commission. In Jersey we made a major effort to increase
the transparency of trust information so that beneficial
ownership could be accurately identified. One of the inhibitions
for cleaning up, if you like, the register in Jersey was the
behaviour of the Government in the United Kingdom, and their
persistent obfuscation of the way in which trusts were to be
treated.
The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, contains exactly
the process that needs to be dealt with in a consultation. I
understand the assurances he may have received and that he may
feel it appropriate to withdraw his amendment, but I hope he
proves as dogged as we know him to be in pursuing this. I assure
him of my continuing support.
(Non-Afl)
My Lords, I also support what the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, has
said and done. I am very sorry that the Government did not accept
the amendment in relation to trusts. It was entirely in keeping
with the purpose of the Bill, and more specifically with the
purpose of the introduction of the register of overseas
entities.
Some of us have been advancing the cause of this register—some
would say banging on about it—for some considerable time. I had
the privilege of chairing the Joint Committee on a draft Bill. We
recommended legislation as soon as possible. Unfortunately, it
took the invasion of Ukraine for the Government to incorporate
the necessary legislation into the last economic crime Bill.
During the taking of evidence by the committee in 2019, the need
to avoid trusts being used to avoid the identification of the
true owner of property was specifically brought to our attention.
It then became part of our recommendations that the legislation,
when it came before your Lordships’ House, should cater for this
obvious loophole. The Government ignored the recommendation then
and have now resisted the amendment passed by your Lordships’
House.
If there is concern about minors and keeping them ignorant about
their status as beneficiaries, this could have been catered for
by an appropriate provision. Instead, the Government, against
whom the former Lord Chancellor voted in the other place on this
issue, have resorted to “financial privilege” as a means of
blocking the amendment.
Trust lawyers are going to be very busy, as foreign owners will
set about frustrating the purpose of the register and the
aspirations that we all share for this and related legislation. I
hope the Government bear that in mind.4.00pm
(Con)
My Lords, I had the privilege of being a member of the noble
Lord’s committee. I agreed with what he had to say then, and I
agree with what he has just said now.
(LD)
My Lords, in his opening dispatch the Minister praised those
involved for the way in which the Bill has been modified and
changed. The noble Lord, Lord Agnew, needs to take a lot of
credit for how that modification has gone ahead, and the work
that he has done and will have to continue to do in his role
overseeing the Government’s response to this. I will not repeat
anything that has already been said, other than to say that I
agree.
The reason we are concerned about this issue is that the
Government will rightfully say that they know who the names are
in these trusts, but the issue we are talking about is the
publication. It has been the role of civil society and
journalists to uncover problems, and that has been very important
in issues around this. If the Government can demonstrate that
their commitment to enforcement, getting behind these trusts and
exposing people who are using them to avoid issues is fully
funded and fully backed by them, our relying on civil
society—which we have had to do to date—would be less of an
issue. That is why we support the quest by the noble Lord, Lord
Agnew, on this, and will support him as he seeks to make sure
that further steps are appropriate and that enforcement is at the
heart of what we seek to achieve here.
(Lab)
My Lords, I start by thanking the Minister for the broader
tidying up of the amendments in this group and by reflecting on
the time, over several months, that we have been discussing these
important issues. We must keep our eye on the scale of the issues
that we are dealing with; they are immense, and they cost this
country billions of pounds. We have a great deal to do to repair
the UK’s reputation in the world, and I hope that we involved in
this debate will all have our eyes on that prize.
I am pleased to say that we have seen some positive changes
achieved through the passage of this Bill and a genuine appetite
for change, as we experienced with our conversation with
Companies House. We are going through an immense cultural change
in the management of these affairs. As we know, it is the biggest
shake-up for 170 years. I also pay tribute to everyone in the
Chamber, and those who are not here today, for their diligence in
the work that they have done, and to my colleagues in the other
place, and in particular. Months and
months of work have gone into getting us to this place.
I am very grateful for the explanation that the noble Lord, Lord
Vaux, gave. There is real recognition that there will be an
ongoing need to scrutinise. I think we all accept the commitments
in good faith, but we need to make it clear to Ministers and
their officials that the interest is very live and that there
will be close scrutiny as these matters roll up. Compromise has
been reached on this—I accept that that is the reason we will not
be taking the amendment to a vote—but we add our support to the
ongoing scrutiny that will need to take place.
I also pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, for his
persistence in this and his unique position having had experience
in government, which has informed the approach he has taken and
the concern that I think many would agree he has rightly raised.
We are where we are—he has decided to accept the reassurances—but
we also have an insight into those elephant traps that he
referred to. I also reference the comments of my noble friend
on the explicit need for
vigilance.
With those comments, and thanking everyone for the spirit of
compromise, I reassure everyone that we will look closely at
this, and we very much hope that the measures being brought in
today will be sufficient. We will look to those delegated powers
that have been built in to make sure that, if change is
necessary, it will indeed be made.
(Con)
I thank noble Lords for their contributions, including the noble
Baroness, Lady Blake, for her extremely helpful and supportive
comments about the overall debate. In her summation, she was
right that we have, through a great degree of good faith among us
all, come up with a very strong series of actions that will
genuinely change the economic landscape in this country for the
better.
I have had the privilege of working with my noble friend Lord
Agnew for a number of months as we have come to today’s
conclusion on these measures. I reiterate my personal commitment,
and the commitment of this Government, to delivering on the
thrust of his ambitions. On a process that came to light only
recently—the issue of bulk data and its accessibility—I can
commit that Companies House will do a review of how it can assess
bulk data for the trusts’ information on the register of overseas
entities once a consultation period has finished and it is deemed
appropriate.
Ultimately, we are committed to greater transparency, and I am
very grateful to my noble friend and noble Lords across the House
for their understanding of our approach to how we can best
achieve this without either endangering vulnerable minors or
individuals or opening ourselves up to legal challenge which
could derail many of the main principles of this part the Bill to
which my noble friend is rightly keen to contribute.
Finally, I express my gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux,
who, from the very beginning, has been a tireless collaborator in
creating—with his input across the board in this section of the
Bill—a truly powerful piece of legislation. It was my own
personal pleasure and pride to work with him as we have come to
this conclusion, and I am very grateful to him for his
understanding, again, of how we believe that we can achieve our
shared ambitions in what we think will be the right way.
We have made some clear further commitments today—to which I
would be delighted to be held to account by my noble friend Lord
Agnew and all noble Lords in the House today—to make the Economic
Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill the most effective
legislation it can be. I therefore invite the House to agree the
government Motions in this group.
(CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his generous comments. I also
thank noble Lords who have been so generous with their support
throughout the passage of the Bill on these matters, which has
allowed us to get to the point of achieving at least this
compromise. With that, I beg leave to withdraw Motion A1.
Motion A1 withdrawn.
Motion A agreed.
Motion B
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 56 and do agree
with the Commons in their Amendments 56A, 56B and 56C in
lieu.
56A: Page 57, line 25, leave out subsection (3) and insert— “(3)
After section 1067 insert—
“Who may deliver documents to the registrar
1067A Delivery of documents: identity verification requirements
etc
(1) An individual may not deliver a document to the registrar on
their own behalf unless—
(a) their identity is verified (see section 1110A), and
(b) the document is accompanied by a statement to that
effect.
(2) An individual (A) may not deliver a document to the registrar
on behalf of another person (B) who is of a description specified
in column 1 of the following table unless—
(a) the individual is of a description specified in the
corresponding entry in column 2, and
(b) the document is accompanied by the statement specified in the
corresponding entry in column 3.
1
2
3
Description of person on whose behalf document delivered (B)
Description of individual who may deliver document on B’s behalf
(A)
Accompanying statement
1
Firm
Individual who is an officer or employee of the firm and whose
identity is verified (see section 1110A).
Statement by A—
(a) that A is an officer or employee of the firm, (b) that A is
delivering the document on the firm’s behalf, and
(c) that A’s identity is verified.
2
Firm
Individual who is an officer or employee of a corporate officer
of the firm and whose identity is verified.
Statement by A—
(a) that A is an officer or employee of a corporate officer of
the firm,
(b) that A is delivering the document on the firm’s behalf,
and
(c) that A’s identity is verified.
1
2
3
Description of person on
whose behalf document delivered (B)
Description of individual who may deliver document on B’s behalf
(A)
Accompanying statement
3
Firm
Individual who is an authorised corporate service provider (see
section 1098A).
Statement by A—
(a) that A is an authorised corporate service provider, and
(b) that A is delivering the document on the firm’s behalf.
4
Firm
Individual who is an officer or employee of an authorised
corporate service provider.
Statement by A—
(a) that A is an officer or employee of an authorised corporate
service provider, and
(b) that A is delivering the document on the firm’s behalf.
5
Individual
Individual whose identity is verified.
Statement by A—
(a) that A is delivering the document on B’s behalf, and
(b) that A’s identity is verified.
6
Individual
Individual who is an authorised corporate service provider.
Statement by A—
(a) that A is an authorised corporate service provider, and
(b) that A is delivering the document on B’s behalf.
7
Individual
Individual who is an officer or employee of an authorised
corporate service provider.
Statement by A—
(a) that A is an officer or employee of an authorised corporate
service provider, and
(b) that A is delivering the document on B’s behalf.
(3) In relation to a corporate officer that has only corporate
officers, the reference in row 2 of the table to an individual
who is one of its officers is to—
(a) an individual who is an officer of one of those corporate
officers, or
(b) if the officers of those corporate officers are all corporate
officers, an individual who is an officer of any of the corporate
officers’ corporate officers,
and so on until there is at least one individual who is an
officer.
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations—
(a) create exceptions to subsections (1) or (2) (which may be
framed by reference to the person by whom or on whose behalf a
document is delivered or by reference to descriptions of document
or in any other way);
(b) amend this section for the purpose of changing the effect of
the table in subsection (2).
(5) Regulations under subsection (4)(a)—
(a) may require any document delivered to the registrar in
reliance on an exception to be accompanied by a statement; (b)
may amend this section.
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision
requiring a statement delivered to the registrar under subsection
(2) to be accompanied by additional statements or additional
information in connection with the subject-matter of the
statement.
(7) Regulations under this section are subject to affirmative
resolution procedure.
(8) In this section “corporate officer” means an officer that is
not an individual.””
56B: Page 59, line 9, at end insert—
“(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend this section
for the purposes of changing who may deliver a document to the
registrar on behalf of a disqualified person.
(8) Regulations under subsection (7) are subject to the
affirmative procedure.”
56C:Page 129, line 37, after “regulations” insert “—
(a) amend this section for the purposes of changing who may
deliver a document under a provision listed in subsection (4) to
the registrar on behalf of another person;
(b) ”
Motion B agreed.
Motion C
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 115, to which the
Commons have disagreed for their Reason 115A.
115A: Because it would alter the financial arrangements made by
the Commons, and the Commons do not offer any further Reason,
trusting that this Reason may be deemed sufficient.
Motion C agreed.
Motion D
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 117, to which the
Commons have disagreed for their Reason 117A.
117A: Because it would alter the financial arrangements made by
the Commons, and the Commons do not offer any further Reason,
trusting that this Reason may be deemed sufficient.
(Con)
I beg to move.
Motion D1 not moved.
Motion D agreed.
Motion E
Moved by
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment
151A.
151A: In subsection (1), after first “body” insert “which is a
large organisation (see sections ((Failure to prevent fraud):
large organisations) and (Large organisations: parent
undertakings))”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office () (Con)
My Lords, I will speak also to Motions F, G, H and H1. We cannot
agree to the proposed amendments for practical reasons, not least
that the burdens they would place on business would not just be
justified. It is for this reason, and not because of any
intransigence or party-political reason, that we are unable to
agree with the proposed Lords amendments. I will now talk
specifically to the Motions in this group.
Motion E would reinsert the SME exemption for the failure to
prevent fraud offence. I have of course noted Motion E1, tabled
by my noble and learned friend . I appreciate that he has
moved closer to the Government’s position on this issue, creating
his own threshold that would exclude microentities from the
failure to prevent fraud offence. However, the Government remain
extremely mindful of the pressures on companies of all sizes,
including small and medium-sized enterprises, and therefore do
not feel it is appropriate to place this new, unnecessary burden
on more than 450,000 of them.
The analysis on this issue remains clear: even reducing the
exemption threshold to only microentities would increase the
one-off costs on businesses from around £500 million to £1.5
billion. Further, the annually recurrent costs would increase
from £60 million to more than £192 million. Those costs would
still be disproportionately shared by small business owners.
I know some noble Lords have expressed scepticism about the
burdens, but the fact is that when a small business person hears
that they may be liable to a new offence and significant fines if
they are judged not to have taken action on something, they will
worry. They will take time out of their business to scrutinise
the guidance and, whatever it may say, there could be widespread
overcompliance. Furthermore, they may well have to pay their
accountant or lawyer to do it for them. While this burden is
eye-watering in its own right, the issue cannot be taken in
isolation. We must be aware of the cumulative compliance costs
for SMEs across multiple government requirements or regulations.
Furthermore, I can assure noble Lords that 50% of economic
activity would be covered by the organisations in scope of this
new offence with the Government’s threshold in place. It is of
course already easier for law enforcement to attribute and
prosecute fraud more easily in the smaller organisations that
fall below the threshold.
I hope that noble Lords who feel strongly on this issue will be
reassured that this is not the end of the debate. The Government
have future-proofed the legislation by including a delegated
power to allow them to raise, lower or remove the threshold
altogether. Of course, as with all legislation, the Government
will keep the threshold under review and will make changes if
there is evidence to suggest that they are required. I therefore
urge noble Lords to support government Motion E, rather than
Motion E1.
I now turn to government Motion G, which disagrees with Lords
Amendment 158. This was also tabled by my noble and learned
friend and seeks to introduce a
failure to prevent money laundering offence. I am pleased that no
amending Motions have been tabled for today, as I fear this
amendment is entirely duplicative of existing regulations. Much
like my noble and learned friend’s other amendment, it would
therefore impose yet further unnecessary burdens on UK
businesses. The UK already has a strong anti-money laundering
regime in the form of the money laundering regulations, which
require regulated sectors to implement a comprehensive set of
measures to prevent money laundering. Corporations and
individuals can face serious penalties, ranging from fines to
cancellation of registration and criminal prosecution, if they
fail to take those measures. What is more, those penalties will
apply even if no actual money laundering has occurred. No
knowledge of or intention to commit an offence has to be
proved.
The money laundering regulations and the money laundering
offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act are directly linked and can
be seen as part of the same regime. A failure to prevent money
laundering offence would therefore be highly duplicative of the
existing regime. This is not just the view of the Government: in
our conversations with industry, it has been very clear that
duplication would create a serious level of confusion and
unnecessary burdens on businesses. We should support legitimate
businesses, rather than hamper them with overlapping regimes. I
therefore hope that noble Lords will agree with the government
Motion to disagree with the amendment from Report.
4.15pm
I turn finally to the Government’s Motion H, with which I will
address Motion H1, tabled by the noble Lord, . As I have discussed with the
noble Lord, the Government’s position on this issue is that his
amendments would be a significant departure from the loser pays
principle, and therefore not something that should be rushed into
without careful consideration. The effect that I believe he
intends them to have would mean that the state could come after
someone’s assets and lose the case, and then the individual—who
will not necessarily be a Russian oligarch—would be left with a
potentially ruinous legal bill. That would be the case even where
the court decides that the property is not derived from unlawful
conduct, although, as drafted, the noble Lord’s amendment would,
in effect, achieve the opposite.
Furthermore, there is not the evidence that such changes would
help achieve their intended aim of protecting enforcement budgets
and increasing the number of civil recovery cost orders. There
have been no adverse cost rulings against an enforcement
authority carrying out this type of civil recovery in the past
six years. Costs are just one of the many factors that determine
whether law enforcement will take on a case. For example, the
evidence available to pursue a case, particularly where evidence
is required from overseas, often proves more vital to an
operational decision.
I appreciate the noble Lord’s intentions behind Motion H1, which
I think is intended to address some of these concerns, but I am
far from convinced that it does. This amendment is not only a
significant departure from the loser pays principle without clear
benefits but it appears to make the starting point that the
enforcement agency normally pays the costs to the respondent,
regardless of the outcome of the case, unless the court decides
that it is not in the interests of justice. Introducing
legislation on costs that starts with the enforcement agency
paying the respondent’s costs would swing the balance in favour
of the respondent. This would expose the law enforcement agency
to liability for costs even where it has won its case. It is not
clear to me whether this was intended by the noble Lord, which in
itself shows just how complex this area of law is.
Additionally, this would be a limited reform to economic crime
offences, whereas the civil recovery regime applies to all kinds
of unlawful conduct. Distinguishing which aspect of the
underlying unlawful conduct was economic crime—for example, money
laundering—and which was some other type of offence will be
unworkable for law enforcement and the courts. In fact, the
drafting of the amendment assumes that the property is
recoverable, because it requires that the property has been
obtained through economic crime. That suggests that a law
enforcement agency must have satisfied a court that it derives
from unlawful conduct, so it may well have won its case and
recovered that property. However, the default would be that the
agency pays the respondent’s costs. I do not think that was the
intention behind the amendment.
I am keen to reiterate that civil recovery is a powerful tool
that can result in the permanent depravation of someone’s home.
The law in this area is well developed but relies on the
discretion of the court to award costs, rather than the
intervention of government to entirely remove the liability for
costs of just one party except in certain circumstances. There
are already a number of ways in which an enforcement agency’s
liability to legal costs can be protected under the Civil
Procedure Rules in England and Wales. For instance, Rule 44.2
gives the court discretion as to the payment of costs by either
party, including whether they are payable to another party, the
amount and when they are payable. In addition, a cost-capping
order can be applied for under Rule 3.19 that limits any future
costs that a party may recover under a later costs order. If we
are to introduce further legislation, we must consider what gap
this is trying to fill.
However, the Government recognise the strength of feeling on this
issue and the potential merits in bolstering the system for all
of civil recovery, not only economic crime offences. The
Government would like the time, and more input from those
affected, to be able to consider this issue further. That is why
Motion H imposes a statutory commitment on the Government to
review the payment of costs in civil recovery cases in England
and Wales by enforcement authorities and to publish a report on
their findings before Parliament within 12 months. This review
will look in detail across all the available evidence, take
account of key stakeholder views, analyse any potential legal
issues and provide a view on whether and how any cost protection
should be implemented. Given the need to ensure that any changes
in this area are evidenced and workable, and the evident
complications that can arise from rushed legislative changes, I
urge noble Lords to therefore support government Motion E. I beg
to move.
Motion E1 (as an amendment to Motion E)
Moved by
Leave out from leave out from “House” to end and insert “do
disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 151A and do propose
Amendments 151B and 151C in lieu—
151B: As an amendment to Lords Amendment 151, in subsection (1),
after first “body” insert “which is a non-micro organisation or
which is a large organisation (see sections (Section (Failure to
prevent fraud): non-micro organisations), (Section (Failure to
prevent fraud): large organisations) and (Large organisations:
parent undertakings))”
151C: After Clause 180, insert the following new Clause—
“Section (Failure to prevent fraud): non-micro organisations
For the purposes of section (Failure to prevent fraud)(1) a
relevant body is a “non-micro organisation” only if the body
satisfied two or more of the following conditions in the
financial year of the body (“year P”) that precedes the year of
the fraud offence—
Turnover
More than £632,000 and less than £36 million
Balance sheet total
More than £316,000 and less than £18 million
Number of employees
More than 10 and less than 250.
(2) For a period that is a relevant body’s financial year but not
in fact a year, the figure for turnover must be proportionately
adjusted.
(3) In subsection (1) the “number of employees” means the average
number of persons employed by the relevant body in year P,
determined as follows—
(a) find for each month in year P the number of persons employed
under contracts of service by the relevant body in that month
(whether throughout the month or not),
(b) add together the monthly totals, and (c) divide by the number
of months in year P.
(4) In this section—
“balance sheet total”, in relation to a relevant body and a
financial year—
(a) means the aggregate of the amounts shown as assets in its
balance sheet at the end of the financial year, or
(b) where the body has no balance sheet for the financial year,
has a corresponding meaning;
“turnover”—
(a) in relation to a UK company, has the same meaning as in Part
15 of the Companies Act 2006 (see section 474 of that Act);
(b) in relation to any other relevant body, has a corresponding
meaning;
“year of the fraud offence” is to be interpreted in accordance
with section (Failure to prevent fraud)(1).
(5) The Secretary of State may by regulations modify this section
(other than this subsection and subsections (6) and (8)) for the
purpose of altering the meaning of “non-micro organisation” in
section (Failure to prevent fraud)(1).
(6) The Secretary of State may (whether or not the power in
subsection (5) has been exercised) by regulations—
(a) omit the words “which is a non-micro organisation or” in
section (Failure to prevent fraud)(1), and
(b) make any modifications of this section (other than this
subsection) that the Secretary of State thinks appropriate in
consequence of provision made under quotegraph (a).
(7) Before making regulations under subsection (5) or (6) the
Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Scottish Ministers, and
(b) the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.
(8) Regulations under subsection (5) or (6) may make
consequential amendments of section (Failure to prevent fraud:
minor definitions).””
(Con)
My Lords, I begin by referring to my interest as a barrister in
private practice and informing the House that that practice
includes economic and corporate crime.
I wish to acknowledge the genuine attempts of my noble friends on
the Front Bench to understand my concerns, expressed over a good
many years and, more particularly, during the passage of this
Bill, not only in this Chamber and in Grand Committee but in
meetings with them and their officials, most recently on Friday.
My noble friend Lord Sharpe has had to bear the brunt of my
concerns, but he has never dissembled nor lost his sense of
humour, even when listening to my jokes. It is regrettable that
he has not been permitted any discretion by Ministers in the
other place and has had to stick to his instructions on a matter
that has nothing to do with party politics or manifesto
commitments.
I know that your Lordships are interested only in creating good,
coherent and comprehensible criminal law that meets the needs of
the modern economy and is in line with public opinion and
morality. Thanks to the support of your Lordships’ House—I am
grateful to noble Lords of all parties and none—the Bill we are
dealing with was altered on Report to delete the SME exemption
from the failure to prevent fraud offences regime, while money
laundering was added to the failure to prevent regime introduced
by the Government; by that, I mean the substantive money
laundering offences under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act
2002, not to be confused with the due diligence requirements
under the more recent money laundering regulations.
Last Monday, despite the powerful arguments of my right
honourable and learned friends Sir and Sir , the other place refused to
extend the proposed new offence of failure to prevent fraud to
99.5% of the corporate economy and deleted money laundering from
the failure to prevent regime. Having won the Division in the
other place last week, the Government now seek to sustain that
position in your Lordships’ House today. I accept that democratic
politics is as much about arithmetic as it is about sound
arguments; if a majority prefers to do something unsatisfactory,
whether or not it has listened to the arguments and the evidence
in support of them, that is what will happen. Even as they stand,
these limited proposals are well overdue and have been in the
making since 2010.
In the spirit of compromise, those of us who voted for the
extension of failure to prevent to money laundering on Report
have agreed not to press the money laundering extension today. We
happen to think that it should be extended to money laundering—I
happen to think also that there are other substantive offences,
such as those listed in the deferred prosecution agreements
schedule to the Crime and Courts Act 2013, that could be
included—but, on the basis that the best is often the enemy of
the good, and in an attempt to meet the Government a lot more
than half way down the road, we will not take that matter further
on this occasion. However, I invite the Government and the other
place to reconsider the SME exemption, subject to a further
concession to exempt micro-businesses; I hope that this will
allay the fear, albeit unfounded, that extending the failure to
prevent regime further than the Bill currently permits will
stifle small businesses. Absent any agreement from my noble
friend the Minister, I will seek leave to test the opinion of the
House at the appropriate time.
On Report, I spoke in support of a number of amendments or
proposed new clauses to the Bill—a Bill which has much to
recommend it, even if it has been slow to arrive. The defects
that I intended to correct related to the failure to prevent
regime. No one needs reminding of this but that regime is not a
new provision stealthily added to the criminal law in the past
few months by an eccentric Back-Bench Peer. It was first
introduced into our criminal law with cross-party support—indeed,
without a vote—via the Bribery Act 2010, which began its passage
through Parliament under Gordon Brown’s Labour Government and was
enacted under David Cameron’s coalition Government. Failure to
prevent bribery under Section 7 of the 2010 Act, supported by all
three major parties, as well as the Cross Benches and others, is
now a tried and tested criminal offence, with an easily
understood and practical defence for companies and partnerships
that I and many other practitioners have not found difficult to
advise on or to apply in particular cases, whether we have been
acting for the Serious Fraud Office or for defendant
companies.
The objective of the 2010 Act was and is not to bring the full
force of the criminal law to bear on well-run commercial
organisations that experience an isolated incident of bribery on
their behalf. Therefore, to achieve an appropriate balance,
Section 7 provides a full defence. This is in recognition of the
fact that no bribery prevention scheme will be capable of always
preventing bribery. However, the defence was also included to
encourage commercial organisations to put procedures in place to
prevent bribery by persons associated with them. The failure to
prevent bribery offence is in addition to, and does not displace,
liability that might arise under Sections 1 and 6 of the Act for
direct bribery here or of a foreign public official where the
commercial organisation itself commits an offence.
That was well understood as the Act progressed through Parliament
and I hope it is well understood now. So too are the special
nature and parameters of the statutory defence of “adequate
procedures”. Note that the defence requires “adequate
procedures”, not perfect procedures. There is no practical
difference between “adequate procedures” in the 2010 Act and
“reasonable procedures” in the Criminal Finances Act 2017 and in
this Bill. The law requires no more than a proportionate approach
to the facts relevant to the company or partnership in
question.
The alarmist suggestion that a failure to prevent fraud offences
regime that does not include SMEs—that is, it does not exempt
99.5% of companies and partnerships—will impose unbearable cost
burdens running into multiple billions of pounds on those
organisations is absurd. There will be some cost but since the
guidance under the 2010 Act has been available since 2011, it is
well understood and can easily be adapted to the failure to
prevent offences under this Bill. The Bribery Act guidance will
easily translate to fraud offences and the sooner it is
published, the better. The best estimates are that SME companies
will need to spend between £2,000 and £4,000 to prepare
themselves and some will need to spend nothing because of their
low risk profile. These costs are a legitimate business expense
but, to put this in proportion, Lesley O’Brien, a director of
Freightlink Europe, said in June 2022 that it costs £20,000 per
year to run one heavy-goods vehicle. No sensibly run business
should be trading abroad without taking proportionate
precautionary steps to avoid the risk of bribery or fraud
committed by its associates.
In the guidance to the 2010 Act, published in 2011 by my noble
friend Lord Clarke of Nottingham, the then Justice Secretary, he
explained that “procedures” is used to embrace bribery prevention
policies and the procedures that implement them. Policies
articulate a commercial organisation’s anti-bribery stance, show
how it will be maintained and help create an anti-bribery
culture. They are therefore a necessary measure in the prevention
of bribery but they will not achieve that objective unless they
are properly implemented. Adequate bribery prevention procedures,
I repeat, ought to be proportionate to the bribery risks that the
organisation faces. The same applies to the prevention of fraud
offences and, where the guidance refers to “bribery”, one could
in the context of this Bill substitute “fraud”.
The guidance says:
“To a certain extent the level of risk will be linked to the size
of the organisation and the nature and complexity of its
business, but size will not be the only determining factor. Some
small organisations can face quite significant risks, and will
need more extensive procedures than their counterparts facing
limited risks. However, small organisations are unlikely to need
procedures that are as extensive as those of a large
multi-national organisation. For example, a very small business
may be able to rely heavily on periodic oral briefings to
communicate its policies while a large one may need to rely on
extensive written communication … The level of risk that
organisations face will also vary with the type and nature of the
persons associated with it. For example, a commercial
organisation that properly assesses that there is no risk of
bribery”—
substitute “fraud”—
“on the part of one of its associated persons will, accordingly,
require nothing in the way of procedures to prevent bribery”—
substitute “fraud”—
“in the context of that relationship. By the same token the
bribery”—
substitute “fraud”—
“risks associated with reliance on a third party agent
representing a commercial organisation in negotiations with
foreign public officials may be assessed as significant and
accordingly require much more in the way of procedures to
mitigate those risks. Organisations are likely to need to select
procedures to cover a broad range of risks but any consideration
by a court in an individual case of the adequacy or
reasonableness of procedures is necessarily likely to focus on
those procedures designed to prevent bribery or fraud on the part
of the associated person committing the offence in question”.
4.30pm
It was not suggested by the Government then that the Section 7
offence or the failure to prevent facilitation of tax offences
would not apply to SMEs or small partnerships. It is frankly
laughable that we are, on the Bill’s current wording, about to
exempt 99.5% of the corporate economy.
As I have indicated, Parliament criminalised the failure to
prevent the facilitation of tax evasion via the Criminal Finances
Act 2017. It was the next logical step in the extension of the
failure to prevent regime and Parliament passed the relevant
provisions without opposition. Of course, a number of
professional lobbying organisations—paid for by those who thought
that amending the law would be commercially
inconvenient—approached the Government and parliamentarians, as
they had in 2010, but their submissions did not attract support
because most right-thinking people, in and out of government,
recognised that things needed to change and that there was no
good reason to accede to these narrow commercial interests.
Similar attempts were made to prevent the corporate manslaughter
and health and safety legislation in the early years of this
century, on the basis, as now, that it would create unacceptable
burdens on business. No one now sensibly countenances unsafe
systems of work.
There have, within living memory, been those who thought it
appropriate to prevent health and safety at work laws because
they would create an unacceptable business cost. It was suggested
that the deaths or injuries of scaffolders, ferry crews or
steelworkers were rare and that, in any event, the proposed laws
would be an unnecessary burden on business. The Government, it
seems, have been persuaded by a couple of lobbying
organisations—no doubt legitimately earning their fees by making
the same arguments rejected in 2010 and 2017—that the laws we
have unanimously passed in the past 13 years were wrongly enacted
and should not be replicated in this Bill.
Let us be clear: there is no SME exemption in the Bribery Act or
in the Criminal Finances Act, and Parliament did not think there
should be. The criminal law applies to all and if the defence of
adequate or reasonable procedures is available, there is no
conviction—and often no prosecution. What other criminal offence
defines liability based on the size of the defendant? A small
thief is every bit as much a thief as a tall one, and as liable
under the law if the evidence and the public interest in their
prosecution are made out. The public interest in requiring a
company with a small turnover and only a few employees to prevent
its associates committing fraud for its benefit is no lesser than
in a far larger company. To limit the failure to prevent fraud
offence to corporates that have at least £36 million in turnover,
£18 million in assets and more than 250 employees is both absurd
and incoherent. The Government have been persuaded by these
lobbyists that my amendment to make all companies and
partnerships equal before the law would create an unacceptable
burden on business—it will not. When I last looked, we make laws
through Parliament, not by taking dictation from lobbyists.
Let me help my noble friend the Minister. Under the law of
England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, we exempt children under
the age of 10 from criminal responsibility; in Scotland I believe
it is children under the age of 12. The child could have
committed an offence in London for which, had they been aged over
10, they could have received a lengthy period in secure
accommodation. For entirely civilised and sensible public policy
reasons we do not prosecute children under the age of 10. On that
basis, and by that stretched analogy, I propose that we should
exempt only the very smallest and newest commercial
organisations—micro-businesses—from the failure to prevent
regime. You will find the definition of a micro-business by
looking at page 18 of the Marshalled List and Amendment 151C,
which gives the figures for non-micro-organisations. If you
imagine a company that has smaller figures for turnover, balance
sheet total or number of employees, you will work out what a
micro-business is.
As Barry Vitou, a highly respected white-collar crime solicitor
at London solicitors Holman Fenwick Willan, pointed out in an
article in City A.M.last Friday, 8 September, by exempting SMEs
from the failure-to-prevent regime, we will, ironically, be
creating an unintended but foreseeable consequence that could
lead to unfairness. Criminal liability, under the identification
principle, is much easier to establish in small companies than in
large conglomerates. If they are exempted from the
failure-to-prevent regime, prosecutors will be tempted to
prosecute them for a direct fraud. So we are robbing them of
their defence of having put in place reasonable anti-fraud
procedures.
I gently submit that the argument I make is not
anti-Conservative. Indeed, this whole discussion is not a
party-political argument, but one about making good, coherent and
sustainable criminal law in a pragmatic way. After all, it was a
Conservative-led Government who enacted Section 7 of the Bribery
Act and a Conservative Government who enacted the 2017 Act.
Surprising as it may seem to my noble friends, I am not a
socialist dedicated to the downfall of capitalism, but a Tory
interested in the growth of good and honest business. I therefore
urge my noble friends on my own government Front Bench to
recognise the compromises that I have spoken to and to accept
them with the willingness with which they are offered. I beg to
move.
(Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will take this opportunity to speak to my Motion H1
in the same group, which proposes, as an amendment to Motion H,
to
“leave out from ‘161’ to end and insert ‘, do disagree with the
Commons in their Amendment 161A in lieu, and do propose”
the amendment listed at page 24 of the Marshalled List.
However, I should explain that there is a mistake in this
amendment, which is no doubt my fault. There were various
communications between me and the Public Bill Office on Friday
afternoon, in order to get the amendment in the appropriate
shape, and a “not” features in the wrong place. I will explain
where the omission is and why I submit that it does not
ultimately matter.
The intention behind this amendment, under “Civil recovery: costs
of proceedings”, was to try to give some protection to the
agencies in the case of adverse costs orders made against them.
This amendment was passed by your Lordships’ House; it went back
to the House of Commons last Monday and was rejected.
My amendment is a softening of the original amendment put down by
the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, and me—softening because it had to be
softened somewhat to comply with the rules. Proposed new
subsection (2) should read:
“The court should not normally make an order that any costs of
proceedings relating to a case to which this section applies …
are payable by an enforcement authority to a respondent or a
specified responsible officer in respect of the involvement of
the respondent or the officer in those proceedings, unless it
would be in the interests of justice”.
So the “not” should be inserted earlier and removed later on.
The amendment that was drawn to my attention today did not
entirely reflect my intention. I have been in communication with
the Public Bill Office as to whether it was possible to amend it.
Although it is possible to table a manuscript amendment—see
paragraph 8.172 of the Companion—it is inelegant and I am told
that the better course is to explain the purpose of the
amendment. Were the House to be in favour of the amendment, the
matter can be amended at the House of Commons stage. That appears
to be the position.
Now perhaps I can come on to the merits, as I see them, of the
amendment. The Minister says that my amendment—which is really
not much more than a nudge; it does not compel the court to do
anything in relation to costs—is intended to prevent any
disincentive being provided to the agencies, who may seek to
recover the proceeds of crime, often against very well-resourced
defendants. Unexplained wealth orders, brought in by the Criminal
Finances Act, were to be a powerful weapon in seeking to obtain
recovery, ultimately, from those whose wealth was not easily
explicable. The agency tried on one occasion to do that and was
unable to surmount the hurdle the court said was appropriate in
these cases—and, indeed, which Parliament said was appropriate.
The result was an order of £1.5 million-worth of costs against
the agency.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there has not been great enthusiasm to
take up unexplained wealth orders on the part of the Serious
Fraud Office. So your Lordships’ House, during the last economic
crime Bill proceedings, very sensibly produced an amendment that,
broadly speaking, reflected the amendment we are now discussing
in relation to unexplained wealth orders, so as not to provide
such a disincentive to the authorities seeking to obtain one of
these orders. The rationale behind my amendment is precisely the
same. The Minister says that this offends the “loser pays”
principle. He is right that the starting point in most civil
cases is that the loser pays—for very good reason. If A brings a
claim against B that proves to be unjustified, and B has been put
to expense thereby, why should B not recover his or her or its
costs from A?
However, that rule is subject to many exceptions, as all those
who are familiar with the law will know. For example, on some
occasions the court orders each side to bear its own costs,
having regard to the facts. Sometimes there will be no orders as
to costs; sometimes there will be issue-based costs. There will
be a variety of different orders to meet the justice of a
particular case. Sometimes Parliament even specifically weights
the cost in one particular direction. An egregious example is
Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act, which is a controversial
issue but shows that Parliament is perfectly capable of deciding
who should pay the costs in particular circumstances.
What will happen if this particular provision becomes part of our
law? I suggest what will happen is that a judge looking at the
end of a case will see that Parliament has decided that normally
there should not be an order that the agency pays the costs.
However, if the agency quite unreasonably, without proper
evidence, seeks to pursue somebody for the proceeds of crime,
there is of course the saving provision—“in the interests of
justice”—which is part of our amendment. So a court is perfectly
able, as it will always do, to look at the particular
circumstances of the case and decide that, in this case, the
agency has been inappropriately pursuing somebody, seeking a
remedy when they should not have done. But this is a nudge
towards the judge, and a very qualified exception to the “loser
pays” principle.
It is, however, an important amendment. Those giving evidence
towards the Bill Committee included Bill Browder, who may be well
known to your Lordships for his particularly vigorous pursuit of
justice in this particular area, and representatives of the
Serious Fraud Office. I would be interested to know from the
Minister what the approach of the agencies is to this. If he
tells me firmly that they do not want this power, that is of
course a powerful argument. It would be somewhat at odds with the
evidence and the information I have, but I do not have a complete
and total understanding of what their approach should be.
It seems to me that someone running the Serious Fraud Office or
the NCA, when deciding whether or not to pursue somebody, would
bear very much in mind their budget and the cost consequences of
taking a particular course of action. If they knew that there was
a degree of protection—and that is all this is, a degree of
protection—provided in this, it would act as much less of a
disincentive. If they thought that, should they fail to recover
what they thought they were entitled to, there would be a very
heavy hit on their budget, it might mean that they would not do
so, which might be contrary to the interests of justice.
4.45pm
The Minister quite rightly says that it is complicated, but I
suspect that we can trust our judges on this. With great respect
to him, the Government’s response is that we should have a
report. During the debate in the other place on Monday, when
discussing the problem that I have outlined, the former Lord
Chancellor, Sir MP, said:
“We know that it is a problem. We know that it is a disincentive
to the bringing of civil proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime
Act 2002. We should just get on with it. The particular rules and
proposals about costs are well reflected in other parts of legal
procedure and other types of proceedings, so this is nothing new.
I think that it is time that we grasped the nettle rather than
having yet another report”.—[Official Report, Commons, 4/9/23;
col. 108.]
Who—which stakeholders, as the Government are wont to call
them—do we seek to involve? I dare say that those against whom
these orders might be sought will be reluctant to have this
amendment as part of the statute. Are they stakeholders? As to
the agencies, I would need convincing that they would not be to
some considerable extent assisted by this amendment. I am not
sure that a report would help.
I respectfully submit to your Lordships’ House—and I will be
testing the opinion of the House on this—that this amendment,
once tidied up, would provide proper assistance to the agencies
as well as proper protection, and would none the less provide an
appropriate safety valve in case of circumstances where justice
needs to be done.
(Con)
My Lords, I rise briefly in support of my noble friend on this amendment. I am
particularly grateful to him; I was involved in the earlier
amendments, but I realised that it needed a premier division
lawyer rather than a second division entrepreneur to get this
through.
In our discussion with Ministers, we were often told that the
enforcement agencies did not want this; that seemed disingenuous
to me. I now have some information. For example, law enforcement
agents have shown a strong appetite for cost protection and civil
recovery. The chief capability officer of the Serious Fraud
Office told the economic crime Bill committee that the SFO would
like to see this, while the head of the National Economic Crime
Centre told the same committee that they found cost protection
“an attractive proposal”. I do not think that is a searing
insight. Spotlight on Corruption has identified 60 high-risk
cases, with the potential of £1 billion of frozen assets, and the
chilling effect is palpable among them.
I respectfully disagree with the Government on this. I am
grateful to my noble friends the Ministers who have spoken
several times to all of us, but I think they are on the wrong
side of logic.
(Con)
My Lords, I have some very real concerns about the impacts of the
new failure to prevent offence on small and medium-sized
entities. If my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier’s Motion E1
is agreed to, I think it could be very significant. I believe
that the other place was wise to restrict the offence to larger
companies only. Setting the threshold at the micro-entity level
would still leave very many small and medium-sized entities
within the scope of the offence.
I did try to find out how many companies would be affected. My
noble friend the Minister said 450,000 companies would be brought
within the net of the offence. According to Companies House
statistics, around 3.1 million active companies filed accounts
last year. Of those, 1.6 million were for micro-entities, and
would therefore be excluded, but 1.4 million were for small
companies that took advantage of the audit exemption. That, very
broadly, is the group of companies that would benefit from the
changes made by the other place; it is obviously rather more than
450,000. Whatever the number, there will certainly be regulatory
costs for those companies, whether 450,000 or 1.4 million. My
noble friend the Minister has given his estimate of what those
costs will be. I have never placed much faith in estimates made
by Governments of the direct costs of regulatory burdens that
Governments try to impose. I generally put a multiplier against
them to arrive at a more realistic figure.
However, I believe the most important cost is the opportunity
cost that is imposed by regulation. Every time a new regulation
is imposed, the people who run small businesses have to spend
time away from thinking about their core activities, which should
be wealth-generating. Every moment spent thinking about whether
they have reasonable prevention procedures in place, or
implementing those procedures, is a moment spent not thinking
about how to grow the business or how to make it more profitable.
Large companies have specialists to cope with all this. Small
businesses often have no one beyond the proprietor of the
business itself, but they are the very people who are supposed to
be spending their time growing their businesses, thereby helping
the UK economy to grow—and my goodness me, do not we need growth
in our economy?
The cumulative effect of incremental regulation on individual
businesses is huge, as any small businessman will tell you, but
the cumulative opportunity cost for those businesses of missing
out on that growth, and the impact that will have on UK plc,
simply cannot be ignored when we are looking at any form of
legislation that imposes burdens on businesses. I urge noble
Lords to accept the pragmatic solution that the other place has
put forward.
of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, I am greatly assisted by the correction made by the
noble Lord, ; I had great difficulty in
understanding the amendment on first reading. Now that he has
corrected it, I would like to say from the point of view of a
Scots lawyer that there is nothing startling in the proposition
that is made. We in Scotland are quite used to the normal routine
that law enforcement agencies are not liable in costs for the
proceedings that have been taken, probably for the reasons that
the noble Lord has clearly expressed.
(LD)
My Lords, we have benefited from two extremely detailed and
learned speeches proposing Motions E1 and H1. On Motion E1, I am
exercised by the idea that there is an opportunity cost in
checking whether you are preventing or causing fraud. That seems
to be a strange discussion. The analogy made by the noble and
learned Lord, , with HSE and health and
safety, is a good one: yes, it is a cost to make sure that you
are doing something safely but it is a much wider benefit. The
notion that 95% to 98% of the business community should be
allowed not to consider their impact on fraud because that would
get in the way of their growth is strange, because that growth
would then be predicated on very shaky circumstances. I am not
persuaded by the counterarguments, but I have been persuaded
strongly by the noble and learned Lord.
Similarly, on the Motion from the noble Lord, , causing agencies to be too
tentative and restricted in how they go about prosecuting people
is an important issue. It is clear from what we have heard from
the outside world that this gets in the way of prosecutions. It
also causes the prosecuting authorities to go for low-hanging
fruit—that is, easier propositions—and avoid harder and often
more severe prosecutions. That is a chilling effect which we
should be worrying about when we look at this issue.
These two important amendments have been trimmed in the light of
the rejection of the last set by the House of Commons. Noble
Lords and Baronesses on these Benches will be happy to support
them, if and when they are moved to a vote.
(Lab)
My Lords, we have been pleased to support the legislation, which
overall we think is very good, and we have said that to the noble
Lord, Lord Sharpe. Indeed, the Government have listened, as have
all the Ministers on the Bill, and made significant changes. Now
we are left with just two amendments, put forward by the noble
and learned Lord, , and the noble Lord, , which deal with two issues
that remain outstanding but are of significant importance and
deserve our support and consideration.
I want to reference one or two points made by the noble and
learned Lord, , because he made them
particularly well. It is a proportionate and reasonable amendment
to ask of the Government. There are all sorts of regulations and
legislation—the noble and learned Lord referenced them—to which
we say small businesses should be subject to, because we believe
that it is the right thing to do and the right climate in which
those businesses should operate. When it comes to the failure to
prevent, the Government point out that 50% are covered by their
legislation, which of course leaves 50% that are not.
Throughout the passage of the Bill, many of us have sought to
ensure that the failure to prevent—which is a good step
forward—applies, as far as possible, to as many businesses as it
possibly can. The noble and learned Lord, , asked why we would exclude
many small businesses when they are not excluded from other
legislation that may be seen as a burden. The argument is hollow
and does not cut through. For that reason, and because the noble
and learned Lord has put forward an amendment that takes into
account what was said in the Commons, it deserves our support.
Should he put it to a vote, as I think he suggested he would, we
will support him.
Similarly, the noble Lord, , notwithstanding the correction
he made to the amendment, brings forward a very important point
indeed. One of the great criticisms that is often made about
dealing with fraud is that somehow law enforcement agencies are
frightened of taking on the people who are committing fraud. I
always thought it should be the other way around; the fraudster
should be frightened of the law enforcement agency. Yet, for some
bizarre reason, it is that way around—that cannot be right. It is
not something that any of us want to be the case. Through his
amendment, the noble Lord, , has tried yet again to push
the Government to do better and to do more than what is currently
in the Bill. His amendment says to the Government, “Surely we
should do better”. Indeed, the Treasury itself should be
confident in the work of the law enforcement agencies. Some have
suggested that those agencies should be indemnified against any
costs they may incur.
I go back to two simple points. First is the point in the
amendment from the noble and learned Lord, : why should small businesses
be excluded from this legislation, other than the
micro-businesses to which he referred, when we do not exclude
them from other legislation that we think is important? Small
businesses adhere to that legislation in the same way as other
businesses. Secondly, the amendment from the noble Lord, , gives us an opportunity to
turn the tables and ensure that, rather than the law enforcement
agencies being frightened of costs they may incur in ensuring
that fraudsters are brought to book, the fraudsters are
frightened. That is why, if the noble and learned Lord, , and the noble Lord, , put their amendments to a
vote, we will certainly support them.
(Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate.
I will respond relatively briefly; I think I have rehearsed the
majority of the arguments widely and frequently, and there is not
much point in saying more to some of them. However, the precise
point I was trying to make in my opening remarks is, in essence,
about proportionality. My noble friend Lady Noakes referred to
that extremely eloquently.
My noble and learned friend oftens points out that 99.5%
of business is exempted, but I repeat that this is very much a
judgment call because 50% of economic activity is captured. My
noble friend Lady Noakes referred to the opportunity cost and the
noble Lord, , suggested that perhaps this is
about businesses not checking whether they in some way have the
right procedures in place to prevent fraud, but it is not about
that. It is about many other factors that do not involve the
business at hand, as my noble friend Lady Noakes referred to.
Those other burdens are obviously partially financial, but not
fully.
5.00pm
My noble and learned friend referenced the fact that there
are different thresholds for this offence in the failure to
prevent bribery or the criminal evasion of tax, to give two
examples. The noble Lord, , also referred to that. We
considered the threshold in the light of the nature of fraud and
the need to support struggling small businesses. The Law
Commission identified a disparity, as it is easier to prosecute
smaller organisations under the current law, which this failure
to prevent offence will address. The new offence is less
necessary for smaller firms. It is easier to prosecute
individuals and businesses for the substantive fraud offence; it
would therefore be disproportionate to impose the same burdens on
them. As I pointed out in my opening remarks, the Bill also
includes a power to amend the threshold via secondary legislation
in future if evidence suggests that such a change would be
appropriate.
I go back to the financial burdens. As I say, the Government
recognise the need to consider the cumulative compliance costs
for small and medium entities across multiple government
regulations, rather than seeing these fraud measures in
isolation. The cost of extending the measures to cover SMEs is
significant: up to £4 billion from £487 million. The cost of
reducing the threshold to cover only micro-entities, I repeat,
would also be vast. It would increase the one-off cost on
businesses from around £500 million to £1.5 billion. The annual
recurrent costs would increase from £60 million to more than £192
million. I am afraid that the Government’s position has not
changed; we regard this as disproportionate.
I thank the noble Lord, , for his clarification on his
amendment. He has partially provided an answer as to why we need
a review, because it is a complex area of law. Looking at these
things and amending them at speed can obviously have unintended
consequences. We do not believe that there has been a chilling
effect. No agency has told us that this is the case and, as I
explained, it is the evidential burden that proves more of a
barrier to prosecuting some of these cases, which are, by their
very nature, exceptionally complex.
We worked with law enforcement in putting together the Bill, and
the content included many of its key requests such as powers on
crypto assets, changes to corporate criminal liability, more
accurate Companies House data and greater pre-investigation
powers for the SFO. All those agencies will have significantly
more tools in their armoury to go after the people who are
committing economic crime and, as I say, no agency has told us
that this particular lack has a chilling effect.
The noble Lord, , asked about unexplained wealth
orders. They are an investigatory tool for law enforcement, so do
not directly result in individuals being permanently deprived of
their assets. UWOs are exceptional investigations that can be
used only against PEPs or those reasonably suspected to be
involved in serious crime, where there are reasonable grounds to
suspect that they have assets that are disproportionate to their
legally obtained income or have been obtained through unlawful
conduct. UWOs can apply only to property that is more than
£50,000 and are often used in complex, lengthy cases. Given this
and the other factors that I have set out, it was deemed
justified to introduce cost protection in UWO cases—but, as the
noble Lord pointed out to me earlier today, they are used a lot
less frequently than in other cases. Having said all that, I
agree that it may well be in the interests of justice to look at
this again, which is why we would like to do the review and
report back to Parliament in 12 months. That is the right way to
do it.
I urge all noble Lords to note the improvements that the
Government have made to the Bill and I thank them for their
extensive engagement on all these and other matters. We believe
that these provisions strike the right balance between promoting
economic growth and the all-important job of tackling economic
crime, so I ask noble Lords to consider that when voting.
(Con)
My Lords, I wish to press my Motion E1 and test the opinion of
the House.
[Division 1
Division on Motion E1
Content
211
Not Content
185
Motion E1 agreed.
Held on 11 September 2023 at
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5.15pm
Motion F
Moved by
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments
153A, 153B and 153C.
153A: In subsection (1), after “(Failure to prevent fraud)(1)”
insert “and (2)”
153B: In subsection (6), after “(Failure to prevent fraud)(1)”
insert “and (2)”
153C: In subsection (7)(a), after “(Failure to prevent fraud)(1)”
insert “and (2)(c)”
Motion F agreed.
Motion G
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 159, to which the
Commons have disagreed for their Reason 159A.
159A: Because the law already makes sufficient provision in
relation to the prevention of money laundering.
Motion G agreed.
Motion H
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 161 and do agree
with the Commons in their Amendment 161A in lieu—
161A: Page 172, line 44, at end insert the following new
Clause—
“Report on costs orders for proceedings for civil recovery
Report on costs orders for proceedings for civil recovery
(1) The Secretary of State must assess whether it would be
appropriate to restrict the court’s power to order that the costs
of proceedings under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime
Act 2002 are payable by an enforcement authority and, if so,
how.
(2) In carrying out the assessment, the Secretary of State must
consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers
appropriate.
(3) The Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament
a report on the outcome of the assessment by the end of the
period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is
passed.
(4) In this section “the court” means the High Court in England
and Wales.”
Motion H1 (as an amendment to Motion H)
Moved by
Leave out from “161” to end and insert “, do disagree with the
Commons in their Amendment 161A in lieu, and do propose Amendment
161B in lieu—
161B: After Clause 187, insert the following new Clause—
“Civil recovery of proceeds of crime: costs of proceedings
Civil recovery: costs of proceedings
After section 313 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 insert—
“313A Costs orders
(1) This section applies to proceedings brought by an enforcement
authority under Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 where
the property in respect of which the proceedings have been
brought has been obtained through economic crime.
(2) The court should normally make an order that any costs of
proceedings relating to a case to which this section applies
(including appeal proceedings) are payable by an enforcement
authority to a respondent or a specified responsible officer in
respect of the involvement of the respondent or the officer in
those proceedings, unless it would not be in the interests of
justice.”””
(Non-Afl)
My Lords, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
[Division 2
Division on Motion H1
Content
218
Not Content
186
Motion H1 agreed.
Held on 11 September 2023 at
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