The Deputy Prime Minister ()
With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on
claims relating to an ongoing counter-terrorism police
investigation that were reported in The Sunday Times yesterday,
Sunday 10 September. The story alleged that two individuals,
including a parliamentary researcher, had been arrested on
charges of conducting espionage on behalf of China.
These are serious allegations, and it is right that they are
being thoroughly investigated by the police and relevant
agencies. We must not hamper their work or prejudice any future
legal processes by what we say today—as I believe, Mr Speaker,
you said at the beginning of today’s proceedings. As you would
expect me to say, it would therefore be inappropriate for me to
comment on any specific aspect of the active investigation
itself. I would, however, point the House to what the
Metropolitan police said in their own statement:
“The investigation is being carried out by officers from the
Met’s Counter Terrorism Command, which has responsibility for
investigations relating to allegations of Official Secrets Act
and espionage-related offences”.
Of course, any decision on whether to proceed with a prosecution
under the Official Secrets Act, and related legislation, would be
a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service.
It remains an absolute priority for the Government to take all
necessary steps to protect the United Kingdom from any foreign
state activity which seeks to undermine our national security,
prosperity and democratic values. The Government have been clear
that China represents a systemic challenge to the United Kingdom
and to our values. That has been evidenced in China’s continued
disregard for universal human rights and international
commitments in Xinjiang, its erasure of dissenting voices and
stifling of opposition under its new national security law in
Hong Kong, and disturbing reports of Chinese coercion and
intimidation in the South China sea. We are clear-eyed about that
challenge, and we must be able to look the Chinese in the eye and
call out unacceptable behaviour directly, just as our Prime
Minister was able to do this with Premier Li at the G20 summit in
New Delhi this weekend—an approach that has also been taken
consistently by our Five Eyes allies.
Actions speak louder than words, and that is why I took the
decision to instruct Departments to cease deployment of all
surveillance equipment subject to China’s national intelligence
law from sensitive Government sites in November last year. It is
one of the reasons why I banned TikTok from Government devices;
the Government investigated and called out the so-called Chinese
overseas police service stations and, as the Minister for
Security, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and
Malling (), set out in a statement to this House in June,
instructed the Chinese embassy to close them; we significantly
reduced Chinese involvement in the UK’s civil nuclear sector,
including taking ownership of China’s stake in the Sizewell C
nuclear power project; and, as Digital Secretary, I took the
decision to ban Huawei from our 5G networks.
This afternoon the Procurement Bill is being debated in the other
place. The Bill will include national security debarment
provisions that will enable us to act when we see malign
influence in our public procurement. In taking this approach, we
are aligned with our Five Eyes allies and other G7
partners—indeed, every single G7 partner.
The UK will deploy, again, an aircraft carrier to the
Indo-Pacific in 2025; we have announced AUKUS, a new security
partnership that will promote a free and open Indo-Pacific that
is secure and stable; and we will work with Italy and Japan
through the global combat air programme to adapt and respond to
the security threats of the future, through an unprecedented
international aerospace coalition.
These Houses of Parliament stand as a monument to the freedoms of
expression and belief that underpin our values, but just as these
institutions have provided the paradigm for so many modern
democracies, there are still those who fear such freedoms, and
who seek to undermine them and to interfere in our society. We
maintain constant vigilance in our efforts to understand and root
out that interference, and we will always take action to address
it, whatever its source.
In 2022, the Government established the defending democracy
taskforce, a group that works to co-ordinate across Government to
protect the integrity of our democracy from threats of foreign
interference. It is engaging across Government, with Parliament,
the UK’s intelligence community, the devolved Administrations,
local authorities, the private sector and civil society on the
full range of threats facing our democratic institutions. Those
threats include foreign interference in the electoral process,
disinformation, physical and cyber threats to democratic
institutions and those who represent them, foreign interference
in public offices, political parties and our universities, and
transnational repression in the United Kingdom.
Earlier this year, the Government passed the National Security
Act 2023, which has overhauled legislation applicable to
espionage, sabotage, and any persons acting for foreign powers
against the safety and interest of the United Kingdom. The
measures in the Act will enable our law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to deter, detect, and disrupt the full
range of modern-day threats, including threats from China. New
offences in the Act will enable the disruption of illegitimate
influence conducted for, or on behalf of, foreign states, whether
designed to advance their interests or to harm the United
Kingdom. The United Kingdom Government will do whatever it takes
to protect our national security and this nation's democratic
institutions, which have stood for centuries as a beacon of
liberty—wherever the threat may come from.
I commend this statement to the House.
Mr Speaker
I call the shadow Home Secretary.
3.43pm
(Normanton, Pontefract and
Castleford) (Lab)
I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for his statement, and for
advance sight of it.
Maintaining national security in the face of threats to our
values and our democracy is the first duty of any Government, in
respect of which Labour stands ready always to work on a
cross-party basis to keep our country safe. I pay tribute to all
those in our intelligence and security services and police, and
those across Government and beyond, who work to protect our
national security on the anniversary of the awful attacks of
9/11. As we remember those lost, we are in no doubt about the
seriousness of the work that they do.
We recognise, too, the seriousness of the allegations involving
espionage on behalf of China at the heart of our democracy. It is
essential that the police, the intelligence agencies and the
justice system are able to do their jobs, and we must support
them as they do so. However, we need to know more about what
action the Government are taking against attempts by other states
to interfere in our democracy and undermine our security. MI5
issued an interference alert about the Chinese Communist party
attempting to influence Parliament 20 months ago. The Security
Service and others have also raised wider concerns. The Minister
referred to the Prime Minister raising strong concerns with China
about unacceptable interference. Did the Prime Minister do so at
the time of those arrests, or has he only done so now, since they
have been made public?
The Government set up the defending democracy taskforce to look
at foreign interference, but what has it actually done? Is the
Minister on it? Has it produced a report for the National
Security Council as was promised? Has it looked at vetting levels
and delays? The Government opposed the Lords amendment to the
National Security Bill that was put forward to introduce stronger
checks on donations to political parties, to ensure no foreign
influence, and they opposed Labour’s proposal to close the
loophole on shell companies. Has the taskforce looked at those
measures? Why is it not acting in that area?
What is being done about national security prisoners? It beggars
belief that Daniel Khalife was charged with national security
offences but was able to escape under a van. Can the Minister
confirm that even though this individual had already evaded
arrest for three weeks when the police first tried to apprehend
him, he still ended up in a category B prison? Can he also
confirm reports that in 2019 another prisoner was able to escape
from Wandsworth prison, also by hiding underneath a van? Has the
review been completed of all national security prisoners—those on
remand and those convicted —to see what level of prison security
is in place? If not, why not?
I want to ask the Minister about the wider issue of the risks to
our national security from other states. He has rightly taken
action on sensitive surveillance equipment and I am glad that
Ministers have accepted Labour’s proposals on procurement. In his
statement, he rightly talked of the systemic challenge that China
poses, including on human rights, but the statement says nothing
about the work of the investment security unit. What is it doing?
Nor does the statement say anything about the comprehensive
approach we need to the risks to our critical national
infrastructure, even though the head of MI5 has given a series of
warnings and the Intelligence and Security Committee was
extremely critical in its report in July, warning of the lack of
a proper strategy on China and of short-termism. We need to
engage with China on climate change and global issues, but we
also need to be robust about defending our national security.
That is why the shadow Foreign Secretary has called for a full
audit of China’s relationship and why we have supported the
National Security Act 2023 but also raised concerns about Iran
pursuing kidnap and murder threats and Russia pursuing
cyber-attacks.
We recognise that after 9/11 and the appalling terror attacks on
7/7, the country came together. The then Labour Government worked
on a major counter-terror strategy—the Contest strategy—involving
everyone across Government, the police, the intelligence
agencies, local government and the private sector. The Contest
strategy has endured and has strong cross-party support, but the
Government have been warned for years about rising state
challenges, so where is the Contest strategy for state threats?
We will support the Government in producing one, and a Labour
Government would work cross-party to produce one, but where is
it? We need a Contest strategy on state risks, state challenges
and state threats to protect our national security. National
security is too important to ignore warnings; we need urgent
action to defend our national security.
The Deputy Prime Minister
I thank the shadow Home Secretary for the overall constructive
approach with which she has addressed this issue. It is important
that we treat issues such as this on a cross-party basis in
defence of our democratic institutions, and it is timely that
this statement should be made on the anniversary of 9/11. I will
endeavour to address the points that she has raised, and I will
be happy to write to her on any points that I inadvertently miss
out.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary regularly raise with
their Chinese opposite numbers Chinese interference in democratic
institutions. This is an ongoing approach that has been going on
for some time.
The right hon. Lady asked about the defending democracy
taskforce, which is led by my right hon. Friend the Minister for
Security. It reports into the National Security Council, on which
I sit, and we receive regular updates on the work that he is
doing, working with Departments across Government, not least the
Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, which is
responsible for large elements of electoral integrity, the
devolved Administrations, local authorities and other matters.
The purpose of the taskforce is to bring together all those
different elements to pursue a whole-of-Government and
whole-of-society approach when addressing those threats.
The principal purpose of the investment security unit is to
provide advice to me, as the quasi-judicial decision maker, in
respect of acquisitions that may invoke national security
questions. I take advice from the unit on whether the Government
should intervene, and we have issued 15 directions in respect of
acquisitions in the past year. That is to say we are asking
companies to take action, the hardest being to block the
acquisition, but it could be some other remedial action. More
than half of those directions are in respect of Chinese
companies.
The right hon. Lady is entirely right to raise the question of
critical national infrastructure, on which I have worked very
closely with the head of MI5 and others. Countries around the
world are looking again at their critical national
infrastructure, particularly in relation to the threat of
cyber-crime, which often has a blurred link with hostile states.
I take cyber-crime very seriously, and I chair regular meetings
on it. We are constantly upping the work we do, against a
background in which the external threat continues to rise.
The Government will very shortly respond to the ISC’s report. The
draft is with Ministers, and it is about to be signed off. I hope
it will be with the House this week.
The right hon. Lady rightly raises points about Iran and Russia,
particularly in relation to cyber but also across a whole range
of issues. As part of our overall approach, we have done two
things. First, we have tried to give the agencies a public face
with which to interface with businesses and private citizens in a
whole-of-society approach. For example, GCHQ now works through
the National Cyber Security Centre to advise businesses and
individuals on cyber-risks. Equally, we have just created the
National Protective Security Authority, which essentially enables
MI5 to interface with businesses and individuals on protective
security. Those agencies, working through the Cabinet Office and
particularly with the Home Office and the Foreign Office, work
across the range of issues that particularly arise in relation to
Iran and Russia.
Although we take this investigation very seriously, and it
clearly should be conducted independently, I reassure the right
hon. Lady and the House that the Government are taking a
whole-of-society approach across all these issues to strengthen
our defences against rising threats.
Mr Speaker
I call the Chair of the ISC.
Sir (New Forest East) (Con)
Without referring to any specific case, may I gently remind the
Government that their initial response to the ISC’s substantial
and wide-ranging report on the national security threat from
China, published just two months ago, was to suggest that our
findings might be out of date? Will the Deputy Prime Minister
therefore confirm that the full Government response, when it
comes—we gather it is coming very soon—will set out specific
steps to address the threat of Chinese interference, particularly
within our democratic system?
The Deputy Prime Minister
The short answer is yes. I have reviewed the response, and I am
content that it does exactly that. It will be with my right hon.
Friend shortly.
Mr Speaker
I call the SNP spokesperson.
(Aberdeen North) (SNP)
It is timely that we are having a security update today. My
thoughts and the thoughts of my colleagues are with all those
impacted by 9/11 on its anniversary.
I am glad the Deputy Prime Minister mentioned the issues relating
to sensitive Government sites and cameras, but Members on both
sides of the House had to ask questions on Hikvision for months
before the Government took any action. Will they commit to acting
more quickly in future, and will the Procurement Bill, as he
states, allow that to happen?
I am glad to hear that the response to the ISC report is coming.
Will the Government also commit to implementing the
recommendations of the ISC report on Russian interference in
British politics? Hopefully that response will also come
soon.
To turn to some specific questions, when did the Deputy Prime
Minister himself learn of these allegations and arrests? Why did
MPs only learn of this from The Times? Will the Government
institute, as soon as possible, a review into the decision-making
process that led to MPs not being told, in order that such
critical updates are given to MPs in future and that this
decision-making process is never allowed to happen again?
Mr Speaker
Order. We have to be very careful here. This is a major security
issue and it would be wrong to expect to break all that in order
to brief MPs. The MPs who needed to be told were told and worked
very closely on this. Please, be very careful. I think my earlier
statement addressed some of the points, but, if need be, we can
re-address things.
The Deputy Prime Minister
Thank you, Mr Speaker. On the first point that the hon. Lady
raised, we take an evidence-based approach to action. It is right
that Ministers take action not on a hunch or an intuition, but on
the basis of detailed analysis provided to us by the agencies and
by others. That is precisely the approach we took in relation to
Hikvision and other China-based companies subject to China’s
national security laws.
On when I or others learned about this, as Mr Speaker said in a
number of the points he made, Members would not expect me to give
the House a running commentary on intelligence briefings that I
have received, but the House would expect me to be briefed on all
matters.
In conclusion, I will make a broader point about parliamentary
security. We have the Parliamentary Security Department and it
works very closely with the agencies to support Members of
Parliament, including with general advice. If Members have
specific concerns, they can raise those with the PSD. That is the
correct approach, which respects the division between Parliament
and Government, and the independence of the House.
(South West Norfolk)
(Con)
These are extremely worrying reports about the level of
infiltration of Chinese-supported forces into our democracy. Does
my right hon. Friend agree that we need to recognise that China
is the largest threat, both to the world and to the UK, on
freedom and democracy? Does he not agree that the Government
should designate it as such?
The Deputy Prime Minister
May I begin by paying tribute to my right hon. Friend for all the
work she did in this space, particularly when she was Foreign
Secretary? She is absolutely right to say that China represents a
systemic challenge to our interests and values, and it is also,
for example, the No. 1 state-based threat to our economic
security. The Government are absolutely clear-eyed about the
threats that this nation faces and we are robust in taking
action. Indeed, that is why I personally took the decisions in
respect of banning Huawei from our 5G networks, and in respect of
Chinese CCTV technology and TikTok. We will continue to take
whatever steps are necessary, based on appropriate advice, to
provide that protection for our nation and our democratic
institutions.
(North Durham) (Lab)
A key part of democracy is the ability to scrutinise the
Executive. As the Chair of the Intelligence and Security
Committee said, No. 10’s response to our China report was to
pooh-pooh it and say that it was out of date. I understand that
the Government response was due today but has now been put off.
The defending democracy taskforce has been mentioned. We have
asked for an update on that but are met with radio silence. The
Prime Minister has on his desk our report on international
partnerships. He has had it on his desk for nearly 10 months now.
He usually has 10 days in which to respond, so when will we get
that signed off? May I just say to the Deputy Prime Minister that
if he is talking about security and democracy in the terms he
has, that has to include proper scrutiny? There is a long list of
examples of where this Government are trying to avoid it.
The Deputy Prime Minister
Proper scrutiny is provided by the Intelligence and Security
Committee. I certainly take the reports produced by the ISC very
seriously—[Interruption.] I am fully aware of the membership of
the Committee, to reassure Opposition Members. It is precisely
because we take the recommendations so seriously that the
Committee will receive a comprehensive response addressing all
these points, including an update on the defending democracy
taskforce.
(Chingford and Woodford
Green) (Con)
It is appalling news that we have a potential espionage cell
operating in and around Westminster. As a sanctioned individual
alongside many of my colleagues, I am particularly perturbed by
the news. Notwithstanding that, this should not perhaps come as a
surprise, as the ISC, chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member
for New Forest East (Sir ), has warned that the
Government were ill-prepared and that the necessary security
measures were not available.
I ask the Secretary of State a specific question: when was the
Foreign Secretary told about the investigation? Was it before he
went to Beijing? If he went to Beijing with this knowledge, did
he raise it with his counterpart there? It is important to know
that. With respect, it is no good coming to the Dispatch Box and
telling us that we do not talk about such matters; the Prime
Minister did so yesterday, and the investigation is not complete.
What did the Foreign Secretary do?
I say to the Secretary of State that the problem lies in the mess
we have got into over whether we define China as a threat or not?
If it is a threat, why do we not call it that, take the action
that is necessary to deal with it on that basis, and sanction
some people?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My right hon. Friend, who is a former Cabinet Minister and
current Privy Counsellor, knows full well that the Government do
not provide a running commentary on updates and intelligence
received by Ministers. I can assure him that the Foreign
Secretary regularly raises electoral interference and
interference with our democratic institutions with his Chinese
opposite number. Specific cases, particularly those that are
subject to an ongoing police investigation, would not, as is
generally the case, be raised. On the wider principle, we have
been robust and clear-eyed in addressing and raising these points
with our Chinese opposite numbers.
On the action we have taken, I set out the steps that I took in
respect of TikTok and Huawei, and I pay tribute to my right hon.
Friend’s support for the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021,
which we got to a very good place. There is not just that Act,
but the National Security Act 2023, the National Security and
Investment Act 2021 and the deployment of the carrier fleet. All
those things have happened in the past short number of years.
They are evidence of the seriousness with which the Government
take this threat.
(Kingston upon Hull North)
(Lab)
The Deputy Prime Minister said that he holds the Intelligence and
Security Committee in very high regard. On that basis, will he
commit to the recommendation that it made in its recent report on
China about updating the guidelines of the Advisory Committee on
Business Appointments in relation to intelligence and security,
particularly referencing China? How will he ensure that they are
enforced?
The Deputy Prime Minister
As I said in answer to a previous question, the full response to
the ISC will be coming shortly. An important point has been
raised in respect of ACOBA, for which I have overall ministerial
responsibility in the Cabinet Office. I will take that away and
discuss it with the chair of that committee, Sir , formerly of this House.
(Esher and Walton) (Con)
I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for his statement and I support
the action that the Government are taking. On the issue of
transparency and accountability, will the data regarding the
volume of prosecutions and convictions under existing legislation
and the new National Security Act be collated and made available
to the House so that we can track the scale of hostile state
action? Also, have the Government decided on any necessary
changes to the memorandum of understanding with the ISC, as they
are required to at least consider under section 93 of that
Act?
The Deputy Prime Minister
I do not think I have had chance from the Dispatch Box to pay a
genuine, heartfelt tribute to my immediate predecessor as Deputy
Prime Minister. Having done the job for a few months, I have a
particular appreciation of all the work that my right hon. Friend
did when he was in that post.
In respect of the volume of prosecutions and convictions, we seek
to be as transparent as we can be with the House. I am sure it is
something that we can take away and look at with a desire to do
as my right hon. Friend asks. I cannot give him a firm commitment
at the Dispatch Box, but if it is possible, I shall seek to do
so.
We keep the MOU with the ISC under review. We do not have any
current plans to change it, but we keep it under review.
(Orkney and Shetland)
(LD)
Yet again, we are watching the horse disappear over the horizon
and shutting the stable door behind it. Every time we act to take
on China, everything the Deputy Prime Minister boasts about is
always stated reactively. Just for once, could we get ahead of
the curve and take action in relation to genomics and, as I and
others have been urging for months now, designate it as part of
our critical national infrastructure, so that in a few months’
time, we are not again having to explain another failure?
The Deputy Prime Minister
I say gently to the right hon. Gentleman that he did serve in
government and in Cabinet for five years, from 2010 to 2015, so
he and other Members of his party need to bear some
responsibility for the decisions made, although I would think
that they would take pride in the decisions that we took. More
recently, under this majority Conservative Government, we have
taken a huge range of steps, including passing the National
Security Act and the National Security and Investment Act.
The right hon. Gentleman raises a legitimate point about genomics
and its relevance to critical national infrastructure. It is not
currently designated as such, but in my role in the Cabinet
Office, I keep the register of critical national infrastructure
under review, and I am exploring the matter.
Tim Loughton (East Worthing and Shoreham) (Con)
May I thank you personally, Mr Speaker, for the care and support
you have shown to those of us who have been sanctioned by China?
We are in the frontline of this threat, but I have to say that
neither before nor after these revelations has any of us been
offered a briefing by the parliamentary security authorities, or
by the Foreign Office or Home Office. In fact, I found out more
about this character from my son, who happened to be at
university with them, than from anything I have been told
formally.
I do not want to mention the current incident, but do want to
note that it is now a year on from when MI5 took the almost
unprecedented step of issuing a security service interference
alert about a character working within Parliament—for which there
were no consequences. It is about a year on from the revelations
about the activities of the Chinese consul general in Manchester,
who thought it was his job to attack demonstrators—for which
there were no expulsions, no consequences. It is months on from
the recent revelations about the activities of the Confucius
institutes, which the Government pledged to abolish; there have
been no consequences, no abolition—again, nothing has happened.
And it is just a couple of weeks since the Foreign Secretary
promised that he would take up the case of the sanctioned MPs and
of Jimmy Lai with the Chinese Foreign Minister, yet he came away
with nothing—there have been no consequences.
Is not the problem that, for all the tough talk, there are no
consequences and the Chinese know that there will be no
consequences? May I ask the Deputy Prime Minister this: will
China be in the enhanced tier of the foreign agents registration
scheme?
The Deputy Prime Minister
May I deal with the specific question first, and then reflect on
the wider points? We are currently reviewing the countries in the
enhanced tier. I think there is a strong case to be made, but my
hon. Friend would not expect me to make that announcement from
the Dispatch Box before we have gone through the proper
process.
On my hon. Friend’s wider points about the parliamentary security
directorate, we as a Government stand ready to provide any
further support that MPs feel they require. If my hon. Friend
feels that he requires further briefing, I am very happy to help
to facilitate that with the House.
(Brent North) (Lab)
May I extend my genuine sympathy to the two Conservative
colleagues who appear to have been targeted by a suspected
Chinese spy who was employed in Parliament and paid for out of
public funds? I do know what they are feeling. The House will be
aware—
Mr Speaker
Order. I am not sure that is the case. I think that is quite a
bit of speculation. I would stick to a general question rather
than trying to go into the details of what may have happened.
Thank you, Mr Speaker. I did say “suspected”.
The House will be aware that the subject of the security alert
last year, Christine Lee, was never arrested, has never been
charged with spying or, indeed, any other offence, and was said
by the previous Home Secretary to have done nothing criminal.
However, there is a court case pending. I understand that Ms Lee
has taken out a civil suit against the Government; will the
Deputy Prime Minister update the House on when that case is
likely to be heard and what the Government hope to learn from
it?
The Deputy Prime Minister
I am not quite sure what to say in response to that question. In
the light of the Lee case and others, that is precisely why we
have taken enhanced powers through the new National Security Act.
Although I have to hold back from commenting on individual cases,
I am confident that we have much more robust powers under that
legislation that will enable us to act.
(Chipping Barnet)
(Con)
In its China report, the ISC highlighted the efforts of the
Chinese Communist party to influence, co-opt or coerce into
silence potential critics of its regime in the UK. We
acknowledged that the Government are waking up to this threat and
taking it more seriously, but I highlight to the Minister the
fact that we need more urgency. In particular, I highlight the
fact that for years the ISC has been saying that we need a
foreign agents registration scheme, and one is now on its way;
does the Minister agree that it would have been helpful had it
been in operation and on the statute book at the time of the
relevant events we are considering today?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My right hon. Friend raises some very important points, but I
just observe that—this applies to a lot of the questions—we have
a relationship with China that is very different from the one
that we had just a few years ago. It is important that we are not
naive about China, that we are clear-eyed about protecting our
national security, that we are clear-eyed about the threats that
it represents and that we are robust in taking action. My right
hon. Friend rightly highlights the foreign agents registration
scheme; the secondary legislation under that will come before the
House very shortly, which will enable us to take the relevant
actions under that legislation.
Sir (Rhondda) (Lab)
Actually, the people who have been really clear-sighted about
China have mostly been on the Back Benches in this House, on
either side and including the hon. Member for East Worthing and
Shoreham (Tim Loughton), and some of them have been sanctioned. I
have been delighted to work with two successive Chairs of the
Foreign Affairs Committee, to whom I pay enormous tribute for the
outspoken way in which they have pushed the Government towards a
more sensible policy on China.
My anxiety is that we still flip-flop all over the place. This
year already we have seen several Foreign Secretaries, apart from
anything else, and we have seen them wanting to suck up to China
one moment and the next wanting to have robust words with China.
It simply does not work. Why oh why have we still not declared
that China is a threat to UK national security? Why oh why have
we still not seen even the redacted version of the China strategy
which, according to the Government, the FCDO developed but which
has not even been shared with other Government ministries?
The Deputy Prime Minister
I have great respect for the hon. Gentleman, as he knows, but I
simply do not accept this slightly over-the-top characterisation
of the Government’s approach. We have been consistent. First, we
must protect our national interests in relation to China. That is
why we passed the legislation that I have outlined, why I banned
Huawei from our 5G networks and why we banned Chinese technology
from surveillance equipment and other matters.
Secondly, it is important that we align with our allies around
the world. I spend a lot of time on this and know that the
Foreign Secretary, the Minister for Security and others work very
closely with nations around the world, particularly but not
confined to the Five Eyes, to make sure that we share our
understanding of Chinese intent and take co-ordinated action to
protect us, not least through the military
It is also the case, though, that we must engage with the
Chinese, as we do with many other countries around the world with
which we do not share a number of their values. It is not a
realistic position to take to say that we should entirely cut off
from engagement with China. We should engage with China but be
absolutely clear about where we disagree with it and clear-eyed
in protecting our national security, which is precisely the
approach we are taking.
(Isle of Wight) (Con)
Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford
Green ( ), I cannot wait to be
able to discuss the merits of this case, although I understand
the situation now. I want to raise a couple of issues with the
Deputy Prime Minister. The Government are moving, they have done
lots of new things and we are getting more coherence, but I do
not understand why they keep thinking that we either bury our
heads in the sand or effectively go soft on elements of the
relationship with China. We can debate with and engage with China
all we like, but we can also do so in an increasingly robust way
that answers the threat it presents towards us.
Specifically, the Government keep avoiding the argument about the
growing economic dependency that all western nations have on
China. That dependency will mean that in the case of war in the
Pacific in two or five years’ time, which is what President Xi is
planning for—he has said, “We are retaking Taiwan by 2027.”—we
will not be in a position to do anything about it without
collapsing the global economy. Effectively, in the next few
years, our hands will have been tied by economic dependency.
Every time I raise that issue, the Government are not even
willing to produce an annual statement on it. Please can we take
this issue more seriously? It is at the heart of security, and no
freedom of action means we have no security.
The Deputy Prime Minister
I have a great deal of respect for my hon. Friend and he and I
have discussed these issues on many occasions. I believe we are
taking precisely that robust approach. The question of economic
dependency is precisely why we passed the National Security and
Investment Act 2021, which enables me as a Minister to take
decisions to intervene where we feel that the acquiring of
technology by any state could undermine our resilience and our
ability to protect ourselves, or could enhance the capability of
other states. I have taken the decision to intervene on a number
of occasions, and more than half the orders we have issued have
been in respect of Chinese-related companies.
On the resilience of supply chains, that is why the Prime
Minister established the National Secretary Council resilience
sub-committee, building on work by my right hon. Friend the
Member for Esher and Walton (), the former Deputy Prime
Minister. My hon. Friend is totally right to raise this issue,
but I can assure him that the Government take this very seriously
and are acting.
(Huddersfield)
(Lab/Co-op)
Will the Deputy Prime Minister remind the House of December 2016,
when the then Prime Minister was in the Plough pub in
Cadsden with President Xi? We were all urged to be very positive
towards China. Indeed, when I expressed worries about the
takeover by China of a global company based in Huddersfield, I
was told to go away and be quiet. I have also consistently asked
for an audit of how much of our British industry and interests
are owned by the Chinese—a simple audit—but we have never had a
positive reaction, or any reaction, to that suggestion. When will
the Government do that?
The Deputy Prime Minister
The hon. Gentleman is right to highlight that we have a changed
approach to China, because the facts on China have changed. With
its conduct in relation to Hong Kong and the national security
law that it has passed, the increasing evidence of abuses in
Xinjiang province and the increased aggression in relation to the
South China sea, there is no room for any naivety about China. We
have to be clear-eyed and we are being clear-eyed. That is why we
have passed a host of legislation. It is why—to answer his point
about what is owned by China—for the first time, we have now
taken the power to intervene on transactions, whether in relation
to China or to other countries, in the interest of national
security and why I have not hesitated as a Minister to do so.
(Cities of London and
Westminster) (Con)
I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for his statement. Does he
agree that this latest episode shows clearly that it is vital
that we do all we can to protect our democracy and democratic
institutions? It is right that the Government continue with the
“protect, align and engage” strategy, but actions speak louder
than words, and the Chinese communist state needs to hear very
loudly that we will do all we can to protect our democracy.
The Deputy Prime Minister
I completely agree with my hon. Friend’s comments. That is
precisely what the Prime Minister did at the G20 summit with
Premier Li at the weekend, and why we have introduced a wide
range of legislation to address threats, including, among many
other pieces of legislation, the Higher Education (Freedom of
Speech) Bill in relation to academia.
(Tiverton and Honiton)
(LD)
The integrated review refresh was announced on 13 March this
year. At the time, it was welcomed that funding would be doubled
for building Government expertise on China, but we have since
learned that the doubling was from a base of 170 civil servants
learning Mandarin in the previous year, of whom just 20 were to
attend language immersion. Given that the UK hosts more than
150,000 Chinese students learning the English language and about
British culture, does that announcement of perhaps 300 training
places for British Government officials not now sound a little
modest?
The Deputy Prime Minister
First, the integrated review refresh was clear about China being
the No. 1 state-based threat to our economic security. The hon.
Gentleman cites the foreign language training; that is just one
element of the action that we have taken to increase our capacity
in relation to China. Clearly, he would not expect me to comment
on what the agencies are doing in respect of China, but I can
assure him that within the Cabinet Office and its structures, we
are constantly increasing the amount of resource that we put in,
as is the Foreign Office.
(Harwich and North Essex)
(Con)
I have some sympathy with my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime
Minister for wanting to strike the right balance. I very much
welcome his recognition that we have come a long way from the
ill-fated idea of a golden age with China, which was only eight
years ago. Much of what has happened has been predicable and
predicted, and we continue to predict what will happen, as he has
heard this afternoon. Why are the Government so squeamish not
just about talking about threats from China, but about calling
China a threat? What is the difference between a challenge and a
threat?
The Deputy Prime Minister
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for recognising the evolution and
strengthening of our approach to China—I will not add to what I
have said on that. We continue to enhance our capability in
relation to China. I have outlined a number of the measures that
we take; we continue to keep all those things under review. I
want to reassure him and other Members on both sides of the House
that we are absolutely clear about the threat that China
represents, but at the same time, it is right that we engage with
China, and that is the approach that we are taking, alongside
working closely with our allies. I think that is a sensible and
balanced approach that in no way underestimates the scale of the
challenge in respect of China, as has been set out in numerous
documents.
(Bradford South) (Lab)
An attack on this place, including on Members, by any hostile
Government intent on interfering with our democracy and its
structures is a direct affront to British democracy itself. Given
that several Members of this place have been sanctioned by China,
can the Deputy Prime Minister give the House assurances that
steps are in place to support and protect Members from hostile
Governments, and will he make it clear that there are
consequences, as the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham
(Tim Loughton) outlined?
The Deputy Prime Minister
Yes, I am very happy to give that assurance. Of course, we
respect the independence of this House and provide support
indirectly to the House through the parliamentary security
directorate. I can assure the hon. Lady that we provide a
considerable amount of resource to the House in respect of this
threat.
(Ashford) (Con)
I sympathise with my right hon. Friend. On this Chinese matter,
he will face countervailing pressures and arguments on the
economic side and on the security side. In his statement, he made
great play of the six welcome measures that the Government have
taken to toughen Britain’s stance towards the Chinese Government.
Can he give the House any evidence that the Chinese Government
have altered their behaviour in any way at all in response to
that tough response from the British Government?
The Deputy Prime Minister
It is never the case that the United Kingdom Government trade off
economic security for national security. National security always
comes first in the approach we take, and we have seen action in
response to the measures we have taken: for example, we have
blocked Chinese acquisitions of companies in this country through
the National Security and Investment Act 2021, so we are biting
directly.
(Halton) (Lab)
How many requests have the Government received from security
services’ chiefs in the past 12 months for additional resources
to combat the Chinese security threat, and have all those
requests been met in full?
The Deputy Prime Minister
The hon. Gentleman would not expect me to comment specifically on
the agencies, but I can give him a general assurance that we have
provided them with the necessary resources they need to combat
all the threats that this nation faces.
(Bracknell) (Con)
This unsavoury episode serves as a reminder for all of us in this
place of the threats we face, not just from state interference
but from a variety of malign actors. Can I please ask the Deputy
Prime Minister whether we are doing enough to think about our
physical security, surveillance and counter-surveillance, malware
and IT on our phones and other Trojan viruses, and governance of
MPs’ security?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise all of those points.
It is the case, not just in respect of China but also of
Russia—particularly in light of the Russia-Ukraine war—and,
indeed, Iran and other hostile states that the threat landscape
is increasing, and the Government have to continually increase
their actions. Through the creation of the National Cyber
Security Centre and its work with GCHQ, we are able to constantly
increase our action in respect of cyber-threats, malware and the
other threats that my hon. Friend highlighted, and in respect of
physical security, we have a mirror in the National Protective
Security Authority working with MI5. In turn, the agencies also
work with the Parliamentary Security Department, which deals
directly with threats to Members of Parliament and is supported
by those agencies and others.
(St Helens South and Whiston)
(Lab)
The Chinese Communist party has shown once again that it will
stop at nothing to get its way. The Deputy Prime Minister has
said today that he realises there are serious issues and that
this is a systemic challenge, but he would not come out with a
statement that it is a serious threat and being treated as such.
The CCP is infiltrating our academia, and a lot of people right
across these Benches feel very uneasy. Actions speak louder than
words, and the Government need to back up words with
actions—strong actions—and give us the impression that they are
not being dragged by the heels all the time. We are constantly
having to raise these things, and there is no confidence that we
are treating the CCP as an absolutely serious threat, which is
what it is. We are playing cricket while the CCP has the machetes
out. Please, please take some urgent action.
The Deputy Prime Minister
We have been totally clear-eyed about the threats represented by
China, and have been robust in the action we have taken. The hon.
Lady talks about higher education: we have passed legislation in
respect of higher education, the Higher Education (Freedom of
Speech) Act 2023. That Act requires greater transparency about
higher education institutions’ sources of funding, including from
overseas states and hostile states. We are taking exactly the
kind of action that she requests.
(Boston and Skegness)
(Con)
At what was then the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and
Sport, I saw at first hand the now Deputy Prime Minister oversee
an increasingly robust attitude to China in terms of economic
security, and telecoms security in particular. To some extent, I
wonder if that is why we see this growth in unwelcome attention
from China. However, can the Deputy Prime Minister reassure the
House that we will continue to take that increasingly robust
approach, particularly when it comes to emergent technologies
such as artificial intelligence and some of the other
increasingly high-tech areas where Britain excels in the world,
and where we will continue to attract even more interest from
unfriendly states?
The Deputy Prime Minister
My hon. Friend has a great deal of experience from his time as a
Minister, and we worked together on these issues. Telecoms
security is precisely an example of the approach. First, we put
national security before economic security. On a purely economic
interest basis, we should not have removed Huawei’s equipment
from our networks. We put national security first, and I was
transparent with the House about that. We also took the powers in
the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021, which is the
legislation required to provide that protection of our national
security. That is yet more evidence of how the Government are
taking a more robust approach and increasing the amount of
activity with every passing month and year.
(North West Leicestershire)
(Reclaim)
I thank the Deputy Prime Minister for his statement. I am
sensitive to the restrictions on both the questions and the
answers, but we know—these facts are in the public domain—that
two individuals have been arrested on suspicion of working for a
hostile power and that they were parliamentary passholders. Their
passes will have been sponsored by individuals who are probably
in this Chamber, and they passed the security vetting for a
parliamentary pass. Does the Deputy Prime Minister agree that in
due course—not today—an important question will have to be
answered: were they recruited by the hostile power before or
after they became passholders?
Mr Speaker
Order. We must be careful what detail we go into, and I know the
Deputy Prime Minister is aware of that.
The Deputy Prime Minister
The hon. Gentleman made a number of suppositions in his question
that are subject to an ongoing police investigation. When that
investigation has concluded and indeed if the Crown Prosecution
Service decides to take any action under the Official Secrets
Act, there will be a time for this House to debate the lessons
from that, and the Government will of course—with you, Mr
Speaker— help to facilitate the time for that to happen.
(Hayes and Harlington)
(Lab)
In the statement, the Deputy Prime Minister very helpfully refers
to the “erasure of dissenting voices” and the “stifling of
opposition” under the new national security law in Hong Kong. In
whatever dialogue now takes place with the Chinese, can I ask
again that the cases of my two trade union colleagues, Lee Cheuk
Yan and Carol Ng Man-yee, who were leaders of the Hong Kong
Federation of Trade Unions, be raised again? They have been in
detention since 2021, and are now facing lengthy prison sentences
purely for standing up for democratic rights and trade union
rights.
The Deputy Prime Minister
Ministers raised the general principle of China’s national
security law, its application to Hong Kong and the suppression of
liberties in Hong Kong in very robust terms with their Chinese
opposite numbers, and will raise individual cases. I am happy to
pass that on to the Foreign Secretary, if the right hon. Member
has not done so already, to make sure that those individual cases
are raised.
(Edinburgh West) (LD)
These allegations are concerning, but sadly they are not the
first of their type. We have heard about the sanctions against
MPs and the activity at the Manchester consulate. I have been
ticked off more than once by the consulate in my own constituency
because I said things it did not like, and I have been filmed by
a drone speaking at a Chinese rally in the city. In July, the
Intelligence and Security Committee said there was a lack of
clear strategy from the Government. Does the Deputy Prime
Minister accept that that might be responsible for these repeated
attempts, and is it not time that the Government had that clear
strategy?
The Deputy Prime Minister
First, the integrated review refresh was very clear about the
approach we take in respect of China. We are clear that it
represents the No. 1 state- based thread to our economic
security. It also represents a range of other threats and a
systemic challenge to our interests and our values. Ministers
have raised Chinese interference with democratic processes, and
any interference with the conduct of Members of Parliament is
totally unacceptable and we will not hesitate in raising it.
The Lord Privy Seal () (Con)
My Lords, with the leave of the House I shall now repeat a
Statement made earlier in another place by my right honourable
friend the Deputy Prime Minister. The Statement is as follows:
“With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement on
claims relating to an ongoing counterterrorism police
investigation that were reported in the Sunday Times yesterday,
Sunday 10 September. The story alleged that two individuals,
including a parliamentary researcher, had been arrested on
charges of conducting espionage on behalf of China.
These are serious allegations, and it is right that they are
being thoroughly investigated by the police and relevant
agencies. We must not hamper their work or prejudice any future
legal processes by what we say today—as I believe, Mr Speaker,
you said at the beginning of today’s proceedings. As you would
expect me to say, it would therefore be inappropriate for me to
comment on any specific aspect of the active investigation
itself. I would, however, point the House to what the
Metropolitan police said in their own statement:
‘The investigation is being carried out by officers from the
Met’s Counter Terrorism Command, which has responsibility for
investigations relating to allegations of Official Secrets Act
and espionage-related offences’.
Of course, any decision on whether to proceed with a prosecution
under the Official Secrets Act, and related legislation, would be
a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service.
It remains an absolute priority for the Government to take all
necessary steps to protect the United Kingdom from any foreign
state activity which seeks to undermine our national security,
prosperity and democratic values. The Government have been clear
that China represents a systemic challenge to the United Kingdom
and to our values. That has been evidenced in China’s continued
disregard for universal human rights and international
commitments in Xinjiang, its erasure of dissenting voices and
stifling of opposition under its new national security law in
Hong Kong, and disturbing reports of Chinese coercion and
intimidation in the South China Sea. We are clear-eyed about that
challenge, and we must be able to look the Chinese in the eye and
call out unacceptable behaviour directly, just as our Prime
Minister was able to do this with Premier Li at the G20 summit in
New Delhi this weekend—an approach that has also been taken
consistently by our Five Eyes allies.
Actions speak louder than words, and that is why I took the
decision to instruct departments to cease deployment of all
surveillance equipment subject to China’s national intelligence
law from sensitive government sites in November last year. It is
one of the reasons why I banned TikTok from government devices;
the Government investigated and called out the so-called Chinese
overseas police service stations and, as my right honourable
friend the Security Minister set out in a Statement to this House
in June, instructed the Chinese embassy to close them; we
significantly reduced Chinese involvement in the UK’s civil
nuclear sector, including taking ownership of China’s stake in
the Sizewell C nuclear power project; and, as Digital Secretary,
I took the action to ban Huawei from our 5G networks.
This afternoon the Procurement Bill is being debated in the other
place. The Bill will include national security debarment
provisions that will enable us to act when we see malign
influence in our public procurement. In taking this approach, we
are aligned with our Five Eyes allies and other G7
partners—indeed, every single G7 partner.
The UK will deploy, again, an aircraft carrier to the
Indo-Pacific in 2025; we have announced AUKUS, a new security
partnership that will promote a free and open Indo-Pacific that
is secure and stable; and we will work with Italy and Japan
through the global combat air programme to adapt and respond to
the security threats of the future, through an unprecedented
international aerospace coalition.
These Houses of Parliament stand as a monument to the freedoms of
expression and belief that underpin our values, but just as these
institutions have provided the paradigm for so many modern
democracies, there are still those who fear such freedoms, and
who seek to undermine them and to interfere in our society. We
maintain constant vigilance in our efforts to understand and root
out that interference, and we will always take action to address
it, whatever its source.
In 2022, the Government established the Defending Democracy
Taskforce, a group that works to co-ordinate across Government to
protect the integrity of our democracy from threats of foreign
interference. It is engaging across government, with Parliament,
the UK’s intelligence community, the devolved Administrations,
local authorities, the private sector and civil society on the
full range of threats facing our democratic institutions. Those
threats include any foreign interference in the electoral
process, disinformation, physical and cyber threats to democratic
institutions and those who represent them, foreign interference
in public offices, political parties and our universities, and
transnational repression in the United Kingdom.
Earlier this year, Parliament passed the National Security Act,
which has overhauled legislation applicable to espionage,
sabotage and any persons acting for foreign powers against the
safety and interest of the United Kingdom. The measures in the
Act will enable our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
deter, detect and disrupt the full range of modern-day threats,
including threats from China. New offences in the Act will enable
the disruption of illegitimate influence conducted for, or on
behalf of, foreign states, whether designed to advance their
interests or to harm the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom
Government will do whatever it takes to protect our national
security and this nation’s democratic institutions, which have
stood for centuries as a beacon of liberty—from wherever the
threat may come.
I commend this Statement to the House.”
19:46:00
(Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Lord Privy Seal for repeating the Statement
in a timely way on the same day as it was made in the other
place. I have often said from this Dispatch Box that the first
duty of any Government is to ensure the safety and security of
its citizens, but, when you look at it, it is more than that. In
doing so, we must ensure that we uphold the integrity of our
democracy and values.
I am sure that everyone in your Lordships’ House can recall where
they were when we heard the news of the attacks on the twin
towers, 22 years ago today. It is an appropriate time to
recognise and pay tribute to the work of the intelligence and
security agencies, who work alongside the police and other public
sector organisations. I thank them for their work to protect us,
in which they face unprecedented challenges and risks. Those
risks are evolving in size, volatility and complexity. Security
threats now appear through threats to our economy and
technological systems, at our borders and through interference in
our democracy. It is a huge challenge, and our security response
must evolve to ensure that it is cohesive, comprehensive and able
to adjust to face the changing nature of those threats.
In the last week, we have heard of two serious security issues:
the escape from prison of a man facing charges for terrorism and
the serious allegations of espionage on behalf of China. The
police, intelligence agencies and justice system have our support
in carrying out their investigations and should be left to do so.
That also means that we have to be honest about the challenges
faced and mistakes made; we have to recognise where there are
gaps and take action to address them.
The Lord Privy Seal will understand that there is some
incredulity that a man suspected of terrorism was able to escape
from a category B prison under a van. It is extraordinary that he
was in a category B prison—HMP Wandsworth—in the first place,
that he had access to an area from which he could escape, and
that it was not immediately noticed that he had absconded. I
doubt that the Lord Privy Seal will be able to answer questions
on this matter today, but I am sure that he recognises the
importance of those questions that need to be investigated. Can
he say whether the review into the security status of national
security prisoners has been completed?
In response to the arrests made for espionage, there are
questions about the actions the Government are taking to combat
the threats posed by other states which seek to interfere in our
democracy. MI5 issued an alert about Chinese attempts to
influence Parliament 20 months ago. Our security services have
long warned about interference in our democracy and in our
elections, and there have been previous alerts and warnings about
foreign actors seeking to penetrate parliamentary security. Can
the Lord Privy Seal say anything about the actions they are
taking in response to those specific warnings, and are they
observed across government by both Ministers and those in their
departments?
The Lord Speaker mentioned it in his introduction, but I ask the
Lord Privy Seal to clarify whether the two men who have been
arrested, and, I understand, charged with espionage, have been
released on bail.
MI5 has also warned about commercial espionage from China, cyber
risks and the threat to supply chains. The Intelligence and
Security Committee has noted the Government’s lack of a long-term
strategy towards China and is currently waiting for a response to
the report it published in July. Can the Lord Privy Seal say
anything more today about the specific threat posed by China? Can
he more specifically say when the Government’s response to the
ISC report will be published?
We must be able to work with China on key issues, such as climate
change, but at the same time we must protect our national
security and oppose attempts to infiltrate our democracy. In your
Lordships’ House, we on the Labour Benches introduced an
amendment to the National Security Bill to create stronger checks
on donations to political parties which would have closed a
loophole that allows shell companies to be used to hide political
donations. The Government opposed that amendment. Can the Lord
Privy Seal explain why, and will the Government now reconsider
their position?
We know that the threats are not limited to China. For example,
we saw the attack from the Russians in Salisbury, and we know
there have been further cyberattacks and misinformation
campaigns. In response to the shocking and terrible attacks on
9/11, the then Labour Government created a comprehensive strategy
in response to state threats to national security. The UK
counterterrorism strategy Contest established new links between
the counterterrorism police, intelligence agencies and our public
services, with the Home Office and the Government at the centre
at the helm. The scale of the response that is needed today is
certainly no less than that which was needed 22 years ago.
We are committed to extending this approach, if we are fortunate
enough to be in government, by creating an equivalent strategy
today to deal with such state threats. I can assure the Lord
Privy Seal that the Government would have our support if they
were to commit to introducing such a strategy and response now. I
am not asking him to answer that at the Dispatch Box today, but
will he commit to take this back to his Cabinet colleagues and
report back to your Lordships’ House?
I end where I started. Nothing is more important in government
than ensuring the safety, security and well-being of citizens. To
fulfil that obligation, we need the right policies, strategies
and collaborations. If we are to protect our democracy, we need
to have a strategy in place, but we also need our citizens to
have confidence in our democracy if they are to properly and
effectively participate in it. This should be a joint endeavour
across all parties and both Houses, and I hope the Lord Privy
Seal will be able today to reassure us on the actions the
Government are taking, and commit to going forward on this in a
way that protects our democracy and security and unites the
country, rather than creating division.
(LD)
My Lords, there are two distinct but related aspects to this
Statement. The first relates to the arrest of two people on
charges of conducting espionage on behalf of China. The second
relates more generally to our posture towards the security risks
which China poses to the UK.
On the charges, I fully understand why it is inappropriate to
comment at this stage. However, I confess to be bemused as to the
nature of the spying which the parliamentary researcher might
have undertaken. According to media reports, one of his crimes
seems to be to have organised regular drinks sessions at a
Westminster pub. This may not be a meritorious activity but it is
hardly a serious offence. I think everybody will be fascinated to
discover, if charges are pursued, exactly what kind of secrets
the parliamentary researcher might have had access to. But for
today, we must simply compose our souls in patience until further
details of any charges emerge.
There is the more serious question of whether parliamentarians
should have been told about the arrests at an earlier stage, so
that they could take particular care in their dealings with China
and Chinese entities. It is not clear when the Home Secretary and
Prime Minister were aware of this case and why they decided to
remain silent about it with parliamentary colleagues. Perhaps the
noble Lord the Leader can enlighten us.
The broader issue which this case exemplifies relates to our
overall posture towards China. The Statement says that the
Government believe that China presents a systemic challenge to
our values. It lists a number of actions which they have taken to
counter these challenges, but it fails to convince. In July,
Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee issued an
excoriating report on China which said that the Government do not
have a “clear strategy” on China and have not devoted sufficient
resources to tackling the threat that it posed. The actions
listed in today’s Statement do not constitute such a strategy.
The Government should be making protecting our democracy a
national security priority—something, incidentally, which they
have already consistently failed to do in respect of Russia—and
accept the recommendations of the ISC’s China report.
More generally, the Government’s record on standing up to China
is weak. From the genocide against the Uighurs to Hong Kong, and
from Taiwan to interference in our democracy, the Government have
failed to take China seriously. The Prime Minister may have
meetings in Delhi with his Chinese counterpart, but the suspicion
is that he is more interested in trade, rather than these broader
concerns.
Developing a clear overall approach to China should now be an
urgent priority. One specific question which such a strategy must
cover is the extent to which we designate China formally as a
security threat. The Prime Minister originally claimed that China
was such a threat during the Conservative leadership contest—and
on this we agree—but since then, he has back-pedalled. The spying
case illustrates the broad challenge which China now poses to the
UK, yet the Government have failed to take Chinese interference
seriously. They surely must now do so.
(Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the general tone of the response. It
is invidious to choose, but although I am grateful for the
response of the noble Lord, , I am particularly grateful for
the very statesmanlike tone of the noble Baroness. I of course
underline her tribute to the work of the Security Service, and
indeed all the law enforcement services. On the day of 9/11, I
was occupying the office which is now that of the Lord Convener,
and I remember vividly watching what was going on in a position
of disbelief. We must support their work, which sometimes, of its
very nature—often, perhaps normally—has to be done on a
confidential and secret basis. I think all noble Lords understand
that matters cannot be avowed and addressed in detail while cases
are ongoing.
I heard what the noble Baroness said about the prison escape and,
fortunately, the individual concerned was recaptured—after I had
had a sleepless night as the police helicopters circled over
Richmond Park. I did not resent that at all; it was essential
that that man be retaken.
The Lord Chancellor certainly said that these matters would be
looked into. I shall not expand on that; nor would I want to
anticipate where the examination of those events might lead. I
will make sure that the Lord Chancellor is made aware of her
comments on that.
On the question of MI5’s alerts and concerns, of course we are
concerned about China. I thought a disappointing aspect of the
response from the noble Lord, , was that he rather belittled
the range of action taken by this Government in relation to
China. I repeated that in the Statement and do not wish to weary
the House by repeating it again but a look at Hansard will see
the significant actions we have taken, which, in addition to
those in the Statement, include reducing Chinese involvement in
the UK’s civil nuclear sector by taking control and ownership of
China’s stake in the Sizewell C project. We have also passed the
National Security Act, which I referred to in the Statement.
The director-general of MI5—since MI5 was referred to
specifically—called this
“a game changing update to our powers”.
Those are his public words. He said:
“We now have a modern set of laws to tackle today’s threats”.
These will give law enforcement and intelligence agencies new and
updated tools to deter, detect and disrupt foreign influence,
including a foreign influence registration scheme that
criminalises those acting covertly for states that pose the
greatest threat to the UK.
There were various comments and I have to say that not everything
said in this House derived from newspaper reports was entirely
accurate. But I shall not be led to comment on what was or was
not. I think all noble Lords will understand that this is an
ongoing investigation and it is extremely important that we do
not jeopardise any proceedings that may follow.
I was asked about the response to the ISC report. I think it may
not be the first time I have been asked that very legitimate
question. I was told that I was permitted to say “very shortly”
in response. I am now telling everybody not to betray secrets but
I did say that I could not say that again and was assured that
“very shortly” really does mean “very shortly” in this case. My
noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe will have heard those comments.
Information to Members of Parliament is again a matter for the
relevant authorities. I shall not go down that road or say who
knew what when. Noble Lords will have heard the Lord Speaker
assure the House that:
“The extremely small number of people who needed to know about
this issue were immediately briefed on a strictly confidential
basis”.
That was held to be the responsible approach.
The noble Lord, , said that our approach to China
does not convince. The noble Baroness also said that we must have
a serious response to China. I believe that was implicit in the
Statement and explicit in the Statement made by my right
honourable friend in the other place. I underline what he said
and what the House feels: China is a country that—sadly—has
fundamentally different values from us and therefore represents a
systemic challenge to the world order.
I agree with the noble Lord, , that China’s behaviour is
increasingly concerning. It is becoming more authoritarian at
home and more assertive overseas. We are alert to that challenge
and I would say, as I often say in this House, how much we feel
fortified by the support across the Chamber. We must take the
necessary steps to stand up for our values and protect our
interests.
On the other hand, China is also a permanent member of the UN
Security Council. It is the second largest economy in the world
and has an impact on almost every global issue of importance to
the UK. Our overall approach, therefore, must be rooted in our
national interest and co-ordinated with like-minded partners, as
I referred to with the AUKUS arrangements, the long-standing Five
Eyes arrangements and the work on a new aerial provision with
Italy and Japan. We will go on working with like-minded partners.
We are sending the aircraft carrier presence to the East again to
assure our allies there that we will go on working with them to
maintain a stable international order. The integrated review
refresh set out a new approach and measures to respond to the
increasingly concerning actions of Chinese authorities.
I agree with the noble Lord, , that it is an epoch-defining
challenge for our country and the world. We have been clear that
China remains the biggest long-term question and threat to the
UK’s economic security, but it is not smart foreign policy to
reduce our entire approach to China to one word. Our approach
should be measured in our actions rather than our words. We in
the Government are confident that, with the support of the party
opposite and others, we are taking the right actions to keep the
United Kingdom safe and prosperous.
20:05:00
(CB)
My Lords, the noble Lord will be aware that I, along with the
noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and our families, have
been sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party for, among other
things, speaking out against the treatment of the Uighurs in
Xinjiang, the atrocities committed in Tibet, the threats almost
daily to Taiwan and the terrible destruction of democracy and
incarceration of lawmakers and pro-democracy advocates in Hong
Kong, including the British citizen, Jimmy Lai. Here at home, we
have spoken—as many have today in the House in the preceding
debates—about issues such as forced organ harvesting and the
surveillance state that comes through the installation of cameras
by companies such as Hikvision and Dahua, in which the noble Lord
himself has taken such a keen interest.
In the light of all that, the Leader of the House will not be
surprised to hear me reiterate a point made by the noble Lord,
. In another place earlier today,
my good friend , who is also one of those who has been
sanctioned, expressed surprise that those of us who had been put
in this invidious position were not told anything about the
activities that were said to be taking place across the
Parliamentary Estate. Will the Leader look at that issue again
and have some regard to those who obviously have a direct
interest in this?
The foreign influence registration scheme contains a power to
place a foreign power in the enhanced tier. That will require
parliamentary approval. What is the proposed timetable? Can it be
accelerated? Will the Chinese Communist Party regime be on that
list? The Leader referred to the “very shortly” assurance that he
was asked to give concerning the excellent report from the
Intelligence and Security Committee, which says that China has
penetrated
“every sector of the UK’s economy”.
This House’s Select Committee on International Relations and
Defence has also said that China is not a strategic competitor
but a threat. Although it cannot be reduced to one word, as the
Leader of the House said, surely it is time for us to schedule a
debate. I hope that, as soon as the response from the Government
is forthcoming, we will have in government time the chance to
discuss the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report, along
with our own reports.
Finally, will the Leader urgently consider establishing a small
Joint Committee of both Houses to review infiltration, espionage,
the subversion of our democratic institutions, the effects on
places such as our universities, and these attempts to silence
those of us who have been sanctioned by the CCP and our families?
(Con)
My Lords, I pay tribute to the persistence and courage of the
noble Lord—I will call him my noble friend—Lord Alton in his
long-standing witness against the brutalities that he has
described and the assault on democracy; for example, I refer to
the oppression that we have seen in Hong Kong. I also deprecate,
as the Government do, the absurd concept of people in your
Lordships’ House and the other place being sanctioned—and by
whom? The Chinese Communist Party. By what right do people who do
not understand our freedoms in this place and our right to speak
purport to sanction or threaten us?
We are very alert to some of the activities, which is why the
so-called police service stations that perhaps should never have
been allowed to grow in the first place have been closed down. We
do not assume that they are being closed down; we are checking
that they have been closed down.
The noble Lord asked specific questions about the FISA
provisions, including timing and scale. If I may, I will be
advised on that and write to the noble Lord, but I can say that
those powers are there. I quoted the director-general of MI5
saying how welcome they are; I can assure your Lordships that we
will pursue them.
(Con)
My Lords, this is an unusual situation. We are dealing with a
matter of great sensitivity. There is a prosecution currently
ongoing and there are national security issues; a review of
parliamentary security is also ongoing, as the Lord Chancellor
mentioned in the media yesterday.
I have given notice of my concern to the Lord Privy Seal and my
noble friend the Cabinet Office Minister by way of email; I have
also communicated previously with the Lord Speaker about it. I am
talking about the current practice, which is well known to all
noble Lords—this is not a personal point at all—of noble Lords’
spouses and partners being issued with security passes without
any security vetting. Due to the overlap between these issues,
which is a rare circumstance, I ask my noble friend the Minister
whether this review gives us an opportunity to think about
whether we need to reconsider that policy in light of the matters
raised, particularly the safety of our staff and the fact that we
are well aware of how clever and wily our enemy is. We need to
make sure that any loophole or avenue is closed off.
(Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving advance
notice. I am not sure how helpful that means I can be. Obviously,
although I have the indescribable honour of being the Leader of
your Lordships’ House, a review of security vetting in Parliament
is a matter for Parliament and the authorities here. I am sure
that they will have taken note of what my noble friend says, but
the Parliamentary Security Department is responsible for the
delivery of security vetting in Parliament. Like all security
policies, we expect this to be kept under constant review; I hope
that will be informed.
I did not answer the point from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, about
people being informed about what had happened. I said that I had
nothing to add to what was said in the Lord Speaker’s Statement
about the extremely small number of people who needed to know
being briefed immediately.
(Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Leader of the House for repeating the
Statement. I fully endorse all the comments made by my noble
friend on the Opposition Front Bench. I declare an interest as a
member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy;
it involves Members of both Houses, some of whom have been
mentioned in the course of press reporting on the case that we
are discussing—or not discussing. We are fully aware of the fact
that certain countries, such as China, are engaged in what I have
heard described as the hoovering up of as much information and
intelligence as possible for purposes of their own that may be a
threat to us.
The Statement refers to the Official Secrets Act and related
legislation. Do I take it from the Leader of the House’s answers
so far that the Government take the view that the National
Security Act now provides a much more appropriate legal framework
for considering a case of this kind? Secondly, we now know of
events that took place as long ago as March, but that have only
become widely known this week. Is there any connection between
this and the fact that the Prime Minister chose to raise with
Premier Li at the G20 summit the case that has given rise to this
Statement?
(Con)
My Lords, the Prime Minister will have an opportunity to discuss
the G20 Statement tomorrow, when I fear that your Lordships will
suffer the pain of me answering again from this Dispatch Box.
Perhaps I can then say a little more, if asked, about the
engagement with Premier Li. However, I assure the House that the
Prime Minister has certainly addressed the substance of Chinese
activity and China’s efforts to undermine our democratic
procedures so far as they are concerned.
On the question of the Official Secrets Act and the National
Security Act, I would not wish to relate those to the ongoing
investigation and was not seeking to do so. Obviously, I referred
to the National Security Act, as did the director-general of MI5,
as a further building block in the tools we have. That was in
response to the question asked by the noble Lord, . So far as the current
investigation is concerned, the Met has said that due to the
active and ongoing nature of the investigation, it will not
provide further details at this stage. It would not be right for
me to comment on these reports. A statement was put out by the
Metropolitan Police; I refer noble Lords to that statement.
(LD)
My Lords, I begin by declaring that I was previously a member of
the Intelligence and Security Committee, although that is not a
reason for urging the Minister to re-read the report, since it
contains a lot of conclusions that are entirely relevant to our
discussion this evening.
I direct his attention to paragraph 7, which carries the
description “whole-of-state threat”. The committee concludes that
the Government’s policy has enabled China
“to advance its commercial, science and technology, and
industrial goals in order to gain a strategic advantage”.
Given what we know of China’s tactics, why are we so surprised
that there are now allegations of spying? Indeed, there would be
surprise had there been no such allegation, given China’s
previous record. Respectfully, it seems that the Government
should be not only responding to the contents of the Intelligence
and Security Committee’s report but implementing the various
opportunities it identifies for putting a proper control over the
activities of China against the United Kingdom. It is not a
matter of “as soon as we can”; it should be a matter for
immediate implementation.
(Con)
My Lords, the committee’s report is obviously of great
significance and importance, and the Government regard it in that
way. I have nothing to add to what I have said about hoping that
the government response will come very shortly. Some people
suspect that I am part of the usual channels. but I am not going
to say from this Dispatch Box whether there will be a debate on
this subject. However, at some point Parliament will require that
we have a chance to take stock.
The only thing I would say—this is a statement of fact rather
than a political point—is that if one goes back to the coalition
years, when we shared time in government, the rhetoric was very
different. Some of the facts on the ground were different. The
nature of the Chinese regime has evolved since those times and
the nature of our response is evolving. It is often easy to be
wise after the event, but as my right honourable friend said in
the Statement, we are very open-eyed about this and clearly
recognise the nature, scale and uniqueness of the position of
China, led by the Chinese Communist Party, with its ambitions,
not all of them potentially pacific. We recognise that reality in
the modern world and I hope that Parliament and the country as a
whole will rise to that. Certainly, the Government will play
their part.
(GP)
My Lords, I declare my position as co-chair of the All-Party
Parliamentary Group on Hong Kong. The reports this weekend and
the allegations that have emerged are of great concern to the
large and growing community of refugees, exiles and students from
Hong Kong in the UK. This follows a few months after a bounty of
1 million Hong Kong dollars was put on the heads of eight
activists around the world, three of whom live in the UK. What
reassurance, services and support are the UK Government planning
to provide to ensure that people know where to go if they have
had a concerning, dangerous or worrying experience on social
media or in person? The many students, particularly
post-graduates, who might be studying issues around China, may be
approached, perhaps innocently or not so innocently, by someone
who may be an agent of the Chinese state. Do the Government have
advice for them on what steps they should take to make sure they
are able to act appropriately in that situation to protect
themselves and the rest of us?
(Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her question. I believe
she will acknowledge that the action of Her Majesty’s Government,
as it then was, in opening the door to so many people from Hong
Kong, which was supported across the House, was the right and
wise thing to do—I hope that she will recognise that. In that
region we are seeking to be active to constrain China as it seeks
to extend its malign influence, and I know from her background
that she will welcome the AUKUS arrangement—I am very
disappointed to see her shaking her head, because that is a
reaction that might be shared in quarters that we are now
discussing.
The Hong Kong bounties are intolerable and unacceptable. Anybody
who receives any sort of threat should let that be known to the
authorities; we take that extraordinarily seriously. We will not
tolerate any attempts by China to intimidate and silence
individuals in the UK or overseas. The UK will always defend the
universal right to freedom of expression—why are we here in this
Chamber?—and stand up for those who are targeted. We strongly
object to the national security law that China imposed on Hong
Kong, including its extraterritorial reach, which was in breach
of the legally binding Sino-British joint declaration. We
suspended the extradition agreement with Hong Kong on 20 July
2020 in response to the imposition of the national security law
by Beijing. I assure your Lordships that we will give the most
vigorous support to those intimidated by China who come from the
remarkable territory of Hong Kong.
(CB)
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the Statement, with which
I am obviously at one, as I did the Front Benches and the call
for a renewed strategy. I propose that procedures of verification
and enhanced vetting be considered. As a matter of course, and
for the purpose of disclosure and information, is the Minister
aware that the press have been referring to a spy
“at the heart of power”?
In doing so, they were referring to Parliament. I was concerned,
and ask what explanation there is, that a Russian spy now
expelled from the UK—and so presumably known about—was at a
high-level reception, including ambassadors from a range of
countries friendly to the UK, at which I was also present. That
person was expelled shortly after the meeting to which I refer. I
bring this to the attention of the Leader only so that all these
matters be considered by the relevant authorities as we clean up
what is going on.
(Con)
My Lords, I am not going to comment on press reports. It is
unfortunate that I am not the most regular reader of the
press—much to its annoyance. All I say in response to the noble
Viscount is that this country is always vigilant against
espionage threats from whatever quarter. Over many decades, there
has been a record of incidents of bad actors being expelled from
the United Kingdom, and I am sure there will be more in the
future.