Moved by Baroness Anelay of St Johns That this House takes note of
the Report from the International Relations and Defence Committee
UK defence policy: from aspiration to reality? (1st Report, HL
Paper 124). Baroness Anelay of St Johns (Con) My Lords, I am
pleased to introduce today’s debate on our report. I thank the
members of the International Relations and Defence Committee for
all they have done. As always, we could not produce a report
without expert help,...Request free
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Moved by
That this House takes note of the Report from the International
Relations and Defence Committee UK defence policy: from
aspiration to reality? (1st Report, HL Paper 124).
(Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to introduce today’s debate on our report.
I thank the members of the International Relations and Defence
Committee for all they have done. As always, we could not produce
a report without expert help, which we received from our
specialist adviser, Dr David Blagden, and from our committee
staff. I am also very grateful to those who made it possible for
us to miss—I mean, to visit. Sometimes it felt like missing, when
we could not get to Portsmouth, but we were able to get to HM
Naval Base Clyde at Faslane, the UK Naval Support Facility,
Bahrain and the RAF base at al-Udeid in Qatar.
The purpose of this inquiry was to examine the Government’s
ambitions and plans for UK defence as set out in the March 2021
Defence Command Paper, and how these related to the strategic
assumptions set out in the integrated review. We launched our
inquiry in April 2022, shortly after Russia launched its invasion
of Ukraine. I begin my remarks today as we began our report, by
condemning President Putin’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine. I pay tribute to the extraordinary courage of the
Ukrainian people and their armed forces, who are fighting not
only for their homeland and freedom but also for our security. I
also commend the steadfast commitment of the Government to
support the Ukrainians. I know that support has the strong
backing of all sides of the House.
The outcome of the war remains uncertain. We should therefore be
cautious about drawing lessons from it prematurely. Nevertheless,
it was clear as we started our inquiry that, with the return of
large-scale conventional war to Europe, the strategic assumptions
underpinning the IR and the Defence Command Paper had changed.
Our inquiry provided an early opportunity to consider the
implications of the war for UK defence policy and, more broadly,
whether the UK Government had made the hard choices necessary to
convert the broad aspirations of the IR into clear defence
planning. Today I will outline just three issues raised by the
committee’s report: the UK’s posture within a changing global
strategic context; the UK’s current and future defence
capabilities; and the Government’s relationship with the defence
industry and their approach to new and emerging technologies.
The 2021 IR was manifestly vindicated in its view of Russia as
the most acute threat to the United Kingdom. It also rightly
recognised the importance of co-operation with both the US and
the UK’s European partners, which has only been strengthened in
response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The committee’s report
expressed concern that this co-operation could be undermined by
the poor quality of UK-EU relations in recent years. It noted,
however, that the UK and the EU lacked a clear framework for
structured co-operation on foreign policy, security and defence.
I therefore welcome the new commitment in this year’s IR refresh
to reinvigorate European security relationships, and I welcome
the statement by the Minister for the Armed Forces on 14 June
that the UK should be ready to work with and within EU security
missions to achieve mutual foreign policy aims.
I also welcome the greater clarity provided in the IR refresh
regarding the nature and aims of the Indo-Pacific tilt.
Furthermore, I welcome the clarity of the Defence Secretary’s
statement in his letter to the committee regarding the UK’s
policy on Taiwan, in which he stated:
“We have clear interests in the peace and stability of the Taiwan
Strait and do not support any unilateral attempts to change the
status quo”.
I endorse the Government’s view that Russia represents the most
acute threat to the UK, and that China represents a long-term
systemic challenge to our interests. However, our report noted
that the Middle East was not given the same level of prominence
as other regions in the IR, and this was not corrected in this
year’s refresh. The Middle East is home to several ongoing UK
military commitments, as well as several key partners. It remains
an important region for UK engagement. In evidence to the
committee, the Defence Secretary strongly rejected concerns that
the Middle East had been neglected in UK strategic planning.
Nevertheless, we feel that more work is needed to reassure
long-standing partners in the region that it remains a focus for
UK diplomacy.
The nature of the war in Ukraine calls into question the emphasis
on strengthening capabilities to tackle so-called “sub-threshold”
threats and underlines the need to maintain and develop the UK’s
conventional capabilities. The committee expressed concerns about
the UK’s hard defence capabilities, notably in the land domain,
and questioned whether the British Army had sufficient resources
to ensure that its capabilities and contribution to NATO remain
credible in the eyes of its allies.
The conflict in Ukraine has shown how quickly ammunition and
other key assets can run out in conventional warfare, and how
inadequate “just-in-time” supply chains can be. The committee
found that the UK’s weapon and ammunition stocks were inadequate
across all three services, and we recommended that remedying this
situation should be the highest priority for the Government. We
also called on the Government to build greater resilience into
their stocks, supply chains and industrial capacity.
In their response to our report, the Government stated that they
would review the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy
alongside the update to the IR and defence Command Paper. I look
forward to the results of that review.
No discussion of defence strategy can avoid the question of
defence spending and whether we have sufficient resources to meet
the security challenges identified by the Government. While the
IR announced a substantial uplift to defence spending, our report
found that the current defence spending plans mean that the
Government may not be able to deliver on the aspirations of the
IR and the defence Command Paper. The Defence Secretary has been
disarmingly frank regarding the impact of spending constraints on
the UK’s military capabilities, describing the British Army as
“hollowed out and underfunded”. I have no illusions of course
regarding the extraordinary pressures on the public finances.
Nevertheless, defence spending must be set with a view to meet
the threats we face and the capabilities we require. The IR
refresh noted:
“We are now in a period of heightened risk and volatility that is
likely to last beyond the 2030s”.
When the Committee was finalising its report, the Defence
Secretary described spending 3% of GDP on defence as
“an aspiration or a planned marker”.
Since then, this aspiration appears to have been cut back
somewhat, and the Government now pledge to spend 2.5% of GDP
“as fiscal and economic circumstances allow”.
In addition to committing sufficient funds to our defence, it is
of course essential that these funds are well spent. Our report
makes recommendations regarding parliamentary scrutiny and
effective procurement. One of the committee’s key concerns is
that the Government can be reluctant to be a little more
transparent about their spending on defence. I am disappointed
that the Government did not respond to the committee’s request
for an update on the ongoing impact of inflation on defence
spending. As the Defence Secretary told us, high levels of
capital spending mean that the defence budget is particularly
vulnerable to inflation.
Given the tendency of UK defence procurement to run over budget
and behind schedule, it is essential that Parliament is given the
opportunity to scrutinise defence spending plans adequately. The
committee therefore believes that the Government should consider
granting relevant parliamentary committees, on a confidential
basis, access to information setting out how funds are allocated
and spent.
In view of the intense pressure on the defence budget, it is also
vital that the MoD has robust procurement mechanisms in place and
an effective relationship with the defence industry. In this
context, I welcome the fact that the Government have conducted a
full “lessons learned” review of the troubled Ajax programme, led
by Clive Sheldon KC. As the Minister for Defence Procurement
noted in another place, the report makes for difficult reading. I
welcome the fact that the Government have accepted its findings,
and most of Mr Sheldon’s recommendations.
I also hope that the Government will act on the findings of our
report regarding the MoD’s co-operation with the defence sector,
in particular those companies working with cutting-edge and
experimental technologies. The IR places heavy emphasis on
investment in innovation and technology as a means to maintain
military power in the context of diminished land forces and
limited conventional capabilities. Whether or not such a bet on
technology is wise, given the enduring relevance of conventional
forces in the war in Ukraine, it is vital that the UK effectively
leverages its research and development capabilities to maximise
its defence capabilities.
However, I regret to say that the committee heard evidence of
significant problems in the way the MoD manages its relationships
with private enterprises—particularly SMEs that do not have an
established relationship with the Ministry of Defence and are
often more likely to be among the most innovative firms that
abound here and overseas. One defence firm noted that the
barriers to entry remained “stubbornly high,” and described the
MoD’s approach to innovation management as “byzantine”. Another
told us that, from the perspective of a tech company, the MoD
remains
“one of the worst customers in the world”.
As a result, the committee concluded that the MoD must consider
changing fundamentally its approach to smaller high-tech and
start-up companies.
As our report noted, the security circumstances facing our
country are now graver than anything the UK has experienced since
the height of the Cold War—and I am of an age that I can remember
that period. The Government can be rightly proud of the leading
role they have taken in supporting Ukraine, and through that
support, helping to uphold the European security order.
Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine has raised challenging questions
regarding the UK’s conventional capabilities and the resources it
has available for defence. To maintain credibility with our
allies we must ensure that we invest sufficiently and effectively
in defence capabilities and improve how we engage with the
defence industry through a major culture change in our approach
to procurement. I beg to move.
11:59:00
(Lab)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness,
who chaired with great distinction the committee before I joined
it. Although I joined it only this year, I fully endorse what she
said and what it says, and I congratulate it on its perception
and insight. Like others, I am sure, I regret that it has taken
so long to get to a debate on the important analysis provided by
the committee.
The committee rightly made a very important point in its
conclusions:
“The strategic assumptions that underpinned the Integrated Review
and the Defence Command Paper have changed. In particular, the
Russian invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the
European security environment”.
I emphasise “fundamentally changed” because that is now a
self-evident truth, but a truth with enormous implications.
Indeed, the Government’s response to the committee went further
and was even blunter. They said that
“we misjudged the pace of change and the range and severity of
the threats we would face. As a result, we can no longer tolerate
some of the risks we felt able to bear at the time, and we need
to ensure that our capabilities and their supporting enablers are
credible for the challenges both of this decade and the
next”.
So, here is my question for today: given the huge importance to
our country and its people of what is acknowledged to be a
fundamental change in the security environment we live in, why
have we had so little time allocated to debate these issues? This
is only the second debate in this House on the war in Ukraine and
its enormous implications since the invasion took place 16 months
ago—and this debate is not even actually about Ukraine. There
have of course been a number of Statements, and they are welcome,
but they simply involve a Q&A session with the Minister
concerned, not a full House debate.
This is the Parliament of our country, and it seems obvious to me
and to many others that we should be debating, discussing,
challenging and deliberating on that “fundamental change” and the
Government’s acknowledged misjudgment of the risks we face. The
people of this country, in my view, are being short-changed by
the Government denying Parliament the ventilation of the crisis,
which is what a debate here and in the Commons would represent,
because—this is the second issue I wish to raise in this very
short and very rare debate—we need to recognise the gravity of
the stakes at play in Ukraine today.
This war is not just about saving Ukraine as a sovereign,
independent nation state and the survival of its people,
important and life-saving as those are. It is about our safety
and security as well. Make no mistake at all: if Vladimir Putin
prevails in this bloody, unprovoked attempted conquest, the
resulting world will be a very different place—and not a very
comfortable one. There will be a new rules-based order, that is
for sure, but it will be written by the Chinese and a subordinate
Russia. It will have the acquiescence of what we have come to
know as the Global South—those countries such as India, South
Africa and Brazil which are, almost unbelievably, sitting on the
fence but edging towards Russia, ignoring as they do the stark
fact that, if the principle of nuclear blackmail and of borders
changed by force prevails, it will devastate them as much as us
in Europe. That new world order assuredly will not enshrine the
values and principles we have adopted throughout my life.
Authoritarians do not believe in the rule of law, free speech, a
free press, free elections or private property. That is amply on
display today in Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. We neglect
at our peril the present manoeuvrings of those authoritarians—for
example, meddling in the Middle East. As the report says, and the
refresh underlines, in this region that is almost ignored by the
integrated review, meddling is now on vivid display.
Who here would have imagined the day when China would be the
midwife to the rencontre between Saudi Arabia and Iran? Just look
at the western Balkans; I know the noble Baroness, Lady Helic,
will speak on this authoritatively later on. Neglected as it has
been by the West, this area, which we did so much to settle and
save, is being used today by Russia and China as an adventure
playground for their deadly mischief. I ask noble Lords to
imagine for a bleak moment what these two areas will be like if
Putin succeeds in Ukraine.
What about the Arctic, the subject of the committee’s present
investigation? Russia has long protected and projected its
strategic and resource role in the region, but now, as Russia has
become the little brother, China has become an Arctic
nation—avariciously watching the opening northern sea route and
the data-rich domination at the very top of the world.
Eastern Ukraine is on our TV screens every night that something
dreadful happens, but its plight and its umbilical connection to
this country’s safety and security are amazingly absent from the
serious deliberations of our Parliament. That should be
unacceptable to all of us. I believe that the Government’s
support for Ukraine is justified and praiseworthy. A debate in
Parliament would emphasise that point and produce a signal to
Putin, in the cracked glasshouse he now inhabits, that our
collective resolution is strong, unanimous and durable. When he
knows that, even his fevered mind might change. He cannot, and
must not, succeed.
12:07:00
(CB)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, , as I did for
a significant part of my military career. The noble Baroness,
Lady Anelay, who so ably led the International Relations and
Defence Committee on which I have the privilege to serve, has
very clearly set out the background to the report we are debating
today.
Inevitably, given the delay in considering Select Committee
findings, things have moved on. We have a refreshed integrated
review, and we are still expecting an updated version of the
Defence Command Paper. Nevertheless, a number of the key issues
highlighted in the report remain both relevant and urgent, in
light of the present international situation. I want to focus on
just two of them today.
The first concerns a problem that has bedevilled all defence
reviews: the balance between ambition and resource. This was of
course a central element in the inquiry and is reflected in its
subtitle, “From aspiration to reality”. The first version of the
integrated review sought to draw attention to the growing
strategic importance to the UK of the Indo-Pacific region—the
so-called “Tilt”—and it was right to do so. Indeed, the
International Relations and Defence Committee’s previous report,
The UK and China’s Security and Trade Relationship, made that
very point.
However, the extent to which such a tilt involves UK military
capability is another matter entirely. Defence certainly has a
role to play, not least through the AUKUS agreement and Japan’s
welcome involvement in the global combat air programme. But the
resources allocated to our Armed Forces simply do not allow them
to make significant contributions in both Europe and the
Indo-Pacific.
In his evidence to our inquiry, the Defence Secretary made it
clear that our military focus must remain on Europe and the north
Atlantic. That is a welcome clarification, not least given the
current events in Ukraine. No matter how that conflict ends, or
perhaps freezes, we in Europe will continue to face an
unpredictable and resentful Russia—a Russia that will certainly
have suffered some significant losses in Ukraine, but a Russia
whose nuclear, maritime and long-range air forces will have
remained largely untouched.
The central importance of Europe in purely military terms must be
reflected in the balance of defence investment, and the evidence
on this score is not good. Our ability to defend our own
airspace, to achieve air superiority over the battle space and to
contribute effectively to the defence and, if necessary,
restoration of NATO territory is all at risk. Our bases and
infrastructure in the UK—including our undersea
infrastructure—are vulnerable to long-range attack, and the
concentration of our forces in fewer locations means that we lack
the resilience we once had.
Meanwhile, the course of the current conflict in Ukraine has
underscored the importance of air superiority: fail to achieve
it, and you risk something resembling a First World War
battlefield on the ground. Our inability to field an armoured
division that can fight effectively and enduringly in
high-intensity conflict has become something of a national
embarrassment as well as a strategic weakness.
All three services have some good equipment, but they lack many
key enablers and, most importantly, adequate stocks of the
appropriate weapons to fight intensively for anything other than
a very brief period. The Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force are
all too small, but enabling our current force structure to
undertake sustained operations must be our highest priority for
investment.
This is not just a matter of more money for the defence budget.
We must also strengthen and expand the Western defence industries
that we have allowed to atrophy over the many years of budgetary
cuts and on which we and the rest of NATO rely for our
sustainability. However, if we are to secure the necessary
private sector investment in those industries, we will need more
predictable, longer-range procurement plans. The frequent changes
currently made in response to short-term budgetary pressures are
simply not designed to inspire the necessary investor
confidence.
The usual official response to these kinds of criticisms—I expect
to hear it again today—is to assert that the Government have
recently delivered the largest increase in defence spending since
the end of the Cold War. That may be true, but it follows, and
only partly ameliorates, some of the largest cuts, made by the
same Government. It is rather like pushing someone into a river
and then claiming credit for helping them to keep their head
temporarily above water. We need serious, sustained and increased
investment in our military capability and sustainability, and it
must be focused on our ability to fight and win in Europe and
northern waters.
The other issue I will touch on is the emphasis the Defence
Command Paper places on technology and innovation. It sees these
as a substitute, at least in part, for mass. In a sense, this is
right. Throughout history, there are many examples of smaller but
more capable forces succeeding against larger opponents. Once
again, Ukraine has shown the advantage to be gained from
innovation and novel uses of technology, civilian as well as
military. Effects are what matter, but those effects need to be
created in enough places and on a sufficiently enduring basis to
achieve the desired ends, so size does matter.
Beyond this, though, we need to ensure that novel ideas make it
through to front-line capability. A great deal of innovation
comes from small, high-technology enterprises rather than large
defence contractors. The very size of the latter, and their
resultant bureaucratic processes, often robs them of the agility
and independence of thought necessary for solutions that fall
outside the box.
Fortunately, we have no shortage of such small, imaginative
enterprises in this country. Unfortunately, those smaller
companies face enormous obstacles in translating their ideas into
marketable products—or, in defence terms, into front-line
capability. For them, there exists something called the valley of
death, where good ideas go to die. This is not a new phenomenon.
How often have we seen something invented in this country, only
for commercial exploitation and the associated economic benefits
to move elsewhere? I see insufficient evidence that this problem
is being addressed.
There are some welcome initiatives in the Defence Command Paper
to develop unconventional thinking, but unless there are
mechanisms and processes to encourage substantial private capital
investment in new technology and innovative ideas, defence is
unlikely to realise their benefits. This goes beyond the Ministry
of Defence and requires a wider government focus, but it is one
of the biggest risks in the Defence Command Paper, and therefore
should be a very high priority for action.
Finally, with war raging in Europe and all the dangers to this
country’s security, I am deeply disappointed that a debate on the
UK’s defence policy has been tucked away on a Friday afternoon.
The Whips will no doubt pray in aid the pressure of government
business. The defence of this country and its people is
government business; it is the Government’s most important
business and it deserves much better than it has received in the
scheduling of this debate.
12:15:00
(Lab)
My Lords, it is a particular privilege to follow the noble and
gallant Lord, , with whom I had the honour of
serving on the committee. As I commend this report to the House,
I pay tribute to our distinguished former chairman, the noble
Baroness, Lady Anelay. She was an exemplary chairman: she was
firm, she had a sense of humour—which always helps in a
chairman—and she led us with marked distinction, so I give
heartfelt thanks to her on behalf of the committee.
In commending the report to the House, I draw attention in
particular to recommendation 162, which acknowledges and praises
the deployment of military soft power and makes specific
recommendations in relation to it. The integrated review of 2021
sets out the UK’s position and strength with regard to soft
power:
“The source of much of the UK’s soft power lies beyond the
ownership of government—an independence from state direction that
is essential to its influence. The Government can use its own
assets, such as the diplomatic network, aid spending and the
armed forces, to help create goodwill towards the UK”.
The Defence Committee in the other place had cause recently to
draw attention in a report to the deployment of soft power and
made this observation:
“Whilst soft power does not instinctively fall within the remit
of the Ministry of Defence, it plays a part in ‘defence
engagement’, which is the military contribution to soft power.
‘Defence engagement’ itself is defined as ‘the means by which we
use our Defence assets and activities, short of combat
operations, to achieve influence’”.
I will draw attention to two specific areas of this in relation
to the integrated review: implementation and that definition of
engagement. Its implementation was reinforced by the mention made
of it in the integrated review refresh as recently as March of
this year, when the Government pledged to promote the soft and
cultural power that the UK possesses and do more to bring soft
power into their broader foreign policy approach. That is all
well and good, and much needed on the ground when you look at the
activities of our “strategic competitors”. That is one phrase the
Government have used on occasion; they could also be described in
a number of instances as our opponents and, in Ukraine, as our
direct enemies, because that is what Russia and its
surrogates—the Wagner Group—are. They are the enemies of this
country and of the wider world.
Only today, we learned that, despite the events earlier this
month, it is business as usual as far as Wagner is concerned. As
we speak, Wagner is recruiting in Moscow and St Petersburg.
Whether those recruits will be deployed in Ukraine or not remains
to be seen, because it may well be that Wagner’s forces are
integrated with Russian forces in Ukraine, but we know that they
continue to be deployed in Africa. Africa is at the centre of
Wagner and Russia’s policy—a policy of enrichment and
aggrandisement. It is about both those things: the aggrandisement
of Russia and the enrichment of Wagner and the plutocrats that
lie behind it.
As we speak, Wagner’s forces are deployed in Sudan, Mali, Burkina
Faso and the DRC. In all those places, they are seeking to
destabilise and, wherever possible, defenestrate the natural
resources of those countries, both metaphorically and literally,
because the impact on the environment is as grave as the impact
on peace, security and development.
We need a response to that, and it must build on our soft power
and, importantly, our military engagement and our military
defence diplomatic network—the network of military attachés and
peacekeepers who do such good on the ground but who, all too
often, are forgotten when it comes to deployment and resource. We
seek assurances from the Minister on this. I speak from the
experience of my time in South Africa here; they are a critical
part of what happens in any mission. They are at the heart of our
diplomacy and of development. They should not be forgotten, and
we seek a clear and categorical assurance that in Africa, at
least—but not just in Africa, and I shall come to that in a
moment—that network is being enhanced and strengthened. If it is
not, we will pay a price.
We are already paying a price and we see that in the deployment
of Russian and Chinese naval assets off Simon’s Town. That ought
to give us cause for concern. We ought to be concerned that the
People’s Liberation Army is the fastest-growing military presence
in Africa, as we speak. We ought to be concerned that our impact
on the Caribbean is diminished by our failure adequately to
provide scholarships at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and
the Britannia Royal Naval College in Dartmouth, where Caribbean
forces have traditionally been trained. I urge the Minister to
assure us that those scholarships will once again be available to
Caribbean Governments and that we will use the soft power we
possess to the benefit of this nation and the wider world.
12:24:00
(CB)
My Lords, in associating myself with all the preceding speeches,
I too pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, for her
admirable leadership of the International Relations and Defence
Committee, on which I was privileged to serve under her
chairmanship. I draw attention to my non-financial interests.
Writ large across the committee’s report is the age-old Latin
adage that, if you want peace, you should prepare for war. Part
of that preparation must be to minimise dependency and strengthen
national resilience, and solidarity in strong alliances—most
notably NATO and AUKUS.
Although I will concentrate on the threat posed to the free world
by the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party
especially, in parentheses I ask the Minister for an update on
one of the findings in the report referred to by the noble
Baroness, Lady Anelay—that the £5.5 billion Ajax project, now 10
years late, has left a yawning gap in our defence capability. A
recent report blames concealment and in-fighting between factions
in the ministry. A leading article in the Times this week was
headed, “Government complacency about defence resembles that of
the 1930s”. General Sir Patrick Sanders described our capability
as
“rotary dial telephones in the iPhone age”.
In the context of reports that, in a hot war, the army would run
out of ammunition in days, how do the Government respond to those
charges and the urgent need to address manufacturing capacity,
referred to in my noble and gallant friend’s really important
speech, and the issue of replenishment, referred to by the noble
Baroness, Lady Anelay?
In the light of last weekend’s mutiny and the appalling
possibility that a convict turned mercenary warlord could take
control of Russia’s nuclear and biological arsenal, including
nerve agents, what can the Minister tell us about Wagner’s
continuing threat in Europe and Africa, referred to by the noble
Lord, , with whose comments I
associate myself, particularly on Sudan? Why have we still failed
to proscribe Wagner?
In reflecting on the weakening of Putin and the law of unintended
consequences in Ukraine, the Chinese Communist Party needs to
understand that, when you trigger a war, the outcome may never be
certain. While there is much to admire about China’s rich culture
and heritage, the entrepreneurship of its peoples and the
contribution it has made to the world, Xi Jinping’s Chinese
Communist Party regime poses a threat to us all. This is an
important distinction.
In two reports, the International Relations and Defence Committee
makes it clear that the UK’s response to that threat represents
what the committee calls “a strategic void” and what the noble
Lord, of Barnes, calls
“cakeism”—trying to have your cake and eat it. One slice of the
Government’s cake is iced with the following: that the CCP regime
represents the
“most significant geopolitical factor in the world today”.
But another slice is iced with “business as usual”, as
exemplified by the recent ministerial meeting with Liu Jianchao,
a CCP operative responsible for the shocking operations Fox Hunt
and Sky Net, and another Minister going to Hong Kong to deepen
business links while 1,200 lawmakers and pro-democracy activists,
such as the British citizen Jimmy Lai, are incarcerated by a
regime accused by the House of Commons of genocide against the
Uighur Muslims.
This week I met Peter Humphrey, a British national and former
Reuters foreign correspondent, who became a due diligence
investigator with 48 years of experience in China. He and his
wife were locked up in outrageous conditions in a Chinese prison,
experiencing detention and psychological torture and witnessing
prison labour being used in the supply chains of global
multinational brands. Why are we so silent about cases like this?
In addressing the strategic void, can the Minister tell us when
the Prime Minister will respond to the Intelligence and Security
Committee’s China report? What has caused the delay?
Threats come from spy balloons; in cyberspace and space
technology; from surveillance cameras trained on government
buildings, including army barracks, Sandringham and even MI6;
from intimidation, threats and violence directed towards critics
of the regime abroad, including Hong Kongers now resident in the
UK who have escaped, and towards parliamentarians—I declare an
interest as one of seven who has been sanctioned; and on the
battlefields of illegally invaded Ukraine, the Taiwan Strait and
the South China Sea.
On 6 June, China and Russia conducted a joint aerial patrol over
the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, the third such joint air
patrol since Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. They have confirmed
that they will hold further joint military drills this year. The
CCP is not a neutral bystander, but a clear ally and accomplice
to Putin’s war in Ukraine.
As part of the committee’s inquiry, the noble Baroness, Lady
Anelay, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and I were briefed on a
joint military exercise in the Gulf involving China, Russia and
Iran—something of an unholy trinity. While AUKUS is a significant
step in strengthening our ability to defend our allies and
interests in the Asia-Pacific region, I ask the Minister for the
Government’s current assessment of the threats to Taiwan, and
what steps the UK and its allies are taking both to prevent an
escalation and to prepare for the possibility of one. A military
invasion of Taiwan by China would have truly catastrophic
consequences, not only for the region but for the world. Taiwan
is a vibrant democracy that shares our values of human rights and
the rule of law. It has never been part of the People’s Republic
of China, something I would have liked to hear the Defence
Secretary say to the committee.
Taiwan is of vital economic and geopolitical importance. The
Taiwan Strait is the main shipping route from China, Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan to Europe and the US. According to Bloomberg,
almost half the world’s container ships and 88% of larger
container ships transited the Taiwan Strait in 2022. Taiwan holds
a crucial position in the global supply chain due to its
manufacturing capabilities. It produces over 60% of the world’s
semiconductors and over 90% of the most advanced semiconductors,
the chips that power our electric gadgets. Any attempt by the CCP
to seize Taiwan by force would plunge the world into an economic,
and perhaps literal, dark age.
It is therefore in our national interest to do everything
possible to prevent such a catastrophe. That surely means doing
two things: strengthening our relations with Taiwan and being
clear to the CCP what would happen if it did invade. When will we
act on Sir Iain Duncan Smith’s call for an economic impact
analysis of a potential blockade or invasion of Taiwan? It was
clear from an Answer to a Parliamentary Question from him that
none has been done so far. Why not?
I have one other question. Next month we will sign the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership—good. Will we encourage the accession of Taiwan to
the CPTPP, as well as its acceptance—even if only with observer
status—to the World Health Organization and World Health
Assembly? What is the Government’s response to yesterday’s call
by the New Zealand Prime Minister that China should be allowed to
join the CPTPP?
Finally, on Monday the BBC’s “Panorama” broadcast a powerful film
detailing the extent of China’s espionage and infiltration
activities. These range from Hikvision cameras to infiltration of
university programmes involving national defence. There is a
threat from without and a threat from within. I ask the Minister
to please tell us what we are going to do to counter that threat,
to de-risk any business and trade with China, to diversify our
supply chains, to reduce strategic dependency in everything from
its dominance in lithium to electric cars, to deter an invasion
of Taiwan and to strengthen our defences—militarily, economically
and technologically—to confront the growing threats to come.
12:32:00
(Con)
My Lords, it is, as always, a privilege to follow the noble Lord,
Lord Alton. He did not say a word with which I would disagree,
nor indeed did any of the preceding speakers. I begin by
underlining the very powerful remarks of the noble Lord, , and the noble
and gallant Lord, . It really is disgraceful that
Parliament is debating this most important of issues on a Friday,
and that we have had only two major debates on Ukraine. The
Government, who have produced some pretty indifferent legislation
for us to slave over, really ought to get their priorities right.
We ought to have, before the House rises for the Summer Recess, a
full, prime day devoted to foreign affairs in general, and
Ukraine in particular.
I too pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Anelay, not only for
her distinguished chairmanship of the committee but for the way
in which she introduced the debate. We are all very much in her
debt. She was so right to talk about two things which should have
surfaced much more often recently. One is the absolute necessity
for us to have close relations with our former European partners,
the members of the European Union. I am not trying to rerun
Brexit; I accepted the result with sadness and reluctance, but we
are all in this together and it is vital that we work closely
together. It is also worth, particularly bearing in mind the
sinister influence of Iran, us devoting a little more attention
to the Middle East.
If there is a subtext to this very comprehensive report, it is
that our country is skating on very thin ice indeed, from the
point of view of military resources and capacity to deal with the
most comprehensive problems we have faced since the height of the
Cold War. I well remember the Cuban missile crisis; I was a young
Conservative candidate for a Labour seat at the time. We are in
at least as dangerous a situation now as we were then.
I am somewhat perturbed by the letter which the noble Lord,
, the successor of the
noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, felt obliged to write to the
Secretary of State on 23 March following the Government’s partial
response to this very comprehensive and important report. He
said:
“We look forward to receiving a more detailed response on issues
relating to the UK’s defence capabilities”.
He went on to say:
“In particular, we would be grateful for further information on
how Defence plans to refresh its relationship with industry,
replenish equipment, and build greater resilience in its weapons
and ammunition stocks”.
There are a lot of unanswered questions in the Government’s
response, and I very much hope that my noble friend will have
some more information for us today. The House holds her in very
affectionate regard and respect, but I hope she will be able to
give us some glad tidings when she comes to wind up.
One thing that gives me concern is the size of the Armed Forces
in general, but of the Army in particular. It really is
extraordinary that there are almost as many civilian personnel
employed by the Ministry of Defence as the 72,000 target for the
Army. That cannot be right, particularly in view of some of the
evidence given to the committee of the noble Baroness, Lady
Anelay, on the less than agile competence of some of the defence
procurement people. It is disturbing that on the very day that we
are debating this report, we have in the Times an account of Sir
Patrick Sanders, Chief of the General Staff, head of the Army,
leaving early because he is unhappy with the way in which the
Government are tackling things. That is a very disturbing
commentary, at a time of such seriousness.
We enjoy the benefit of cross-party support for the Government’s
approach to Ukraine, and indeed one of the characteristic marks
throughout my 53 years in Parliament is that there has never been
a real divide between the political parties on great issues of
defence and foreign affairs. That does not mean that we should be
complacent about that. On the contrary, we should together be
putting pressure on the Government to recognise that the
questions raised in this report are significant questions of
far-reaching importance, and that we need some answers to the
direct questions that have been asked and the specific
recommendations that have been made.
I hope we will move forward through the reply we shall receive
from the Front Bench today. I repeat what I said earlier, and
what the noble and gallant Lord, , and the noble Lord, , said: I hope,
above all, that before the House rises in four weeks’ time, there
will be a whole day of prime parliamentary time to debate these
far-reaching issues, which affect not only us but generations to
come.
12:40:00
(Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord, , ever travels in hope for glad
tidings; I fear that he and the committee may be disappointed yet
again. Traditionally, it is generally accepted that the two core
roles of government are internal security and external defence.
As many noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Robertson,
the noble and gallant Lord, , and the noble Lord, , have said, it is therefore
surprising that so little attention is given to the subject in
this House at a time when a war is raging and we would likely be
affected massively one way or another if Russia were to succeed
in that war—and all the more so because we have in this House
what the noble Lord, , calls the “warriors’ Bench”,
together with a former Secretary-General of NATO and other people
eminently qualified to contribute to that debate. Yet this debate
is at the fag end of the week, on a Friday afternoon.
That said, I very much support this welcome report from the noble
Baroness, Lady Anelay, and the committee. She was an outstanding
chair. I also welcome the massive contribution made by the
excellent staff. The committee covered a wide canvas. It posed
serious questions that need answers on, for example, the bet on
new technology against mass, as highlighted by the war in
Ukraine; the irrelevance of the “just in time” doctrine to actual
conflict; the need for stocks because of the attrition rate of
modern warfare; the effect of inflation being higher in the
defence field than elsewhere; relations with industry; and the
organisation of the Ministry of Defence. The committee gave
itself a wide remit, and therefore one can concentrate on only
one or two reflections.
My first reflection is on the effect of the pace of change. In
defence terms, the classic example is the Upholder submarine,
which was obsolete as soon as it was launched. I have seen
massive changes in my own lifetime. Eighty years ago, as a little
boy, I strutted around the streets of Swansea chanting, “We won
the war”. Fifty years later, that same little boy was decorated
by the German Government for contributions to British-German
bilateral relations. Over the following years, we had a series of
reality checks for our nation: Suez, east of Suez withdrawal and
the Falklands—magnificent, but the last hurrah. Never again could
we mount such a magnificent unilateral action.
These cases all emphasised the need for alliances. I recall us
debating in the 1990s the need for 40 destroyers and frigates.
Now we are down to 18, and next year it will be 17 or even 16.
Yes, we still have a key role in the JEF, Five Eyes, AUKUS and so
on, but over the past 10 years there have been so many warnings
from experts. In recent weeks there have been warnings from
insiders; for example, General Sir Tim Radford, who is about to
retire as Deputy SACEUR, perhaps demob liberated, forecast in the
Daily Telegraph on 20 June that we risk losing our “fortunate”
position in NATO if we do not invest for the future and said that
we are “just holding on” to our NATO influence. Again, I invite
noble Lords to read the evidence of 20 June to the Defence Select
Committee from the noble and gallant Lord, , the former CDS.
He argued:
“It beggars belief to me that we have a reduced size of army … We
don’t have a properly functioning reserve. To me it’s a national
embarrassment”.
My second reflection is this: hindsight gives 20/20 vision.
Forecasting is particularly hazardous in the defence field, as we
have seen recently in the attempted putsch in Russia, which could
not really have been forecast. The world is moving on from
western dominance. Just look at the voting in the United Nations
General Assembly on the invasion of Ukraine. So much for those
who yearn for Commonwealth political solidarity. We have to seek
alliances, even with imperfect partners.
Yes, Russia is reduced as a threat. It is weakened, but the
threat remains because so many assets have been unused in
Ukraine. It seeks western vulnerabilities—for example, underwater
cables—and is increasingly dependent on China.
China has moved from a regional to a world superpower, powerful
across the board. The point about Taiwan was well made by my
friend, the noble Lord, Lord Alton.
The Middle East has been neglected by the IR, but there are major
changes. Saudi Arabia is distancing itself from the US in
relation to Iran and, indeed, to China.
NATO is not brain-dead but has a new vitality and relevance.
Finland and Sweden will both be major contributors of personnel
and equipment. Think of the new contract with Saab over
NLAWs.
The US is our major key ally. It is dominant, but we will
nevertheless have to look to a possible Trump presidency and the
effects of that in our contingency planning.
I have two final reflections. The first is the looming financial
question posed by defence inflation. Can we continue to seek
excellence across the board, or must we increasingly look for
co-operation with allies, which will assume niche roles for
us?
Secondly, the committee argued for cultural change in planning
and defence in terms of openness, including openness to
Parliament. When I chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee, I used
to ask our own intelligence people to please recognise, like the
CIA, that we are on the same side, even if we need positive
vetting and special private sessions in relevant parliamentary
committees.
I recall being one of the new entrants to the senior branch of
the Foreign Office 63 years ago. We were lectured by the head of
the security department, who sermonised on 1 Peter, chapter 5,
verse 8, advising us to be vigilant, as the devil, our enemy,
“prowls around like a roaring lion looking for someone to
devour”.
Today, at a time when the future of Europe will be determined by
the outcome of the war in Ukraine, we need not only vigilance but
resilience and resources. The report highlights many of the key
problems we face and merits a very serious response from the
Government.
12:48:00
(CB)
My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, . As everyone would
expect, this is a comprehensive and critical commentary on the
Government’s published views on defence and security. It was very
ably introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. At times, it
does not land its punches quite as trenchantly as it might and as
the situation demands.
There is no doubt in the current international climate, with a
resentful and maybe unstable Russia and with the Ukraine conflict
far from resolved, that UK defence and its Armed Forces are not
in a good place. Public perception may be less critical following
the brilliant contributions by all three armed services to the
recent Coronation parades, or their performance for His Majesty’s
official birthday. Indeed, the public might feel reassured. These
displays are all the more worthy because they have never been
mounted with fewer personnel available. Many other operations and
commitments around the world must also be met.
So why are defence and the Armed Forces not in a good place? It
has not just happened suddenly, or even because of the more
recent threat concerns posed by Russia; it is a long, protracted
outcome of budget cuts going back 20, 30 and even more years. It
was, and still is, poor performance in defence procurement. It
was, and still is, expectations that our essential allies will
help shoulder defence capabilities and costs, far more than has
ever been achieved. It was, and still is, expectations of
efficiency savings helping to square the budget.
Long ago—58 years ago—when I was military assistant to the then
Chief of the Defence Staff, the new Government were insisting on
a £200 million saving through cuts and efficiencies; £200 million
then was a hefty 10% of the annual defence budget. Efficiency
savings have been a perennial ask ever since. Expectations of
their success have always far exceeded the actualité.
The Government will rightly say that the defence budget has been
increased and they aspire to further increases; but, with
inflationary pressures, even these increases may not mean that
there will be any real-terms growth in the budget. I stress that
long-term past performance is the determinant of where national
defence capability is now. As night follows day, there is no
short-term fix. Even a massive, immediate increase in funds could
not be transformed overnight into new equipment, more trained
personnel or weapon stocks.
News reports give no sense that replacements of our gifts of
weapons and supplies to Ukraine are being pressed as UORs—urgent
operational requirements—to speed up the procurement process.
Apart from a recently placed order in Germany for 115 millimetre
ammunition, almost 18 months on what else has been ordered? If
anything has, it has not been well publicised. More importantly,
when will it, or other, orders be delivered? Surely these
operational requirements need real priority.
I welcome the all-party support for this Government’s commitment
to provide massive practical help to Ukraine. I would welcome,
too, bipartisan support for the nuclear deterrent force. It would
be equally welcome if such cross-party support could be devised
to work collaboratively on solving the many problems faced with
procurement, for example. Both main parties, while in office,
recognised that there were difficulties. They devised and
promoted new schemes to overcome them. I have seen at close hand
most of them come and go without ever achieving any long-term
success; rather, party-inspired criticism prevails. Year after
year, too, the National Audit Office or another Treasury watchdog
mounts excoriating criticism of failures or of projects that have
been much delayed and have grown in overall cost.
There needs to be a long look ahead—maybe more than political
realities would normally allow—to address these shortfalls in
defence capabilities and the essential weapons spares and stocks.
I will single out just a couple of these shortfalls. Front-line
numbers of fighting forces in all three services are too low to
maintain conventional control in conflict for more than a few
days if they suffer even modest rates of attrition. Recent
practical experience of the Ukraine conflict has demonstrated, in
spades, that weapon stock consumption is high, far higher than
industry could be expected quickly to replace one for one. There
are also novel threats from cyber, and in space, to grapple
with.
The deterrent is often stressed as our greatest safeguard, but it
must be credible to be that safeguard. In turn, its credibility
rests on an ability to stand one’s ground conventionally and not
to be seen by the enemy as a one-trick pony having to contemplate
deterrent use or surrender in the opening stages of conflict.
Defence capabilities and strength are not as they should be. The
climate of threat is real, and in spite of this week’s upheavals
in Russia, will not diminish. Defence needs long-term attention,
real growth and greater cross-party support. What we now have is
tissue-paper thin.
12:56:00
(Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure and an honour to follow the
contribution from a noble and gallant Lord with so much knowledge
and experience in the matters we are debating today. I start by
congratulating my noble friend Lady Anelay and the International
Relations and Defence Committee on this report, which offers a
strong overview of the defence challenges we face and identifies
gaps in the current approach.
The Government’s response, while necessarily incomplete pending
the updated Defence Command Paper, candidly acknowledges
that,
“we misjudged the pace of change and the range and severity of
the threats we would face”.
This admission is welcome. However, I am concerned that despite
it and despite our laudable support for Ukraine, elsewhere in
Europe where Russia and its proxies are fostering instability, we
are carrying on as if the Ukraine invasion never happened.
The threat of Russian-backed subversion in the western Balkans is
real and active. Over the past decade, the Kremlin has
successfully launched misinformation operations, cemented arms
deals, embedded itself in critical energy infrastructure,
compromised political leaders and leveraged the Russian Orthodox
Church’s religious ties to its advantage. Today in the western
Balkans, Russian intelligence operatives are actively involved in
training and equipping paramilitaries and criminal gangs. GRU
officers expelled from NATO and EU countries have found a new
region from which to operate. As a result, nationalist leaders in
the Balkans are fully aligned with Russia on Ukraine and work
hand in glove with Moscow. Russia reciprocates this loyalty by
generously supporting the territorial expansionist plans of its
allies and frustrating NATO aspirations for a peaceful and stable
Balkans.
Recently, we witnessed the type of instability Russia relishes,
when Kosovo, which faces a continuous challenge to its
sovereignty and territorial integrity from its neighbour Serbia,
came close to conflict. Fortunately, the presence of some 3,000
NATO troops, including some from the United Kingdom, helped deter
a serious challenge by the Serbian military massing on the
borders with Kosovo.
Further north, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, much of the progress
made in the aftermath of the 1990s war has been undone due to
Russia’s allies in the Bosnian entity of Republika Srpska, where
corrupt, Kremlin-aligned nationalist politicians are actively
working to dismantle the Bosnian state and secede. Recent
actions, such as passing illegal laws, threatening to halt the
jurisdiction of national institutions, forming paramilitary units
and procuring weapons, indicate a dangerous path that could have
devastating effects if left unanswered. The Balkans represent the
soft underbelly of NATO, and any instability or conflict there
would not be contained and would demand Europe’s and NATO’s
attention. Instability could lead to major movements of people,
chaos within European borders and the opening of a Balkan route
for people smuggling, drug smuggling and arms smuggling.
Unfortunately, we seem to be repeating the same mistakes we made
after the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine in
2014 by hoping for the best and attempting to drive a wedge
between Russia and its local proxies through accommodation. Our
collective response to the events in the Balkans over the past
few years, particularly in the past few weeks, show that the West
is committed to a western Balkan policy centred on Serbian
President Vučić as a partner and a factor of stability. Embracing
autocrats as factors of stability only strengthens their power
and leverage, making them even greater dangers.
A comprehensive policy review and international push-back, with
the clarity we have so valiantly shown over Ukraine, is urgently
needed. The first and immediate step should be an increase in our
defence footprint in Bosnia and Herzegovina by bolstering EUFOR
Operation Althea. This would send a clear signal that there is a
space for political dialogue, but not for armed conflict. It
would also address the noble Baroness’s remark earlier that we
need a framework within which we can work with our EU partners.
This is a perfect framework that works for European stability. It
is in our national interest and in the interest of stabilising
the region.
EUFOR currently lacks presence in key strategic locations in
Bosnia and does not possess the strength or equipment to tackle
serious challenges to peace. It has 1,000 troops from 22
countries, with three helicopters sitting in Sarajevo. It is
desperately short of capability to address the challenge it
faces. By contributing troops to EUFOR or NATO HQ in Sarajevo, we
could make a crucial difference, bring the country and region
back from the edge and provide a credible deterrent to any
attempt at security challenge.
I will pose three questions to my noble friend the Minister.
First, does she agree that the situation in the western Balkans,
and in Bosnia in particular, represents a real and present danger
to European security? Secondly, does my noble friend agree that
contributing troops to EUFOR or NATO HQ in Sarajevo is urgently
needed to prevent conflict in the region? Finally, does she agree
that centring western Balkan policy on Belgrade is a failed
policy and that we need a new approach of supporting democratic
states and allies in the region as a long-term stability
choice?
I am old enough to remember the 1990s, when our policy on the
western Balkans centred around Belgrade. It resulted in ethnic
cleansing, genocide and a complete collapse of western policy in
this part of the world. I hope we are not going to repeat this.
The Government’s response to the committee report said:
“As we have seen starkly over the last twelve months, the
repercussions—and costs—of responding after threats manifest into
conflict are immeasurably greater than if those threats are
adequately deterred or prevented in the first place”.
This is right; an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
Yet, we are not holding to this lesson in the Balkans. Until we
do, the situation will continue to deteriorate, and the risk will
only grow.
In conclusion, just as at the beginning of the Yugoslav wars in
the 1990s, or in the run-up to World War One, it can be difficult
to persuade the world that the Balkans matter. In the 1990s,
European countries declared the “Hour of Europe”, then failed to
respond with sufficient urgency to the crisis that resulted in
horrific ethnic cleansing and genocide. The United States was
forced to step up. This time around, however, the United States
is looking east, and the burden will likely fall on Europe.
Nothing less than Europe’s stability and the effectiveness of the
NATO alliance are on the line. I hope that we have learned the
lessons and that we will apply them.
13:03:00
(CB)
My Lords, I hesitate to speak in such distinguished company, but
my short contribution today concerns the maritime domain, which
the committee’s report rightly addresses.
Over the past year or so I have had the privilege of spending
some time with the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, both here
and overseas. That has brought home to me just how much, as an
island nation, we tend to forget how dependent we are on the
oceans and our Navy, not just for our security but for our
prosperity. The First Sea Lord refers to this as “sea blindness”.
It ignores the fact, for example, that 95% of our imports arrive
by sea and 97% of our data arrives not by satellite but by
undersea cable. Competition for control of the seas is clearly
intensifying. It is said that, around 2020, China’s navy overtook
that of the United States, in size if not capability.
As we have seen in the far north, and as the noble Lord, Lord
Robertson, reminded us, Russia is seeking to control new sea
lanes that will halve the time it takes to move goods from Asia
to Europe. As the noble and gallant Lord, , said, unlike the Russian
army, Russia’s northern and Pacific naval fleets have been
largely untouched by the devastation of the Ukraine war.
Given these inescapable facts about the world, it is wholly
obvious that defence spending will need to increase, and it is
right that we invest in a modern and capable Royal Navy. The
Government are therefore to be commended for the pipeline of new
ships and boats that will come into service over the next 10 to
15 years, which of course includes modernising the continuous
at-sea deterrent. The committee refers to the cost of that as the
MoD’s biggest single defence investment, but, to put it in
context, it is worth noting in parentheses that as a country we
spend less on nuclear deterrence—our ultimate guarantor of
freedom and sovereignty—than we spend on pets and pet food.
However, as these long-term programmes progress, the committee’s
report is surely right to express concern, in paragraph 221,
about the here and now, particularly the impact of inflation on
the Government’s investment plans for the Royal Navy. If
anything, our Armed Forces are already living with the
consequences of previous flawed efficiency and procurement
efforts. Ships are stuck in port, waiting for spare parts, thanks
to supposedly cheaper just-in-time supply chains that often fail.
Submarine refits chronically overrun, so their crews have to
spend extended deployments at sea, and the cost of living crisis
is now clearly taking its toll on front-line service
personnel.
The MoD has just published its annual survey, and under one-third
of Armed Forces personnel now see their pay as fair—down 21
percentage points since 2010. In raw human terms, people are
stuck on base at weekends, for example, because they cannot
afford the petrol to go home to their loved ones, and they are
working second jobs to make ends meet. Although the Armed Forces
cannot strike, in a tight labour market, people are voting with
their feet, be they engineers, chefs or cyber experts.
Earlier this week, the Defence Secretary rightly said that he
wanted a new single Armed Forces Act, enabling so-called “zig-zag
careers” between regular and Reserve commitments. Can the
Minister say whether we will see legislation on that before the
next election? Will the Ministry of Defence commit to
implementing in full the Haythornthwaite review, published last
week? In the meantime, given that the Government want people to
stay, can the Minister confirm that they will back this year’s
recommendations from the independent Armed Forces’ Pay Review
Body?
In summary, the 33,000 people in the Royal Navy and the Royal
Marines have a remarkable global impact, entirely
disproportionate to their size. They support our security and
prosperity, and we, in turn, should support them.
13:08:00
(Con)
My Lords, it is an honour and a pleasure to be at the end of the
Back-Bench contributions to this very important debate and to
have listened to the extremely powerful speeches and the
undercurrent of worry and discontent that has run through almost
all of them. This report from the International Relations and
Defence Committee has given us the chance to examine both the two
integrated review papers from the Government on foreign policy
and the last defence Command Paper. As the noble and gallant
Lord, , said, we are waiting for the
next one, although the report was published before the second,
so-called “refreshed”, integrated review.
I give all credit to the committee, which the noble Lord, Lord
Hannay, and I were proud to help instigate and set up seven years
ago. It has proved its worth. I also give all credit to my noble
friend Lady Anelay, my successor as chair, for her highly
successful chairmanship and for securing and opening this debate,
which she did with great appeal and effect.
The two integrated review papers of 2021 and 2023 have been
curiously undiscussed. This debate has made it pretty clear why
that is so: we have not had the chance or an opportunity, and in
a way they have almost fallen outside and behind the rapid pace
of events. “Integration” was the right concept in both papers,
not least since today’s adversaries are weaponising nearly every
aspect of daily life, far outside the military zone and far into
areas which have never before been touched by warfare, defence or
external security. The papers were right to avoid calling it a
plan or strategy, because we all remember General von Moltke’s
classic remark that no strategy or plan ever survives first
contact with the enemy, so flexibility and uncertainty are
understandable.
However, I share some of the committee’s scepticism and
disappointment when it spoke in its report of a lack of focus in
these integrated reviews and said that there was a lack of
priorities, in both the 2021 and 2023 versions. In fact, I would
go further in three respects. First, both reviews continue to
underestimate the evolving power of new international networks.
Yes, of course they mention ASEAN, the five-power defence pact
Five Eyes and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership, which have been mentioned in the
debate. We also have the AUKUS plans with the Australians and
Americans to build submarines that are nuclear-powered, but not
equipped with nuclear weapons. We are also engaged in an enormous
project with Japan for the next combat air programme, and a lot
of other things go in with that which to me are extremely
welcome.
All that is so, but there are huge changes in the Middle East.
The role of China there is growing all the time, and for instance
there is Israel’s move closer to the Saudis and the new
Saudi-Iranian rapport, which may or may not come to something.
None of that comes into the integrated reviews at all, as the
present chairman of the committee, my noble friend Lord Ashton,
pointed out in his reply to the Government’s comment and as my
noble friend Lady Anelay mentioned in her opening speech. Nor
does the African Union seeking to join the G20, which is an
enormous change in world affairs, feature at all.
There was no more than a passing reference to the biggest network
of all: the modern Commonwealth, which could well prove our
gateway to Asia’s and Africa’s vast new markets, where all the
growth is going to be. It could be one of our greatest assets in
the changed world, as a bulwark against the Chinese expansionism
and maritime intrusions which have been referred to. None of that
gets mentioned in these documents at all. Indeed, some of us have
suggested that the 56-nation network which is the Commonwealth,
with several more countries interested in joining it, could
become a sort of safe haven from a divided world as the great
powers slug out their 20th-century quarrels and ideological
conflicts, which are less and less relevant to the problems that
these nations face. That is my first concern.
Secondly, both documents shy away from our changing relationship
with a changing USA. We remain, of course, the closest partners
and friends but they are not our bosses; they are our partners
and we work with them. We are in no way the puppets of
Washington, nor should we be. That relationship needs much more
careful updating than merely repeating the hopes of the previous
century, and that updating is long overdue. Why is this crucial?
Because the majority of independent nations, many in the
Commonwealth, which have been called by many commentators the
neo-non-aligned—quite different from the Bandung non-aligned of
the previous century—are watching to see where we, the British,
stand. They want neither Chinese hegemony nor American puppetdom.
Of course, they are quite ready to take what they can from both,
and rightly so, to preserve their independence in this new
age.
Thirdly, eyes are understandably on Ukraine and the hideous but
conventional war there, which some experts said would never
happen—but it has—and on NATO and its need for solidarity and
expansion. But eyes should also be, and are not enough, on what
might be called the autocracies’ other wars, as China, followed
to a more violent extent by Russia, is quietly hoovering up the
developing world and large parts of the Sahel and central Africa,
including numerous smaller Commonwealth islands in the south seas
and the Caribbean, and African coastal states, while we sit
watching, seemingly unaware of what is happening, to judge by the
reviews. We should be thinking about how to put the autocracies
on the defensive; yet instead, they appear to be turning the
Commonwealth network, the chain of what should be bastions of
liberty and freedom, the other way around, using them as their
advance points of intrusion into the rest of the world.
The late Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the much underestimated former UN
Secretary-General, once said, and repeated to me, that “Everyone
must have a country to love and believe in”. Well, we love our
country and believe in its future, in utterly transformed
conditions, with much more rapid change to come immediately
ahead. Nothing like enough of that comes through in either of the
government documents looked at in this excellent report. We need
to do much more thinking and to be less confined in silos, and a
much deeper effect needs to be achieved. Like others, I look
forward to hearing what our Front-Bench sages have to say on
that.
13:16:00
(CB)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to be able to speak in the gap on this
incredibly important, comprehensive and wide-ranging report. I
shall not detain the House very long but will just make a few
brief points which I hope will contribute to other distinguished
noble Lords’ thoughts today.
First, I start by joining other noble Lords in raising the issue
of insufficient foreign affairs and security debates taking place
in this House. I note a new tendency here in recent months, even
when we have Statements to the House on matters of the utmost
urgency, such as the events in Russia over the past week. The
Statement we got on Monday evening was held in the dinner hour,
when the House is necessarily thin on the ground, usually because
you do not even know that a Statement will be made that day. I
had applied by chance for an urgent Private Notice Question, but
I was told that it would not be taken because there would be a
debate. I then had to readjust my diary entirely to be able to
come here for the Statement in the dinner hour. I address that
criticism to the Opposition as well, because there is consensus
between the two sides as to when Statements are taken, and it
would be better for the whole House if we could take them as we
used to, after Questions but before the dinner hour, so that more
people can participate.
My second point is about the report itself. I want to pick up on
just one issue in it. I agree with almost everything that was
said, but I want to talk about the shift of emphasis: the tilt
from the Middle East to Indochina. In 2020, I had the privilege
to be part of the working group for the think tank Policy
Exchange on the precursor to the 2021 integrated review. All of
us in that expert working group felt that we should concentrate
on tilting to Indochina, because that was clearly where our
future security threats would come from. As a veteran of the
period 2010 to 2015, I recall that in this House we debated five
almost simultaneous wars: Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, the
intervention in Libya and, occasionally, the Russian invasion of
Crimea. Which one has come back to bite us and will sustain our
concerted efforts over the next decade at least? It is the
Russian invasion of Crimea.
I am sorry to say that the report, even in its comprehensiveness,
refers to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as having happened in
February 2022. Most Ukrainians would profoundly disagree with
that. It did not happen in 2022; it happened in February 2014 and
had we been more vigilant about the impact of that, we would
perhaps have found ourselves better prepared to deal with it.
That brings me, in the few seconds I have left, to my third point
on the relationship between Russia and China. The noble Lord,
, who has
briefly left his place, rightly said that the new world order
will be written in China and supported by Russia. In March, Xi
Jinping made a state visit to Russia, where he said to Putin,
“Right now, there are changes the likes of which we have not seen
for 100 years, and we should drive these changes together”. The
current and persistent strategic challenge that we will face as a
country is that of Russia and China acting in concert, and we
need to be extremely vigilant about that.
13:21:00
of Newnham (LD)
My Lords, as so often in debates on defence, there is unanimity
right across the Chamber not just about the excellence of the
report that we have been debating, or about the brilliance of the
noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, in chairing the committee, but also
about the substance of the report and the issues that we wish to
raise with the MoD.
Normally, I look across from these Benches and, if it has been a
Statement, I am very often following the noble Lord, . He has usually said everything
that I had planned to say, so I have to think of a few more
things to say, and I will start by saying “Of course, I agree
with the noble Lord, , and clearly we support our
Armed Forces”. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, who
said at the end of his remarks that the Navy does the right thing
by us, and we should do the right thing by the Navy. I said
something very similar a few weeks ago in one of the rare debates
about defence. Typically, however, the Red Benches are very often
almost empty when we discuss Statements or Urgent Questions on
defence matters: the Opposition Front Benches agree and the
Minister is usually in the happy position of being able to say,
“On these issues, we agree”.
Nothing I am going to say now should go against the fact that, on
these Liberal Democrat Benches, we fully support His Majesty’s
Armed Forces and are deeply committed to the defence of the
realm. However, I was aware the other day that the Minister felt
that perhaps the criticism of the Government’s investment in the
Navy, in particular, was going a little too far. I am afraid
there will be some further criticisms from these Benches, as
there have been from across the Chamber, about investment in
defence, the size of our Armed Forces and concerns about defence
expenditure and defence procurement, because these remain
profound outstanding concerns.
As the noble Lord, , reminded us, the
defence of the realm is the key issue of government—internal
security and external defence. However, listening to debates
across your Lordships’ House, when we seem to spend so much time
looking at other issues that are perhaps not so fundamental to
our security, one might forget that. There is a danger of
complacency, not just from the Government, as suggested earlier
by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, and the noble Lord,
, but perhaps more broadly from
the membership of your Lordships’ House.
Although there have been many comments today about the lack of
government time given to debates on defence or Ukraine, it is
also noticeable that the House very often empties when we have
Statements. The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine,
suggested that that is because the timing of the Statements is
not always clear, but if Members really felt that issues of
defence were so important, they would sometimes alter their
diaries. We all need to stop and reflect about how much time we
give to matters of security and defence.
We have heard incredibly powerful speeches about the threats that
we face globally and which we, as the United Kingdom, need to
think about: the strategic void in the integrated review and
subsequent refresh; the questions about China, put forward by the
noble Lord, Lord Alton; and the issues of Russia and China and
the interplay between the two, as pointed out by the noble Lord,
Lord Robertson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner. There is,
therefore, a question for His Majesty’s Government. What
assessments are the Government making of the interplay between
Russia and China; the links between Russia, the Wagner Group and
its engagement in Africa; and the more subtle engagement of China
in Africa and elsewhere? China’s engagement is not about the use
of military capabilities necessarily, but about investment in a
way that never includes the conditionality that Western
engagement might have.
The threats are manifold. I will not rehearse the powerful
arguments we have already heard; I want to ask the Government
about force size, however. I was expecting to see the noble Lord,
, on the Benches and
to hear further rehearsals of questions about the size of the
Navy—we did hear some points about the Navy but, surprisingly,
from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens. They are important points. The
noble Lord, Lord West, had a letter in the Financial Times this
morning, pointing out that, although General Sir Patrick Sanders
might raise the issue of the size of the Army, it should not be
at the expense of the maritime sector. What assessments have His
Majesty’s Government made about the balance between our forces
and their sizes?
The committee report is right that it is not just as easy as
saying that we should have 70,000 or 80,000 troops or regular
members of the Army. In fact, it is about the deployability of
the members of our Armed Forces, their capability, their kit and
the ammunition and weapons they have. We are asking ever more of
our Armed Forces—perhaps intentionally. The noble and gallant
Lord, , rightly pointed out that
citizens across the world looking at the Coronation, Trooping the
Colour and her late Majesty’s funeral last autumn would have seen
the magnificence of the displays of our Armed Forces and how
impressive they are. Those Armed Forces are, however, smaller
than in the past.
While we may want innovation in defence procurement and the
defence industrial base, we also need conventional Armed Forces.
In order to have effective Armed Forces, however, we need to look
again at defence procurement and the size of the budget. Issues
of defence procurement have, for years, been a byword for chaos
and confusion. There are questions about whether those within the
Civil Service who are undertaking that procurement have the
expertise they need. There is also a political issue,
however.
Non-democratic regimes might assume that they can be in
government for decades. You can have a strategy to 2030, 2050 or
2070 if you are not looking to the electorate. Elected
politicians, inevitably, are looking to the next election, and if
the Government change to one of another complexion, there is
always the danger that the new Secretary of State for Defence
will say, “Well, that particular procurement looks quite
interesting, but the bells and whistles aren’t quite what we
want—let’s go back and amend the contract”. That is one reason
why the MoD faces some challenges in relation to defence
procurement.
Have His Majesty’s Government given any thought to the idea that
there should be longer-term thinking about defence procurement? I
am not suggesting that it should be on a cross-party
basis—clearly, it is the role of the Government to make the
decisions—but it could allow for further discussions, on an off
the record, Privy Council basis, with senior politicians from the
Opposition, so that there could be longer-term thinking about
defence procurement. That fits with the suggestions from the
committee about scrutiny of defence expenditure.
With regard to the nuclear deterrent, but also in many other
areas of defence policy, the standard line from the Front Bench
is: “We can’t give you a full answer for reasons of national
security”. Those of us who stand up and ask questions on the
Floor of the House during Oral Questions or on Statements
absolutely understand that Government Ministers are not able to
give confidential information that could breach national
security. However, would it not be possible for His Majesty
Government not just to give private briefings to members of the
relevant committees but perhaps—I declare an interest as the
Front-Bench spokesperson for the Liberal Democrats—to give some
confidential briefings to Front-Bench spokespeople?
Finally, I turn to defence expenditure. One of the issues I have
raised ever since I have been in this House—2014—has been about
defence inflation. The committee’s excellent report raises this
issue, and even the Secretary of State has acknowledged questions
about the problems with defence inflation and the exchange rate.
What assessment have His Majesty’s Government made of this? I
share the views of the noble and gallant Lords, and , that more could and should
be done about expenditure and making sure that we are spending a
sufficiently large budget on defence to ensure that we meet the
expectations and needs of our own citizens and what our Armed
Forces need, and that we can not only defend our own realm but
meet the challenges and opportunities of co-operating with our
partners and allies in Europe, the United States and the Five
Eyes.
13:33:00
(Lab)
My Lords, I too congratulate the committee on its excellent
report and the noble Baroness on her excellent introduction to
it. I echo the praise for her for her period as chair of the
committee. We have had a lot of exchanges, and those exchanges
have mirrored what I hope we will see in today’s debate: a lot of
consensus and a lot of support for the defence of this
country.
The situation in Russia in recent weeks has proved, if we needed
proof, that events are constantly shifting in size and shape, and
our defence capability must therefore be agile, fit for purpose
and resilient. It means that we often have to make
extraordinarily large contingencies, particularly in this
uncertain world we now face. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith,
mentioned my noble friend . He is on MoD visits at the
moment, so I am covering for him, but obviously we work closely
together, because if there is one thing that we have also
learned—which the integrated review attempted to do—it is that
defence, diplomacy and development are key ingredients for a more
secure world.
I also echo the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, in saying that we
should have huge pride in our Armed Forces personnel, veterans
and their families for the contribution they make to our country.
We do not say it enough. From our deployments abroad in response
to the invasion of Ukraine to deployments at home during the
Covid-19 pandemic, our Armed Forces are essential to our national
defence, our national resilience and our NATO obligations. On
Britain’s military help to Ukraine—noble Lords have heard me say
it from the Dispatch Box—we are at one with the Government. In
Britain’s military help to Ukraine and reinforcing NATO allies,
the Government have had and will continue to have the fullest
support of Labour and the Opposition. Labour strongly welcomes
the £2.3 billion in UK military assistance for Ukraine last year
and this year.
The report before us asks some fundamental questions, not least
whether the Army has sufficient numbers and capabilities to
deliver on the Government’s ambition. We know that, since 2010,
the Government have cut the full-time strength of our Armed
Forces by 45,000. One in five ships has been removed from the
Royal Navy’s fleet, and more than 200 aircraft have been taken
out of RAF service in the last five years alone. Despite
increased threats from Putin’s war in Ukraine, Ministers are
cutting down further, to 73,000 troops by 2025—the smallest size
of the British Army since it faced Napoleon.
The Minister needs to address today the fundamental question of
whether we are failing or falling short on our NATO obligations.
At a time when we are facing war in Europe and NATO is raising
its high-readiness force to 300,000 from 40,000, Britain is still
travelling in the opposite direction. We are assured that the
question about the UK’s defence capabilities raised in the report
will be addressed in the revised Defence Command Paper. In May,
the Government said that they expected this to be published in
June. Then we heard that it was delayed until 17 July. Today’s
Guardian suggests that we will not see it until September. The
article in the Guardian also suggested, as the noble Lord, , referred to in respect of the
article in the Times, that General Sir Patrick Sanders, who has
served only a year as the Chief of the General Staff, may quit
even sooner if the Defence Secretary imposes further cuts.
As a consequence of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, finishing
her term, we saw the follow-up letter from the new chair of the
committee, asking for more detailed information on how Defence
plans to refresh its relationship with industry, replenish
equipment and build greater resilience and weapons and ammunition
stocks. Again, I think that is what we all want to hear today.
The letter also asked for the Government’s plans to address
shortfalls in the UK’s hard power capabilities in the light of
the Ukraine war, including the £2 billion over two years
allocated in the Budget and how that will address the
shortfalls.
Noble Lords have referred to the original integrated review,
which I welcomed at the time. It was good to have that emphasis
linking those three Ds. That review looked at geopolitical and
geoeconomic shifts, such as China’s increasing power, the growing
importance of the Indo-Pacific, systematic competition and rapid
technological changes, which we have heard about again in this
debate. On how we build a more secure world, we should not forget
the collective action required between countries to challenge
things such as climate change, global health risks, illicit
finance, and serious and organised crime. Challenging all those
things is vital for a safer country and a safer world.
The original Defence Command Paper outlined the MoD’s role in
achieving the overarching objective set out in the integrated
review and how we utilise the additional £16.5 billion in its
budget that it received in 2020 to
“transform the Armed Forces to meet the threats of the
future”.
It also announced further reviews and strategies, including those
focused on accommodation, career management and pay—vital to
reflect the importance of retaining an effective Army.
In March 2023, the Integrated Review Refresh responded to the
factors that the Prime Minister referred to as
“Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, weaponisation of energy
and food supplies and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, combined
with China’s more aggressive stance in the South China Sea and
the Taiwan Strait”,
all of which threaten
“to create a world defined by danger, disorder and division—and
an international order more favourable to authoritarianism”,
as noble Lords have referred to. The refresh recognised that
“further investment and a greater proportion of national resource
will be needed in defence and national security—now and in the
future—to deliver its objectives”.
Again, I hope the Minister will be able to give us a very clear
timetable as to when we will see the refresh Command Paper.
The biggest threats and risks for Britain remain in the NATO
area: Europe, the North Atlantic and the Arctic. That is where
our primary responsibilities fall, as the report highlighted. We
need to have the United Kingdom secured as the leading European
nation within NATO so that we can help NATO forge its response to
future Russian aggression and the opening up of the Arctic under
climate change, and set a strategy for dealing with the
challenges of China in the long term. Those points were so ably
and so brilliantly argued by my noble friend .
As the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, said, key to addressing these
challenges is rebuilding relationships within Europe. Britain has
badly damaged its relationship with key European countries and
allies in the Brexit process—sometimes deliberately so. We have
to rebuild those to make Brexit work, but in defence and security
we have to build those relationships because they reinforce
security for us all.
On China, instead of flip-flopping between tough talk and muddled
actions, we need to develop a strategy in which we challenge,
compete and, where we can, co-operate. To do that, we first need
a complete and comprehensive audit of the UK-China relationship,
not restricting ourselves to government but including the private
sector and local government.
We have heard detailed reference to procurement in today’s
debate. We have seen many errors in relation to the defence
procurement programmes, particularly since 2010. As we know, the
Government have no systematic plans to fix the military
procurement system, which the Public Accounts Committee described
as “broken” and “repeatedly wasting money”. I agree with the
noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham: we need a clear programme
and strategy that take this issue out of a political back and
forth. We need to ensure a much more effective, long-term
procurement programme.
In conclusion, we need to focus on fulfilling Britain’s NATO
obligations; that is absolutely essential. Ministers must adopt
what my honourable friend in the other place, the shadow Defence
Minister, has called Labour’s plan for a “NATO test” of major
defence programmes and a “stockpiles strategy” to replenish
reserves and sustain support for Ukraine. We also need to renew
Britain’s contract with our forces. Defence plans must ensure
that our heroes have good homes to live in and that we fully
incorporate the Armed Forces covenant into law.
13:47:00
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence () (Con)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to speak in the House when we
debate such a thorough, well-informed report as this one from the
International Relations and Defence Committee. It is a privilege
to follow such knowledgeable and distinguished contributors.
Debates in this House are always immeasurably enhanced by the
breadth of experience of those who have been not just Ministers
in the midst of some of our nation’s greatest challenges but
diplomats in the world’s great capital cities and military
commanders in the most hazardous of conditions. I thank all those
who have participated; I extend a special note of gratitude to my
noble friend Lady Anelay of St Johns and her committee for their
diligence and acuity in producing such an interesting report.
I think I had better deal with the elephant in the room, which
was referred to by all your Lordships: the disquiet about a
perceived inadequacy of opportunity to debate these issues in
this Chamber. All I can observe is that I recall having the
pleasure of a full debate in which I and my noble friend participated. If I
recall correctly, he opened the debate and I wound it up,
although it may have been the other way around; in any case, I
remember that we both thought it a very fertile debate. I observe
to your Lordships that there are usual channels, which can
heavily influence calls for debates on issues of interest or
concern to the House. Parties can table their own debates. Both
in the other place and in this Chamber, Ministers have
consistently been called to account by numerous Chamber
appearance. For my own part, these have tended to be responding
to either Statements, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of
Newnham, observed, or Oral Questions, which may be topical or
Urgent Questions. These have a particularly abrasive character in
terms of the Minister’s anxiety about being able to respond
accurately and fully; they are representative of a fluid
character of business whereby such questions can address
topicality and currency. Ministers can then assist, perhaps, in
giving the most up-to-date presentation of information and
engagement possible. I will take noble Lords’ comments back to my
noble friends the Leader of the House and the Chief Whip.
Before I respond to many of the excellent points that we have
heard today, it is worth reflecting once more on the context that
frames our discussions. Inevitably, with the conflict in Ukraine,
this debate takes place in an all-encompassing environment of
threat; hence my presence at the Dispatch Box today as an MoD
Minister.
The underlying assumptions of our integrated review back in 2021
proved correct; it established Russia as our most acute threat
and showed that our decision to train Ukrainians back in 2015 was
prescient. However, it would also be true to say that a degree of
cognitive dissonance prevailed. For all of Putin’s belligerence,
we still hoped against hope that the Russian threat would not
materialise and that the pace of competition outlined in IR21
would not accelerate.
Putin’s decision to send tanks into Ukraine last February sent
shockwaves around the world. We understood immediately that this
was more than an illegal invasion of a sovereign nation. It was
an assault on the established open international order, an
affront to human rights and a taunt to the West. Putin believed
that he could simply roll over Ukraine and the West would not
act.
In the event, Putin could not have been more wrong. The
Ukrainians have shown extraordinary, superhuman levels of
courage, and the international community, barring the usual
suspects, has displayed remarkable unanimity. The UK, alongside
our great US friends, has displayed exemplary leadership,
galvanising the global response, providing lethal and non-lethal
aid, training more than 17,700 new Ukrainian recruits alongside
our partner nations since last June, and ensuring that
international donations keep rolling in. I thank my noble friend
Lady Anelay and the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for recognising
that response.
However, there is no disguising that the world as we knew it has
mutated. The last vestiges of Cold War optimism have dissipated
in a fuselage of missiles and brutality. In this new age, where
uncertainty lurks around every corner, we cannot afford any
misjudgments, because the threat is multiplying.
As Prigozhin’s attempted coup last week reminded us, the
situation is febrile. Already, the ramifications of Russia’s
illegal invasion have spread far beyond the borders of Ukraine.
Russia is co-operating with Iran and North Korea. It has a
no-limits partnership with China, which is itself increasingly
assertive and poses an enduring and epoch-defining challenge.
Russia’s actions have triggered an energy crisis, a food crisis,
and a cost of living crisis. All the while, extremist actors
continue to agitate across the world and, as the noble Lord, Lord
Collins, correctly said, climate change exacerbates
instability.
Our integrated review refresh, which was published subsequent to
the committee’s report earlier this year and aligned with many of
the report’s recommendations, was a response to this perfect
storm. Work to update the integrated review was under way the
moment Russian boots stepped across the border. Defence fully
endorses the conclusions of the integrated review refresh. The
Government’s most urgent foreign policy priority is to address
the Russian threat to European security. We are working with
allies across the world to impose our toughest-ever sanctions
regime to provide huge quantities of military aid and rebuild our
stockpiles and munitions.
We must maintain this momentum. Putin is convinced that the West
does not have the stomach for this fight. We must show him he is
wrong, which is why we are doubling down on our support for
Ukraine; we have already committed a further £2.3 billion in the
next financial year.
The MoD also has a much wider role to play in delivering each of
the critical pillars of the strategic review refresh. I remind
your Lordships that this is about shaping the international
framework, generating strategic advantage, addressing
vulnerabilities, and ensuring that we can deter, defend and
compete across all domains. That is why we are refreshing our
2021 Defence Command Paper. I can inform your Lordships that this
has been an intensive process. It has been under way for several
months. It has involved extensive consultation with academia,
industry and think tanks. The paper is still under wraps but its
general conclusions, which I break no confidences in summarising,
will come as no surprise to perspicacious colleagues; indeed,
some of your Lordships may very well have helped to shape
them.
The Command Paper will enshrine Defence’s mission to protect the
nation and help it prosper. Having contributed to the paper
myself, I would like to highlight three themes in particular:
readiness, resilience and relationships. All the contributions
have touched on these in some respect. My noble friend Lady
Anelay referred to readiness, as did the noble Lord, Lord
Collins, who shrewdly identified that you cannot leave readiness
in a silo. It is inevitably caught up with resilience and the
need for agility, pace and response.
To head off danger at the pass, Defence will need to operate more
persistently and proactively across the globe. Greater readiness
will in turn demand greater integration across Whitehall and
across all the domains: not just land, sea and air, but space and
cyber. Our object is not simply to enhance our deterrence and
situation awareness but to enable faster decision-making and
leverage our diplomatic and economic muscle as well as military
might. Indeed, we are currently creating a digital ecosystem to
rapidly assimilate and harness the data we receive from a myriad
of sensors across multiple domains. Your Lordships may think that
“digital ecosystems” sounds like trendy jargon, but in a nutshell
it is about making data and information the drivers of
decision-making.
That brings me to resilience, because our forthcoming Command
Paper will underscore the need for greater resilience. To operate
effectively in a more contested world, we must change the way the
MoD functions. Our structures, processes and ways of working must
accelerate efficiency, efficacy and delivered effect, to give us
an edge. We expect ever more from our people, by which I mean our
whole force of regulars and reservists, uniformed and civilians,
government and industry, apprentices and contractors; veterans
also play a role. We have to look after them and help develop
their skills and maximise their potential.
My noble friend Lady Anelay and the noble and gallant Lord,
, also raised the role of
industry in relation to resilience. The conflict in Ukraine has
exposed the vulnerabilities of a completely globalised free
market. It has underlined the importance of stockpiles of
munitions and other essential capability, and has shown us the
need to shore up our supply chains. That is why we are now
looking at how to de-risk our industries so that we are less
reliant on others to provide us with critical minerals and
semiconductors. I reassure your Lordships that significant orders
have now been placed for replenishment.
That brings me to relationships. The third principle of our
Defence Command Paper will relate to being international by
design. Only by deepening friendships and weaving together a
tapestry of partners and allies can we collectively secure our
populations and interests. We have seen the value of
international unity in Ukraine, an effort that has proven more
enduring and robust than many, not least Putin, predicted.
My noble friend Lady Anelay, along with my noble friend and others, raised the matter
of the EU. I can perhaps offer a reassuring counterbalance here.
There is no doubt that during the anguish of the Brexit process,
relations with the EU were difficult and fractious, but I detect
a dramatic improvement. Even at the most difficult time of
tensions, within the MoD, we had constructive cordial
relationships with professionals and counterparts in other EU
countries. That was very important. Post Brexit, I am delighted
to say that there is now a new warmth in relationships. There was
reference to PESCO; I can add to that that there are very strong
bilateral relationships on defence between the UK and EU
countries.
I had the privilege of attending the EI2 defence group of
countries. What is interesting is that 10 of these are EU members
and two are not; one is the UK and the other is Norway. I cannot
overstate to your Lordships the warmth of the reception that I
received, the interest in what the UK was doing and the desire to
engage and share experiences and knowledge.
We have also rediscovered, because of the conflict in Ukraine,
the value of decisive leadership. Whenever one nation has put its
head above the parapet, others have followed. That aggregate
effect is having a huge impact. We have watched NATO come into
its own: more united, more resilient and, with the accession of
Finland and eventually Sweden, stronger than ever before. Not one
Russian boot has entered NATO territory.
Our adversaries act globally. They act from the Indo-Pacific to
west Africa, as has been indicated, and from Latin America to the
high north, as was also mentioned. We have to compete globally
too. In relation to the Indo-Pacific, which a number of noble
Lords raised, perhaps with an air of concern, the Prime Minister
said recently that Atlantic and Pacific security was indivisible.
He was absolutely correct, for a variety of reasons, so it has
been encouraging to see nations outside of NATO drawing the same
conclusions and uniting to defend the international order.
There is another important strand to relationships: how we
optimise our HM Government strengths. From my engagement with
other countries on defence matters, one example is a seamless
tandem between our diplomatic presence and in-country defence
attachés. I cannot overestimate or overdescribe the importance of
that relationship because, where their activity is mutually
comprehensive, the aggregate effect is potent; it really packs a
punch. The noble Lord, , spoke very powerfully on that
issue and I would seek to reassure him on that.
A Command Paper will chart defence’s course in the decades ahead.
There will remain many issues to be worked through. Noble Lords
have identified a number of those challenges today and I will try
to address them in the time available. I am probably not going to
manage it, in which case I will offer to write.
A number of noble Lords, not least my noble friend Lady Anelay,
asked whether we would update the defence and security industrial
strategy, the DSIS. It has been reviewed, alongside the IR and
DCPR. We will outline further how the Government will deliver
that defence, security and industrial strategy.
On defence procurement, I was speaking to a lunch yesterday of
stellar presences—or was it the day before?—from the worlds of
defence and diplomatic activity. Unsurprisingly, some of your
Lordships were there. A diplomat said to me that MoD procurement
had not been a series of unmitigated triumphs. I said to him that
that was the best diplomatic-speak I had heard in a long
time—because it has not been.
We have learned painful lessons, for a variety of reasons. We
have been exposed to scrutiny by the National Audit Office and
the Public Accounts Committee. We have been exposed to—unwelcome
at times—media investigation. We have certainly been exposed to
parliamentary scrutiny. All of that has had a galvanizing effect.
There is a seismic change in defence, and I will describe some of
that in a moment.
On the very interesting point of how we deal, not so much with
the primes but with the small or medium-sized enterprises, I am
pleased to say that I was having a discussion about this with our
director of general industry, trade and economic security in
defence, a marvellous woman, Avril Jolliffe. She is absolutely on
the ball on this. We see opportunities where we think we can do
more on that front and hopefully provide greater encouragement to
these smaller presences.
Specifically on the Ajax contract, the Sheldon review was a very
helpful commentary on what had been happening. We have already
introduced a number of significant changes within the Army. There
will be an additional £70 million over 10 years to resource Army
programmes and an increased number of senior responsible owners
to match its portfolio. Importantly, senior responsible owners
are now going to have to spend at least 50% of their time
dedicated to the programme. There was an unwelcome churn on
previous programme procurements, and it was not healthy. The Army
currently has half of its SROs working 100% on its programmes,
and that includes the SRO for the armoured cavalry programme that
is delivering Ajax.
So I hope I can reassure noble Lords that big changes have taken
place. There is also a recognition of the crucial importance of
effective sustainment of operations, highlighting the need for
sufficient stockpiles and munitions. That is being underpinned by
a resilient economic and industrial base at home.
A number of noble Lords raised matters in the Middle East and
China. The Middle East is critical to Euro-Atlantic security and
prosperity. We recognise that significance and we maintain an
enduring presence in the Gulf. We have strong relationships with
each of the six countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council. The
MoD has been playing its role in supporting that, as your
Lordships will be aware, with the presence of naval assets.
The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, raised the matter of the Arctic
and the high north. It is significant, as new routes are opening
up with climate change. The MoD has now published its Arctic
strategy. I commend it to the noble Lord; I think it makes for
interesting reading.
A number of your Lordships, including my noble friend Lord
Howell, the noble Baronesses, Lady Falkner of Margravine and Lady
Smith of Newnham, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins, raised very
important points on China. The IR23 refresh identifies the
character of the threat posed by China. That is why we will
pursue a policy through three interrelated strands, which runs
through the IR23 framework. We will protect the UK and align and
deepen our co-operation and increase alignment with our core
allies and a broader group of partners, but we will also engage
directly with China bilaterally and in international fora to
preserve and create space for open, constructive, predictable and
stable relations that reflect China’s importance in world
affairs. To reassure your Lordships, the Government are backing
this; there will be double funding—£3.2 million over the next two
years—to build China capabilities across government so that we
better understand the country. That will enable us to engage
confidently when it is in our interest to do so.
The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, and my noble friend Lady Helic
spoke eloquently and with great knowledge about the western
Balkans. My noble friend raised significant issues and rightly
identified inherent and potential threats. She makes a powerful
point about prevention; the strategy of the UK and our partners
and allies, not least in NATO, is to keep that objective at the
forefront of our thinking. The MoD is actively supporting
countries in the western Balkans to make progress towards
democratic values and greater integration through building
resilience in their defence and security institutions. There is a
persistent FCDO engagement. Very recently, my noble friend , the FCDO Minister
in the Lords, and I were discussing what we might do to assist
the UK endeavour. On Bosnia and EUFOR, we recognise the
importance of the EUFOR peace stabilisation mission in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. We will explore how we can best support that
initiative.
A number of your Lordships, including the noble and gallant Lord,
, and the noble Lord, Lord
Alton, raised issues around the Indo-Pacific. I have indicated
how our MoD attitude to the Indo-Pacific is strategically robust
and inherent within our attitude to the broader security of the
United Kingdom. Noble Lords will be aware that there has been
consistent activity out in that region. That is a good
combination and a demonstration of soft and hard power where we
have assets. I have been out in that region visiting various
countries in south-east Asia; the amalgam of the diplomatic
presence and the defence attaché presence has absolutely opened
doors I would not otherwise ever have got through. There is very
useful activity going on there.
The noble Lord, , raised scholarships for
Caribbean servicepeople at the Royal Military Academy and at
Dartmouth. I will write to the noble Lord on that issue.
Along with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, the noble Lord, , raised Wagner, which is a
repugnant entity. I believe that sanctions have been imposed on
some identified personnel. We have to approach its activity,
particularly in Africa, with a mixture of diplomatic and MoD
activity in conjunction with partners. We are very clear about
the need to ensure that Wagner’s sphere of influence is limited
because it is a pernicious presence.
(Lab)
Can I press the Minister a bit on that? Wagner is in Burkina Faso
and it threatens Ghana. It threatens the whole of that region.
Have we increased our military attaché presence in west Africa in
order to counter it? Frankly, if we have not, then we are
whistling in the wind in terms of any hope of addressing the
threat that it represents.
(Con)
I do not have an answer to the specific question about the number
of defence attachés we have there, but I will make the inquiry
and undertake to write to the noble Lord.
(CB)
My Lords, the Minister referred to Wagner, and the interventions
by the noble Lord, , and myself. I specifically
asked why we have failed to proscribe Wagner. When she comes to
write on these issues and other questions that have been
asked—she said she would reply to them all in writing if they
have not been answered on the Floor of the House—will she
particularly address that question?
(Con)
Strictly, this is not a matter for the MoD, as the noble Lord
will be aware; it is, essentially, a matter for the Cabinet
Office. These matters are not discussed; that is for another
forum of discussion. I had a look at some organisations that have
been proscribed, and I was not entirely clear what the benefit
was. Yes, you nail them as people to have nothing to do with,
but, actually, the more effective undermining of their position
is to try to get at their financial wallets with sanctions. But I
cannot give any advance on the Government’s positions already
articulated.
(CB)
My Lords, I do not want to detain the House, but this is a
profoundly important point. For nearly a year now, the noble
Lord, Lord Purvis, has been asking this question from the Lib Dem
Benches of any Minister who will listen. All I say, respectfully,
to the Minister is that she speaks for the whole of the
Government, not just the Ministry of Defence, of course.
(Con)
Yes, and I cannot add to the position I articulated. I have no
further position to share with the House.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, raised some interesting points
about shipbuilding. I remind him that, for the first time in 30
years, two UK shipyards are building two types of frigate—that is
something to fly the flag about. In the refreshed national
shipbuilding strategy, we set out the shipbuilding pipeline.
The noble Lord made an important point about our people, and he
is absolutely correct: they are our most vital asset. We support
them, and we shall respond to the Haythornthwaite review and,
imminently, to the independent pay review board’s
recommendations. I undertake to make further inquiries about his
comment on the “zig-zag” career process and see whether I can
obtain further information for him.
I am conscious of time, but I realise that what noble Lords want
is to talk about this, to hold the Government to account and to
hear from them, so, with noble Lords’ indulgence, I will keep
going until I reach the end of my notes. My noble friend Lord
Howell made a number of important and perceptive points, but I
slightly disagree with him in one area. He said that the IR and
the Defence Command Paper were in silos, but I do not see that;
in this hybrid world of global threat, I see a very fast-changing
and fluid set of imperatives, and it is about how we try to
harness these in some strategic sense and then bring some
intelligent specifics about how we will deal with them.
I agreed with my noble friend’s point about the Commonwealth, for
which there is an important role. That is always worth exploring,
and I would not disagree with that at all. I dealt with the
position on China, but I was struck by my noble friend’s phrase
about putting “autocracies on the defensive”. I have a lot of
sympathy with doing that, and I share his analysis of these
concerns. But I hope that the imminent Defence Command Paper
refresh will reassure my noble friend that this is an active
matter under current consideration.
The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, raised Russia,
China and the new world order, which are important points. That
is why the integrated review refresh is shaped as it is and why
the Defence Command Paper refresh will be shaped as I have
indicated in general terms.
The noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury—informally, he is my
noble friend—raised important issues about the Army and, in
particular, our NATO obligations. We will have a combined Army
strength, regular and reserve, of over 100,000. It is important
to put that in the context of what we are now dealing with. If we
have learned anything from Ukraine, we have learned that,
although land conflict might look unchanged in some respects, it
is absolutely transformed in other respects because of how
warfare is now conducted, with the deployment of various aspects
of information technology and artificial intelligence.
I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that the UK contributes
to every NATO mission. We did so in Iraq, in Kosovo and in the
Med with Operation Sea Guardian, and the UK is making a very
ambitious offer of forces to NATO’s force model. Our approach to
the NATO force model has been “NATO by default and national by
exception”, which means that almost all our forces across all
domains will be made available to support NATO tasking and the
deterrence and defence of the Euro-Atlantic. For 2024-25, we will
transition from the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force to the
inaugural allied land reaction force. We already contribute
heavily to NATO deterrence activity.
The noble Lord, Lord Collins, also raised climate change, which
is very dear to my heart. It might interest your Lordships—it may
sound improbable, but it is absolutely the case—that within the
MoD we have a director for climate change and sustainability.
There is a Minister responsible for pursuing our policy in that
sphere—me. I take a keen interest in what is going on and have
been utterly bowled over by the innovation within our single
services in devising how they adapt to climate change and, with
their own ingenuity, make their contribution to reducing our
emissions. We have had some extraordinary innovatory activity by
the RAF, which leads the field in sustainable aviation fuel. It
is incredible. I have been speaking to some think tanks in the
RAF—geniuses at work in basements—and even if only one of their
plans comes to fruition, it will be a major contribution.
I commend to your Lordships a wonderful magazine called
Sanctuary. It is an MoD product, produced once a year; it looks
great and it reads like a treat. I am sure the House of Lords
Library will give your Lordships a copy to look at and I
guarantee that it will cheer you up.
I apologise for running over time, but I detect that noble Lords
genuinely want to hear about this. Work to resolve the issues
that have been identified is either happening or currently under
way. A number of noble Lords mentioned defence spending. The
Defence Equipment Plan is public and lays out an exciting
combination of spend and equipment, whether that is UK shipyards,
Lossiemouth as a showcase for RAF potent power or an Army
equipment plan of £41 billion over the next 10 years. I go back
to something that the noble and gallant Lord, , said in the
Chamber just last week. He very astutely pointed out that we need
to get away from becoming fixating on a single force or a
particular part of a capability. The trick now is to know how we
amalgamate this holistically, to deliver the capability effect
that we need to address threat.
Noble Lords are aware of the financial settlements that have been
available in the last few years for defence. The Prime Minister
has pledged, when economic circumstances improve, to raise our
defence spending to 2.5% of GDP. I reassure the noble and gallant
Lord, , that this is a welcome
boost in very difficult economic circumstances. Times are
challenging but I think noble Lords can expect to see us
accelerating our modernisation and mobilisation plans, investing
in critical partnerships such as AUKUS and GCAP, the global
combat air programme, restocking our munitions and upgrading our
digital infrastructure.
The Command Paper is currently at write-round for clearance with
other National Security Council members and will be published in
the coming weeks. I think its recognition and release will bring
with it a new reality. When Putin’s troops crossed the Dnieper at
the start of 2022, they also crossed the Rubicon, because we now
live in a completely transformed world. We cannot go back. We
have to adapt rapidly and enhance our readiness. We must
strengthen our resilience and reinforce our relationships to
secure the peace and prosperity that our country and our allies
deserve.
I say to those who might have been tempted to adopt a slightly
depressive note that I regard it as a privilege to be a Minister
in defence. I see at first hand uniformed and civilian staff of
stellar calibre delivering every day on our UK strategic
objectives, focused and with an effectiveness and professionalism
that is second to none. It is a department that is dynamic in
character, pulsating with energy and proud, with state-of-the-art
equipment and underpinned by funding, to do the vital job we ask
of it.
I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and the noble
Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, for specifically seeking that
out, commenting on it and paying their tribute to our Armed
Forces, because I am very proud of all the people who contribute
to our defence capability. I pay tribute to them and, on behalf
of us all, I say to them: thank you.
14:20:00
(Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister and all those who
took part in today’s debate; it shows not only the interest of
those present but the spread of expertise. I agree with the noble
Baroness, Lady Smith, that it is up to us all to ensure that our
colleagues are encouraged to be present a little more on these
occasions, because by being so they would be able to hear from
those who have actually experienced work in the defence field. I
was extremely grateful that I had as one of the members of our
committee the noble and gallant Lord, , a fairly recent CDS, and he
was able to keep us on the straight and narrow—most of the time.
Today he made the critical point: in defence, you have to have
long-term plans and ambitions, you have to be able to balance
them against your assets now and in future, and the world changes
rapidly.
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, the road is moving on,
away from western dominance, and we all have to think of that
very carefully indeed, as my noble friend Lord Howell does when
he talks about the Commonwealth and other power blocs. With power
blocs, we immediately think of Russia and its illegal invasion of
Ukraine. I was taken to task by someone who is a friend, the
noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, for saying that it was in 2022. Of
course, we were thinking of the full-out, brutal attack on the
whole of Ukraine. It was appalling what happened in 2014. I had
just gone to the Foreign Office then as a Minister and I realised
how closely it was working with the MoD on our response. It was
important for Members today—I always think of them as
colleagues—to refer to soft power, such as the importance of
having military attachés. There is the work that my friend the
noble Lord, Lord Boating, has done on this matter with regard to
the threats across Africa, the interventions and investment by
Russia and China. We must have our eyes wide open about that, not
wide shut, and do something about it.
Throughout the debate, there was an atmosphere here not of being
critical but of providing a critique. That is exactly the right
kind of atmosphere, because we are all on the side of ensuring
that there is security for this country and the world in an
international order that is not rewritten by China. Above all, I
know we are united on the most special thing of all, which is
appreciation of and admiration for His Majesty’s Armed Forces,
our Armed Forces, and to them I say: thank you today, thank you
tomorrow.
Motion agreed.
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