UK Ambassador to the IAEA, Corinne Kitsell, gave a
statement on behalf of Australia, the UK and the US on their
co-operation on AUKUS nuclear naval propulsion.
Chair,
I have the honour of speaking on behalf of Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States on our effort through the AUKUS
partnership to determine the optimal pathway for Australia to
acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
Chair,
We are now more than one year into our 18-month initial
consultation period, and we are pleased with the progress made so
far.
Since the September Board meeting, senior officials and technical
experts have held further trilateral discussions in our capitals.
We have also continued to hold productive technical consultations
with the IAEA’s AUKUS taskforce and the IAEA
Secretariat in Vienna as we work to formulate a safeguards
approach that will meet the IAEA’s technical objectives. These
consultations are regular and ongoing, and they reflect the depth
of the AUKUS partners’ commitment to the nuclear
non-proliferation regime.
We remain resolutely committed to setting the highest possible
non-proliferation standards in relation to our co-operation on
the AUKUS endeavour, and we will continue to keep Member States
fully updated on our trilateral consultations with the IAEA.
Chair,
Sadly, there have been continued calls by some countries for the
Agency to suspend engagement with us until a separate mechanism
is established to discuss all aspects of AUKUS cooperation on
nuclear-powered submarines.
All Member States have the right to confidential discussions with
the IAEA Secretariat, and it is vital that the Agency remains the
impartial and independent technical authority on the
implementation of safeguards agreements. At the September Board,
the Director General reiterated his satisfaction with AUKUS
partners’ level of engagement to date, and reaffirmed the mandate
of the IAEA to engage with Member States on safeguards matters.
To reconfirm what we have set out at the Board on previous
occasions, Australia’s proposed naval nuclear propulsion
activities will occur within the framework of Australia’s
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol,
providing the firm legal basis on which the IAEA, through the
Director General and the Secretariat, is engaging with Australia
and AUKUS partners.
Chair,
We would like to briefly address the unfounded criticism that
certain members continue to repeat at this Board. As an example,
one distinguished delegate yesterday identified nine items on
which they claim the Director General is required to – and has
purportedly failed to – report with respect to AUKUS. In his
September report, the Director General explicitly stated that
Australia has “complied with its reporting obligations under its
CSA and AP, including those required under Modified Code 3.1 of
the Subsidiary Arrangements to its CSA.”
The Director General also confirmed that further reporting by
Australia at this time would be premature because Australia has
“informed the Agency that…no activities listed in Annex I of the
AP had either been conducted or were planned; no transfers of
equipment/material listed in Annex II of the AP had either taken
place or were planned; and no decision had been taken to
construct or otherwise acquire any nuclear reactor or other
nuclear facility in connection with AUKUS.”
Given we have repeatedly responded to these unfounded allegations
in previous meetings, we will not again refute them line by line.
However, we would like to make one point clear: Australia and the
AUKUS partners are fully compliant with their respective
safeguards obligations. Any assertions to the contrary are
without any factual or legal foundation.
Chair,
We will continue our engagement with the Agency over the coming
months, and we anticipate there will be further reports from the
Director General in the future upon which we look forward to
further discussions. We will continue to update the Board in
future, as appropriate.
