Oral answer (Lords) on
Police and Crime Commissioners and Panels
Asked by
To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of
the ability of Police and Crime Panels to hold Police and Crime
Commissioners to account.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office () (Con)
My Lords, the two-part police and crime commissioner review
considered the role of police and crime panels and concluded that
they have the appropriate powers to scrutinise police and crime
commissioners. However, the consistency and quality of this
scrutiny can vary. Recommendations arising from the review have
therefore focused on improving panels’ understanding of their
role, the application of their existing powers and strengthening
the professionalism and quality of the support provided to
panels.
(Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister. Does he agree that, to do their
core job of holding police and crime commissioners to
account—nobody else does it, least of all the Home Office, I am
afraid—it is necessary for a panel to be robust, challenging and
fair? Much depends on the approach, attitude and style of the
chair of the panel. Given the need for the public to have
confidence in the system, would the Government consider amending
the rules so that a chair of a police and crime panel cannot be
from the same political party as the police and crime
commissioner?
(Con)
As the noble Lord will be aware, the Government believe that
panels have the appropriate powers, agreed by Parliament, to
effectively scrutinise the actions and decisions of PCCs and
enable the public to therefore hold them to account. As I have
also just said, we concluded a two-part review. In part 1 we took
steps to improve and strengthen the scrutiny of PCCs by issuing
new guidance and a training package for panels. Through part 2 we
are undertaking a fundamental assessment of the panel support
model to further improve the professionalism, quality and
consistency of support provided to panels. I am very happy to
take the noble Lord’s suggestion on chairmen back as part of that
ongoing assessment.
(Con)
My Lords, should not the police and crime panel in Leicestershire
be urged to pass a vote of censure on the irresponsible PCC Mr
for paying some £100,000
per year for advice from Mr Mike Veale, a discredited policeman
who is facing a gross misconduct hearing? Could not that money
have been spent better on front-line policing?
(Con)
My Lords, it is not for me to comment on individual cases.
However, police and crime panels must refer serious complaints
and conduct matters to the Independent Office for Police Conduct.
Panels are responsible for resolving non-serious complaints made
about a PCC’s conduct when in office. Ultimate responsibility for
handling any complaints they have received remains with the
panel.
(LD)
My Lords, what assessment have the Government made of the
likelihood of members of police and crime panels asking difficult
questions of police and crime commissioners if they belong to the
same political party, bearing in mind that they will want a
police and crime commissioner from their own political party to
be re-elected? Is it not time to take party politics out of
policing?
(Con)
I would argue that it is about public accountability, not party
politics. We heard through part 1 of the PCC review that the
public cannot always easily access information on how well their
force is doing, which is obviously vital if they wish to hold
PCCs to account. The review therefore recommended that the
specified information order of 2011 was amended to require PCCs
to publish additional information. That came into force in May
2021. There is transparency and accountability in the system, and
rather more than under the old one.
(Con)
My Lords, I remember when the original police and crime
commissioners Bill went through the other place. Like other
parties in the Midlands, where I come from, I wonder whether the
role now pursued by police and crime commissioners is what was
originally conceived. Given that worry, is it not time perhaps to
have an overall look at the role of our police and crime
commissioners?
(Con)
It is fair to say that the role has evolved to some extent.
Whether it is appropriate to have an overall review is already
under discussion.
(GP)
My Lords, before the Government introduced police and crime
commissioners, we had police and crime panels, just as we now
have to oversee the police and crime commissioners. If that
system was so bad that we needed to introduce police and crime
commissioners, who cost a huge amount of money and whose ability
is variable, why do we now have police and crime panels to
oversee them?
(Con)
I made it clear that there is a transparency and accountability
issue. I am grateful to my friend , the Sussex police and crime
commissioner. She tells me that PCCs are more visible and
approachable than the police authorities that they replaced. Many
hold monthly accountability meetings with their chief constable,
often online, which the public can attend and contribute to.
(Lab)
My Lords, surely the ultimate test of the PCC system and the
panels is whether policing has improved as a result of the
legislation that the Government brought in. Surely the general
concern about the overall performance of police forces is an
indication that the system is not working.
(Con)
I am obviously aware of the noble Lord’s long engagement with
this subject, but I do not agree; there are lots of reasons why
things have happened.
(Con)
My Lords, I will be perhaps a little unhelpful to my noble friend
and say that I quite agree with the noble Lord, . Trust in the police has
measurably declined in recent years. My noble friend’s
predecessors have stood at that Dispatch Box and talked about the
former chief constable of Wiltshire and commissioners of police
in the London Met, and we have had endless examples of where the
system is going wrong. Whatever system we have set up for this,
is it not ultimately the Government’s responsibility to sort this
out and restore trust in the police? Without that, we cannot
trust in justice.
(Con)
I thank my noble friend for his helpful question. It is of course
up to the Government, and we talked about last week’s Casey
review at some length in the Chamber. The Government are doing a
lot to restore confidence in the police, and of course the police
also have a responsibility to do so, as Sir Mark Rowley has
said.
(Lab)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, , said, is there not example
after example, across the country, of police and crime panels
failing to hold chief constables and commissioners to account?
Instead of the Government having review after review, is it not
about time that police and crime panels were given the teeth to
hold commissioners to account and, in that way, restore
confidence to policing? If the Minister is so confident of the
work of the police and crime panels, will he place in the Library
a list of examples of where they have worked?
(Con)
The Government are confident that the panels have the appropriate
powers—agreed by Parliament, as I said—to effectively scrutinise
the actions and decisions of PCCs and enable the public to hold
them to account. Through the review process, we agreed that this
scrutiny was inconsistent in some cases, and significant measures
have been taken to do something about that. These include
extensive engagement with members of the panels, which has proved
popular; indeed, there are requests for more of that
engagement.
(Con)
My Lords, at the risk of asking another unhelpful question, I say
that the noble Lord, , and the noble Baroness, Lady
Jones of Moulsecoomb, are on to something about the imperfections
of the panels. But why not replace them with a really powerful
body that could fire the police and crime commissioners just like
that? We could call it the electorate. Is that not the strongest
accountability of all?
(Con)
Actually, that is a helpful question, because the electorate do
of course have ultimate responsibility for the election of the
PCCs. I am pleased to say that the electorate seem to be becoming
more enthusiastic about the elections: turnout has increased
every year. Obviously that is not determined by a single factor,
but it is going up.
(Lab)
My Lords, the Minister’s definition of “enthusiasm” is certainly
different from some that I could suggest. One of the main
purposes of the whole system of police and crime commissioners
was to get closer engagement between the public and policing.
With three rounds of police and crime commissioners elections
having taken place, the turnout has varied between poor and
abysmal. Clearly, they are not fulfilling one of the key reasons
for their having been established, so what is the point of
them?
(Con)
I have answered the question about the point. I have the turnout
figures: in 2012, it was 15.1%; in 2016, it was 27.4%; and in
2021, it was 33.9%. We cheerfully accept that those are not the
greatest numbers—certainly not relative to national
elections—but, in a local context, they are not bad.
(Con)
In most democratic contexts, they are pretty awful numbers. Did
my noble friend see the report in the Times this morning quoting
the chief constable of the West Midlands, in which he expressed
great concern that crime figures were being inflated by including
so-called intimidatory gestures, which resulted in no charges but
created a fair amount of bureaucracy? Could this be something
that the police and crime commissioners are asked to look into as
a matter of urgency?
(Con)
I absolutely think that it is, but police and crime commissioners
are of course answerable to their electorate, so it depends on
the electorate’s priorities. I imagine that the electorate of the
West Midlands would share my noble friend’s concerns.
Question for Short
Debate (Lords) on Police and Crime Commissioners
Asked by
To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to review
the powers and functions of police and crime commissioners.
(Con)
My Lords, I have two objectives. The first is to draw together
and reiterate a number of concerns which I have raised in
speeches and in Oral Questions and Written Questions over the
last four years. My concerns relate to misconduct in three of the
areas where police and crime commissioners are elected under
current arrangements—Wiltshire, Leicestershire and Cleveland.
My second objective is to take the Government to task for doing
nothing to bear down on the cases of misconduct which have given
rise to my long-standing concerns. Regarding the Government, I
have tried hard to make some progress by seeking a discussion
with the Home Secretary. In an Oral Question on 18 July, I asked
for a meeting to be arranged which a small group, drawn from
across the House, could attend. I got in touch with a few Members
in the opposition parties and on the Cross Benches to see whether
they could take part. Unsurprisingly, ministerial changes
complicated and delayed matters over the summer, but towards the
end of last month, I enlisted the help of my noble friend in finally fixing a
date for the long-awaited meeting. On 26 September, he told me
that he would pursue the matter, adding,
“I will come back to you as soon as I can.”
I have heard nothing further from him.
However, I have heard from his private office, which sent me the
following email on 18 October:
“Thought I would provide an update now that we are post recess. I
have reached out to the Home Secretary’s office again and due to
her increasingly busy schedule she will be unable to commit to a
meeting.”
The House will understand that my hopes of securing action by the
Government have not been strengthened, rather it seems clearer
than ever that the Government will continue to stand idly by in
the face of my serious concerns. This debate is their opportunity
to prove me wrong.
All this is very dispiriting, so let me make it plain that in
using the limited time available to me to express worries and
anxieties about specific issues, I cast no aspersions on the many
police and crime commissioners, connected or unconnected with a
political party, who are serving their communities with devotion
and success. Since this year marks the 10th anniversary of the
introduction of elected police and crime commissioners, it would
be wrong not to pay tribute to what they have achieved, while at
the same time expressing a little regret that they have not
become better known and brought the system of which they are part
widespread popularity. Opinion polls suggest that nearly half the
country have never heard of them.
Here is another matter on which the Government could usefully
exert themselves. If they took a sustained interest in the work
of the commissioners, and made speeches about it, the public’s
knowledge would increase. They have rejected other chances to
show an interest in police and crime commissioners. If the noble
Lord, , had been able to take part in
this debate, he would have mentioned a report by his Committee on
Standards in Public Life about police and crime commissioners.
The report has been completely ignored by the Home Office.
The deep concerns that I mentioned at the outset are all
connected with one person, Mike Veale. I have referred to him
many times in the House over the years. He is at the centre of an
issue of deep injustice. He is not a man lacking in regard for
himself. In self-promoting publicity, he states, regarding his
year as chief constable of Cleveland, a post from which he was
forced to resign in 2019:
“I was responsible for the development and delivery of a
compelling strategic vision … I am able to operate within my
ethical and moral boundaries without compromising my values and
integrity.”
His record tells a rather different story.
I first became aware of Mr Veale when, in 2015, as chief
constable of Wiltshire and in charge of Operation Conifer, he
sent officers to go through all Sir Edward Heath’s voluminous
papers in the Bodleian Library, in the hope of finding evidence
to show that the deceased statesman was guilty of the child sex
crimes alleged by the notorious fantasist, Carl Beech, who is now
serving a long prison sentence.
Veale said he was convinced that Sir Edward was “120 per cent
guilty”. One of his senior officers stood outside Sir Edward’s
house and appealed for witnesses against him. Veale destroyed his
mobile telephone and so concealed its contents. Unable to
substantiate any of the allegations against Sir Edward, he left
seven of them open, neither proved nor disproved, in an obvious
attempt to save face. Not a shred of evidence has been adduced to
support any of these allegations against a public servant of
immense distinction.
The then PCC for Wiltshire, Mr , said that he would
establish an independent inquiry into Operation Conifer, but then
changed his mind and called on the Government to set it up. The
Government accepted that they had the power to intervene, the one
exception to their normal Pontius Pilate stance, but then refused
to use it. They say today that there is no need for them to do
anything because Operation Conifer has now been carefully
scrutinised. That was the line they took when writing in July to
, a former Cabinet Minister
who has now retired from the House, in reply to a letter from him
sent to the Home Office one year—I repeat, one year—earlier.
That was no answer at all. Conifer has been scrutinised by the
police themselves, not by an independent body. The Wiltshire PCC
even allowed Veale to set up his own hand-picked scrutiny panel.
Thanks to the Wiltshire PCC and a supine Home Office, Veale was
left to transgress elsewhere. His brief stint as chief constable
for Cleveland was investigated by the Independent Office for
Police Conduct. After two years—things rarely move swiftly where
police misconduct is concerned—the IOPC found in 2021 that Veale
had
“breached standards of professional behaviour”.
On 2 August last year, the PCC for Cleveland announced that Veale
would be referred “shortly” to an independent panel, where he
would face gross misconduct proceedings. It is a legal
requirement that such proceedings begin within 100 days, yet, by
my rather shaky calculations, time ran out for Veale on 11
November last year. Very nearly 12 months later, proceedings have
yet to begin.
During this period, Veale has been raking in an annual salary of
some £100,000 as adviser to the so-called Conservative PCC for
Leicestershire, one . He must have taken
instruction in the school of ethics. On 7 March,
the noble Lord, , asked the then Minster, the
noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford:
“Does she accept that, in many areas of public and private life,
persons against whom serious allegations are made are suspended
from their office, employment or other contributions to public
life while an investigation is conducted? Why is that not
happening here?”—[Official Report, 7/2/22; col. 1120.]
The answer he was given bore no relation to the question.
Answers, the Government say, must be sought not from them but
from the relevant police and crime commissioners, so a
public-spirited person, well known to me, has been doing just
that. He has asked Mr Matthews several times to justify employing
the discredited Veale. On 9 August last year, Matthews’s casework
officer replied. Veale, she said, was being employed for six
months. She added that
“it is important to note that he is currently not in breach of
any misconduct regulations. The investigation is ongoing, and it
would therefore be inappropriate to comment on anything in
relation to that at this time”.
All further requests for a proper explanation were ignored until
last month, when the same words were sent again, preceded by the
following:
“This matter was discussed at the Police and Crime Panel for
Leicestershire.”
Why was Veale still there long after the expiry of the six-month
arrangement? To that, there was silence.
Is Cleveland more open and accountable? Not exactly. The PCC was
asked in July why Veale’s misconduct hearing had not started. An
executive assistant in his office replied:
“I have spoken to the Police & Crime Commissioner , and he has advised me this
is currently being reviewed by our Chief Executive.”
In October, she was asked whether the review had been completed.
The person who could supply an answer was on annual leave. She
said:
“I will speak to her upon her return to the office and send you
an update with regard to the review.”
At this rate, Veale will retire on a fat pension, and never
answer for his misconduct.
What is needed is a Minister at the Home Office who will
challenge the well-entrenched attitude in it that PCCs should be
left entirely to their own devices, as if they constituted a
separate estate of the realm. It is an attitude that makes
effective accountability impossible. That accountability is not
going to come from the small number of local electors who take an
interest in the work of PCCs. Who but the elected Government is
going to stop the offices of PCCs fobbing off inquirers with
feeble and totally inadequate answers?
8.10pm
(Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, , for securing this short
debate. I agree with his every word. I want to stress that I
still support the idea of police and crime commissioners
representing the public of a police force area in their
relationship with the police, holding chief constables to account
and performing a vital community and partnership role. As the
noble Lord, , said, there are some superb
examples of PCCs and their achievements. However, my support
nowadays is sometimes sorely tested. The speech by the noble
Lord, , has added to my concerns.
As for the Veale case, this is a truly astonishing position. He
was brought in to be my successor’s main adviser; got rid of all
the others on day one, with a number of substantial contracts;
and is facing a gross misconduct charge, still not decided,
although it should have been decided in 100 days. Of course, he
should have been suspended pending the tribunal decision, as
normally happens in public life. This happened to a Minister from
the other place just a few weeks ago during the Truss Government.
He was immediately suspended from the Conservative Party,
awaiting the result of an inquiry. That was the appropriate way
to do it. I repeat the question: why has that not happened here,
and why has the Home Office not insisted on it?
What has upset me as much has been what I describe as the
masterful inactivity by my successor as police and crime
commissioner for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland a couple
of months ago, when there was much-publicised violence and
trouble between minority communities in my city of Leicester.
Surely it should be the priority of every police and crime
commissioner to intervene and do what they can to prevent, stop
and sort out community unrest of this nature by decreasing
tensions, talking to the various leaders and bringing people
together.
A prominent and senior Conservative asked me why I was staying
silent on this. He said, “What is the point of police and crime
commissioners anywhere if they do not act in such a situation as
there was in Leicester a couple of months ago?” I agree with that
senior Conservative. Given that, in my time, I had a deputy who
understood the inner city, I believe that I and every other
police and crime commissioner would have acted at once.
Unfortunately, my successor did not, and a number of senior
people of all kinds have confirmed what I am saying. Frankly,
apart from a brief statement and a silent attendance at a
post-troubles meeting with the city mayor, he kept out of it,
finding displacement activities. Indeed, he was in London when
the Home Secretary visited Leicester. That is just an
example.
It pains me to say so, but this behaviour obviously gives police
and crime commissioners a bad name. Being photographed endlessly
enjoying tea and cake in beautiful Leicestershire villages is,
frankly, no substitute for doing your job, and no excuse for not
doing the hard grind, with the disappointments and the moments of
success. That is what police and crime commissioners are elected
to do, and most do it. If they choose not to do their job,
particularly when it is difficult, who can blame the public for
rejecting the system in place altogether?
I am sorry that I have had to say what I have said today, but I
feel it strongly. I really think that it is time that the Home
Office took an interest in this.
8.15pm
The Lord
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, , for securing this debate and
setting out for us with his habitual clarity the issues at hand.
I am particularly saddened to hear that the good name of a
distinguished former Prime Minister, Sir Edward Heath, has been
traduced in the way that the noble Lord has described. However, I
wish to approach this debate with a different focus.
Any hierarchy, any delivery of service, any public-facing
organisation is fraught with multiple expectations and with the
frailties and capacities of those who lead. For instance,
diocesan bishops have wide discretion but are constrained by
resource, custom, law, synodical structures and vocation.
The issues around effective delivery and of accountability in
policing are very old. Historically, constables were at the
direction of magistrates, who continued to sit on watch
committees and police authorities until recent times. However,
the growth in the size of forces and their operational complexity
fuelled a sense of operational independence, away from political
interference and amateur direction. It also allowed for
co-operation at a national level where crime issues crossed
county borders. Direct local accountability was seen to threaten
professionalism, and it threatened the fight against crime
nationally.
However, a police service insufficiently accountable fostered a
culture apart from public concerns. In some places, it allowed
corruption to be covered up and prejudices to become ingrained,
and performance to become unchallenged. The alternatives, it
seems, were national direction or local accountability, and the
Government in 2011 opted for the latter by sweeping away local
police authorities and replacing them, as we have heard, with
directly elected police and crime commissioners.
Of the several commentaries on the progress of this innovation,
the research commissioned by the National Police Chiefs’ Council
in 2018 bordered on the excoriating. The more recent article by
Simon Cooper in the journal Policing is more nuanced. It provides
evidence for the sort of direct accountability and scrutiny the
Government hoped for and for greater efficiency of action, but
there is concern over idiosyncrasy of decisions, the increase in
the removal of chief constables and the reluctance of suitable
applicants to replace them.
This brings me to the special case of Dame Cressida Dick, who
announced on 10 February this year that she would step aside as
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis in the midst of
publicly expressed concerns about recent actions by the force. My
thoughts on the matter are in no way related to the merits or
otherwise of how the then commissioner carried out her role. Like
others, however, I am concerned at the deficits in the process of
removing her, identified by Sir Tom Winsor in his report of 24
August on her resignation, which was commissioned by the then
Home Secretary—I have lost track of which one.
According to the former Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of
Constabulary, Dame Cressida was informed that morning that the
mayor would publicly announce that same afternoon his lack of
confidence and intention to begin the statutory process of
removal. She had until then to act, and chose to go. The mayor,
for whom I have a good deal of respect—in fact, a very great
regard—has alluded to an “apparent degree of bias” in the report.
There are questions about leadership and protection of the
Metropolitan Police, but it remains the case that the process set
down in Section 48 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility
Act 2011 was not followed. The commissioner was not suspended.
The commissioner was not formally informed of an intention that
she should retire or resign and was given no opportunity to
respond, and the Home Secretary’s consent was not obtained to
remove her. Virtue lies in following agreed procedures when it is
inconvenient to do so, not just when it is easy, especially when
one is talking about a service which, in turn, is about ensuring
law and order. I remain saddened and disappointed that this
happened in this way.
There is some merit in examining a revision of the regulations
applying to police and crime commissioners and mayors under the
Act, or a code of practice on its operation, and I hope the
Minister might indicate some willingness move in that
direction.
8.21pm
(CB)
My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, , on obtaining this debate, and
on his speech, and I congratulate the noble Lord, , on his. They clearly illustrated
that there are serious problems with the current regime of the
governance of the police, but there is nothing new in this. The
governance of the police has always been difficult. In the middle
of the last century the chief constable of Worcester was jailed
for fraud. There were terrible problems with watch committees. We
set up a royal commission on the police, and it pointed, in some
very wise words, to the issues: that the police should be
powerful but not oppressive; they should be efficient but not
officious; and they should form an impartial force in the body
politic, and yet be subject to a degree of control by persons who
are not required to be impartial and who themselves are liable to
police supervision. That encapsulates, as only royal commissions
can do, the difficult issues.
However, since the police authorities regime was reformed under
the guidance of that royal commission, two things have happened
which transformed the position and necessitated change in the
form of the introduction of police and crime commissioners. The
first was the enormous growth in the power of the chief
constable. This, like all changes that do not occur through
legislation, occurred imperceptibly, and there is no doubt that
by the early part of the current century chief constables were
too powerful and needed a more effective body than the police
authorities. Secondly, there had been a change in the power of
the police. It used to be our view that the police ought to have
just a little bit more power than the ordinary citizen. I am
afraid that, with the Criminal Law Act 1967, we departed from
that very long tradition of our constitution and gave the police
enormous powers.
So, these two forces required reform. I do not want to criticise
the change that was introduced by the introduction of police and
crime commissioners. In the period where I dealt quite
extensively with them, they did, on the whole, a very good job.
But we have never really stood back, and this is why I so much
welcome what the noble Lords, and , have said.
There are now enough problems that we ought to have a proper
review. I know that the Home Secretary has many other matters on
her mind, but what about an independent review? I dare not
suggest a royal commission—those are so wholly out of fashion; I
just raise a number of points that require us to look at them
again. First, is the way the office of police and crime
commissioner is set up sensible? Not being a politician, I have
always thought that the genius of our system was that politicians
had a permanent office behind them that provided a degree of
guidance: that there was some institution that could ensure
continuity. Should not the police and crime commissioners have
some sort of established office that supports them, and that has
the protection of a permanent Civil Service?
Secondly—we have not thought about this enough—the police now
have extensive powers to impose sanctions. They started with
police cautions. Then, penalty notices were introduced, which
were fine for things such as speeding, but no one has reflected
properly on the extent of the problems of accountability. There
was a public investigation by the police into very senior civil
servants and Ministers, and yet the decision was made by the
police, in an unreasoned way, as to what they did or did not do.
It epitomises the growth in the use of the police as a punishing
body—a body entitled to decide issues of justice—that we do not
have a mechanism of accountability.
As I tried to point out during consideration of what I call the
“police et cetera” Act—the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts
Act 2022—one of the defects is that there is nothing to provide a
mechanism for supervising the penalty notices. Then, there is the
problem of who holds the chief constable to account for
operational matters, in so far as you can distinguish that from
policy. Then, there is the whole question of the use of the
police and crime commissioners in relation to criminal justice
boards. I could go on and on. Of course, there is also the
problem of Wales but I will not go into that tonight; that is too
complicated an issue for police and crime commissioners.
All I am saying is that there is plenty of evidence that we need
to look at this again, but we need to think of broader issues
than these particular cases; they are the symptoms. We need to do
everything with a proper regard to our constitutional rights, and
acknowledge that the governance of the police is an intractable
and difficult issue that has lived with us for a very long
time.
8.27pm
(GP)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, , on getting this debate. It is
an interesting topic that we will keep coming back to, because we
are facing legislation that will inevitably drag it to the
fore.
In November 2011, the then Home Secretary made the Policing Protocol
Order, which stated:
“The establishment of PCCs has allowed the Home Office to
withdraw from day-to-day policing matters, giving the police
greater freedom to fight crime as they see fit, and allowing
local communities to hold the police to account.”
The idea was that the public should have a direct say over
policing in their area. I do not think that has happened.
Although the old police authorities may not have been the ideal
system, they were certainly more accessible by the average
person. I was a councillor for four very long years and in my
experience, people found it very easy to speak to me directly.
They would stop me in the street, in the shops or in my front
garden, and they were able to give me straight feedback on
anything they were concerned about. When one has one person in a
role of this kind, it is much harder to speak to them and to
communicate. Police authorities probably worked much better and
were probably more accountable.
I was on a police authority here in London for 12 years, from its
start to its finish. It was a fascinating experience for somebody
like me. I was possibly one of the rare types who went to
protests and things like that, but not completely. We were an
incredibly diverse bunch—a lot of elected people but also experts
in various fields. It worked extremely well. We respected the
successive police commissioners, but we also challenged them; we
made them answer to us for their decisions. I think it worked
extremely well.
At the moment PCCs can hire and fire police chief constables, who
continue to manage things day to day. They also set the police
budget and the police precept. They write the area’s policing
plan and commission a range of crime-related services such as
victim support. That is a very big job, and the PCCs I have
spoken to need quite a lot of office help to make those things
happen. Clearly, there have been many hiccups. One big problem
that I have seen several times is that the chief constable
resents the police and crime commissioner, and any breakdown in
that relationship makes it incredibly difficult for the PCC to do
their job properly.
In March this year the Home Office produced a report on a
consultation it had done on giving PCCs greater powers of
competence. The consultation had a staggering 84 responses—I am
sure that all the groups that responded were very important—and
the majority felt that PCCs should have more power. More scrutiny
and accountability was also discussed. The police and crime
commissioner review has considered options to strengthen the
accountability and transparency of PCCs to ensure that the public
can effectively hold them to account for the exercise of their
functions. Given that the public find it difficult to hold them
to account now, I guess that will be welcome.
Luckily, the end of the report states:
“We require primary legislation to provide PCCs with these wider
powers. We will seek to implement the measures through the next
appropriate legislative vehicle.”
So we lucky Peers will get the chance to debate this and suggest
improvements. I rather think, given the nature of the debate
today, that there might be a lot of amendments in the making.
8.31pm
(LD)
My Lords, I too am grateful to the noble Lord, , for securing this debate.
Liberal Democrats are in favour of greater police accountability
but the system of police and crime commissioners appears to be
broken, as the examples provided by other noble Lords have
demonstrated.
Much criticism has been levelled at police leadership in recent
years. We have seen justified criticism of the lack of Home
Office involvement in the development and selection of the most
senior police officers. Gone is the previous requirement that no
chief constable be appointed without experience as an assistant
chief constable or deputy in another force. Gone is the Home
Office assessment of the suitability of candidates, including the
grading of candidates for promotion. Instead, chief constables
can appoint their own senior officers and PCCs can select their
own chief constables—almost always the incumbent deputy.
Competition for chief officer posts in forces has all but
evaporated, given the belief that the incumbent will always be
selected, having developed a relationship with his or her police
and crime commissioner. As we saw in the Wiltshire Constabulary
case of the investigation of Sir Edward Heath, and as the noble
Lord, , has said, the PCC failed to
launch an investigation into his own chief constable, and the
Home Office then failed to hold either the chief constable or the
PCC to account. Under the old tripartite system of Home Office,
police authority and chief constable, the Home Secretary could
and did overrule the police authority, but, because PCCs are
allegedly democratically elected, they can be held to account
only every four years by the electorate.
I say “allegedly” for a number of reasons. In places like
Wiltshire there is an inbuilt Conservative Party majority. An
Electoral Commission report in 2016 found that 72% of the
electorate knew not very much or nothing at all about police and
crime commissioners. With PCC elections costing £50 million a go,
plus two by-elections so far—and on the last count only a 33%
turnout, with voters clearly voting along party lines in most
places—this is a very poor example of democracy. I understand
that there are no independent police and crime commissioners
left. The Home Office has abdicated responsibility for policing,
placing it on police and crime commissioners who are dubiously
elected on small turnouts, based on little or no public
awareness, with voters voting along traditional party-political
lines.
Placing too much power into the hands of one individual—in this
case police and crime commissioners —creates the potential for
other accountability issues. We saw this in Avon and Somerset,
where inappropriate behaviour towards women was alleged against a
chief constable. Vulnerable victims came forward and a case put
to the police and crime commissioner, who then allegedly passed
the details to the chief constable concerned, including details
of the victims. While the chief constable was eventually forced
to resign and has subsequently had his Queen’s Police Medal
“cancelled and annulled” by the Queen, the police and crime
commissioner remained in place.
The problem with the whole system of police and crime
commissioners can be summed up by the current situation in the
Metropolitan Police, which was placed into special measures by
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue
Services, the subject of a damning report by the noble Baroness,
Lady Casey, with the Government blaming the de facto police and
crime commissioner, and the police and crime commissioner blaming
the Home Office, with the public confused as to where
responsibility lies, and no one being held to account.
Liberal Democrats want police boards with similar powers to PCCs,
composed primarily of local authority members, to replace police
and crime commissioners. Representing a broad cross-section of
constituencies and political parties, minority groups and ideas,
and having responsibility for the overall funding and provision
of local services, not just the police precept, most if not all
of the problems with the existing system of police and crime
commissioners could be overcome. At the very least, as the noble
and learned Lord, , said, there are
now so many problems with police and crime commissioners that a
review is necessary, if not their removal and replacement.
8.36pm
(Lab)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, , on achieving this debate. His
remarks were of concern to all of us. I have no doubt that, like
him, we are waiting for the Minister’s response to that. The
noble Lord, , raised similar concerns, and
they deserve real answers and real steps to be taken to address
them so that we are not here in six months debating the same
thing. We are concerned to hear those remarks again: it
undermines the whole PCC system. They might all be individual
cases, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, but
individual cases undermine the whole system if we are not
careful, and they need to be addressed and dealt with.
The creation of PCCs was to increase public accountability, due
to a belief that police authorities were not working
well—although some police authorities worked really well; I heard
the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—and that a new
structure of accountability was needed. There was a belief that
the public were shut out of decisions with respect to the
policing of their own communities and that something had to be
done. Of course, the policy debate that then takes place is about
what that is. How do you give the public a say without
interfering with the operational independence of the police? That
was the establishment of the police and crime commissioner reform
that the Government took forward. The idea was a sort of
compromise, and led to an individual accountable to a police and
crime panel holding the chief constable to account. Various
problems have emerged, and the Government themselves have
recognised them and undertaken to conduct a part 1 and part 2
review. It would be helpful if the Minister could give us some
idea of the Government’s thinking, following on from those
reviews.
The creation of PCCs was to increase public accountability but
there is still a complete lack of public understanding about the
role. What is being done by the Government to increase
understanding of the role—how PCCs interact with the chief
constable, and how the police and crime panels work and hold
police and crime commissioners to account? On democratic
accountability, what is being done to increase the turnout for
PCC elections? The average was 33.2% across all PCC elections in
2021, with turnout generally higher in Wales; I mention that to
the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. Why was that? In Durham,
the turnout was 16.9%. What work have the Government done to try
to understand the differences in electoral turnout between
different areas, what can be done, and whether there are any
lessons to be learned about that?
The noble Lord, , spoke about the complaints
and misconduct processes. Earlier this month the review by the
noble Baroness, Lady Casey, found grave failings in the
misconduct processes in the Metropolitan Police. We need urgent
action, not only in the Met but to overhaul the whole police
misconduct system. What are the Government doing in working with
PCCs to look at a national reform of the misconduct process and
see what can be done about that? If we do nothing, it leads to
the sort of example that the noble Lord, , spoke to us about.
How is best practice to be spread? Some PCCs, as noble Lords have
said, have done brilliant and innovative work and made a huge
difference in their area. Some police and crime panels work
really well. What are the Government doing to spread that good
practice? How are they trying to ensure that some of the
worst-performing areas are brought up to the level of the
best?
In every area, what we all seek to do is to make a police and
crime commissioner system work. I agree with my noble friend
that it was an attempt to do
something about a lack of democratic accountability. Many people
have had faith in police and crime commissioners but are
concerned about the way that they have operated. The Government
have been slow in responding to the criticism and in coming
forward with their own ideas. What we seem to get is a review
reviewing the review that took place, whereas what people are
demanding is action and reform. The police and crime
commissioners, and the police of this country, deserve that.
One of the greatest problems facing us, as we have said before to
the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, is the undermining of public
confidence in the police. That is a huge concern to all of us
across this Chamber. One way which could take us forward in
dealing with it is to help police and crime commissioners work to
provide the link they were supposed to provide between the public
and the police. The system has not worked in the way that the
Government would have expected or that all of us would have hoped
but, by grasping the nettle of reform and listening to some of
the criticisms and not simply objecting to them, the Government
could and should find a way forward which would command support
across the House.
8.42pm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office () (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their
contributions and very much congratulate my noble friend as well on securing this
important debate. I know that the topic has long been of interest
to him, and a wide range of views have been expressed relating to
the roles and responsibilities of police and crime commissioners
this evening. I ought to remind the noble Lord, , that the policy was
introduced under the coalition Government. I do not believe that
the model is broken, but I will come on to that in a second.
I also reassure my noble friend that I am certainly not idle,
but he may have noticed that I have had three bosses since he
wrote his letter. I am still busily asking for the meeting that
he requested. My predecessor asked for that meeting, which I am
afraid was denied, but I will continue to persevere.
Before I get on to the bulk of the more general points, perhaps I
may go into Operation Conifer to answer my noble friend Lord
Lexden’s specific questions about that unfortunate case.
Obviously I understand the strength of feeling on this matter.
However, the Government have no plans to commission a review of
either the conduct of the investigation into allegations made
against Sir Edward Heath or the findings of that investigation.
It is unfortunate, of course, that Operation Conifer was not able
to resolve conclusively the position in respect of all the
allegations made against Sir Edward Heath. I understand the
desire of noble Lords to find a solution but the investigation
has already been subject to considerable external scrutiny. I
will go into that in a bit of detail.
There were three main bits of scrutiny. First, there was an
independent scrutiny panel—I stress “independent”—to ensure
proportionality. Secondly, there were two reviews by Operation
Hydrant in September 2016 and May 2017, which concluded that the
investigation was proportionate, legitimate and in accordance
with national guidance. Thirdly, there was a review in January
2017 by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary as to whether
resources assigned to the investigation by the Home Office were
deployed in accordance with value-for-money principles; the
review concluded that they were. Finally, the Wiltshire PCC then
referred two matters regarding Mike Veale to the IOPC. That is a
lot of external scrutiny, if we are being objective about
this.
I am going to talk more generally about the police and crime
commissioner model and try to answer all noble Lords’ specific
points. We accept that policing is a unique public service, but
like any public service—I think all noble Lords acknowledge
this—it needs to be transparent and accountable to the public.
The introduction of PCCs in 2012 has brought real local
accountability to how chief constables and their forces perform,
ensuring that the public have a stronger voice in policing.
I say to the noble Lord, , that I have no particular
knowledge of his successor; I do not know him, and I do not know
what he has been doing in Leicester. I would have thought that,
given what the noble Lord has said about him tonight, he is very
accountable to his public. If he has behaved as described, then
he deserves what is coming to him. PCCs operate in the full gaze
of the media and must justify their record via the ballot box.
This is in stark contrast to the invisible and unaccountable
police authorities that preceded them. I will go on a little bit
until we get to the review, then I will talk a little about
complaints.
We are approaching the 10-year anniversary of their introduction
and we think it is important to recognise the vital role that
PCCs play in the public safety landscape. They work with their
communities to focus on local priorities, using their convening
powers to drive crime-fighting efforts in their areas and
advocate for victims across the criminal justice system. PCCs
have a strong involvement in work to tackle some of the most
significant issues facing our society, including county lines,
anti-social behaviour and violence against women and girls. There
are lots of examples of that. I will go back to one from my
friend , the PCC in Sussex. She points
out that 10 years ago, for example, only 20% of police and crime
plans referenced prevention and now it is included in all police
and crime plans. That is a direct, positive feature of the
introduction of police and crime commissioners.
I will go on to the review, which the noble and learned Lord,
, the noble
Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, , referred to. It is vital that
PCCs continue to be strong and visible leaders in the fight
against crime. That is why in July 2020 the Government announced
a two-part review into PCCs to strengthen their role, to ensure
that they are accountable to the public and that they have the
tools and levers to carry out their role effectively.
Recommendations from parts 1 and 2 were announced by Written
Ministerial Statement in March 2021 and 2022 respectively.
These measures will sharpen local accountability and improve the
consistency and quality of scrutiny by police and crime panels,
as we were talking about earlier, and make it easier for the
public to hold their PCC to account for their record on reducing
crime. They will also ensure that PCCs have the necessary tools
and levers to cut crime and will turn the dial on their
involvement in the criminal justice system, giving PCCs a more
defined role in relation to offender management and strengthening
their role in key local partnerships. Of course, the proof will
be in the pudding. That is why we have retained a relentless
focus on delivery to realise the benefits of these important
recommendations as quickly as possible. We have moved to
multi-year violence reduction unit funding to facilitate
long-term preventative strategies, better enabling PCCs to
develop long-term strategies for reducing crime in their
locality.
We have amended the specified information order to improve PCCs’
transparency by requiring them to provide a narrative on the
Government’s crime outcomes, their force’s His Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services
performance reports and further complaint-handling information.
We have also strengthened the scrutiny of PCCs by publishing new
guidance for police and crime panels, including a variety of
training tools such as videos, good-practice guides and sharing
best practice, as referred to by the noble Lord, . Also under discussion, and
which I probably should have mentioned earlier in Questions, are
regional panels. These are being looked at in terms of the police
and crime panels as a way of ensuring that best practice is
shared.
I take the point that publicity around the role of PCCs could be
improved. I am going to get to the subject of the relationship
between PCCs and chief constables. It would be important to
answer the right reverend Prelate’s concerns and the question of
the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about the breakdown in
communication and trust between those two roles. For a PCC to
deliver to the community they serve, they need to have a strong
working relationship with their chief constable. That has to
recognise the operational independence of policing but also the
local mandate of the PCC to deliver on local priorities.
The right reverend Prelate referred to the situation with Dame
Cressida Dick. During the debate on the review of the noble
Baroness, Lady Casey, a week ago, I referred—at some length, I am
afraid—to the mayor and MOPAC’s complex relationship with the
Home Secretary in regard to this. I refer noble Lords to that in
Hansard. On the point made by the noble Lord, , I do not think that anyone is
blaming anyone; it is a complex relationship, and the lines
unfortunately crossed on a number of occasions.
Through the PCC review, we heard loud and clear the need for
clarification of the working relationships between policing
system partners. This is one of the primary reasons why we
consulted on the Policing Protocol Order 2011—I note the point of
the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—to ensure that we are able to
support effective and constructive working relationships in the
policing sector as well as possible. These responses are
currently being considered, and we will update in due course.
We are also working with the sector to further develop the
existing PCC and chief constable accountability guidance, which
is designed to embed healthy working relationships between PCCs
and chief constables, as well as outlining a framework for
mediation for relationships that may be at risk of breaking down.
We will also bring forward legislative amendments to make the
chief constable suspension and dismissal process more rigorous
and transparent, which in turn will make it fairer, ensuring that
the chief constable has a voice.
I take the point about chief officer recruitment, which a number
of noble Lords referred to. We want to ensure that there is a
wide, well-rounded and diverse pool of candidates for appointment
to chief officer ranks. We also want to ensure that there are
consistent and high standards in selection processes. We welcome
the College of Policing’s proposals for fundamental change to the
current system, following a full independent review of
progression and development to chief officer ranks. These
measures will increase transparency and open up access to senior
officer level development.
We continue to engage with local areas developing devolution
deals to expand the mayoral PCC model, in line with the
Government’s wider devolution and levelling-up agenda, and we
have published our response to the consultation on giving PCCs
greater powers of competence.
Time allows me to talk a little about the PCC complaints process,
to which my noble friend referred. Our announcement of
the PCC review recommendations did not make specific
recommendations on the PCC complaints system, and we are still
committed to developing reforms in this area. This includes
ensuring that there is clarity on what constitutes misconduct or
a breach of expected standards by PCCs, deciding which body is
best placed to handle certain types of complaints, ensuring that
the system does not give rise to vexatious complaints and
ensuring the effective handling of criminal allegations against
PCCs.
(Con)
What do the Government plan to do to prevent serious misconduct
hearings being indefinitely delayed, as has happened in
Cleveland? What will the Government do to get clear answers to
public inquiries made to the offices of police and crime
commissioners, instead of the hopeless and inadequate answers
that I cited?
(Con)
I am afraid I will disappoint my noble friend to some degree. As
I said, we are committed to developing reforms in this area, and
this will obviously need to look at the specific sets of
circumstances to which he refers. I will make sure that my noble
friend’s particular points are taken back and incorporated.
As I was saying, developing reforms include ensuring that there
is clarity on what constitutes misconduct or a breach of expected
standards by PCCs, deciding which body is best placed to handle
certain types of complaints, ensuring that the system does not
give rise to vexatious complaints and ensuring the effective
handling of criminal allegations against PCCs. We acknowledge
that we need a system that is open, transparent and fair for all
parties when handling complaints. While we develop the reforms in
this area, we have taken interim steps to assist. This includes
publishing guidance to strengthen the quality and consistency of
scrutiny by panels, more clearly explaining their roles and
responsibilities—I note the point of the noble Lord, Lord
Coaker—including in relation to their remit for handling PCC
complaints.
The noble Lord, , also asked what legal
requirements exist to ensure that police and crime commissioners
answer the inquiries made to them. The actions and decisions of
PCCs are scrutinised by the panels, and the PCCs must provide
information and answer questions raised by their PCP, where
reasonable and appropriate, in line with their duties in the
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. Where
necessary, PCCs must also respond to freedom of information
requests from the public, in accordance with the Freedom of
Information Act 2000.
We intend to legislate to deliver those recommendations from the
PCC review, which require primary legislation, as soon as
parliamentary time allows. We are also fully committed to
delivering the remainder of our non-legislative recommendations
in conjunction with the sector by the end of this calendar year,
where possible.
I am afraid I do not have any time left, but I close by saying
that we seem to have debated the instances—very bad instances; no
one is denying that—of one or two particularly bad apples. The
fact remains that there are 39 PCCs and three mayors with PCC
responsibilities and, as has been recognised, we should all
acknowledge that they are, in the main, doing a very good job. I
take this opportunity to thank all our sector partners for their
continued support.
