Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con) I beg to move, That this House
expresses grave concern at the imminent prospect of a nuclear armed
Iran; calls on the Government in its ongoing negotiations in
respect of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) agreement
to seek to extend the sunset clauses, enact a stricter monitoring
regime, retain terrorist proscriptions, and expand its scope to
include Iran’s other destabilising activities in the region. There
are...Request free trial
(Newark) (Con)
I beg to move,
That this House expresses grave concern at the imminent prospect
of a nuclear armed Iran; calls on the Government in its ongoing
negotiations in respect of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPoA) agreement to seek to extend the sunset clauses, enact a
stricter monitoring regime, retain terrorist proscriptions, and
expand its scope to include Iran’s other destabilising activities
in the region.
There are significant concerns, as set out in the motion, at the
negotiated deal that is apparently about to be signed. I have
been actively seeking an opportunity to raise those concerns over
Iran’s destabilising activities for a number of months. I give
thanks to the Backbench Business Committee for granting time in
the main Chamber, and to my many cross-party colleagues who
supported the application.
This debate could not come at a more important time. On 9 June,
the UK, Germany and France released a joint statement saying that
they are ready to conclude a deal with Iran that would restore
the joint comprehensive plan of action, and urging Iran to seize
the diplomatic opportunity it presented. On Monday, indirect
talks between the United States and Iran resumed in Doha.
This is by no means the first time that we have debated Iran in
this place, and I dare say it will not be the last, but today’s
debate could perhaps be the last opportunity to evaluate the
merits or otherwise of a return to the JCPOA nuclear agreement. I
firmly believe that, whatever one’s view—we will hear a range of
them today, no doubt—it is vital that, before any deal is signed,
our Government hear the opinions of Members of this House.
Anxieties over Iran are felt acutely by many across the House, as
I am sure we will hear. I am on the record as having been very
sceptical of the original 2015 deal, believing it to be too
limited in scope to prevent Iran’s malign activities and far too
weak in enforcement to prevent a nuclear Iran, should Iran choose
that path. That view was shared at the time by many—including, we
have subsequently learned, a number of those who were close to
the negotiations. I think, for example, of the noble Lord Hammond
and the former Defence Secretary Sir , who have both subsequently
expressed their concerns at the limited nature of the deal that
was ultimately signed.
Whatever one’s thoughts about the JCPOA, the fundamentally
different circumstances we face today must be confronted. It is
always easy to stick with what one has been involved in for a
long time; of course there is pride among those who have
negotiated relentlessly on this issue, both here in the UK, in
the Foreign Office, and particularly in the Biden Administration,
among those officials who were previously in the Obama
Administration. However, it is time to appreciate what has
happened in the seven years since the deal was signed.
Iran’s nuclear programme has continued apace. While the terms of
the JCPOA restricted Iran’s enrichment of uranium to 3.67%
fissile purity and a stockpile of only 300 kg of uranium, as of
last month the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that
Iran has been enriching uranium up to a purity of 60%—a short
technical step from weapons-grade levels of 90%.
(Chipping Barnet)
(Con)
rose—
(Grantham and Stamford)
(Con)
rose—
I am spoilt for choice, but I will give way first to my right
hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet ().
My right hon. Friend is making a powerful speech. Does he agree
that, far from the JCPOA-minus that seems to be in prospect, we
need a tougher deal with Iran that reflects its transgressions in
compliance with the current agreement? We must reflect those
transgressions in a deal that is actually powerful in preventing
Iran from developing its nuclear programme.
I agree wholeheartedly with my right hon. Friend, who has been
interested and engaged in this issue for a long time. The point
she makes, which I hope I will make over the course of my
remarks, is that we do want a negotiated settlement and
agreement, but it must be one that is robust and has the effect
of preventing both Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and its
wider malign activities in the region that are harming our key
partners, our friends and ourselves.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend and neighbour for giving
way. He mentions that Iran has developed uranium to 60% purity.
Is he aware of any country on Earth that has enriched to that
level for peaceful purposes?
No, and I do not think anyone would believe that that is Iran’s
ultimate intent. The latest intelligence, for example, showing
that bunkers have been constructed underground in which to hold
some of that material, makes clear what the ultimate intent of
Iran is on this issue.
(Hendon) (Con)
rose—
I will give way one last time, and then I shall make some
progress.
Dr Offord
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. Many people have focused
on transgressions against the JCPOA, but because of the infamous
sunset provisions in the 2015 deal, Iran will be able to
legitimately undertake a full nuclear programme. That means that
we could be facing a nuclear Iran as early as 2025. Without doing
anything, we are already in a very difficult and dangerous
scenario.
My hon. Friend is correct. I will make this point in a moment,
but there is no harm in restating it now: the original deal
contained a number of sunset provisions, and the proposed deal,
as reported, merely keeps those sunset provisions in exactly the
same form. Even if we were to sign the deal tomorrow, it would
begin to fade away in 2023. One really has to question the point
of signing up to the proposed deal.
Iran stands on the verge of possessing a nuclear bomb. In fact,
intelligence suggests it has sufficient enriched uranium today
for at least two nuclear weapons. It has progressed far beyond
the parameters of the JCPOA, so restoring Iran to the old deal
has none of the benefits we once thought it would. The JCPOA’s
time has been and gone; the Rubicon has been crossed.
After earlier talk of a longer and stronger deal, more recent
rounds of the nuclear talks have seen US negotiators make
concession after painful concession in an attempt to bring Iran
back to the deal. We now see before us the contours of a shorter
and weaker agreement—one that many have taken to dismissing as
JCPOA-minus. In that agreement the Iranian regime will be
reintegrated into the international community and afforded huge
economic benefits that, crucially, will be channelled not into
education, healthcare or infrastructure projects but into
supporting and promoting terrorist activities, for instance
through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran’s web of
proxies across the region, and the restrictions on its nuclear
programme will last for a fraction of the time. It is unclear
whether this stands to strengthen efforts for
non-proliferation.
I believe that a new framework is required. Proponents of the
JCPOA spoke of its ability to restrict Iran’s break-out time to
one year. In view of the reduction of this to as little as a few
weeks, we need the Government to recognise that this is simply
not going to work, and that any agreement that could obtain the
consent of this House—certainly of Members who take my view—will
need to have very significantly longer sunset clauses.
(Harrow East) (Con)
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right in everything he has
said. However, it is not only the potential for Iran to acquire
nuclear weapons that is a concern, but its ability then to
deliver those weapons through ballistic missiles. Clearly Iran
has enhanced its capability in that regard and could, if it has
nuclear weapons, deliver them now. What would he say about how we
need to restrict Iran’s capability to develop such weapons?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. The JCPOA contains the
word “comprehensive”, but it was anything but comprehensive. It
certainly did not speak to the malign activities of Iran
throughout the region, but nor did it address the seeking of
enriched uranium, the weapons that would be able to deliver the
nuclear weapons or the other infrastructure and equipment that is
required in the process. Any deal that we now sign needs to
address all those matters. In fact, as I said, on the pursuit of
enriched uranium, the ship has already sailed because Iran
already has it.
The agreement as reported in the media seems set to include the
same structural problems as we saw in the 2015 deal. Unless the
new nuclear terms are expanded in scope to allow a more rigorous
inspection regime, I fear we will repeat the same mistakes. Iran
has reached the nuclear threshold under the watchful eye of what
was supposed to be the most intrusive inspection regime ever. By
its own admission, the UN’s nuclear watchdog is “flying
blind”—the IAEA chief said as much in June 2021. One year on,
Iran has taken a series of steps to further restrict IAEA access
to its nuclear sites, including the deliberate removal of cameras
from its most sensitive facilities. Years of tolerating Iran’s
flagrant breaches out of fear of the talks collapsing has led us
down this path.
A glaring weakness of the JCPOA was that it did nothing to
address Iran’s wider activities throughout the world. Our failure
to address Iran’s support for its network of proxies continues to
reverberate to this day. Iran was and remains the world’s largest
state sponsor of terrorism—a point I was pleased to hear my right
hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary acknowledge in front of the
Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday. The regime’s commitment to
exporting the Islamic revolution has been underwritten by an
active embrace of violence since it first came to power in 1979.
In recent weeks, Istanbul has been the setting for an
extraordinary Iranian terror plot. Thanks to the close
co-operation between the Israeli and the Turkish security
services, an Iranian terror cell attempting to kidnap and kill
Israeli tourists—innocent civilians—was thwarted. In one
incident, several Israeli tourists visiting a market had to be
intercepted before they returned to their hotel room, where their
would-be assassins were reportedly waiting for their return.
The Iranian threat is very clear and present here at home. In
2019, it was revealed that British intelligence services had
identified a Hezbollah cell stockpiling 3 tonnes of highly
explosive ammonium nitrate in residential north-west London for
use in a terror attack—the very same chemical that was recently
inflicting such terrible damage in Beirut. The misplaced notion
that the JCPOA would moderate the Iranian regime was dispelled
when its Intelligence Ministry sought to bomb an opposition rally
in Paris in 2018 with the help of an Iranian diplomat.
Behind all these examples—and there are many others I could
cite—sits the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s premier
agent for terrorism. The organisation funds, trains and provides
the ideological underpinning for many of the world’s terror
organisations, from Hamas to Hezbollah to the Houthis. Reports
from the previous round of negotiation that the Biden
Administration was considering delisting the IRGC from its
foreign terror list have been worrying, to say the least. Quite
simply, it would be a grave miscalculation and a great dishonour
if our Government were to support any such action. It would make
a mockery of the efforts that we have made in recent years to
proscribe Hamas and Hezbollah if we signed up to a deal that
legitimises the very organisation that funds Hamas and Hezbollah.
That really would be a perverse and absurd outcome.
The negotiations in Doha cannot be detached from the broader
geopolitical landscape. A dangerous new dynamic is at play in the
latest round of nuclear talks. As the EU desperately tries to
wean itself off Russian hydrocarbons, we see an ill-advised pivot
towards Iran for energy supplies. In a visit to Iran over the
weekend, Josep Borrell openly called for Europe to seek new
sources of oil and gas following its move away from Russia and
spoke of the high potential economic benefits awaiting Iran. At
the G7 summit in Germany, Macron pointedly called for more
Iranian oil to enter the market. The west can ill afford to end
its dependency on one rogue regime merely by pivoting towards the
religious fundamentalists in Tehran. How ridiculous would it be
for us to invest so much time, effort and energy in defeating
Vladimir Putin merely to make an advance—an opening—towards
Tehran, Venezuela or other authoritarian regimes? It is troubling
enough that the talks have been mediated by Russia, the world’s
only nuclear-armed state currently threatening to actually use
those weapons. If restrictions are lifted, Russia will receive a
financial boost from sales of military equipment as well as the
construction of nuclear power plants in Iran.
Iran’s list of nuclear transgressions is as long as it is
troubling and has long necessitated an urgent response. The UK
Government were right to say in March:
“Iran’s nuclear programme has never before been this advanced,
and is exposing the international community to unprecedented
levels of risk.”
At this critical juncture, the west urgently needs to change its
strategy. We valiantly pursued diplomatic avenues to their limit,
and beyond. Dedicated officials here in the Foreign Office, and
in the Obama and Biden Administrations, have invested immense
time and resources in negotiating the JCPOA, but that is not a
reason to sign a bad deal. As Iran continues to stall
negotiations, it is time for a more robust approach reimposing
snapback sanctions on Iran and tightening the economic screw
until it is willing to countenance the serious proposals that I
have shared here today.
This position is no longer that of ultra-hawkish Republicans. In
March, despite a polarised political climate in the United
States, 70 Democrats and Republicans in Congress wrote to the
National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, to demand that the new
deal signed with Iran must include an extension of the sunset
clauses that we discussed earlier, retention of the IRGC
proscription—I would like the UK Government to proscribe it as
well—and a toughening of the monitoring regime, with an extension
in scope to include Iran’s other destabilising activities such as
its ballistic missile programme. President Obama can press ahead
with a weak deal, but if he does, there is a strong likelihood
that the Senate and the House of Representatives will do
everything in their power to frustrate it, and were there to be
an incoming Republican President, which seems quite likely, it
would be their day-one act to end the agreement. Why would we do
something that is of such a short-term benefit, if any? In doing
so, we weaken our relationships with some of our oldest friends
and key partners, whether that be the state of Israel, the Gulf
states, Saudi Arabia or others, all of whom publicly or privately
are pleading with our Government to listen to their concerns and
not to proceed with this agreement.
Those countries in the middle east already fear that the west is
retrenching and is an unreliable ally, particularly having seen
the events of our messy and embarrassing retreat from Kabul a
year ago. To impose this agreement in addition, against their
best wishes, merely pushes them further away from us and towards
new friends and relationships, whether that be Russia or China.
That would be a very sad outcome.
To conclude, the Iranian regime brutally represses, persecutes
and tortures its own people. It wastes the Iranian people’s
resources on terrorism, foreign aggression, missiles and
nuclear-weapon capabilities. I hope to see the day when we and
our partners have no need for sanctions on Iran or the
proscription of its affiliates. I hope to see the day when the UK
and Iran can enjoy normalised relations and when the people of
Iran have a Government who respect human dignity and exist in
peace with their neighbours, but that day will not come if we
provide sanctions relief to fuel the regime’s corruption,
incompetence and terrorism. Nor will the day come through weak
and naive responses to the pursuit of and now the establishment
of nuclear-weapon capabilities. I humbly urge the UK Government
to change course, to learn from the first JCPOA’s failures, to
listen to the concerns of many across the House and our partners
in the region, and to work with us and them to impose maximum
pressure on Iran.
1.01pm
(Islington North) (Ind)
I compliment the right hon. Member for Newark () on obtaining this debate
and I particularly endorse the last point he made about looking
forward to the ultimate day when there will be no sanctions
against Iran, because that surely is the place we would want to
be.
We should have a slight passing interest in the past British
relationship with Iran, which is not much discussed in this
country, but is discussed a great deal in Iran. There are
memories of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, later BP, and the
promotion of the coup in 1953 by Britain and the CIA together to
get rid of the secular progressive Government in place at that
time. It might seem a long time ago, but it is very real to
people in Iran, and the arguments about it are rehearsed many
times over.
The 1979 revolution in Iran was obviously a massive event in
every respect. It was a total revolution. A very authoritarian
regime was installed. There was a massive killing rate by that
regime and universal and total abuse of human rights. Many people
from Iran came and sought asylum in this country and many
others—indeed, a considerable number came to live in my
constituency. In anything I say, I am well aware of the
systematic abuse of human rights in Iran for many years. Any
discussion with Iran must include a discussion of human rights.
Obviously, that includes the dramatic horrors of executions and
public executions, but the restriction on rights of assembly and
freedom of speech are to me equally important.
It is also worth remembering that the Iranian people have lost
relatives and thousands and thousands of soldiers in conflict
since 1979. The appalling and disastrous Iran-Iraq war, which
ended up achieving hardly anything for either side, cost hundreds
of thousands of lives on both sides, wrecked both economies and
has led to a continued economic problem for both sides. In
discussing the nuclear issues, one should have regard for the
longer-term history of Iran and the relationship of this country
with Iran.
We are coming up to the non-proliferation treaty review
conference this August in New York. Iran was a member of the
non-proliferation treaty. Successive meetings that I have been to
on the non-proliferation treaty have always concluded with the
hope that there would be the declaration of a middle east weapons
of mass destruction-free zone, which would give the opportunity
for Israel and Iran to be included in the negotiations for a
non-nuclear future for the middle east. While I fully appreciate
that Iran clearly has developed centrifuges and enriched uranium
almost to weapons-grade, two other countries in the region either
have nuclear weapons or could. One is Israel, which clearly does
have nuclear weapons, and the other is Saudi Arabia, which could
quickly develop nuclear weapons if it wanted. The urgency of
having a negotiation and a revamped version of the 2015
agreement, or something like it, is important if we are to try to
preserve the peace of the region.
I was part of a delegation from the all-party group on Iran in
2014, and it was a fascinating experience, because the members of
the delegation were , a former Conservative Minister
and Chancellor, , a former Labour Home Secretary,
the current Defence Secretary, and me. The four of us divided up
our roles in the delegation very clearly early on. talked about economic issues,
talked about global issues and
trade, and I relentlessly and endlessly raised a lot of concerns
about individual and collective human rights cases with the
people we met in Iran. We were quite well received at
universities and so forth, and we had serious negotiations. It
was clear to me not only that such negotiations are tough, but
that, if the Iran nuclear agreement was to succeed—this was pre
the agreement, by the way; that is why we were there—it had to be
accompanied by two things: the lifting of sanctions, which were
very severe, particularly the medical sanctions being imposed at
that time; and a human rights dialogue. The Iranians made it
clear that they were prepared to have a human rights dialogue
with the EU, or with other parties.
We have to strive for the lifting of sanctions, and that means
there has to be a renewed effort to bring about an agreement with
Iran to end the enrichment of uranium to anywhere near
weapons-grade. I am not a great fan of nuclear power, but the
Iranians are legally entitled to develop nuclear power if that is
what they want to do. Personally, I do not think it is a great
direction to go down, but obviously they can legally choose to do
that. We should be well aware that, if we do not succeed in
rejigging the 2015 agreement, we have problems ahead.
(Birmingham, Selly Oak)
(Lab)
Does the right hon. Gentleman seriously believe that a country
with a secret nuclear programme that is hidden from the IAEA
inspectors and a country that is obstructing those inspectors is
serious about negotiations? Is that his genuine belief?
Iran has to be serious about negotiations and we have to be
serious about negotiations. That is the whole point of this
debate and the whole point of the joint agreement. If my friend
has a better alternative, I would be interested to hear it. We
should be aware that the agreement with Iran was made with the
support of the United States under President Obama and of this
country and many others. It is an international agreement. It was
Donald Trump who said it was a bilateral agreement and the US
should walk away from it. That is essentially the situation we
have reached at the present time.
I hope that there will be strong negotiations with Iran. They
will obviously be led by the US, the EU and other countries,
including this one. That is an important way forward. Perhaps the
non-proliferation treaty review conference is an opportunity to
start to explore that way forward, because what is the
alternative? The alternative is we increase the number of nuclear
weapons within the region. I hope to goodness that Iran never
develops nuclear weapons, as I wish other countries did not. We
have to remember, though, that this country has nuclear weapons
and this Government have just announced an increase in the number
of our nuclear warheads, so it is not as if we are on the moral
high ground when saying that nobody should ever develop nuclear
weapons.
There is added urgency because of the situation in Palestine, the
occupation of the west bank and the siege of Gaza. There is also
the war in Yemen, where thankfully there is now a ceasefire. I
hope the ceasefire becomes permanent and that the people of Yemen
are able to live in peace, but our supplying weapons to Saudi
Arabia has made the situation much worse.
We have to look towards a future in which there can be relations
with Iran and a serious programme of improvement in respect of
the human rights abuses in Iran, so that sanctions can gradually
be lifted. That would allow the Iranian economy to develop and
living standards to improve. Many people in Iran lead very poor
lives, partly because of the sanctions and partly because of the
level of resources taken up by the military, as was pointed out
by the right hon. Member for Newark.
In his intervention, my friend the hon. Member for Birmingham,
Selly Oak () asked whether we were serious
about negotiations. We were very serious about negotiations when
we were trying to get Nazanin Ratcliffe released from her
appalling detention in Iran. Eventually, she was released and the
parallel agreement was made about the repayment of money by this
country to Iran. However, other people were not released. I would
be grateful if the Minister let me know, either when she responds
or later in writing, about the situation facing Anoosheh Ashoori
and Morad Tahbaz, both of whom should have been released with
Nazanin but were not. They are still there and apparently the
British Government are supporting their release. Those
negotiations that were brought about for one person—a very
special and wonderful person—had a good outcome, but there are
other detainees who should be released.
This debate takes place at a time of peril, with the appalling
war between Russia and Ukraine, and the resulting loss of life,
and the increase in arms expenditure, with NATO proposing a huge
increase. If we succeed in re-engaging with Iran and have a good
outcome, good work will have been done and we will have helped to
bring about a more peaceful middle east. If we do not, the
pressure of the militarist hawks in Iran will become even more
enormous and even more resources will go into nuclear and other
weapons technology, with obvious dangers for everybody in the
region. Surely our whole focus should be on nuclear disarmament
and peace through negotiation to bring about a better standard of
living for the people of Iran and, indeed, of all other countries
in the region.
1.12pm
(Clwyd West) (Con)
I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark () and the hon. Member for
Birmingham, Selly Oak () on securing the debate, and I
thank the Backbench Business Committee for facilitating it. It
is, for all the reasons set out by my right hon. Friend, a timely
debate. It is also timely because it comes after the report of
the board of governors of the IAEA on 30 May and the subsequent
resolution of 8 June, which censures Iran for non-co-operation
with the agency’s inquiry into nuclear traces found at three
non-declared sites. That action on the part of the agency is
certainly a step forward, but it goes nowhere near far
enough.
Iran’s nuclear programme has been known about since 2002, when
the existence of the facilities at Natanz and Arak were revealed
by the Iranian democratic Opposition, the National Council of
Resistance of Iran. The Iranian regime has always asserted that
its programme is for civilian purposes only and has always denied
that it is attempting to produce nuclear weapons. That simply
defies belief. As we have heard, despite the terms of the JCPOA,
Iran started enriching uranium to 20% in 2010, and later the same
year it moved to 60% enrichment. As my right hon. Friend pointed
out, that is considerably beyond anything that is needed for
civilian purposes.
In its report of 1 June, the Institute for Science and
International Security concluded:
“Iran’s breakout timeline is now at zero. It has enough 60
percent enriched uranium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) to be
assured it could fashion a nuclear explosive. If Iran wanted to
further enrich its 60 percent HEU up to weapon-grade HEU, or 90
percent, it could do so within a few weeks with only a few of its
advanced centrifuge cascades.”
Clearly the time pressure is enormous. The report went on to
note:
“Whether or not Iran enriches its HEU up to 90 percent, it can
have enough HEU for two nuclear weapons within one month after
starting breakout.”
That is, by any standards, a very worrying state of affairs.
It is made all the more worrying by Iran’s increasingly erratic
and aggressive stance in the region and, indeed, the wider world.
As my right hon. Friend rightly pointed out, Iran is an active
state sponsor of terrorism—probably the world’s leading state
sponsor. Its proxies are engaged in fomenting conflict in Yemen,
Syria and Lebanon. My right hon. Friend mentioned the Istanbul
incident; I would like to mention the incident in June 2018, when
a bomb plot targeting a gathering of Iranian pro-democracy
supporters in Paris was disrupted by the French and Belgian
authorities. An Iranian diplomat accredited to the embassy in
Vienna was subsequently convicted for leading the conspiracy and
was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. Three accomplices were
convicted, and their sentences were upheld, with two years added,
by the court of appeal in Antwerp in May. Iran is certainly
exporting terrorism not just throughout the region, but across
the world.
Dr Offord
I feel the need to correct my right hon. Friend on that point. It
was not just Iranian politicians and Opposition members who were
targeted; five of us from the British Parliament were at risk of
being blown up in that terrorist incident.
Mr Jones
My hon. Friend is entirely right: it was a gathering of
supporters of the NCRI, which takes place every year in Paris and
attracts supporters from all round the world. As he points out,
had that conspiracy been successful, its consequences would have
been catastrophic.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Newark mentioned Iran’s
revolutionary guard corps. That is, in effect, a state within a
state. It directs, leads and executes the terrorist activities of
Iran. As he pointed out, it is a proscribed organisation in the
United States, and many will wonder why it is not proscribed in
this country. I believe that it should be. Iran is already a
global danger, but a nuclear-armed Iran is an appalling and
unacceptable prospect.
The IAEA report makes it clear that the Iranian regime has,
effectively, been playing games with the agency for many years.
At three locations that the agency requested to visit, the regime
razed buildings to the ground and removed structural material and
soil, clearly in an effort to disguise what was happening there.
Nevertheless, the agency discovered traces of anthropogenic
nuclear material. The report states that the regime has
“not provided explanations that are technically credible”
for the presence of nuclear material in those locations. The
Tehran regime has clearly shown by its actions that it has no
intent whatever to co-operate in good faith with the IAEA. Not
only is the regime taking steps to advance its enrichment
programme by installing more advanced centrifuges; it is doing
all it can to restrict the ability of IAEA inspectors to monitor
its nuclear sites. It has turned off two devices that the agency
relied on to monitor the enrichment of uranium gas at Natanz and
initiated plans to remove 27 surveillance cameras from other
nuclear facilities.
On 20 June, Reuters cited a confidential IAEA report, which
revealed that:
“Iran is escalating its uranium enrichment further by preparing
to use advanced IR-6 centrifuges at its underground Fordow site
that can more easily switch between enrichment levels”.
In a joint statement to the board of governors of the IAEA on 27
June, the UK, France and Germany expressed their concern about
the continued nuclear activities in breach of the JCPOA. They
pointed out that the alarming accumulation of enriched material
is cause for great concern and is further reducing the time that
it would take Iran to break out towards its first nuclear
weapon.
The position, therefore, is that it is clearly known that Iran is
taking active steps to produce highly enriched uranium, the only
credible purpose of which can be to produce nuclear weapons. The
question must be whether there is any purpose in continuing to
urge Iran to fulfil its obligations under the JCPOA when it is
perfectly clear that it has no intention whatever to do so. The
continued efforts to engage with Iran and go the extra mile may
be laudable, but, frankly, seem increasingly futile. Iran clearly
regards the west as weak and is almost openly laughing at us.
A new course is called for. Consideration should be given to
whether seeking to adhere to the JCPOA as the basis for our
future dealings with Iran is realistic or sensible. Rather than
clinging to vain hopes that Iran is capable of mending its ways
and responding to the IAEA’s censure, the UK should work with the
United States and other international partners to refer Iran to
the UN Security Council with a view to reinstating the six
sanctions-imposing resolutions that were suspended with the
JCPOA’s initial implementation.
Iran must learn that flouting the JCPOA has real consequences,
and the west should unite to apply the most intense pressure
possible on Iran to wind up its nuclear programme, since it is
now abundantly clear that it is not for any peaceful purpose, but
is aggressive. Quite simply, Iran is a rogue state, and a rogue
state in possession of nuclear weapons is not a prospect that the
west can happily contemplate or, indeed, tolerate.
1.22pm
(Birmingham, Selly Oak)
(Lab)
I thank the right hon. Member for Newark () for securing the debate and
congratulate him on an excellent speech. In the interest of
transparency, I am the chair of Labour Friends of Israel and a
member of the British Committee for Iran Freedom.
I suspect that the outcome of the talks in Vienna will be crucial
in shaping the future of the international community’s relations
with Iran. Whatever that outcome, however, we must develop a
clear-sighted and comprehensive strategy to tackle the challenges
we face, including the many that the current talks are unlikely
to resolve. As we have heard, the malign activities of those who
control the Iranian regime extend far beyond its nuclear
ambitions and include: its ballistic missile programme; support
for terrorist proxies across the middle east; the dangerous
influence and activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps; Tehran’s insidious disinformation campaigns; its policy of
state hostage taking; and the suffering of the Iranian people
over four decades.
In the face of those challenges, the JCPOA, which was negotiated
in 2015, looks pretty limited. Despite the name, as the right
hon. Gentleman pointed out, it is clearly not comprehensive and,
as we heard, it actually exacerbated certain problems by freeing
up extra resources for the mullahs. The Trump Administration’s
unilateral withdrawal in 2018 dealt a severe blow to the deal,
but Iran’s record of systematically violating the agreement had
already highlighted its inadequacy.
Those violations include, as we have heard, the decision to
enrich uranium beyond the agreed cap and the deliberate
obstruction of the IAEA inspectors. Iran had already made clear
its contempt for the agreement by turning off some of the
inspectors’ monitoring equipment. Officials said a couple of
weeks ago that they expect to lose any continuity of knowledge
regarding the progress of Iran’s activity because of the
obstruction they are facing from it. Even if we had a deal up and
running, the inspectors would not be able to do their job.
Some believe that a new agreement might provide a measure of
medium-term restraint on Iran’s nuclear programme; others have
their doubts. As we have heard, the Institute for Science and
International Security has concluded that it is on the verge of
obtaining the bomb. The appointment of Mohammad Eslami, the main
liaison with Pakistani freelance nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer
Khan, as the new head of Tehran’s Atomic Energy Organisation is
the clearest signal we could have of Iran’s real intentions. That
is why I am sceptical of the idea that those people will
negotiate in good faith and keep their word.
As the LFI argues in its recent pamphlet on the subject, the UK
needs to develop realistic strategies to address the nuclear
threat and the other Iranian issues. Iran’s ballistic missile
programme is the biggest in the middle east and makes it the
first country to develop a missile with a 2,000 km range without
having first developed nuclear capability. It is also the only
country that routinely threatens to wipe another nation off the
face of the map—the destruction of the state of Israel is the
official policy of Iran’s leaders.
As we have heard, as well as threatening Israel’s existence, Iran
is responsible for waging war, terrorism and violence—mostly
through its proxies—in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and the
Palestinian territories. The UK has rightly banned some of those
proxies, but not all their front organisations. The Government
should do more and look at proscribing Hezbollah and Hamas.
As we have also heard, Iran’s terrorist activities are supported
by the regime’s ideological army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, which not only leads on meddling in the region but
brutally represses ordinary Iranians. Its influence has expanded
rapidly in recent years, including over a variety of operations
across Europe. I believe, as others do, that the UK should join
our allies the United States and proscribe the IRGC for the
dangerous terrorist group it is.
Iranian disinformation efforts, run by the IRGC, have
significantly expanded since 2015. There is mounting evidence of
interference in UK domestic politics, including last year’s
Scottish Parliament elections. The UK Government should urgently
draw up proposals for how they intend to combat and disrupt that
interference.
Iran’s policy of arbitrarily detaining foreign nationals, most
prominently Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, demands co-ordinated
international action. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development
Office must be bold enough to call this activity what it is—state
hostage taking. We should use the UK’s position at the UN to lead
and develop a proper response from the international
community.
We should also never forget that the Iranian regime’s most
long-standing and long-suffering victims are the Iranian people
themselves. We can and should do more to support the victims of
some of the most unimaginable human rights abuses. I think it is
both curious and shocking that, nearly two years since it was
established, the Magnitsky Act is yet to be applied to a single
Iranian individual or entity. There are many Iranian politicians
and officials guilty of human rights abuses, including prison
governors, military personnel, regional governors and others.
Ebrahim Raisi himself stands accused of being responsible for a
programme of mass killings in Iran.
Whatever the outcome of the nuclear talks in Vienna, the threats
posed by this regime to the Iranian people, the peoples of the
middle east, our own country and democracies around the world
will not go away. UK foreign policy should reflect the reality of
the situation. Any revived JCPOA that only deals with the nuclear
programme is probably not worth the paper it is written on. The
desire of those who wish to resurrect the JCPOA should not
detract from the urgent need to recognise and develop a smart,
proportionate and comprehensive strategy to resist Iran’s
terrorist activity around the globe.
Should it prove impossible to secure a satisfactory deal, which I
think is pretty inevitable, I concur with the right hon. Member
for Clwyd West (Mr Jones) that the UK and other western
participants should refer the regime’s nuclear activities to the
UN Security Council, and we should immediately seek to reinstate
the six resolutions that were suspended in good faith because of
the JCPOA.
1.31pm
(South West Wiltshire)
(Con)
It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Birmingham,
Selly Oak (). I congratulate my right hon.
Friend the Member for Newark () on giving us this
opportunity. I listened carefully to everything he said, and I
agree with all of it.
In June 2019, I went to Tehran as Middle East Minister while
Tehran was sinking shipping throughout the Gulf. I went there to
remonstrate at its malign regional activities and to insist that
it meet its JCPOA commitments, including the limits imposed on
its enriched uranium stockpile. In hindsight, it was probably not
the best use of my time; the truth is that the deal had been
moribund since President Trump withdrew in 2018. Attempts to
revive it have failed, and now it is comatose.
I suppose we should not turn off the life support entirely, but
in my view we have no need to bust a gut trying to revive the
plan. What we need is a stronger, longer deal. Indeed, with every
day that passes, the JCPOA becomes less attractive: while Iran’s
technical capabilities advance, the original terms become
redundant and sunset clauses loom large. Some of those clauses
have lapsed or shortly will—the UN arms embargo from October
2020; restrictions on ballistic missile-related goods next year;
and, the year after, restrictions relating to Iran’s advanced
centrifuge R&D. In 2031, the ban on weapons-grade uranium
ends.
That said, we should not be seen to be a guilty party or a
co-author of the plan’s coup de grâce. We have to stick with it,
I suppose, to the bitter end. Iran too—at least, the potentially
reconcilable part of it—wants to be perceived as keen to talk,
but, with artful duplicity, says one thing and does another. The
reported tenor of ongoing discussions is very much true to form.
On Sunday, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited poor Josep
Borrell of the European Commission to Tehran. His plaintive line
following the meeting was that
“the more supply of oil, the better for the energy prices.”
How pathetic is that? It looks as though the European External
Action Service, in its quest for purpose and relevance, has been
all too eager to swallow a pro-Iran line that conveniently gets
its members out of a tight temporary fix. Not for the first time,
it is grossly misreading the Iranians in a disappointing display
of naivety and self-service.
Borrell’s line suggests that the EU is prepared to swap Russian
for Iranian energy, so the Doha talks go on with the Americans
and the Iranians, bizarrely, in separate rooms. The reality is
that Iran’s demands for compensation and guarantees are
intractable. Those who believe Iran will settle for a deal in
order to trade with the west misread the ideological basis of the
regime and its President. They seek nothing less than the
complete Islamisation of society and the elimination of western
influence. Tehran has no desire to be our partner, even less our
friend. Let us be quite clear in separating the good and great
people of Iran from the regime: the two are plainly different
things, as recent shows of unrest have demonstrated, and we
should encourage the one and not the other.
Meanwhile, Iran ratchets up its pressure on the international
community through the expulsion of IAEA officials. The day after
Borrell’s meeting in Tehran, it showcased a missile launch, and
we contemplate a uranium breakout time probably in weeks,
certainly not months. The Iran of 2022 is very different from the
Iran of 2015. Hardliners and the IRGC have tightened their
stranglehold over the state and the economy. President Raisi has
populated Ministries with Guards commanders responsible for
atrocious acts of terrorism. We recall, as has been recalled
already today—correctly so—his participation in the 1988 death
committee, and in the extrajudicial murder of some 4,000
political prisoners.
Sanctions work. Tony Blair’s Institute for Global Change has
revealed that, following the first wave of sanctions relief in
2014, Iran’s terrorist and military activity increased
significantly. Kasra Aarabi writes:
“The number of militias created by the IRGC surged after this
period, and the Guard’s presence abroad peaked, with the Quds
Force expanding its operations in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.”
If that occurred under the previous relatively benign regime,
what effect will sanctions relief—estimated to mean an immediate
$90 billion windfall, and as much as $800 billion over five
years—have on the zealots now in control? I suggest that
sanctions relief at this time would not be a good move at
all.
US special envoy Rob Malley called for a “stronger and longer”
deal shortly after his appointment, and he is right.
Alternatively, we could offer less for less, but we cannot offer
more for less. The integrated review points the way. It says:
“Alongside our allies, the UK will hold Iran to account for its
nuclear activity, remaining open to talks on a more comprehensive
nuclear and regional deal.”
There is no specific mention of the JCPOA, which is very
sensible. If we managed to reheat the JCPOA in its current form,
we would have a stop-gap agreement at best, but the prospects of
definitive talks and a long-term solution led by Washington will
evaporate. Iran expert Professor Ali Ansari suggests we play it
cool, and I agree.
Although we should not be complacent, we should not be worried
about a no-deal scenario. The Iranian regime is struggling to rid
itself of Israeli infiltration, which is preventing it from
advancing its nuclear apparatus and security state. We all
remember the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh last year. Most
recently Hossein Taeb, IRGC head of intelligence, has been
dismissed, and on 22 May IRGC colonel Sayyad Khodaei was shot
dead outside his home.
Nobody goes to Iran without being lectured about Britain being
the source of all the country’s woes; the grievance culture
stoked by the regime makes the SNP look rather like rank
amateurs. It is mildly flattering to think that Iran’s rulers
believe we are still so influential, albeit in their minds
entirely malignly. Historically, however, the villain has been
seen to lie elsewhere. This debate takes place amid Putin’s
imperial war. He invokes Peter the Great, by reclaiming lost
territory and advancing autocracy. There is no doubt that
revanchist Russia and Iran have grown closer under Putin’s
leadership. It has developed from a transactional, military
relationship to one of shared ideological outlook, in so far as
both countries despise the western world order and its culture,
have a theological sense of mission for their countries, and talk
in Anglophobic terms of grievance and resistance. Their shared
paranoia about democracy has grown collaboration and suppression
at home—and also abroad, notably in Syria.
However, it has not always been so. Professor Ansari points out
that
“the greatest sleight of hand achieved by the Russian state with
respect to Iran has been to reinvent its relationship from that
of imperial predator to a fully fledged member of an axis of
resistance against the west.”
Indeed, there is a strong argument that Russia—certainly not
Britain—has been the chief cause of historic Iranian humiliation,
imposing capitulatory treaties in 1808 and 1828, which lasted
until 1921. Nascent Iranian democracy was stamped out by Colonel
Liakhov of the Cossack Brigade in the early 20th century, as he
shelled the Majlis in Tehran and executed constitutionalists. The
parallels with the present day are pretty clear.
Lord Curzon described “avowedly hostile” Russian activities in
Iran, and pointed out that
“piece by piece, partly by open war and partly by furtive
nibbling, Russia has appropriated more and more of Persian
soil.”
There are historic continuities in the Iran-Russia relationship,
namely in Iran’s junior status, and Iranian popular sentiment
against Russia. The 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay ensured that Iran
became a de facto vassal state, with strictures outlining
Russia’s preference for the Qajar succession. Now, as then,
Iran’s presidential candidates and Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps leaders court Putin for his approval. In line with that
junior status, we learn from Minister Javad Zarif’s leaked audio
tape on the war in Syria that Russia
“entered the war by air force, but dragged Iran’s ground force to
war too. We didn’t have ground forces in Syria by then.”
It is a candid assessment of Putin’s disregard for Iranian life,
and reluctance to spill blood when he can use those he sees as
inferiors. We see that, too, in Putin’s feeding the Ukrainian
meat grinder preferentially with troops from east of the
Urals.
But if the regime wants that kind of partnership, the Iranian
people do not. The popular mood in Iran is antithetical to the
Russians; we have seen that most recently in protests against
Russia’s invasion. Meanwhile, the regime blunders on, blaming
NATO and the west, and defending Russia and the UN. Again, that
bifurcation has precedent. An Iranian member of the Majlis once
wrote of the
“dislike of the Persian people for the Russians,”
which was based on
“wars…cruelty and aggression…encouragement given by them to the
extravagancies of the Persian court…the ascendency they had
gained by promising to maintain the succession…the many
concessions they had obtained from the Persian Government…the
undue influence exerted by them.”
He concludes that Russia is
“the home and centre of autocracy and ancient foe of all liberal
ideas.”
That was more than 100 years ago, but it resonates with us today.
That is why it is so important—so imperative—for us to call this
partnership out, reveal its weak foundations, learn from the
past, and support the good and great people of Iran in their
struggle against a wicked regime.
1.43pm
(Strangford) (DUP)
It is a real pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for South
West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), and I thank him for his
contribution. I also thank the right hon. Member for Newark
() for setting the scene so
very well, and other hon. Members for their contributions. It is
good to see the House united, by and large, in the statements we
try to make.
I have spoken about the complexities of the Iranian nuclear
question on a number of occasions, and it is clear that we are
fast coming to the stage at which we will need to do more than
simply discuss or debate it in this House. We must register our
concerns, but we need to act, and act urgently. I said the same
thing six months ago, and I reiterate it today. Let me put it on
the record that I am unashamedly a friend of Israel. I was a
member of the Northern Ireland Friends of Israel group when I
served in the Northern Ireland Assembly, and I am a member of the
Friends of Israel here in this great House. I also have a close
working relationship with the Iranian Government in exile, to
which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak () referred earlier. That is a
good working relationship, and an opportunity to hear about human
rights abuses and deprivations, which I will mention later.
There are many in the world who despair at the actions of Iran.
On 8 June, the International Atomic Energy Agency board of
governors voted overwhelmingly to adopt a resolution introduced
by the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, censuring the
regime in Tehran for non co-operation with the agency’s inquiry
into nuclear traces found at three undeclared sites. Iran has a
blatant disregard for democracy, freedom, and liberty, and for
truth and honesty—it is as simple as that. They will tell lies
‘til the cows come home, as we often say. Indeed, the authorities
in Tehran rejected the draft of that resolution, even before it
was adopted. The May 2022 IAEA report, perhaps the most detailed
and damning since its November 2011 report, made it clear that
the regime had not been entirely open and honourable—what a
surprise. I have heard it characterised as playing games with the
agency. It did, and it must be made accountable for that.
Other Members have referred to the three locations that the IAEA
had requested to visit. The regime razed the buildings, and
removed structure and soil, yet the IAEA still found traces of
nuclear material. The regime did not do the job terribly well,
and that badly executed cover-up left an evidential base, which
tells us as much as any sample could ever have told us. Action is
needed as soon as possible. There are actions that have taken
place that the regime does not want us to know about, and in
light of the IAEA’s report stating that it has not provided
explanations that are technically credible in relation to the
agency’s findings at those locations, the only conclusion is that
actions have been carried out contrary to the agreement. Again,
that must be addressed.
I am pleased to see the Minister and the shadow Minister in their
place, and I ask this: is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
dead, as the regime continues its nuclear provocations and
breaches? Perhaps the Minister will answer that when he winds up
the debate. Although the IAEA’s position had already come to be
regarded as a potentially insurmountable obstacle to the JCPoA’s
revival, each of the participants in that agreement remained
unwilling to abandon the negotiations.
That situation did not immediately change in the wake of the IAEA
board of governors resolution. Tehran even appeared to test that
reaction before the censure was formally adopted, turning off two
monitoring devices that the IAEA relied on for monitoring the
enrichment of uranium gas at the Natanz nuclear facility. The
measure was accompanied by a statement from the spokesperson for
the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, urging western nations to
“come to their senses”—perhaps it is time for Iran to come to its
senses and see that it is time for decency, honesty and truth,
and for it to drop the censure.
When that did not happen, the AEOI initiated plans to remove 27
surveillance cameras from several nuclear facilities. Many
commentators described Tehran’s reactions as a final or fatal
blow to the JCPoA. Those changes come at a time when Iran is
already planning to install two new cascades of advanced
enrichment centrifuges at Natanz, which could substantially speed
up the rate at which uranium is enriched to Iran’s current high
level of 60% purity, and potentially beyond that, even to 90%, or
to weapons-grade. That should reiterate to all Members of the
House that time is of the essence, time is short, and we cannot
wait to take action.
On Monday 20 June, Reuters news agency, citing a confidential
IAEA report that it had seen, reported:
“Iran is escalating its uranium enrichment further by preparing
to use advanced IR-6 centrifuges at its underground Fordow site
that can more easily switch between enrichment levels.”
Again, that is a very worrying development that we must be aware
of and concerned about. According to Reuters:
“IAEA inspectors verified on Saturday that Iran was ready to feed
uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas, the material centrifuges enrich,
into the second of two cascades, or clusters, of IR-6 centrifuges
installed at Fordow, a site dug into mountain, the confidential
IAEA report to member states said.”
The work was done on a mountain, in easily hidden places and
under darkness.
On 7 June, in a joint statement to the IAEA board of governors
addressing the regime’s implementation of its nuclear commitments
under the JCPOA, the United Kingdom, France and Germany said:
“We are deeply concerned about the continued nuclear advances
that the Director General documents in his report. As a result of
Iran’s nuclear activities in violation of the JCPOA for more than
three years, its nuclear programme is now more advanced than at
any point in the past. This is threatening international security
and risks undermining the global nonproliferation regime.”
The risk is at its highest ever. The axis of evil of Russia,
China, North Korea and Iran threaten the very stability of the
world. It is time, as others have said, to refer the matter to
the UN, which is the body responsible, and it is time for a
collective response. The world must unite against Iran. It is, as
has been said, a rogue state that must be controlled. It cannot
be allowed to roam free. Iran has disregard for human decency, as
we all know.
In Iran, we witness some of the worst human rights abuses in any
part of the world—I declare an interest as chair of the all-party
parliamentary group for international freedom of religion or
belief, which I have a particular interest in—with the
persecution of Christians and of Baha’is. It is also about the
rights of women to be women and to have freedom and liberty, but
in Iran they face acid attacks on a daily basis. It has high
rates of poverty and deprivation, yet it seems to find immense
amounts of money to spend on its defence and nuclear programmes.
Iran sponsors terrorism across the world and is involved in
terrorism in the middle east, in the far east and elsewhere. It
is time to bring it to book for what it does.
The dire situation could not be clearer, so our corresponding
action must be just as clear, firm and immediate. I respectfully
ask the Minister and her Department to act appropriately. I am
keen to hear what more action we can take. Strongly worded
statements are not enough. It is vital for the future of the
planet and this world that nuclear arms are kept away from
unstable nations and Governments such as those in Iran who have
proven themselves not to be honest and open when it comes to
their aims. Iran seeks the wanton destruction of Israel and other
parts of the western world. We need to be vigilant, prepared and
ready. We look to our Minister for a satisfactory response.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I rise to correct a
name that I gave wrongly in my speech. I said that Anoosheh
Ashoori was in detention, but I was wrong to do so. The names
that I wanted on the record were Mehran Raoof and Morad Tahbaz,
who are in detention, and I obviously support a campaign for
their release.
Madam Deputy Speaker ( )
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his point of order and for
having taken steps to correct the record immediately he realised
there had been a mistake. The record now stands corrected.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker
Before I call the next Member, I inform Members that if they were
to take between seven and eight minutes—or less—for their
speeches, we would not need a time limit and this reasonable,
balanced and informative debate would conclude at about 3
o’clock, or just before then, which is about the right time. The
hon. Gentlemen who seek to catch my eye are all experienced
enough to make their remarks fit that seven-to-eight-minute
limit.
1.54pm
(Grantham and Stamford)
(Con)
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. Let me quickly congratulate my
right hon. Friend the Member for Newark () on an excellent speech and
on securing the debate. It is important that we have the debate
at this time.
If we look around the world today, we see that we live in
extraordinarily dangerous times. We see the threat of terrorism
at home and abroad and democracies being invaded. We have an
increasingly emboldened China on the rise, and ever sophisticated
cyber-threats from highly trained state operatives. But of all
the threats that we face, a nuclear weapon in the wrong hands
represents one of the gravest. As US President Obama once said,
our scientific advances have enabled us
“to communicate across the seas and fly above the clouds,”
but they have also unleashed some of the most destructive and
deadly weaponry imaginable. We must understand that threat and
face it rather than shy away from the difficult decisions needed
to keep us safe.
Close observers of the recent talks will tell us that
negotiations have not exactly been going smoothly, but, as my
right hon. Friend said, it is important that we have the
opportunity to talk in this House about the threats that we feel
Iran poses and why some of us are cautious about a deal, and to
offer a view on what terms such a deal should take, if indeed we
are to have one. Let me do that.
A nuclear Iran is a clear threat to peace and the world order.
Iran has made clear its views on Israel’s mere existence and,
obviously, a direct nuclear attack on Israel would become a real
possibility. A nuclear-armed Iran would also be emboldened to
increase its support for terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and
Hamas. Regardless of how Iran may behave as a nuclear power, it
could spur other regional rivals to seek out a bomb in response.
The Government are right, therefore, always to be looking to
prevent further development of Iran’s nuclear capability.
However, there is clearly concern that, compared with 2015,
Iran’s programme is more advanced and its leadership and
priorities are different.
Sanctions do work, and they do hurt—Iran has about 40% inflation
and millions live below the poverty line—but, as my right hon.
Friend pointed out, Iran has done tremendously well out of oil
sales. The Iranian central bank estimates that those were worth
$18 billion in just the first half of the Persian year. Its
economic motivations are therefore perhaps not as strong as they
were previously, and that is why we should proceed cautiously
with new talks.
For any agreement, you need trust, and lately Iran’s actions seem
to demonstrate a lack of interest in building trust. It says that
its nuclear ambitions and intentions are entirely for civilian
purposes, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd West (Mr
Jones) said in his excellent speech. So why has it enriched to
60%? Why has it turned off 27 surveillance cameras? Why has it
developed uranium metal, which has no civilian use but lots of
use in developing nuclear weapons? All the while, as my hon.
Friend the Member for Harrow East () said, it has developed a significant ballistic
missile programme, and it has had the gall to call for the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard to be declassified as a terrorist
organisation. Those are not the actions of a state willing to
engage in peace talks or one that seeks to build trust with
anyone.
Of course, I understand the motivations to engage with Iran, and
we should try everything that we can to limit its ambitions. Put
simply, we need greater restrictions if we are to have an
agreement. We need a commitment from it to cease the production
and installation of advanced centrifuges and the removal of
enriched uranium as well as non-nuclear commitments that the
so-called comprehensive agreement did not cover to end its
ballistic missile programme and to cease funding terrorist
organisations. Otherwise, we face bolstering Iran at a time when
we should be restricting it.
Let it be said that I have put my views and concerns on the
record. I genuinely wish the Government and the ministerial team
well in tackling this great issue.
Let me conclude philosophically by saying that it is a great
pleasure to be talking about this and Britain’s role in it at a
time when people question Britain’s place in the world. We should
never forget that this country represents just 0.8% of the global
population, yet we have a seat at all the major international,
multinational and security tables, including the G7, the
International Monetary Fund, the JCPOA and the United Nations
Security Council. We are one of the few nuclear powers in the
world. So let it be said that we have a role to play in ensuring
the security of our world and our people. I hope that the
Government will take that responsibility as it relates to Iran
very seriously.
2.00pm
(Hendon) (Con)
I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark () for this debate—it has
certainly been a long time coming—on an issue of concern to many
of us in this House. I pay tribute to him for his efforts in
securing it. The contributions of all Members have been not only
well reasoned but very constructive. The right hon. Member for
Islington North () raised issues that perhaps
we do not all agree with, but it is important for us to consider
them as part of today’s discussion.
The spectre of a nuclear-armed Iran has been looming for several
years, and it presents a profound threat to our collective way of
life. Only last night I gave a speech to the National Jewish
Assembly, where I was asked at what point the United Kingdom
would step in to stop the emergence of a nuclear Iran. I have to
say that, if we fail to take action now, our later options will
be a lot more extreme. The moment to take the appropriate action,
under the JCPOA, is now.
It is almost unthinkable that the world’s greatest sponsor of
state terrorism could be on the nuclear threshold, but that is
the reality. Two of today’s speakers have mentioned Ahmadinejad
saying that he would like to wipe Israel off the map, which could
be taken in two ways. I think he was being provocative while at
the same time speaking politically. The issue of the JCPOA and a
nuclear Iran is not about Israel and Iran. It is not even about
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. It is about the Twelver Muslims, who
have a different ideology and view of the world, which they would
like to see adopted by other Muslim countries, and they would
certainly like to see it in the western hemisphere as well.
This fundamentalist regime is responsible for the most heinous
human rights abuses, both at home in Iran and, indeed, abroad. It
is a regime that is committed to exporting violent ideology
across the world, that has reneged on repeated commitments to the
international community, and that has been found guilty in
European courts of orchestrating terrorist events. I have
mentioned previously that those terrorist events included the
possibility of five parliamentarians—two of us are sitting here
today—being subject to the violence and destruction orchestrated
and founded by Tehran.
The entire integrity of the JCPOA and its ability to curtail
Iran’s nuclear ambitions have been called into question by
several of us for many years. Originally, we were concerned that
there were no clauses in the JCPOA requiring Iran to stop
transferring funds to terrorist proxies. It certainly did not
seek an end to domestic human rights abuses in the country, or to
end the testing of the ballistic missile programme. Those were
all structural weaknesses of the JCPOA and we were very concerned
about that.
It is not just centre-right politicians in the United Kingdom and
the United States who are concerned about this issue. Senator
Robert Menendez, the Democrat chair of the Foreign Relations
Committee, recently questioned why his own Administration were
trying to return to the JCPOA when it was
“not sufficient in the first place—and still doesn’t address some
of the most serious national security concerns we have.”
He is by no means alone in reaching such a conclusion.
It is an inescapable reality that Iran’s systematic
non-compliance with the JCPOA nuclear deal has rendered it dead,
despite the efforts of the US and the E3 to resuscitate it. Yet
all the available evidence suggests that the E3 and the US remain
committed, albeit perhaps forlornly, to desperately resuscitating
the 2015 framework. There seems to be no plan B under
consideration.
The reported terms of the renewed nuclear agreement make for
alarming reading. Not only will it leave much of Iran’s nuclear
infrastructure intact; it will also receive enormous sanctions
relief. It is clear that this will again fail to provide a
long-term, sustainable answer to Iran’s belligerent nuclear
actions.
The great risk is that, in the absence of an ambitious, broad and
punitive nuclear framework, Iran will become a nuclear-armed
state in a matter of years—perhaps just three. Buying time is not
a viable strategy for the UK Government. At some point, the
international community is likely to be faced with an Iranian
regime arming itself with a nuclear weapon. We will have far
fewer options in tackling that scenario than we do today.
The lesson that we learned from Iraq is that we do not invade
sovereign states without a plan, so our plan must be formed now.
If we are to avoid military action of any kind, we must seek an
assurance from the Iranians that they will abide with an
agreement.
One of the other great weaknesses of the JCPOA was its failure to
address Iran’s blatant arming and funding of its terrorist
proxies. That led directly to the conflicts in Lebanon, Yemen,
Syria and other parts of the world. That was hard to stomach at
the time and we need to address it again today.
We cannot allow funds, resources, men, manpower and money to go
into furthering conflicts around the world. That would not only
provoke greater incivility but provide more impetus for migration
and create evermore refugees in the international community. We
would be assisting in that objective, and we must stop it. These
terror groups are primed to unleash, at any second, horrific
violence against civilian targets across the world, all at the
behest of their Iranian paymasters.
In her summing up, will the Minister provide justification for
why we appear to be compounding the great mistakes of the
previous agreement in 2015? Will she assure us that she is making
it a priority to tackle this issue? I join colleagues in asking
her to consider proscribing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. At the very least, we owe that to the British victims of
that organisation.
I have previously welcomed the Foreign Secretary’s commitment
to
“work night and day to prevent the Iranian regime from ever
becoming a nuclear power.”
I hope that she will keep up that commitment, but does the
Minister believe that the deal under consideration is truly
capable of preventing Iran from getting its hands on the most
devastating weapons known to man? In the event of a new JCPOA,
can the Minister outline what further steps will be taken to
build on what has clearly become a limited and ineffective
mechanism?
Time is upon us, and history will judge us for the decisions we
make today and on any future agreement. For the safety and
security of not only the middle east but the wider world, we must
do the right thing. That may be a hard decision, and it may be a
difficult process, but failure to do so could ultimately lead to
greater conflict.
2.08pm
(Harrow East) (Con)
I add my congratulations to my right hon. Friend the Member for
Newark () and, indeed, the hon.
Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak () on sponsoring this debate and
allowing us to have our say as Back Benchers.
It is clear that we are seeking to challenge Iran’s capability to
develop nuclear weapons. Given that the current President of the
United States was Vice President during President Obama’s regime,
which led to the JCPOA in the first place, it is no surprise that
he will seek to resuscitate the deal struck at that time.
However, we have to face up to facts, and the first fact is that,
even if Iran has not acquired nuclear weapons, it is closer than
ever before to achieving that aim. The UK and other participants
in the JCPOA must insist on dealing with this new dangerous
threshold, with many experts predicting that Iran could have a
nuclear weapon within weeks. At the same time, the regime is
announcing further steps to decrease co-operation with the IAEA
and continuing its nuclear provocations in breach of the JCPOA.
None of those activities has any credible civilian justification,
according to the UK, France and Germany.
The regime’s nuclear advances are dangerous and illegal. The
existing nuclear deal has proven to be totally and utterly
inadequate and it has done nothing to end the regime’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the UK’s softline approach has
only emboldened the regime to continue its illegal nuclear
provocations with impunity. It is therefore time for the UK and
the rest of the west to adopt a firm policy towards the regime in
Iran that holds Tehran accountable for its nuclear provocations
rather than rewarding it with more sanctions relief, as has been
suggested.
The UK and other western participants in the JCPOA must abandon
their flawed approach to the nuclear deal and, as colleagues have
mentioned, refer the regime’s nuclear dossier to the UN Security
Council and reinstate previous UN Security Council resolutions
that were suspended by the JCPOA. In fact, at the time that the
sanctions were starting to bite and have an impact, we removed
them.
Given the time restrictions, I will not go through my dossier of
JCPOA violations that Iran has committed. I declare up front my
interest as chairman of the all-party Britain-Israel
parliamentary group, as an officer of Conservative Friends of
Israel and as a very strong supporter of the National Council of
Resistance of Iran, the resistance movement in Iran, which seeks
to democratise Iran and restore freedom and democracy to it, as
should be the case. I will concentrate my remarks not only on
preventing Iran from achieving nuclear weapon status, but on
Iran’s key motivation of providing strategic protection for the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Any debate on ending Iranian aggression must include provisions
for combating the IRGC. If we do not proscribe that organisation
now, its threat will become only greater if Iran becomes a
nuclear state. The reality is that, if Iran becomes a nuclear
state, it will have the shield to use the IRGC to spread
terrorism not just around the region, but around the world, and
it will do so with impunity.
Iran is the world’s premier supporter of terror. The IRGC was
rightfully proscribed by the United States in 2019 and I, like
others, have been worried that the US is considering delisting it
at Iran’s request. Far from delisting it, the United Kingdom
should proscribe the IRGC, as should the rest of the west.
However, despite the fact that one of our closest allies
proscribed the revolutionary guard corps, we continue to drag our
heels while Iran’s spider web of terror stretches across the
middle east and beyond and begins to grasp at Europe, on our
doorstep.
For those who are unfamiliar with the revolutionary guard corps,
I will set out its pattern of supporting terror and spreading
instability and its authoritarian grip over the people of Iran.
The revolutionary guard corps openly supports Hezbollah by
providing financial assistance, weapons, ammunition and military
training. Hezbollah has reportedly acquired 150,000 missiles—I
repeat: 150,000 missiles, targeted at Israel alone—and Iran
continues to attempt deliveries of weaponry to the proxy to
threaten others in the region.
The al-Ashtar Brigades is another IRGC-directed terror group. It
has claimed responsibility for—rather, admitted to—several terror
attacks in Bahrain and often calls for attacks against the
British Government on social media. That brings this home: not
only is this about other states in the middle east, but the
British Government and the British people are under direct threat
from the IRGC.
These terror groups are rightfully already proscribed by Britain,
but we do not hold the organisation that funds and directs them
to the same account. In 2009, it was reported that the IRGC was
linked to the kidnapping of five Britons in Iraq, three of whom
were murdered. One of the surviving hostages, Peter Moore, was
kidnapped due to his work installing a system that would allow
the Iraqi Government to understand how much international aid was
being funnelled to Iran’s terror groups in Iraq.
More recently, although Britain stands steadfast with the people
of Ukraine, reports indicate that the IRGC-controlled airline
Qeshm Fars Air has made a minimum of seven flights to Moscow
since April. According to retired US Admiral Craig Faller, it is
likely that the airline is used by Iran to transport military aid
and personnel. Given US reports in March that Russia was
attempting to bolster its forces with Syrian mercenaries, is it
not conceivable that the revolutionary guard corps is aiding the
Russian invasion by transporting those troops and undermining
British efforts to protect Ukrainian sovereignty?
The revolutionary guard corps has grown to have a powerful grasp
over almost every aspect of Iranian life. It is holding the
people of Iran hostage in their country. The decent people of
Iran wish to see the country return to a positive role in the
international community. I note the remarks of the right hon.
Member for Islington North (), whom I rarely agree with,
but the fact is that the decent people of Iran want a return to
the norm in the international community and not to be a country
that acts as a terror-supporting pariah state.
We must show the Iranian people that we are willing to hold the
IRGC accountable for its nefarious activities in ways that the
moderates of Iran cannot for fear of death and destruction. I
simply ask the Minister: how many more terrorists must the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fund, how many more innocents
must die, and how many more must it kidnap before we finally
proscribe it as a terror organisation?
Over the past few weeks, I have been inundated by emails from
constituents calling on the Home Office to proscribe the IRGC in
its entirety and to sequestrate its assets. I say to people
listening out there: please bombard the Home Office with emails
requesting that action to be taken—[Interruption.] No, the Home
Office, because it does the proscription—that is key. We can
therefore build the campaign to ensure—[Interruption.] I
completely accept that the Minister cannot respond to this now,
but my message, clearly, to the Home Secretary and colleagues is
this: let us proscribe the IRGC in its entirety. Let us build the
campaign across the United Kingdom to make that happen, so that
the people of Britain can speak up for the moderate people of
Iran and free them from that terrorist regime.
2.17pm
(Bracknell) (Con)
Time is short and we need to progress to the end of this debate,
so I will be brief and offer a pragmatic view. I have listened
with great interest to Members on both sides of the House and I
broadly support the direction of travel. Of course, we are yet to
hear from the Minister.
Of most concern to me is that the time needed to produce uranium
for one nuclear weapon in Iran is now three weeks. That is called
the break-out time and it has fallen from one year. Clearly, the
nuclear aspirations, technologies and advancements have
progressed significantly in Iran. I want to pose this question:
how might the UK and other allied states in the middle east put
Iran back on the road to peace and prosperity as part of the
international community? However, this is also about working with
Iran and doing what we can to help that regime.
The big question is about the restoration of Iran’s 2015 nuclear
deal, the JCPOA, which has been mentioned. That was agreed with
world powers, including China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK
and the USA. As we know, the accord was unilaterally abandoned by
the US in 2018 under Trump, who then imposed heavy sanctions on
Iran. Those have been eased since Biden came into office, but
this perhaps put Iran closer than ever to achieving nuclear
power. Since 2020, talks have been revived, but only
intermittently, so we need the US fully engaged again.
Thankfully, indirect talks between Iran and the US began on 29
June in Qatar, with the EU mediating. All sides are agreed that a
restored deal is the best outcome, but such a deal could still
legitimise Iran’s nuclear transgressions. I am also told by some
sources that a successful deal may bring Iranian oil back to the
market, but, for the reasons outlined so eloquently by my right
hon. Friend the Member for Newark (), I do not subscribe to that
view, although I recognise the counter-arguments.
So where are we? Earlier this month, in response to a resolution
introduced by the US, France, the UK and Germany censuring Iran,
it took down 27 IAEA cameras, making tracking activity at its
nuclear sites much harder. Iran has never been closer to a
nuclear weapon. The stockpile today is 18 times the limit agreed
in 2015. Iran has a missile capability—we know that—and in March
2022 the IRGC adopted a new independent branch called the Command
for the Protection and Security of Nuclear Centres, so
developments are worrying.
My first question to the Minister is whether we think that
sanctions work—I think they probably do, for reasons outlined
this afternoon—or whether they are redundant. Is a restored deal
the best option for now, noting that Iran is doing this anyway?
We know that Iran has committed nuclear transgressions since the
2015 deal. What assessment has been made of the viability of a
renewed JCPOA in preventing Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons
capability—again, noting that it is happening anyway?
We know that the sunset provisions of the 2015 deal are coming up
to their expiration date. We also know that the international
community could face either having to accept Iran as a nuclear
power or, potentially, undertaking military action. That is a
very stark choice. How much would we have to compromise to renew
a deal that would prevent Iran from getting a weapon, noting that
Iran is very close to getting that weapon?
For what it is worth, my take is that Iran should come back into
the international community, as we do not want it to progress its
activities alongside rogue states. But at what price? We need to
better understand the relationship between Iran and its
neighbours in the middle east; we also need to better understand
the position of our allies in the middle east, to ensure that
their needs are best met.
I suspect that it is pragmatic at this stage to call on the
Government to extend the sunset clauses, enact a stricter
monitoring regime, retain terrorist proscriptions, reinforce
existing friendships and relationships with allies in the middle
east and press against Iran’s destabilising impacts in the
region, but I would want to see a way forward in which Iran is at
the table as part of a solution. But, of course, nothing should
be off the table.
Madam Deputy Speaker ( )
I call the SNP spokesperson.
2.23pm
(Aberdeen North) (SNP)
I congratulate the right hon. Member for Newark () on bringing this debate to
the House, and I thank the Backbench Business Committee for
ensuring that it could happen. There has been an awful lot of
accord across the House today; it seems that we are all raising
similar concerns and we are all keen to find a way forward. It is
not quite a matter of semantics, but perhaps there is just a
slight disagreement about the way forward and the best way to
tackle the issue.
The joint comprehensive plan of action was never ideal, but it
was better than no deal and we need to recognise that it was a
major diplomatic achievement. The SNP joins Members across the
House who have called for Iran to halt its activities that are in
violation of the JCPOA. We hope to see detailed, precise and deep
talks this week. There is an urgent need for a diplomatic
solution and an urgent need to end Iran’s nuclear escalation.
We agree with the concerns that have been raised about Iran’s
stated intention to end all JCPOA-related transparency measures
and about the action that it has already taken in that regard.
Transparency is incredibly important, and any future deal needs
to put that at the heart of the agreements made.
There are other risks that have not been mentioned in the Chamber
today. Bilateral work on tackling climate change and on tackling
the Afghan refugee crisis is currently on ice because of the
present situation. Regardless of escalation and nuclear uranium
enrichment, the climate crisis and the Afghan refugee crisis are
not going away. We must work to tackle them. As several hon.
Members have said, we must ensure that we put people at the heart
of our approach and that we work to improve human rights in the
region, as well as ensuring that the people of Iran are decoupled
from the action of their Government and given the opportunity to
flourish.
We agree with the calls for the UK to use our place to press the
regime—and to press all regimes that have issues with human
rights or are committing human rights abuses, whether that is
Iran, Saudi, Russia or any of the countries committing human
rights abuses against their citizens or citizens of other
countries.
I criticise the unilateral actions that Donald Trump took, on the
basis that taking unilateral action on this is not the way
forward. The way forward is for everybody to work together as
international partners to get a settlement. The reality is that
the situation is potentially worse than it could have been if
those unilateral actions had not been taken. It is better to act
in concert.
We welcome President Biden’s commitment not just to returning to
the deal, but to strengthen the areas in which it is defective
and extend the JCPOA. I have not much mentioned wider regional
security, but we need to ensure that action is taken and that
there is international co-operation with respect to Iran’s
issues, its causing of regional instability and the actions that
it is taking to destabilise countries around the world, as
several contributors to the debate have mentioned. That needs to
be a matter of priority.
As somebody who believes that we should not have nuclear weapons
anywhere in the world, I am massively concerned to see the
upscaling of Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities. We need to
ensure that talks happen, whether that is around the table this
week or in some future round of talks. We need to ensure that the
UK’s international power is used to put pressure on, and to
de-escalate the situation as quickly and as properly as we
possibly can.
Madam Deputy Speaker ( )
I call the shadow Minister.
2.28pm
(Enfield, Southgate)
(Lab)
I thank the right hon. Member for Newark () and my hon. Friend the
Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak () for securing this excellent
and important debate, and hon. Members across the House who have
contributed to it.
The JCPOA was a landmark agreement. Labour fully supported the
Vienna negotiations aimed at restoring it. We remain hopeful that
a way forward can be found, including in the latest rounds of
talks in Doha, co-ordinated by the European Union. It is
absolutely right that the UK Government engage with those
negotiations. We continue to believe that the JCPOA framework
remains the best option to limit Iran’s nuclear programme, based
on restoring Iranian compliance in exchange for sanctions relief.
A pragmatic approach should be pursued, as the hon. Member for
Bracknell () said, and it is
important that the US engages with Iran as part of the diplomatic
process to restore the JCPOA.
In the short term, pressure must be applied on Tehran to reverse
its enrichment programme so that it is within the limits of the
initial agreement. Iran must also refrain from further steps that
would reduce the possibility of a return to that agreement. In
the longer term, however, the UK Government must show leadership.
Our aims should be not just to restore the JCPOA, but to address
the long-standing issues and other aspects of the Iranian
Government’s actions that cause serious concern. These include
much more than restricting and monitoring the country’s nuclear
capability, important though that is. I note that the right hon.
Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) has called for a
“stronger, longer deal”. Indeed, we are greatly worried about the
destabilising influence of Iran, which poses a serious threat to
security in the region. That is why I believe we must do more to
hold the Iranian regime to account.
In 2018, as we know, the Trump Administration withdrew the US
from the JCPOA. It was completely wrong for the US to walk away
from the agreement and reimpose sanctions. That decision was
taken without support from the other signatories to the deal,
including the UK, and the reckless action of the US Government at
the time has been deeply damaging. Since the American withdrawal
from the JCPOA, Iran has flagrantly violated the agreement’s
terms. It has pursued a dangerous path of non-compliance. It has
increased the quality and quantity of its enriched uranium
production far beyond the JCPOA limits.
As the hon. Member for Strangford () and the right hon. Member for Clwyd West (Mr Jones)
have pointed out today, Tehran’s persistent refusal to co-operate
with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the global nuclear
watchdog, in matters including its inquiry into prior nuclear
activities, signals Iran’s lack of transparency while it
continues to increase its nuclear capability. For example, the
IAEA has reported that Iran is enriching uranium up to 60% to
produce highly enriched uranium, and in August 2021 the IAEA
verified that it had begun producing uranium metal, which has
little civilian purpose and is applicable to nuclear weapons
development. As we heard from the hon. Member for Grantham and
Stamford (), nuclear weapons in the
wrong hands are the gravest of all threats.
Earlier this month, the IAEA announced that Iran was removing 27
surveillance cameras from nuclear sites in what has been
described as a “fatal blow” to the JCPOA and the monitoring of
Iran’s nuclear programme. As Iran continues to escalate its
nuclear activities, we believe that the IAEA’s inspection ability
must be strengthened, and I would be keen to hear more from the
Minister about the steps that the UK Government are taking to
support the strengthening of the IAEA as a matter of urgency.
More widely, we know that the Vienna talks have stalled since
March, not least owing to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I would
like to hear the Minister’s view on the consequences of the
invasion for the future viability of the E3+3 format, which has
been the basis for negotiations with Iran for more than 15 years.
We also know that Iran is currently holding up conclusion of the
agreement, which would return it to its JCPOA commitments and
restore US involvement in the deal. As has been noted, a new
round of talks is under way in Qatar, and we welcome that, but we
cannot underestimate the challenges and the importance of
securing an agreement.
There has been increasing frustration with the Iranian
intransigence that has been seen in these negotiations, and
concerns remain that the regime is attempting to gain leverage
for future negotiations while advancing its nuclear knowledge as
talks are stalled. As was pointed out by the hon. Member for
Harrow East (), this may mean that at some point on its current
trajectory, Iran will soon make irreversible nuclear progress,
rendering the benefits of returning it to its JCPOA commitments
meaningless. That is incredibly concerning. It remains our
steadfast hope that a compromise can be found that will allow for
the restoration of the nuclear agreement, which could then serve
as a basis for addressing many other concerns.
We cannot talk about Iran without discussing wider issues, many
of which have been rightly raised by other Members today.
Although the JCPOA is a critical agreement to limit Iran’s
nuclear capability, it does not address Tehran’s ballistic
missiles programme, which is designed to deliver nuclear weapons,
or its support for terrorist groups and militias throughout the
middle east, including Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen. That
was mentioned by the hon. Member for Hendon (Dr Offord).
These issues need to be addressed, and the Labour Party believes
it is imperative to move them up the international agenda. We are
seriously concerned about the threats that Iran has made against
Israel. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak
referred to Iran’s stated desire to see Israel’s destruction.
Moreover, the JCPOA does not hold Iran to account for its human
rights violations against its own people, or for its continued
engagement in state hostage-taking—an issue of which we in the
House are acutely aware.
As was pointed out by the right hon. Member for Islington North
(), Mehran Raoof and Morad
Tahbaz remain in Iran despite the release of Nazanin
Zaghari-Ratcliffe and Anoosheh Ashoori earlier this year. It is
shameful that the Iranian regime continues to use the two
remaining hostages as political pawns, and the UK Government must
do everything possible to ensure their safe return home to the
UK, as their families were promised.
As for the wider nuclear issues, we believe there is an
opportunity for the UK to take a leadership role at the upcoming
nuclear non-proliferation treaty review conference. The outlook
at present is not good. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has closed
the space for dialogue on critical issues involving arms control,
transparency and confidence-building. The flagrant violations of
the Budapest memorandum send a dangerous message. Proliferation
risks are very significant. There are also many crucial new
issues that need to be addressed, including threats of emerging
technology, especially in the domains of cyber and space. I urge
the Minister to update the House on the UK’s priorities for the
conference in August, and on how the UK can lead from the front
on these matters internationally.
If diplomacy and efforts to restore the JCPOA fail, the
consequences may be severe. The return of sanctions, a rapid
expansion of Iranian nuclear activity, and a heightened risk of
military tension in the region are likely outcomes. As we have
heard from right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House
today, there is broad agreement that the restoration of the JCPOA
would be an important step, and I therefore ask the Government to
continue to pursue every possible avenue diplomatically to help
to promote and restore the nuclear deal with Iran. However, it is
not the only step, and it should not be the only aim. We must
continue to support our international partners, including Israel,
by holding the regime to account, and we must ensure that the
wider issues that I, and many others, have mentioned today are
not left unaddressed by the UK and our international allies.
2.36pm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign,
Commonwealth and Development Affairs ()
I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for
Newark () and the hon. Member for
Birmingham, Selly Oak () for securing this important
debate. I share their grave concerns, and those of many Members,
about the potential for a nuclear armed Iran.
In his opening remarks, my right hon. Friend the Member for
Newark said that it was important for the Government to listen to
what Members say about this subject. We are listening, and it is
my pleasure to respond on behalf of the Government. I am also
grateful for the contributions of the other Members who have
spoken, and I will try to respond to many of the points that have
been raised.
Time after time, we have seen Iran take actions that directly
undermine global security, freedom and democracy, and challenge
the international order. The UK is taking a tough stance: Iran
must end its threatening behaviour and destabilising regional
activity, and must also return to its JCPOA commitments.
Iran’s nuclear programme has never been more advanced than it is
today, and our objective remains to ensure that the country never
acquires a nuclear weapon. The escalation of its nuclear
activities is threatening regional and international peace and
security, and undermining the global non-proliferation system.
Along with our partners, the United Kingdom has worked
intensively to find a diplomatic solution. Over the last year we
have worked alongside Germany, France, the United States and
others to find a solution that would return Iran to compliance
with its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA.
In March 2022, we left Vienna after reaching the end of talks. At
that point there was a viable deal on the table that would return
Iran to compliance with its commitments and return the US to the
deal, reversing Iran’s nuclear escalation and lifting US
sanctions related to the JCPOA. Iran has not accepted the deal,
and time is running out. Iran should urgently take the offer on
the table; there will not be a better one.
I agree that the JCPOA is not perfect, but it does represent a
pathway for constraining Iran’s nuclear programme. A restored
JCPOA would provide a foundation for international diplomatic
efforts to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme remained peaceful
in the long-term. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Dr
Offord), my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark and the hon.
Member for Strangford () pointed out, there are some issues regarding sunset
provisions. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak also
mentioned the switching off of the cameras, as did my hon. Friend
the Member for Bracknell ().
I want to make it clear that if Iran returns to the JCPOA, our
priority is the extension of the sunset clauses and enabling a
stricter monitoring regime. Should the JCPOA collapse, however,
we will consider all options in partnership with our allies. Let
me repeat that: if a deal is not struck soon the JCPOA will
collapse, and in that scenario we will carefully consider all our
options in partnership with our allies. Those options may include
new sanctions. I accept that the JCPOA does not address wider
regional security issues, but a return to the deal would
contribute positively to regional prosperity and security in the
middle east and could pave the way for further discussions on
regional and security concerns.
Iran must stop its destabilising behaviour. We believe it is
important to encourage Iran to take a more constructive approach
to its relationship with its neighbours. The UK has long made
clear our concern about Iran’s reckless destabilising activity in
the region, including the political, financial and military
support that it gives to militants and proscribed terrorist
groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, to militias in
Iraq and to the Houthis in Yemen.
Iran’s support for these groups and activities risks the security
and prosperity in the region. They pose a direct threat to the UK
and to our interests as well as to the safety of our allies.
Regional security and that of our allies remains one of our top
concerns, and we are working with allies to constrain Iran’s
ability to conduct destabilising activities in the region. We
will continue to do so, whether or not a deal is signed.
We will continue our work with allies and partners to hold Iran
to account for breaches of UN security resolutions. That includes
supporting enforcement of UN prohibitions on the proliferation of
weapons to non-state actors in the region, including to Hezbollah
and to the Houthis in Yemen. We continue to build on the existing
co-operation between the UK and our partners to counter the
activities of Iran and its proxies in the region, including in
our work to support stability in Iraq and to end the conflicts in
Yemen and Syria.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon mentioned the Paris bomb
plot and his experiences at that time. The UK Government always
strongly condemn the targeting of civilians and we welcome the
fact that those responsible for that plot in Paris in 2018 have
been held to account. We also welcome the work by the Belgian
courts in convicting four individuals last year, including
Asadollah Asadi, who received a 20-year sentence.
The integrated review outlines our contribution to maritime
security, upholding the principle of freedom of navigation. The
UK is working to ensure the safety of shipping in the middle
east, including in the Strait of Hormuz. We deter Iran from
disrupting maritime security through our contributions to the
international maritime security construct and the combined
maritime forces.
A number of Members mentioned sanctions. The UK continues to
maintain a range of sanctions aimed at addressing Iran’s
destabilising behaviour. We have over 200 sanctions designations
in place. Those include the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
and sanctions related to human rights, proliferation and
terrorism.
My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East () and others spoke in detail about the IRGC. We have
made clear our concerns about its continuing destabilising
activity throughout the region, and we maintain a range of
sanctions that are working to constrain that activity. The list
of proscribed organisations is kept under constant review, but we
do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is under
consideration for proscription so I cannot comment on that; I
know that my hon. Friend understands the reasons why.
A number of Members spoke about those who have been detained, and
in particular about Morad Tahbaz. The Iranian Government
committed to releasing Morad from prison on indefinite furlough
but they failed to honour that commitment. His continuing
horrendous ordeal sends a clear message to the international
community that Iran does not honour its commitments. We continue
to urge the Iranian authorities at every opportunity to release
him immediately. He must be allowed to return to his family’s
home in Tehran without further delay. Morad is a tri-national,
and we are working closely with the United States to release
him.
Let me conclude by saying that it is in no one’s interest to see
a nuclear-armed Iran. The UK is firm in its commitment to the
security and prosperity of our allies in the region, and to
working with the international community to hold Iran to account
for its destabilising activity. We urge, and will continue to
urge, Iran to cease its nuclear escalation and to conclude the
deal currently on the table to restore the JCPOA while that is
still possible. If that does not happen, we will work with our
international partners to consider all options.
2.47pm
I am extremely grateful to the Minister for her response, and to
all my hon. and right hon. Friends and colleagues across the
House for contributing to a thoughtful and informed debate this
afternoon. I am particularly grateful to the hon. Member for
Birmingham, Selly Oak () for supporting the debate,
and to my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East () for contributing and for his role on the Backbench
Business Committee that made today possible.
We heard a range of views from across the Chamber today, but I
think it was clear that no one spoke in favour of a return to the
JCPOA as is. Numerous colleagues spoke in favour of a negotiated
settlement with Iran, but all expressed concern at the terms of
the JCPOA itself. I therefore ask the Minister to reflect on the
contributions she has heard today, because I think there would be
grave concern if she and the Government were to enter into an
agreement that did not have, for example, extended sunset
provisions or greater enforcement provisions or that permitted
the de-proscribing of terrorist-supporting organisations such the
IRGC. That does not seem to me, in the light of today’s debate,
to be the will of this House. It would be unwise of the
Government to sign an important international agreement for which
there is little, if any, support in this House.
I ask the Minister to reflect on one further point. My hon.
Friend the Member for Harrow East and many others eloquently said
that it seems to be the will of this House, and of many outside,
that the IRGC is proscribed. We have made great steps in recent
years in proscribing both Hamas and Hezbollah following
cross-party campaigns, and I think now is the time to take the
next logical step and proscribe the IRGC. I ask her, on our
behalf, to take that message to the Foreign Secretary and the
Home Secretary, who have joint responsibility, and to ask them to
take all steps to proscribe that organisation as soon as
possible.
On behalf of all hon. and right hon. Members here today, I ask
the Minister to pass on our thanks to her officials in the
Foreign Office for their hard work in the talks thus far, and to
ask them to take action to reflect the views of this House as
they continue those negotiations on the country’s behalf.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House expresses grave concern at the imminent prospect
of a nuclear armed Iran; calls on the Government in its ongoing
negotiations in respect of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPoA) agreement to seek to extend the sunset clauses, enact a
stricter monitoring regime, retain terrorist proscriptions, and
expand its scope to include Iran’s other destabilising activities
in the region
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