Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High-Risk Countries)
(Amendment) Regulations 2022 4.30pm The Economic Secretary to the
Treasury (John Glen) I beg to move, That the Committee has
considered the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High-Risk
Countries) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (S.I. 2022, No. 393). It is
a pleasure to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Mr Hosie.
The Government recognise the threat that economic crime poses to
the...Request free trial
Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing (High-Risk Countries) (Amendment) Regulations
2022
4.30pm
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury ()
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing (High-Risk Countries) (Amendment) Regulations
2022 (S.I. 2022, No. 393).
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Mr
Hosie.
The Government recognise the threat that economic crime poses to
the UK and our international partners, and are committed to
combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Illicit
finance causes significant social and economic costs through its
links to serious and organised crime. It is a threat to our
national security, and risks damaging our international
reputation as a fair, open, rules-based economy. It also
undermines the integrity and stability of our financial sector,
and can reduce opportunities for legitimate business in the UK.
That is why we are taking significant action to combat economic
crime through the economic crime levy and the Economic Crime
(Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, and by progressing the
Government’s landmark economic crime plan. We are also working
closely with the private sector and our international partners to
improve the investigation of economic crime, strengthen
international standards on corporate transparency, and crack down
on illicit financial flows.
The money laundering regulations support our overall efforts. As
the UK’s core legislative framework for tackling money laundering
and terrorist financing, they set out various measures that
businesses must take to protect the UK from illicit financial
flows. Under the regulations, businesses are required to conduct
enhanced checks on business relationships and transactions with
high-risk third countries, which are countries identified as
having strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorism financing regimes that could pose a significant
threat to the UK’s financial system.
This statutory instrument amends the money laundering regulations
to update the UK’s list of high-risk third countries to mirror
lists published by the Financial Action Task Force, the global
standard-setter for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism
financing. The UK’s high-risk third countries list will now
include the United Arab Emirates, and will no longer include
Zimbabwe. In March 2022, the UAE was listed by the FATF, and
Zimbabwe was removed, having completed its FATF action plan to
address the key deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and
terrorist financing regimes.
As the Financial Action Task Force carries out its periodic
reviews and regularly updates its public lists of jurisdictions
with strategic deficiencies, we also need to update our own.
Updating our list shows that we are responsive to the latest
economic crime threats, and ensures that the UK remains at the
forefront of global standards on anti-money laundering and
terrorist financing. This amendment will enable the money
laundering regulations to continue to work as effectively as
possible to protect the UK financial system. It is crucial for
protecting UK businesses and the financial system from money
launderers and terrorist financers. I therefore hope that
colleagues will join me in supporting this legislation.
4.33pm
(Hampstead and Kilburn)
(Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hosie. The
Labour party is completely committed to supporting the global
effort to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The
Financial Action Task Force has long warned about the major
weaknesses in the United Arab Emirates’ anti-money laundering
framework, not least its chaotic approach to registering
companies, which makes it near impossible for law enforcement
agencies to find out what is behind a suspicious company
registered in the country. I will come to the Financial Action
Task Force’s decision on Zimbabwe later, but it came as little
surprise when that intergovernmental organisation
decided—correctly, in my opinion—to add the UAE to the greylist
of high-risk countries at its meeting last month. We on the
Labour Benches therefore wholeheartedly support the regulations,
and welcome the inclusion of the UAE in the UK’s list of
high-risk third countries for money laundering.
However, the Minister will not be surprised to hear that I have a
few questions for him. Will he explain how we got here? As
Spotlight on Corruption—a campaign group that works to end
corruption within the UK and wherever the UK has influence—and
others have pointed out, the UK Government are supposedly a key
partner of the UAE in tackling illicit finance. The Government
must take some responsibility for the UAE’s failure to improve
its anti-money laundering controls.
The co-operation between the UK and the UAE dates back to 2019,
when the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office appointed
an illicit finance policy lead at the British embassy in Abu
Dhabi as part of the UK Government’s newly deployed serious and
organised crime network, while the 2020-2021 Gulf strategy fund
programme committed to improving the UAE and UK’s joint ability
to tackle illicit finance and last year’s integrated review vowed
to increase the UK’s co-operation with our close partner, the
UAE, to tackle global illicit financial flows.
Indeed, last September the Home Secretary went as far as to
describe this co-operation as a “new landmark partnership” to
“raise professional standards on countering money
laundering.”
Will the Minister set out exactly what went wrong? Why did the UK
Government’s so-called “landmark partnership” fail so terribly at
improving the UAE’s anti-money laundering controls? As he will
know, that failure has had tragic consequences. It has been
reported in The Guardian, The New York Times and elsewhere that
Russian kleptocrats linked to the Kremlin are now moving their
assets to the UAE to avoid western sanctions. As a country, we
cannot stand by as Russia exploits the UAE’s lax financial system
to fund its bloody war in Ukraine.
I understand that as part of the UK and UAE’s illicit finance
partnership, there are annual meetings between the Home Secretary
and the UAE Minister of State to ensure progress on money
laundering. Will the Minister tell us what work the Government
have been doing in the lead-up to that meeting to press the UAE
to take the necessary steps to prevent illicit finance from
Russia and elsewhere from flowing through its economy? Does the
Minister agree that if the UK is to successfully influence the
UAE to crack down on money laundering and terrorist financing,
his Government must first get its own house in order?
For years, the Government have stood by as dirty money from
Russia and elsewhere flooded the UK’s financial services sector.
It was only after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February
this year that the Government finally passed an economic crime
Act. Even then, Ministers had to be dragged through the Lobby to
rush through legislation that could have been passed years
ago.
The job of closing down the London laundromat of dirty money is
only half done. To restore the UK’s international reputation, the
Government must fast-track the publication of the much delayed
register of overseas beneficial ownership of property in the UK,
and urgently implement reform of Companies House to crack down on
shell companies hiding cash in Britain. Only then will the UK
have the moral authority to exert influence over the UAE and our
other international partners in the fight against global money
laundering.
Finally, I want to ask the Minister about his Government’s
approach to the UK’s autonomous list of high-risk third
countries. I am not overly concerned about the removal of
Zimbabwe from the list; Zimbabwe is not a major international
transit centre for dirty money, and the UK’s financial services
sector has limited interaction with companies and individuals
linked to its Government. However, I want to hear reassurances
and details from the Minister today on how his Government will
continue to monitor money laundering and terrorist financing
risks linked to Zimbabwe, despite the country’s removal from the
list.
Will the Minister explain why Russia is not included on the UK’s
list, despite the huge threat that dirty money from Russia poses
to our national security? Although we support the Government’s
policy of automatically including countries added to the
international greylists and blacklists, surely it would be in the
UK’s interest to include on our high-risk list certain countries,
such as Russia, regardless of whether or not the Financial Action
Task Force has decided to omit them.
For all their tough talk on dirty money from Russia, the
Government have yet to convince us that they are committed to
cracking down on money laundering in the UK and abroad, and that
has been demonstrated by their delay on Companies House reform
and the failure of their partnership with the UAE to improve that
country’s anti-money laundering regime. We welcome the
regulations, but ultimately the UK is simply following the lead
of the Financial Action Task Force. The Government have to do
much better than this if they are serious about ending the UK’s
reputation as a safe haven for dirty money. I hope the Minister
will answer the questions that I have set out.
4.40pm
Sir (Scarborough and Whitby)
(Con)
I do not want to detain the Committee long, as I very much
support the measures before us today, but will the Minister
comment on some of the activity by the financial institutions,
particularly the high street banks, which has become more of a
box-ticking operation than perhaps an intelligence-led
investigatory process? Let me give one example from my own
experience as a North Yorkshire farmer with a turnover of less
than £200,000.
I was telephoned by my bank, HSBC, some years ago to ask whether
I had done any business in Iran. It is a little ridiculous to
start interrogating farmers, and crofters in Scotland, about
their activities. Many small businesses are being asked a load of
questions that can only be seen as box-ticking exercises. That
same bank was fined £63.9 million in December last year for not
monitoring financial transactions—for a period the whole of Wales
was not being monitored—and was previously fined £1.2 billion in
the USA for not being on top of money laundering associated with
the drugs trade.
Another area where the bank seemed to be overly officious is with
regard to politically exposed persons. Every Member of Parliament
is a politically exposed person, and in many cases it is almost
like we are too difficult. I have heard stories from colleagues
whose sons and daughters cannot get mortgages, because it seems
too difficult to answer the questions about whether we are
subject to bribes or other types of illegal financial activity,
when in fact the UK is very high on the global index of
non-criminal activity among our political classes; we are one of
the least corrupt countries in the world.
Will the Minister talk a little about working with the financial
institutions in the implementation of the measure to ensure that
we target dodgy transactions and do not just tick boxes for North
Yorkshire farmers who might be doing some business in Iran, or
indeed for Members of this House and other Parliaments around the
world who seem to be getting the glare of attention from these
institutions, which should perhaps be looking elsewhere for
illegal activity?
4.42pm
I will endeavour to address the points made by the hon. Member
for Hampstead and Kilburn, but I will turn first to the two
points made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough
and Whitby, the first of which was on the nature of the
regulator’s engagement with small entities—he cited his own in
North Yorkshire. The new chief executive of the Financial Conduct
Authority, who was appointed in October 2020, is undertaking a
transformation programme at the FCA that is designed to
interrogate risks more effectively and to target compliance
activity more proportionately. A lot of progress has been made,
but clearly there is more to be done. I will be happy to take up
any individual examples that my right hon. Friend raises
formally.
My right hon. Friend also raised the issue of PEPs—politically
exposed persons—and the frustrations that occur when colleagues
are prevented from accessing financial services products, as well
as the consequences of not resolving that issue. There is a
framework for light-touch, proportionate and appropriate
interrogation of such risks, although sometimes those processes
are not always executed properly. I have taken that up on two
occasions over the last few years, and there has been an
incremental step change each time, although the situation is not
yet perfect. Again, I will be happy to take that up that
issue.
The hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn raised three points—on
the UAE, Zimbabwe and Russia—which I will take in turn. On the
listing of the UAE, she recognises the history. At the March 2022
FATF plenary, the FATF concluded that the UAE should be added to
the list of jurisdictions with significant weaknesses in its
counter-illicit finance regimes, but recognised that the UAE had
made significant progress. A lot of FATF assessments are not
black and white, as many of the countries are on a journey, but
in my experience the FATF is pretty rigorous in its assessments
and pretty unashamed in intervening, regardless of any lobbying.
I am clear that the process is rigorous and thorough.
The UAE expressed its high-level political commitment to making
further reforms in a number of areas in order to exit the FATF
list. The UK is working closely with the UAE to address those
weaknesses in the UK-UAE partnership in order to tackle illicit
finance. By aligning the UK’s approach to that of the FATF, the
UK is in line with international standards. The identification of
countries is underpinned by the FATF’s consistent technical
methodology and robust assessment processes. On occasion, other
countries’ representatives have challenged those processes,
asking me, “Would the UK intervene?”; we do not. As a key,
leading member of the FATF—one of its 39 countries—we stand by
its methodology.
The hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn asked a number of
questions about the history of the relationship with the UAE, and
cited Spotlight on Corruption and other organisations, such as
Transparency International. We look carefully at what they have
to say. I cannot answer her questions about the specifics of the
UAE-UK relationship historically, but I will write to her if I
can find any more information.
The hon. Lady made a number of assertions about the FATF and
where the UK is. I recognise the politics of the matter, and the
movements that the Government have made in this Session and hope
to make in future. I draw her attention to the mutual evaluation
report of the UK’s system in December 2018, which cited the
progress needed on the register of overseas beneficial ownership
and Companies House reform. A large amount of money—£63
million—was allocated to work on Companies House reform at the
last spending review, and the legislation is coming to make good
on that. I do not accept all that the hon. Lady said, but I
welcome the steps that have been taken in these difficult times,
and that will continue to be taken to accelerate and to meet the
conditions set out in that report. Overall, that FATF analysis of
the UK was extremely complementary—one of the best reports it has
ever done—and we should be proud of our progress.
On Zimbabwe, I acknowledge and am grateful for the hon. Lady’s
assent to what I am proposing today. Clearly, there is an ongoing
piece of work with every country. Countries move through the
journey, from being a cause for concern to not a cause for
concern; this measure is the consequence of that. She asked why
Russia has not been added to the high-risk third countries list.
The UK’s HRTC list mirrors those identified by the FATF in its
public documents as having poor anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorist financing controls. I certainly grasp the
optics of where Russia is—that it is not on the list—but by
aligning our approach FATF we remain in line with international
standards. The identification of high-risk countries is
underpinned by that consistent, objective methodology and robust
assessment process.
It is important not to look at the UK’s list of high-risk
jurisdictions in isolation. The money laundering regulations
require enhanced scrutiny in a range of situations that present a
high risk of money laundering, and Russia will be included in
that. Regardless of listing, firms have to make nuanced risk
assessments of business relationships and transactions. The UK’s
national risk assessment on money laundering and terrorist
financing publicly identified Russia as high risk. We will
continue to work with our allies, including the FATF, the EU and
the US on these matters, ensuring the continuation of a
co-ordinated and targeted response to Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine that protects the international financial system as a
consequence.
I have addressed the three countries that the hon. Lady
mentioned. It is the Government’s view that this amendment will
ensure that UK legislation remains up to date and continues to
protect the financial system from the threats posed by
jurisdictions with inadequate money laundering and terrorist
financing systems. The amendment enables the UK to remain in line
with international standards on anti-money laundering and
terrorist financing, allowing it to continue to play its full
part in the fight against economic crime. I hope the Committee
has found my observations somewhat illuminating, and supports the
regulations.
Question put and agreed to.
|