On 08 March, the UK’s Ambassador to the IAEA, Corinne Kitsell,
delivered a statement on behalf of the E3 to the IAEA Board of
Governors addressing Iran’s implementation of its nuclear
commitments under the JCPoA.
"Chair,
France, Germany and the United Kingdom would like to thank
Director General Grossi for his latest report contained in
GOV/2022/4 and Deputy Director General Aparo for his Technical
Briefing. We commend the Agency for its reporting, despite the
limitations placed on its activities in Iran, and support its
independence.
We note with concern that, since the last Board of Governors in
November, Iran has continued to advance its nuclear programme by
developing its stockpile of enriched uranium and conducting
activities that provide permanent and irreversible knowledge
gains. Iran’s nuclear programme has never before been this
advanced, and is exposing the international community to
unprecedented levels of risk.
In particular, Iran has nearly doubled its stockpile of Highly
Enriched Uranium since the last Board and has begun to convert
this material into Highly Enriched Uranium targets over the last
two weeks.
Iran has also continued to stockpile 20% enriched uranium, and
since the last Board, has begun to operate a cascade of advanced
IR-6 centrifuges to do so at the underground Fordow facility.
Iran has no plausible civilian justification for 20% and 60%
enrichment and the production of Highly Enriched Uranium is
unprecedented for a State without a weapons programme.
Accumulation of uranium enriched at 20% and 60% is further
reducing the time Iran would take to break out towards a first
nuclear weapon. Iran’s R&D on, and extensive use of, advanced
centrifuges have permanently improved its enrichment
capabilities. This means that Iran’s continued escalations are
irreversibly reducing the non-proliferation value of the JCPoA.
The IAEA has also been without crucial access to data on
centrifuge and component manufacturing for over a year since Iran
stopped implementing verification and monitoring arrangements
agreed in the JCPoA, and suspended implementation of the
Additional Protocol. The Agency reports that verification and
monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of
Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related
commitments under the JCPoA.
The E3/EU+3 have been engaged in intensive negotiations with Iran
for eleven months. We are now very close to finalising a deal
that would address our most pressing and immediate
non-proliferation concerns, returning Iran’s nuclear programme to
JCPoA limits as well as restoring JCPoA transparency measures and
Iran’s implementation of the Additional Protocol. The rate of
advances in Iran’s nuclear programme means this deal cannot
remain on the table indefinitely. The window of opportunity is
closing. We call on all sides to make the decisions necessary to
close this deal now, and on Russia not to add extraneous
conditions to its conclusion.
We strongly urge Iran to avoid undertaking any new escalations
and in particular, call upon Iran to immediately cease all
activity related to conversion of Highly Enriched Uranium, which
will have practical implications for returning to JCPoA limits.
We urge Iran to prepare to take steps towards reimplementation of
the JCPoA, including by: firstly, ceasing the production of high
enriched uranium and any enrichment above JCPoA limits; secondly,
preparing to dispose of its stockpile of enriched uranium in
excess of JCPoA limits; thirdly, returning enrichment capacities
and R&D to agreed limits; fourthly, stopping all activities
related to the production of uranium metal; and fifthly,
restoring full transparency and cooperation with the IAEA.
We reiterate that Iran must cooperate with the IAEA and enable
the Agency to restore continuity of knowledge over its nuclear
programme, enhancing the Agency’s ability to resume verification
and monitoring, and provide full and effective assurance to the
international community over the peaceful nature of Iran’s
programme. We commend the IAEA for its objective reporting, and
its rigorous and impartial implementation of the mandate
conferred on it by the United Nations Security Council, and we
encourage the Director General to keep the Board informed
regarding progress on monitoring and verification in Iran in all
its aspects. We would welcome the Agency’s latest quarterly
report on monitoring and verification in Iran be made public.
Thank you Chair."
