Moved by Lord Callanan That the Bill be now read a second time. The
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business,
Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con) My Lords, the
Subsidy Control Bill creates a new, bespoke, UK-wide subsidy
control regime that delivers on our national priorities. This Bill
demonstrates the Government’s clear determination to seize the
benefits arising from Brexit and design a UK-tailored regime that
departs...Request free trial
Moved by
That the Bill be now read a second time.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy () (Con)
My Lords, the Subsidy Control Bill creates a new, bespoke,
UK-wide subsidy control regime that delivers on our national
priorities. This Bill demonstrates the Government’s clear
determination to seize the benefits arising from Brexit and
design a UK-tailored regime that departs from the previous
prescriptive and burdensome EU state-aid system. We have designed
a regime that works for the whole of the United Kingdom while at
the same time maintaining our reputation as a trusted and
respected partner on the world stage. This Bill helps us to
honour our international obligations under World Trade
Organization rules, under the UK-EU Trade and Co-operation
Agreement and other free trade agreements.
The regime that the Government have set out in this Bill will
help public authorities to deliver subsidies where they are
needed, without facing excessive bureaucracy or lengthy
pre-approval processes, as seen under the previous EU system. It
allows for greater flexibility and autonomy for public
authorities to deliver on local priorities. However, the
Government are clear that this freedom does not extend to harmful
and excessively distortive subsidies. We are not in the business
of propping up businesses that are unviable or doomed to fail
without government support.
It is also important to set out clearly what this Bill is not. It
is not about intruding on spending decisions for local
authorities or the devolved Administrations, and it will not
dictate the policy decisions that this Government make in
supporting our strategic priorities, from levelling up to net
zero. Public authorities will maintain their spending decisions
in relevant areas and will be supported by clear guidance on how
to grant subsidies in line with the new regime. We will continue
to make the right strategic decisions, to support the people’s
priorities.
For the first time, local authorities, public bodies and the
devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
will be empowered to decide for themselves if they can issue
taxpayer-funded subsidies, by following a set of UK-wide
principles. This will provide them with new freedom and
flexibility to design subsidies and subsidy schemes which meet
local needs, as well as national policy objectives such as
reaching net zero. The seven principles that they will need to
follow are clear and proportionate and form the basis of our new
regime. They set out that subsidies awarded under the new regime
must be justifiable on policy grounds. The subsidy must be
appropriate, proportionate, and designed to minimise any
distortions to competition and investment in the United Kingdom.
These principles, along with additional considerations for energy
and the environment, will ensure that public authorities design
subsidies that bring out the best in our communities while
ensuring consistency. The Government are clear that subsidies are
there to support and encourage businesses, not to prop them
up.
The Government are committed to our international obligations and
relationships with our valued trading partners. Therefore, the
principles also require a public authority to carry out a
balancing test and to proceed only if the benefits of the subsidy
outweigh any distortions to international trade, in addition to
UK competition and investment. These principles will be
underpinned by clear guidance, which will be published ahead of
implementation of the regime. This guidance will support public
authorities to ensure that subsidies deliver strong benefits and
good value for money for the UK taxpayer, and ensure that
subsidies are being awarded in a timely and effective way, to
give businesses the certainty and confidence that they need. The
guidance will also ensure that public authorities fully
understand their legal obligations, and make clear which
subsidies are permitted and which are prohibited.
We want public authorities to be able to deliver subsidies
quickly, easily and without undue burdens. The Government want
low-risk subsidies to proceed with minimum bureaucracy and
maximum certainty, so we will create streamlined subsidy routes
for subsidies that are at low risk of causing market distortions,
and that promote UK-wide strategic policy objectives. These
routes will make demonstrating compliance even simpler than the
baseline method of principle-by-principle assessment. I
appreciate that streamlined routes are a novel approach to
subsidising and that further explication is required. To aid
understanding, we will shortly publish a policy statement and two
draft illustrative routes. Together, they will describe in detail
the Government’s thinking in this area and demonstrate exactly
how these routes will work.
(Con)
I know we have had Covid, but I can still ask a question at
Second Reading, even though it is unusual. Can my noble friend
explain why the guidance and the information that he is
describing has not been made available before we got to Second
Reading?
(Con)
My noble friend makes a good point. We will be publishing the
guidance as soon as it is available. We are still in discussions
with the devolved Administrations and others on the exact design
of the regime and the possibility of obtaining legislative
consent Motions.
The Bill also establishes the UK subsidy advice unit, hosted by
the Competition and Markets Authority. The unit will monitor and
oversee how the regime is working, as well as conducting a
mandatory, non-binding review on public authorities’ assessments
for subsidies of particular interest. Subsidies or schemes of
interest may be referred to the subsidy advice unit. A subsidy or
scheme of particular interest must be referred to the unit, which
will then publish a report detailing its decision within 30
working days. This quick process will allow public authorities to
act with far greater agility than before, while upholding the
highest standards of accountability or transparency. We are clear
that this Bill will allow for agile delivery and proportionate
scrutiny at the same time.
Although we can expect that public authorities will take their
obligations under this regime seriously, we also recognise the
need for a direct route to challenge by interested parties, so
there will be a meaningful, time-limited process for enforcement,
through the competition appeal tribunal. This will ensure that
the subsidy recipients have legal certainty once the window for a
challenge has passed. A key part of effective enforcement is
ensuring that we are as transparent as possible with information
on what subsidies have been awarded. My department listened to
the concerns expressed in the other place about the operation of
the subsidy database. We are editing the database to improve the
quality of information that is available publicly. Of course, the
database is still relatively new. Officials are actively
developing further enhancements over the coming months, in
advance of the new regime coming into force.
A UK-wide subsidy control regime is necessary to ensure that
subsidies do not unduly distort competition within the UK’s
internal market. I repeat, as we have many times before, that we
are wholeheartedly committed to ensuring that the new regime
works for the whole United Kingdom. That is why the Government
have worked closely with the devolved Administrations, including
sharing the consultation response document ahead of publication
and carefully considering their representations. We have met with
DA officials 45 times and Ministers 13 times to talk about the
regime, since July 2020, and we will continue to discuss its
development with DA counterparts ahead of implementation. We will
work closely with the devolved Administrations, but it is
important to reiterate that subsidy control is a matter reserved
for this Parliament. Noble Lords will remember the robust debates
that we had on this matter during the passage of the UK Internal
Market Bill, but I assure them that the devolved Administrations
are and will remain responsible for spending decisions on
devolved subsidies within any domestic subsidy control
system.
As it currently stands, and according to the terms of the
Northern Ireland protocol, subsidies for services in Northern
Ireland will be within scope of the new domestic regime. It is
this Government’s view that it is no longer necessary for
Northern Ireland to be subject to the EU state aid regime, which
is why we have proposed a change to the Northern Ireland protocol
to bring all subsidies within scope of the domestic regime. As
noble Lords will be aware, discussions continue at pace with the
EU on the Northern Ireland protocol. However, no matter the
outcome of these negotiations, the Bill will deliver for the
people of Northern Ireland and ensure that there is clarity on
which rules to follow.
This new independent subsidy control regime will help ensure that
people in all areas of the UK, from Belfast to Bangor, Derby to
Dundee, feel the benefits of targeted subsidies in their areas,
and that prosperity and opportunity is spread right across the
UK. This includes investment in skills, local infrastructure and
new technologies, as well as into research and development. We
have the opportunity here to facilitate subsidies that support
people’s priorities, from tackling regional inequalities, to
combating climate change, to increasing R&D and innovation.
The common-sense energy and environment principles in Schedule 2
of the Bill support the UK’s net-zero ambitions, as well as
contributing to a secure, affordable energy system. Under this
regime, public authorities at all levels of government will be
empowered to give subsidies to help address regional
disadvantages, supporting our levelling-up aims.
Noble Lords will be aware of the delegated powers in the Bill. I
assure them that the powers to make regulations are reasonable
and necessary. The regime will need to change over time in
response to a number of factors, such as exchange rate
fluctuations. Where the Bill includes powers to amend primary
legislation, these have been drafted to be as narrow as possible.
However, we will of course take into account the findings from
the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s report and
we will review accordingly.
The illustrative regulations that we will publish before
Committee will help to demonstrate to noble Lords how the
Government will exercise, with care, the powers contained in the
Bill. I am, as usual, very happy to engage and I will very much
welcome feedback from all sides of the House on these products in
due course.
We are seizing the opportunities of Brexit. The Bill before us
today is an important move away from prescriptive state aid
rules. Public authorities across all parts of the UK will have
the autonomy and flexibility to deliver subsidies that work for
their local area. We are returning decision-making to the hands
of the decision-makers in local communities up and down the
country. This legislation ensures that our new subsidy system
will maintain the competitive, free-market economy central to the
UK’s economic success and to our national prosperity. I beg to
move.
7.31pm
(Lab)
My Lords, I start by thanking the Minister for his engagement
with our team and the offers of detailed briefings on this
important legislation. Such openness is much appreciated. We
agree with the need for this legislation and support the
introduction of a subsidy control scheme that provides public
authorities at all levels and in all parts of the UK with greater
flexibility than they enjoyed under the EU state aid rules.
However, while the EU system came with less flexibility than the
one that this Bill envisages, action, for example to support key
industries, was never impossible. The UK consistently lagged
behind comparable EU member states in the amount of subsidy
provided, and in most cases the failure to step in and provide
support during a firm’s hour of need was a political choice.
When this Bill was in the Commons, we outlined several
fundamental concerns with it. It is not, as has been identified,
the finished product. Key terms are not properly defined, and a
significant amount of the detail will be left to statutory
instruments and guidance, with the department acknowledging in
its impact assessment that there are “considerable unknowns”
attached to the chosen approach. As the Minister has
acknowledged, when we come to talk about oversight, although
there have been some improvements since the Commons stages to the
public subsidy database, we believe still that it fails on the
whole area of oversight.
The Government are failing to mandate clear, swift public
declarations of subsidies, or proper means for authorities,
including the devolved Administrations, to challenge those that
may be unfair. This lack of transparency is an area that we will
return to at greater length and is, I am sure, an area that my
noble friend Lord McNicol will pick up as we debate these matters
further. Surely this is a prime area where the Government’s
stated intention to make the UK
“a world leader in subsidy transparency”
should be enacted.
We believe that the Bill lacks ambition. This is yet another
framework Bill, meaning there is no clear underlying strategy
beyond that of boosting flexibility. Despite stating a wish to
level up deprived areas across the UK, the new scheme does not
target support by allowing subsidies to target areas of economic
deprivation; nor does it address the issue of putting fairness
and need at the heart of decision-making. It fails to tackle the
biggest challenges that we face. The Bill says virtually nothing
about transitioning to net zero, and, while it does still feature
some additional energy and environmental principles, they are
limited in scope and would not, for example, encourage subsidies
for things such as green transport projects. This misses the
opportunity to enhance environmental protection, boost regional
growth or incentivise research and development, all of which were
at the centre of decision-making under the previous
arrangements.
Better outcomes drove our decision-making when I was an LEP
member for Leeds City Region. Collective decision-making, based
on strict criteria and collaboration between all relevant local
authorities, was the key to our investment strategy. Perhaps the
Minister could inform us as to how this collaborative approach
will be enhanced under the new arrangements.
This legislation is especially contentious in terms of the
devolved Administrations, who, in a number of areas, are not
being afforded the same powers as the Secretary of State, and
will not have representation, for example, on the Competition and
Markets Authority body advising on subsidy matters.
I could predict the comments made by the Minister when I say that
the Government will point to dozens of meetings, held at both
ministerial and official level; but, as with most of the Brexit
process, it seems that Westminster’s definition of “engagement”
differs from that adopted by everyone else. On some points, such
as whether the DAs can establish streamlined subsidy schemes,
there are probably new forms of words that can be agreed, but
others raise that nagging feeling that this Government are simply
not interested in devolution.
While there is a benefit to be derived from implementing a new
regime sooner rather than later, it is not clear why the Bill has
to be pushed through according to the department’s chosen
timescale. Surely there was a clear public interest in getting
its contents right from the start, rather than leaving gaps to be
filled in later. Are we at risk, as suggested in the Financial
Times, of sacrificing scrutiny on the altar of speed?
We will seek to make a variety of sensible changes to this
legislation and hope that colleagues across the House will work
with us to ensure that the Bill that eventually returns to the
Commons is an improvement on the initial offering.
7.37pm
(LD)
My Lords, we on these Benches support a legal system of state aid
subsidy support, built on the principles of a sound industrial
strategy, where there are identified areas of need and
deprivation. The system should be transparent and linked with
addressing the structural problems of our economy and the regions
within it.
Between 2014 and 2020, the UK as a whole was allocated £4.3
billion a year of structural funds, ERDF funds and ESF funds. The
Government’s Budget has stated that we will reach only £1.5
billion a year for the UK shared prosperity funds in 2024-25. Can
the Minister say how that shortfall will be met? It is not as if
we were renowned for having an expansive subsidy approach. The
impact assessment had highlighted the fact that the UK was one of
the lowest in expenditure on subsidies within the former 28. The
impact assessment used the data from the EU scorecard. In the
most recent year, the UK spent £8 billion—0.4% of GDP—compared to
France, £16 billion or 0.8% of GDP, and Germany, £49 billion or
1.5% of GDP. Clearly, Germany, spending five times as much as we
did, did not consider us a major straitjacket, burdensome and
prescriptive, so why were we so low if it was not the fact that
it was simply a government policy choice to be so low?
Interestingly, the Government’s impact assessment also said that,
for the purposes of us scrutinising the Bill and for the purposes
of costing impact, historic data on the volume and value of
subsidies awarded in the UK has been used. So the Government,
even as they present their Bill to us, are saying that there will
not be any change of direction from that anyway. So what is their
intention as far as the way forward is concerned? After the
Internal Market Act, the Professional Qualifications Bill and now
this Bill, we are legislating in limbo, with so many decisions
deferred for future regulation and guidance and with a lack of
clear information on how it will support structural investment.
It simply is not good enough.
It is interesting that five years after the referendum, the
Johnson Government are so uncertain what to do with their new
powers that they do not even bring forward any schemes that
accompany legislation. The noble Lord, , and I seem to have this
confusion in common.
The deficiencies of this Bill were rather cruelly exposed within
the first three minutes of the Secretary of State’s introduction
at Second Reading in the Commons. A rather plaintive intervention
by a Conservative Back-Bencher, on behalf of her constituency,
which has a tradition in steel manufacturing, asked whether the
coal and steel research fund worth €111 million, and from which
the UK would have been able to benefit, would be ring-fenced
equivalent for state aid support for research on decarbonisation
in the UK. No guarantee was forthcoming. That is the essence of
the point. The fact that we now have uncertainty and are reliant
on the lack of clarity will be a concern for businesses.
The Minister gave us a number of assertions of the benefits of
this new scheme, which are not backed up in the Government’s
impact assessment. For example, paragraph 468 on the positive
impacts for competition that the Minister mentioned, states:
“It is not possible or appropriate to produce a full competition
assessment on such a broad policy change—potentially affecting a
large number of subsidies and therefore markets.”
So it is not possible to work out the benefits. The Minister also
referenced the Government’s impact assessment on trade, paragraph
474 of which states:
“It is not possible or appropriate to produce a full trade
assessment”.
Paragraph 478 states:
“As there is still policy detail—yet to be decided—to follow in
secondary legislation and guidance it is not possible or
appropriate to provide further analysis on the potential trade
impacts”.
On monitoring and evaluation, to get away from the approach that
the Minister says is harming us so much, paragraph 481
states:
“As the final details of the policy are yet to be decided, or
will follow in secondary legislation and guidance, it is not
possible or appropriate to provide specific details on the plan
for monitoring and evaluation at this stage”.
At what stage will we get this information? Is it the
Government’s intention to bring another impact assessment
forward, as they have done on market, competition, trade,
monitoring and evaluation? These are fundamental for any new
schemes.
Finally, Northern Ireland is an area of considerable concern. The
Government have indicated, as the Minister said, that it is their
intent that no part of this Bill will apply to Northern Ireland,
but that is not in the Command Paper. Paragraph 68 of the Command
Paper fully anticipates that European Union law will still apply
to Northern Ireland. There will still be a situation where there
is double jeopardy, where businesses trading in the UK will still
have to comply with British-based schemes and EU schemes,
especially when businesses are at risk. The Government’s guidance
has told them that they should start having two sets of accounts,
one for their business operations in Britain and one for their
business operations in Northern Ireland. If they trade in
Northern Ireland with a parent company in Britain, they will have
to comply with both sets of rules. That is not what the Minister
indicated.
, in her article in the Telegraph, said that it would no
longer be appropriate to have any schemes where Britain would
have to notify the European Union for any support for British
businesses in Northern Ireland. That is still going to be the
case, even if the Government succeed in getting everything they
want in the Command Paper.
There are many other concerns of devolution and the fact that the
Minister made no reference to agriculture or fisheries at all,
which my noble friends will pick up in this debate. If anything
is clear, even so far, it is that there are so many holes in this
legislation that need to be filled during this scrutiny that we
will have a long task ahead of us, especially for our colleagues
in Northern Ireland, who will be faced with a continuing system
of confusion, lack of clarity and uncertainty—the very things
that the Minister promised we were moving away from.
7.44pm
(CB)
My Lords, I welcome this Bill, which puts in place a subsidy
regime that will deliver for the whole of the UK. The principle
of having considerably more flexibility than the old system in
what we are able to do opens up a host of opportunities for how
subsidies can be used for the benefit of the whole UK.
Building on what the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, said, I will
focus my remarks on levelling up. Central to the levelling-up
agenda will be investment into disadvantaged regions, for which
this Bill will obviously play a key role, so I was somewhat
surprised not to find levelling up at the heart of the Bill, or
even find anything which really contributes to it.
As an example, I am the co-chair of the Midlands Engine APPG. The
Midlands Engine is a pan-regional partnership that focuses on
levelling up the Midlands. Home to 11 million people, the
Midlands Engine contains some of the most deprived areas in the
UK and, unsurprisingly, subsidies will be vital to levelling up
the region. This is perhaps best illustrated by some economic
indicators.
Within the Midlands Engine, public spending and support lag
significantly behind the rest of the UK, contributing to a
considerable gross value-added gap, whether in transport
spending, economic affairs or R&D. For example, spending on
transport is £289 per head for the east Midlands and £492 per
head in the West Midlands, compared to £882 in London. Public
sector R&D in the east Midlands is the lowest in the UK.
These figures also represent a great opportunity for the UK. Data
from the Midlands Engine shows that gross value added per capita
in the Midlands is almost £24,000, or 91% of the England minus
London average. If this gap were closed, it would add an extra
£82 billion each year to the UK economy. The Bill could be a key
part of closing this gap in the Midlands and the other regions of
the UK. What is needed is a clear signal to businesses as to
where are the areas in which additional support will be given, to
drive investment into disadvantaged regions and level up.
I heard the Minister say that this is a framework Bill, but it
will be used by many public authorities and future
Administrations, so there should be more definition on how it
will help disadvantaged areas. First, there is nothing on
assisted areas, as we had previously. Of course, there are a
number of issues when attempting to draw a map for which areas
would receive preferential treatment, but there are ways of
approaching this which would learn lessons from previous schemes.
A map is not necessarily required—a list of agreed economic
indicators could be an alternative mechanism.
The way the Bill is currently drafted, if a manufacturer is
deciding on whether to locate in Scunthorpe or Surrey, or between
Dudley and Notting Hill, there is nothing to advantage these
former locations. There is a great opportunity for the Government
here, at a time when there is much debate about what levelling up
actually means, to show that a clear, evidence-based mechanism
will be put in place through the Bill to begin delivering for
left-behind communities in the UK. Will the Minister expand on
how it is intended that investment in disadvantaged areas will be
made more attractive to feed into the levelling-up agenda, and
why there is nothing on this in the legislation?
Clause18 appears to prohibit relocation of economic activity. I
question why this clause exists, as it could be contrary to the
levelling-up agenda by preventing productive relocation projects
that would benefit disadvantaged regions in the UK. I can see why
it may have been included, to prevent gaming the system and
internal competition, but I believe that these factors are
already adequately controlled by the existing provisions in
Schedule 1. Explicitly ruling out relocation appears to be rather
a blunt instrument and contrary to the flexible nature of the
Bill. Will the Minister say more on this in his summing up and
how he sees Clause 18 align with the levelling-up agenda?
Finally, the Bill represents a great opportunity to embed climate
and environment considerations into the decision-making of
government and public authorities, given that it will be used by
hundreds of public bodies. A key part of the success of net zero
will be how far we go in a systems view of the problem, embedding
climate considerations across all relevant government policy.
Through this Bill, net zero considerations could be applied to
all subsidies to help meet the principal strategic goal of the
nation and link with levelling up due to the key role that the
regions will play in the net zero transition.
7.49pm
(Con)
My Lords, I apologise if I discombobulated my noble friend by
asking a question at Second Reading. I appreciate it is unusual
to do that, but it is also unusual to have a Second Reading of a
Bill so devoid of detail and without the information being
provided. I put a marker down: this is becoming a habit for this
Government. I voted for leaving the European Union; I thought it
would mean that this Parliament would have more power over our
affairs. This kind of behaviour just gives power to the
bureaucracy, which is then not accountable to Parliament. That is
not why we did it.
Again and again, from the Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill
onwards, we have had legislation which has not been properly
thought through. It is particularly striking with this Bill; it
has been through the House of Commons, yet when it arrives here
we still do not have the basic information to enable us to have a
Second Reading debate on what it is about and what its principles
are. We are told that that will follow shortly. It is becoming a
habit, like Billy Bunter’s postal order—it is in the post, and by
the time it arrives you have forgotten what was promised.
I start from a slightly ideological position which may not please
some Members opposite; I am suspicious of subsidies, because I
believe they distort competition by bailing out unsustainable
industries and attempting to pick winners. I think my fly-fishing
but very distinguished economist friend Sir Dieter Helm coined
the phrase that Governments are poor at picking winners but
losers are good at picking Governments. That is important to
remember. If we are to have a regime of this kind, it is really
important that we know what money is being handed out to whom and
for what purpose.
Looking at the Bill, it is great that, as advertised, it promotes
“autonomy, transparency and accountability”. It is unusual for me
to praise the European Union—having dealt with the principles of
additionality and the problems of getting through the
bureaucracy, I do think this is an advance—but I find it
difficult to understand why the threshold for disclosure is
higher than it was for the EU. Why should that be? Unless I have
misunderstood, it is £500,000 instead of €500,000. That is a
significant difference. People might say that it is just a
rounding error—my honourable friend John Penrose made these
points in the House of Commons—but, while these subsidies must be
reported, you have to wait six months to find them. It is hard to
understand how having to wait six months to see them increases
accountability or transparency.
The bit I really do not understand, which my noble friend touched
on in his introduction and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, picked up
on, is how this works for Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland is
part of the United Kingdom, but on my reading of where we are
now, any subsidies would be subject to the European Commission’s
rules. That is the position and, until such time as the
Government have negotiated their way out of the protocol which
they agreed to, it will remain so. I am not clear what happens if
you are a British manufacturer of car batteries, to take an
example a colleague suggested to me today, and your cars go to
Northern Ireland—if there is a subsidy from the Government to you
in the UK, how does that work? It is not clear to me. I would be
grateful if my noble friend could explain what will happen. The
noble Lord, Lord Purvis, talked about having two sets of
accounts. How will that be possible?
I see that I am about to run out of time. I know my noble friend
is not to blame, but something is going wrong with the machinery
of government when we continue to get legislation, which is not
thought through and has no proper impact assessments or detail,
being rushed through the House of Commons and coming here.
Everyone complains about the number of amendments tabled in this
House and the time it takes to get legislation through. That is
because Bills are arriving in a form which is not suitable for
consideration.
7.55pm
(Lab)
My Lords, in introducing the Bill, the Minister said that we are
getting away from an overburdensome and prescriptive European
system. I will comment on that in a minute but, until we get
detailed guidance from the Minister, we cannot tell quite how
prescriptive and overburdensome this legislation will be. We are
being asked to buy this Bill without knowing the form it will
take and in particular its impact on the devolved authorities,
local authorities and administrative bodies in this country.
When I chaired one of the sub-committees of the European Union
Committee, we found that the European Union state aid regime was
indeed very centralised and authoritative but, as my noble friend
Lady Blake and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said, we did not
actually put to it many of the propositions that other member
states did. Germany and France had more than twice as much state
aid as the UK, because the UK system was overcautious and, in
many cases, anti-intervention. Ministers in Whitehall were always
faced with civil servants telling them, “This will not pass the
state aid regime”. In reality, the European system was not
disproportionately unfavourable towards British
propositions—those propositions were never put, to the detriment
of many of the most deprived areas of our country.
The history is not correct, and nor is the future. The devolved
Administrations have very serious concerns about this Bill; for
example, it is not clear whether they can invent streamlined
schemes themselves, whether they can appeal against decisions by
the CMA or whether they will have any representation in the whole
process. As I understand it, at the moment the Welsh and Scottish
Governments are not prepared to put the appropriate legislation
through their Parliaments. That is a serious constitutional
issue, one which we need to understand a bit more about before
finishing the process of the Bill in this House. I leave it to
others to demonstrate the serious problems businesses in Northern
Ireland may have with double jeopardy in this area. Scotland and
Wales have tried to co-operate with the Government on this and
other post-Brexit issues, yet they are not prepared to give the
amber light to the Government on this. That is a serious
constitutional issue, and this House should consider it.
The Government may well intend to be more flexible, but we do not
know yet. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that, when
we have framework Bills of this nature, the Government cannot
expect the House simply to nod them through without seeing how
they will really be implemented.
I have three other quick questions for the Minister. First, the
Government have resisted calls to exclude agriculture, although
the CAP used to be excluded from the European regime. There will
be very significant differences between the post-CAP regimes in
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England, so will the
Government reconsider special rules for agriculture? They have
provided some for energy and the environment—they need
strengthening but they have provided them—so can they do that for
agriculture?
Secondly, how does this operate in relation to local authorities
and procurement? Public procurement is one of the areas the old
state aid regime used to be concerned about; if my council of
Dorset awards a contract to a firm because it is giving special
preference to local employment, will it fall foul of this regime?
Finally, what does the £500,000 apply to—the value of that
contract or the differential between that contract and what could
be applied, shall I say, from Wiltshire?
7.59pm
(LD)
My Lords, the Subsidy Control Bill, following on from our
experience of the internal market Act and of the loss of EU
funding after leaving the EU, provides those of us from the
devolved nations with another battle. Our battle is, of course,
to protect and defend the powers of the Ministers of the devolved
Administrations, given to us by this Parliament. Our fellow
citizens would expect no less of us. So, what are our concerns
about the Bill? I will concentrate on two issues: consultation
with the devolved Governments and the powers bestowed on the
Secretary of State. I also wish to make a short comment on
transparency.
The Bill makes provision about the control of subsidies following
the UK’s exit from the EU, and it is a new system, replacing the
EU state aid rules. It sets out a new domestic subsidy control
regime, which binds all the countries of the UK together. In
doing so, the UK Government have, almost unilaterally, produced a
Bill that impacts on the devolved Administrations, and they have
drafted it in what is becoming their customary fashion. There was
little or no consultation with Welsh Ministers before the Bill
was introduced to the Commons, although the UK Government
consider that policy development on the Bill has involved
“frequent consultation with devolved Governments”.
So what does “frequent consultation” mean? The draft copy of the
Bill was shared with the Welsh Minister on 29 June last year—the
day before the UK Government laid the draft Bill before
Parliament, where it passed its First Reading. This unnecessarily
tight timescale has resulted in a distinct lack of any meaningful
engagement on its detail and little or no opportunity for
devolved government Ministers to influence its content. Indeed,
the Welsh Finance Minister has commented that meetings with the
UK Government on the Bill have been
“little more … than opportunities for the UK Government to
outline their position and … their intentions moving
forward”.
She added:
“when UK Government has provided us with draft documents, the
deadlines for our inputs have been too short to provide a
reasoned and considered response, or the drafts … have been just
so vague and so general as to provide us with minimal insight
into the development of the policy.”
It appears that the two Governments have differing definitions of
the word “consultation”. The UK Government are missing a trick
here. The Welsh Government have vast experience in the
distribution of EU subsidies and are calling for a collegiate
approach to drafting the new subsidy regime.
The Bill also provides that functions held at EU level are now
held by the Secretary of State, the CMA or the CAT. The role of
the Secretary of State is far reaching. The Bill empowers them to
shape the subsidy regime in future, with little scrutiny from
this UK Parliament and with no scrutiny at all available to Welsh
Ministers or the Senedd.
A number of regulation powers are bestowed on the Secretary of
State that do not require the consent of or consultation with
Welsh Ministers, even when the regulations cover devolved issues.
The Secretary of State will also have the power to refer subsidy
awards or schemes in policy areas of devolved competence to the
independent regulator. These new powers alone would undermine the
power of Welsh Ministers to act in relation to matters such as
economic development, agriculture and fisheries, which are within
their devolved competence at present. So, there will be no
meaningful consultation and no involvement in the future drafting
of subsidy control measures—in essence, this is a complete
neutering of Welsh Ministers’ powers.
On transparency, under EU state law, individual subsidies of over
€500,000 were published online, as the noble Lord, , explained. The
Bill increases that threshold to £500,000. This of course means
that subsidies of £499,999 will not need to be published. So,
because the subsidies are not cumulative, one business can
receive repeated subsidies without publishing their details.
The Centre for Public Data recommends that all subsidies over
£500 should be published. Why do the Government not agree with
this? Perhaps they should seize the benefits of Brexit which the
Minister spoke about and provide the UK with a more transparent
system than that of the EU.
8.05pm
(Non-Afl)
My Lords, the Explanatory Notes of the Subsidy Control Bill say,
in very grand words, that the Bill is to
“implement a domestic subsidy control regime in the United
Kingdom that reflects the UK’s strategic interests and particular
national circumstances, providing a legal framework within which
public authorities make subsidy decisions.”
Here we go again. Under Article 10 of the Northern Ireland
protocol, EU state aid rules continue to apply to subsidies
related to trade in goods and the single electricity market that
affect trade between Northern Ireland and the EU. The Bill would
not apply to subsidies that are subject to Article 10, so why do
we even bother saying “the United Kingdom” in the Bill? It is not
the United Kingdom.
In their Command Paper, the Government maintained that the
provisions of Article 10 are
“redundant in their current form.”
The noble Lord, , said in December 2021 that
businesses in Northern Ireland were
“facing unjustified burdens and complexity”
and that the Government could not deliver aid,
“for example for Covid recovery support, without asking for the
EU’s permission.”
What kind of Government leave part of the United Kingdom outside
the advantages of breaking away from EU state aid rules? What
kind of country allows this to happen and has to go cap in hand
to beg the EU to be able to give help to its own citizens?
It is very disappointing that, despite what the Minister has
said, there is absolutely no confidence that in these
negotiations the EU is simply going to roll over and allow us to
take back control of our economic situation in Northern Ireland.
Northern Ireland will be significantly disadvantaged in goods yet
again.
I want to read something from a very big manufacturing company in
Northern Ireland which told me how it will affect the company in
reality. The company said that in May 2020, , who was then the Secretary of State at the Department
for International Trade, announced the most favoured nation
tariff regime, the UK global tariff, which replaced the EU common
external tariffs. Then, in January 2021, it reduced or removed
rest of the world customs duties on thousands of
products—compared to those imposed by the EU—that the UK no
longer produced, or not in significant quantities. The EU, of
course, retains those duties to protect its manufacturing
industries from competition. stated:
“It supports the country by making it easier and cheaper for
businesses to import goods from overseas … It is a simpler,
easier to use and lower tariff regime than the EU’s … CET … It
will scrap red tape and other unnecessary barriers to trade,
reduce cost pressures and increase choice for consumers … It
backs UK manufacturing and production by dropping tariffs to zero
across a … range of products used in UK production”.
However, there should have been a footnote which said, “Not
applicable in Northern Ireland”.
The company continued by saying that Northern Ireland, as part of
the EU for goods, will be subject to EU custom duties and pay
higher prices than its GB counterparts for the same goods,
irrespective of how they arrive in Northern Ireland. That is all
before the rules of origin are taken into consideration.
Typically, a product requires 50% originating content based on
its ex-works price to qualify for country of origin and allow it
to be exported, even to Northern Ireland, under a free trade
agreement using preferential rates of duty. If not, standard
rates of duty apply. In future, GB exporters to Northern Ireland
must hold evidence that the exported goods meet the relevant
rules, which will involve HMRC audit procedures, production
records, invoicing and accounting details and supplier
declarations. The fact that a product is in free circulation in
GB does not prove originating status.
They concluded by saying that today there appears to be little or
no validation of origin and the current system is open to abuse.
Why? This will not be the case in the future as customs issues
are black or white and false declarations are fraudulent. Will
some GB suppliers be bothered with the Northern Ireland market
due to the compliance costs that they do not incur on the
mainland? This will all push Northern Ireland manufacturers
towards sourcing from EU suppliers. The protocol is unworkable
and no amount of sticking plasters will ever fix it.
It is really disappointing that, despite Minister after Minister
visiting Northern Ireland, they all get taken round to see the
same businesspeople by the Northern Ireland Office. They do not
get out there and talk to people who are really being affected. I
support what the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, and others have said:
there is no real detail in the Bill. I hope that, by the time we
get to Committee, there will be a lot more and that the
negotiations that everyone in government seems to think are going
to be so successful are actually seen to be successful. If not,
then the Government have to do what they said they would: get out
of the protocol, go for Article 16 to be invoked and tell the EU,
“Sorry, we made a mistake and shouldn’t have signed it. We’re
going back on it.”
8.10pm
(Con)
My Lords, this Bill is highly unusual. It may be unique in the
world because I do not think any other country has a national
system of subsidy control. The United States does not; the EU
does, but of course it is a collection of countries. I think this
is the only national system of subsidy control. Of course, we had
to have a national system because it was part of the negotiation
with the EU on the TCA. The EU, understandably, had fears that
Britain, having been subject to the EU system of subsidy control,
was going to be free of all control. There therefore had to be a
negotiated settlement, the seven principles of which are what is
in the Bill.
I read the speech of the Secretary of State in the House of
Commons very carefully and listened to the Minister’s speech
today. It seems that the Government have, if they will forgive me
saying so, something of a Janus-like stance on the Bill. On the
one hand, it is a Brexit dividend: there are going to be hints of
largesse and more spending, while the money will come more
quickly and flexibly. On the other hand, this is also going to
control subsidies. Well, which is it? There is an obvious
conflict between the two.
It has been said several times, although I think Ministers in the
Commons said it more than my noble friend did, that our system
will be very much preferable to the slow, inflexible and
obstructive system that they had in the EU. I am bound to say, as
a Minister who dealt a lot with the EU—admittedly, a very long
time ago—that that was not my experience of the EU system. It was
a system, incidentally, largely designed by the UK and often
operated by UK officials. Most of the applications for subsidies
went through the EU through the block exemption. Most of them
were approved, and relatively quickly.
There were, however, difficult negotiations over very large state
aid projects, such as the motor industry in this country in the
1980s or the steel industry, but it was quite right that the EU
took a long time to consider those. Let me put it this way: the
EU acted as a discipline upon us, and we have to view a system of
subsidy control as not just something permissive but something
that imposes a discipline on Governments. That is the point of it
but, of course, it poses questions as to how effective this will
be compared with the EU system.
I put it to the House that the key difference between what is
proposed now and the previous system is that, under the EU, no
subsidy was legal until it was approved. Under this system, it is
legal until it is struck down after legal proceedings in front of
the Competition Appeal Tribunal. What worries me about this
system—I say this as someone who, like my noble friend Lord
Forsyth, believes profoundly in the merits of competition and
market forces—is that there is no enforcer of the regime. The
subsidy advice unit is really weak. It has no power to block and,
instead of an enforcer, we have to rely on citizens to police
this system and take legal proceedings. There is a degree of
self-assessment. The question is whether that is enough to
discipline and control the Government.
My noble friend may think I am being rather unfair to the
Government, but this Government have made some curious subsidy
decisions in their life. I never thought I would quote , the former shadow
Chancellor, but he said the other day that this Government were
the biggest nationaliser since Harold Wilson. That may be a
slight exaggeration, but we have had the curious investment in
the bankrupt satellite company OneWeb—how would that be dealt
with under the Bill?—the bailing out of Bulb and the
nationalisation of part of the steel industry. Then we have the
Chancellor’s future fund, which subsidises everything from
manufacturers of cannabis to dating agencies. There are serious
questions to be asked about the Bill and whether it really will
be the self-discipline that the Government say it will.
There are also a number of detailed points. I agree with what was
said about thresholds—why should they be higher than in the EU? I
shall wait with interest to find out the difference between a
“subsidy of interest” and a “subsidy of particular interest”. It
is a disgrace that these points are not made clear.
Subsidies distort, misallocate resources and often slow down
inevitable and necessary change. However, provided that the
Government stick to their principles of a competitive, market
forces driven economy, I shall give the Bill at least two
cheers.
8.16pm
(Lab)
My Lords, contrary to what the Minister said in his introduction,
the Subsidy Control Bill is yet another step towards centralising
power at Westminster. Even after 20 years of devolution, the UK
Government do not seem to understand—or, perhaps more accurately,
do not support—the purpose of devolution.
The summary of the Bill provided by the Minister states that the
UK is no longer bound by bureaucratic and burdensome EU state aid
rules. The Bill introduces equally bureaucratic and burdensome
rules, excludes the devolved Governments from having a role in
UK-wide policies and prevents them from developing their own
policies on subsidies in their own economies. The Minister said
that this gives freedoms, but those freedoms are constrained by
the UK Government’s policies rather than by the devolved
Governments’ policies.
The UK Government claim that they have had discussions with the
devolved Administrations, but we heard from the noble Baroness,
Lady Humphreys, that both the Welsh and Scottish Governments
state they have had no opportunity to engage on the details of
the Bill. Last Thursday the Government published a paper, Review
on Intergovernmental Relations. Can the Minister explain why the
Bill and the United Kingdom Internal Market Act were imposed on
the devolved Administrations in advance of the new arrangements
outlined in that paper?
There are many examples of how the Bill disregards devolution,
and I will touch on a few. Clause 10, which defines and explains
streamlined subsidies, states that only Ministers of the Crown
may make streamlined subsidy schemes. Given that the regime
impacts on areas of devolved responsibility, Ministers from
devolved Governments should be able to lay such schemes before
their own Parliaments. Clause 31, dealing with cooling off and
mandatory referrals, should allow Scottish and Welsh Ministers to
overrule such standstill requirements if they affect areas of
devolved responsibility or where the devolved Government’s policy
commitments may be delayed.
Clause 79 states that
“the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the
Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
Can the Minister explain why, in the guidance on the practical
application of the principles covered in Schedules 1, 2 and 3,
the devolved Ministers are not given an explicit role in
mandatory engagement? As the Bill is currently drafted, the
Secretary of State is not even required to talk to the devolved
Governments if he or she does not deem it appropriate, let alone
take their positions into account.
Can the Minister explain why the UK Government have decided to
include agriculture in this Bill? The WTO and the trade and
co-operation agreement have separate subsidy regimes for
agriculture. The devolved Governments should be entitled to use
subsidies in the most appropriate way to meet their particular
needs in relation to agriculture, which will inevitably differ
across the nations.
Schedule 2 impacts on devolved areas of energy and the
environment. Different nations have the right to develop
different priorities, particularly in setting climate change
goals. Subsidies may play an important role in achieving these
goals.
The Scottish Government’s response to legislative consent argues
that they are concerned that Schedule 3 impacts on devolved areas
of economic development and, potentially, other areas of devolved
competence. Can the Minister explain what the point of devolution
is if the elected Parliaments are unable to develop their own
priorities, policies and economies according to the platforms on
which they were elected?
We started down the road of devolution while part of the EU. If
that had not been the case, there would of necessity have been
discussions about how the four nations shared power. If the UK is
to stay together—that is a big if at times—it will have to
involve a change in relationship that goes beyond the steps
outlined in the review of intergovernmental relations. It
requires finding a way of sharing sovereignty between the
nations, but there is still little evidence that this Government
understand that.
8.21pm
(LD)
My Lords, the starting point I have for this Bill is that we need
a subsidy regime for the United Kingdom and we need a rulebook.
However, this Bill, as has already been said, falls far short of
what is needed. It is, in fact, a rulebook with a lot of blank
pages.
I want to focus on Wales. The construct of the new subsidy regime
is incredibly important to Wales. As the prime beneficiaries of
EU funding, a substantial amount of EU money was made available
for the Welsh Government to utilise. To be clear, the power to
use these funds came with a great deal of flexibility. An
operational programme had to be approved by the Commission but
these programmes spanned a six-year period and allowed for a wide
range of policy options. For example, the agricultural subsidy
regime in Wales was significantly different from that of England
and still is. Importantly, all the EU money received was not
countable as state aid. They were not considered to be a
distorting subsidy.
I have two specific questions for the Minister. How does this
Bill provide the same or a better level of flexibility to the
Welsh Government on the use of subsidies than that which they
previously had? Secondly, since this Government promised—here in
this House, at least twice—that they were going to match the EU
money Wales had previously received pound for pound, can the
Minister tell the House the scoreboard? How much money has been
made available to Wales already? Please separate out the
agricultural subsidies, because that could cloud the overall
picture. I am pretty sure that the Government have fallen short
of their promise to this House substantially.
The second major issue relating to this Bill and its impact on
the devolved Administrations is the very wide powers it places in
the hands of the Business Secretary, mostly by regulation. As an
aside, as the Minister said, the Bill gives the Secretary of
State the power to change primary legislation by regulation as
well. So, for example, the power to define a subsidy and subsidy
schemes “of interest” and “of particular interest” is for the
Secretary of State by regulation. These types of subsidies will
be treated differently from other subsidies and we do not have
any detail of what they are. Without them and without an
industrial strategy, how can we and other public bodies be
expected to understand what these are? There are more blank pages
in the rulebook. I must say that I find it very strange that in a
piece of primary legislation we get a clause—Clause 79—headed
“Guidance”. This House has taken a very grim view of the use of
guidance and trying to treat it as a legal power.
We had a debate just last week in this House in which noble
Lords, almost universally around the Chamber, looked at how
secondary legislation and guidance was being used. The Minister
will be well aware that that will cause some problems during the
course of this Bill. Given the economic development powers of
devolved Governments, surely these details should be worked on
together as they are developed, because they will impact
significantly on the Welsh Government’s ability to exercise their
legal powers for economic development. This House will surely
want an opportunity to scrutinise them properly—another matter
that this House explained and had great disdain for in the debate
last week. Owing to the nature of the powers given to the
Secretary of State, it seems that the framework could be an
ever-changing one, depending on the views or objectives of the
Secretary of State at any one time.
Last week, the Government announced a new council of United
Kingdom and devolved Governments, which will be chaired by the
Prime Minister—so I presume that trumps the Secretary of State
for Business. So it is now the policy of this Government,
according to the Written Statement made to this House just last
week, that this new council
“provides … new processes to increase impartiality and to avoid,
resolve and, where necessary, escalate disputes.”
So where does this dispute resolution procedure fit into the
context of this Bill?
The Welsh Government and the Welsh Parliament have declined to
give consent for this Bill to legislate in devolved areas, so
does it constrain the new council in resolving disputes about the
operation of the subsidy regime or not? Given the failure to
achieve the legislative consent agreement from the Welsh
Government and Welsh Parliament, how does this Bill respect the
devolved competency of the Welsh Government? I am afraid that we
are looking forward to a rule book with all these blank pages. I
hope that they will be filled in, but I suspect that that is a
forlorn hope.
8.26pm
(GP)
My Lords, I heard state aid described this morning as something
that people do not get very interested in, yet the range of
speakers in this debate, starting at such a ridiculously late
hour, puts paid to the claim that there is a lack of interest.
Indeed, there could hardly be anything more crucial than what the
Government support or do not support—and that, indeed, is a
decision not to support. As the noble Lords, and , pointed out, Governments have
often tried to suggest that it was the EU’s fault that the UK
Government were not providing support, but that claim does not
stand up. That lack of support has given us industries, sectors
and communities that are struggling to get a decent quality of
life for their members, while living within the boundaries of
this one fragile planet. It is something we are far away from
today, be it the level of child or pensioner poverty, or the way
our society collectively consumes the resources of our share of
three planets, when we have only one.
My noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb will later in this
debate be looking at the issues of environment and the lack of a
strategic direction here, as in so much of the Her Majesty’s
Government. It is hard to have a strategic direction when the
ship of state is being tossed around by a party whose members are
running to and fro on leadership manoeuvres. My speech is going
to focus on the democratic and structural concerns about this
Bill, of which many have already been clearly set out, and I
shall seek to add to that rather than repeat.
One issue that has not yet been raised is the Bank of England’s
monetary policy activities, which are explicitly exempted from
the subsidy regime in Clause 46. The Explanatory Notes do not
give any explanation or justification for this. This is
significant, because we are talking about billions of pounds
frequently supplied in cheap credit. It could be used in a
positive way, for environmental or social objectives, and the
Bill could give direction to that effect. But of course, there is
also the problem, which I have often raised in other contexts, of
what is known as “too much finance”. One reason why we are in
that situation today—the threat to our security that the
over-large financial sector presents—is the massive government
subsidies of the past, including guarantees for banks that remain
“too large to fail”.
I want to pick up the point made by a number of noble Lords,
notably the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, about the reduction
in the publication threshold and the removal of legal controls.
Rather than a central pre-approval of subsidies, the system will
now rely on challenges from rival businesses to stop harmful
subsidies. But with very high levels of subsidies, rather than
the £500 that is so often the public sector norm, how can anyone
challenge a subsidy that they do not know exists? There is
effectively no control at all. Given the issues with government
contracts—issues that have been so well-aired that I hardly need
go into detail—here we have another potential huge concern about
lack of transparency.
We have already talked a lot about the devolved Administrations,
and I will not go over the same ground. But I will note that one
of the reasons why Scotland is particularly concerned about
agricultural subsidies is that it has made far more progress on
land reform and has retained far more small land holdings—a very
different agricultural structure from what we see in much of
England. These crofts and small land holdings are a hugely valued
part of Scottish agriculture, community and society and surely
require special arrangements and support.
Finally, many noble Lords have covered the issue of how, oddly,
the Government’s levelling-up agenda seems to be missing from the
Bill. There is actually a levelling down from the EU regional aid
system, which permits higher aid ceilings in less developed
areas.
As we have heard from every part of your Lordships’ House, we are
in a total muddle. This Bill does not hold together, and it is
asking a lot of your Lordships’ House to try to pull it together.
All I know is that we will try.
8.32pm
(Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction to the Second
Reading of this Bill. As he was the long-suffering Minister for
Exiting the EU who helped to deliver the trade and co-operation
agreement, it is particularly appropriate that he is now
responsible for piloting through your Lordships’ House this Bill
to introduce a replacement for the EU state aid rules, thereby
meeting our obligations both under the TCA and towards the
WTO.
It seems longer than thirteen months since the negotiations with
the EU apparently hung in the balance over the question of the
subsidy and the state aid regime that the UK would adopt after
the final departure from the EU. Maybe that is because the
Government’s shameless renouncing of a key part of the TCA, with
respect to the Northern Ireland protocol, makes all the theatrics
and rhetoric around reaching an agreement as insincere as the
Prime Minister’s apologies. But there we were in December 2020,
being asked by the party opposite—which had for decades, if not
centuries, espoused the smallest possible role for the state and
starved the economy of support and investment—to believe that it
wanted to provide industry with financial support beyond anything
that was possible under the EU state aid regime.
Whether or not there will be more rejoicing in heaven over one
sinner who repents, we on these Benches welcome the
acknowledgement—if the Government are sincere—of the important
role the state has to play in the market economy. Can the
Minister confirm that he supports an active role for government
in industry and business? Does he believe that that is also the
case for his ministerial colleagues, such as the authors of
Britannia Unchained, who now apparently drive government policy
in the vacuum left by this lame duck of an accidental Keynesian
Prime Minister?
I believe that, the stronger that you believe in the principle of
the state as an active player in the market, in a complex and
nuanced way, the more important it is to have a clear and
effective regulatory framework, within which the state has to
operate. The track record of this Government in so many
areas—public procurement of PPE inescapably springs to mind—makes
it all the more important that absolute transparency and rigour
of process is embedded in the legislation.
How well does the Bill measure up against these criteria? As my
noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord
Forsyth, have already emphasised, it is hard to provide a
definitive answer to that question in the absence of so much
information. But, in the short time remaining, I will focus on a
few points and questions that I hope the Minister can respond
to.
Widespread concern has been expressed about the combination of
the inadequacies in the database, and I am not sure that the word
“editing”, used by the Minister, filled me with confidence.
Neither does the short 28-day period available for interested
parties to challenge, so long as they become aware of it.
As the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, has said, no enforcer is
envisaged. It is of course supremely ironic that judicial review
is being promoted as a key part of the enforcement. Can the
Minister explain why the Government’s campaign against its use
has been suspended in this case? How does he envisage it actually
working?
Finally—perhaps this would have been more appropriate as the
first question—how easily can public bodies, large and small, be
confident of knowing when they are effectively granting a
subsidy? Clause 2(2) lists a sample of subsidies:
“a direct transfer of funds … a contingent transfer of funds …
the provision of goods or services”
and so on. But it makes no reference to investments of any sort.
The noble Lord, Lord Lamont, has already raised the question of
how the investment in OneWeb would fit into the new regime.
Investments are undoubtedly the most complex instance of
effective subsidy—how can you determine whether an investment is
on commercial terms? I hope that the noble Lord can explain what
the Government’s plans are for incorporating investments into
this regime.
8.37pm
(LD)
My Lords, the Bill raises a number of serious questions, for
example, around lower transparency—as articulated in the
Delegated Powers Committee’s report—around the strategy that will
guide these subsidies, around what a “subsidy scheme” or a
“streamlined subsidy scheme” is and around what is meant by
“subsidy of interest” and “subsidy of particular interest”. Why
are these terms not defined on the face of the Bill? As a
significant example of the UK’s post-Brexit landscape, these
details in the Bill are essential, so I support all noble Lords
who have voiced their concerns on these issues.
It is not enough to have a line in the Explanatory Notes
saying,
“The Government aims to deliver ... UK ... priorities such as
levelling up and achieving net zero”,
especially because we are now without an industrial strategy,
which for inexplicable reasons was done away with early last
year. The report of the Commons BEIS Committee last June on the
scrapping of the industrial strategy was scathing, calling the
axing of the ISC, the Industrial Strategy Council, “a retrograde
step”, removing valuable independent scrutiny, insight and
expertise.
Business is crying out for long-term consistency and clarity, but
instead it is presented with the nebulous “plan for growth”,
which does nothing to address how policy statements will be
shaped to meet the country’s objectives and provides no expert
oversight on what Ministers have actually been able to deliver.
This Bill could have put some meat on the bones of the
Government’s stated policy aims and given a sense of which
sectors will be prioritised to achieve those aims, but they have
failed to grasp this opportunity.
I am going to focus on the Government’s aim of achieving net
zero. The fact is that, despite the stated strategic approach,
there are no climate provisions in the Bill that set out a
narrative on how this will be achieved. The Government could have
incorporated a robust and systemic approach to climate change
mitigation and adaptation, as well as to their “30 by 30” pledge,
the aim of which is to protect and conserve 30% of the world’s
land and marine ecosystems by 2030 which, by the way, is
conspicuously missing from their stated aims. They opted not to
do this. Therefore, will the Minister address how the regime
would facilitate the future-proofing of industries and promote
growth and employment in new, green sectors to ensure a resilient
and competitive economy?
It is vital that the overarching subsidies regime is aligned with
the country’s climate and wider environmental goals and addresses
market and systemic failures. However, this Bill gives us no clue
as to how they will do that. Perhaps the Minister can enlighten
us. How, for example, will they incentivise investment to help to
scale up innovative, low-carbon technologies, industries and
solutions across the economy, which will require measures that go
beyond R&D investment?
My final point relates to the COP 26 Glasgow climate pact, which
included an agreement to accelerate efforts towards the phase-out
of inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies. The Government currently
subsidise the production and use of fossil fuels in a number of
ways, including through tax breaks for high-carbon activities. As
an example, in 2019, for each barrel of oil, the UK received
$1.72 in tax. In Norway, that sum was $21.35. The Government
really need to get a grip on what is happening with regard to
advantages that are conferred on the oil and gas industry. Do the
Government intend to take a more robust approach to ending
subsidies for fossil fuels?
8.43pm
(CB)
My Lords, we plainly need a proper subsidy control regime and we
need independent enforcement. We decided that this was a matter
that was a reserved power, but the fact that it is a reserved
power does not mean that every effort should not be made to agree
the principles on which the independent enforcement agency is to
work and to ensure that the procedure before it is fair and
balanced. There are very good grounds, therefore, for the fact
that the devolved Administrations have refused to give
legislative consent.
I will look at two specific areas. The first relates to the way
in which the detailed guidance under the Bill and other powers
given to the Secretary of State will be operated. Guidance in
relation to principles is of fundamental importance, given the
very general and non-specific terms in which the principles are
set out in Schedule 1. I understand what is meant by,
“Subsidies should pursue a specific policy objective in order
to—(a) remedy an identified market failure”
That is reasonably easy to understand—but I am entirely uncertain
about what is meant by
“address an equity rationale (such as social difficulties or
distributional concerns)”.
What does that actually mean?
It seems that when one takes those words and focuses them on two
areas that will be of acute political concern—regional aid and
agriculture—we are building up a terrible problem for the
enforcer unless we have clear guidance. The real deficiency in
the way we are going forward, apart from the points that have
been made by the noble Lords, Lord Forsyth and Lord Lamont, as to
the way in which the Bill is constructed, is that there is a
danger if we do not put this right on a basis of consensus
between the UK Government—for a reason I will come to in a
minute—and the devolved Administrations.
We have heard an awful lot about consultation, but I am afraid
that I have lost faith in consultation. We need a proper protocol
or—to use the word for which we fought during the passage of the
internal market Act—a framework within which this can all be
agreed. I am grateful to the Minister for taking forward some of
these suggestions during the passage of that Act, and I hope
fondly that I can persuade him again to look more carefully at a
mechanism, because it is critical. We have overlooked it, or
insufficient attention has been paid to the fact, that the sole
enforcer will be the Competition Appeal Tribunal. It will be a
judicial body and it needs the clearest, most definite guidance
to deal with what will inevitably be highly political issues.
Speaking as a former judge, the last thing a body of that kind
wants is to get involved in politics—therefore we need clear
principles.
The second aspect is procedural fairness. In this respect, it is
interesting to read that the Secretary of State, as a Secretary
of State, is an interested party in any application before the
Competition Appeal Tribunal, but the other governments are not.
Therefore, the Secretary of State, putting on his hat as a
Minister for England, can intervene before the Competition Appeal
Tribunal to say, “We don’t want this—we are very unhappy about a
factory going to Scotland or Wales”, but it does not apply the
other way round. Where is the justice in that?
All these points show that we need a proper framework for
consultation to iron out these points and ensure that the
judicial body that decides these things does so on the basis of
clear principles. That is what we should try to achieve.
I have 30 seconds to make a completely different point, of which
the Minister has been given notice. It is on the powers given to
the Treasury under Clause 47, particularly the power to make
secret laws or directions. I never thought I would rise in this
House to object to legislation on secret powers. There can be no
justification —I hope the Minister will look at that again.
8.48pm
(LD)
My Lords, I am happy to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord
Thomas, and indeed some of his arguments. This Bill shares the
same characteristics as the internal market Act. It lacks detail
and clarity but shows disregard and a lack of sensitivity to the
devolution settlements. This House managed to secure amendments
during the passage of that Act, and I hope that we will succeed
in securing amendments to this Bill.
The Bill replaces the EU state aid rules, which developed in a
way that had the advantage of practicality and clarity. However,
it is not clear whether the lack of clarity is because the
Government have no coherent strategy for any subsidy regime or
they have one but are keeping it under wraps until they have the
powers under the Bill. We need to know. Either way, the devolved
Administrations of Scotland and Wales have reacted with
understandable concern and, so far, have indicated unwillingness
to give legislative consent.
The Law Society of Scotland stated in its helpful submission:
“We … stress the importance of ensuring that this bill and its
accompanying guidance implements a regime that is clear,
proportionate and gives businesses and local authorities (and
their advisers), the tools to operate confidently within it.”
As it stands, the Bill does not do that. The imbalance between
the role and powers of the Secretary of State and those of the
devolved Administrations aggravates the situation. The Government
argue that these are reserved powers. However, devolution
requires consultation—genuine consultation—co-operation and
respect, not the cavalier application of reserved powers.
Both Wales and Scotland have also expressed opposition to the
inclusion of agriculture in the Bill. Indeed, the question arises
as to why it is being included, given that we had extensive
debate on the Agriculture Act, and that other national and
international controls and commitments exist. NFU Scotland has
stated that it is
“unequivocal that agricultural and rural development financial
support”—
that is, subsidy—
“must be kept separate from the subsidy control regime being
proposed.”
Some 86% of Scotland’s land is recognised as having “less
favoured area” status. The management of that land has required
consistent subsidy and support. Although the nature of the
support has changed over the years, moving away from reducing
livestock subsidies towards environmental and area payments,
there is no doubt that these rural areas will require continued
support.
Rewilding has its place, but tension is already emerging between
this approach and support for traditional farming, land
management conservation, tourism and small-scale economic
development as a means of averting depopulation, which is
re-emerging in rural Scotland having been reversed for many
years.
The lack of clarity in the Bill means that there is an inherent
contradiction. On the one hand, compared with EU state aid rules,
public authorities may be able to provide subsidies that would
have been prevented under those rules. However, they do not know
whether they can and whether they will be challenged. This means
that agencies could well refer the proposals to the EMA—although
whether the EMA will be effective in reviewing them is
doubtful—meaning more bureaucracy and delay, or they may simply
decide, “It is all too difficult, let’s not do it”, and the
schemes will be abandoned. The imbalance in the rules makes this
even worse. Making the EMA the arbiter raises questions about the
fact that the regime is excessively centralised, whether the EMA
has the capacity or the expertise, and how it can be fair and
effective to apply its role without the specific involvement of
the devolved Administrations, which is not proposed at all.
This leads directly to the role of the Secretary of State. He or
she has the power to define subsidies or subsidy scheme of
interest or particular interest. The Minister really must give an
indication of what the heck the Government mean by “interest or
particular interest”. Can he give us examples or any idea of what
is in the Government’s mind? The Secretary of State also has the
power to refer to the CMA and, further, to challenge the ruling
before the Competition Appeal Tribunal on the basis of government
regulations that we do not even know about yet.
This presumably means that, if the Welsh or Scottish Governments
proposed a subsidy scheme for their disadvantaged areas or
sectors that the Secretary of State did not like or challenged,
the scheme could be blocked. However, if the Secretary of
State—acting as an English, not a UK, Minister—supported a
subsidy regime in England that the devolved Administrations
deemed unfair, there would be no such right. It may reflect
reserved powers, but it fails to recognise the reality of
devolution, which requires respect and consent. In reality, the
Scottish Government’s interventions have been disastrously
mismanaged, delivering neither jobs, production nor economic
benefit. However, the way to deal with that is to throw them out,
not challenge their right to do so.
I will certainly seek to support amendments to address the
balance of the Bill and press the Government for clarity and
transparency on how, in practice, they think this will
operate.
8.53pm
Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)
My Lords, I hope that your Lordships will forgive me if I return
to the issue of the Northern Ireland protocol and the impact—or
lack of it, in many ways—of the provisions of this Bill on
Northern Ireland. This is a result of the application of Article
10 of the protocol, whereby EU state aid rules will continue to
apply to subsidies related to trade and goods and the wholesale
electricity market in so far as these can effect trade between
Northern Ireland and the EU. Clause 48(3) makes it clear that the
new domestic regime will not apply in circumstances covered by
the protocol. So, as was mentioned earlier, Northern Ireland will
operate in a dual state aid regime.
The contrasting interpretations of Article 10 by the UK
Government and the EU mean that the Bill presents significant
legal and practical challenges. I know that the Department for
the Economy in Northern Ireland has faced a lot of difficulties
in trying to tease out what this will actually mean for
businesses affected in Northern Ireland. I really hope that there
will be better co-operation between officials here and those of
the devolved Administration on these very important matters. The
European Commission has set out the broad scope of which measures
it believes can affect trade between Northern Ireland and the EU.
In interim guidance, the Government have referred to limited
circumstances that might apply under Article 10.
The Command Paper of July last year argued that the commitments
in the trade and co-operation agreement, together with the Bill,
make Article 10 of the protocol “redundant” in its current form.
Therefore, it should be taken out of the protocol. I would be
grateful if the Minister could tell us how those negotiations are
going in this respect. The Government talked about reaching some
interim agreements and other matters being dealt with in due
course. Is this issue of state aid and subsidy control one of
those areas where an interim agreement is being sought? We do not
have a lot of time, if the aims in the Government’s Command Paper
are to be achieved. I would welcome an update on that particular
aspect of the negotiations.
So although I welcome, in many ways, the Bill’s principles and
the aim of establishing an independent state aid regime that
reflects the specific interests of the United Kingdom, we
obviously have a concern that Article 10 of the protocol will be
a serious issue for businesses in Northern Ireland. I will give a
number of examples. Clause 53 provides that a report on a
proposed subsidy must be published within 30 days, yet the
process for determining a referral in the EU can extend to up to
a year. This could see Northern Ireland businesses put in a
detrimental position and it could have an effect on where people
decide to locate their investment. The EU caps maximum support at
50%, but no such provision is made in the Bill, so businesses in
other UK regions could benefit under the UK regime and Northern
Ireland would lag behind. The Bill allows for support for
existing businesses to expand, but that is not the case under the
EU regime. These will have a detrimental effect on Northern
Ireland.
One thinks of the situation where there is competition for
investment and Northern Ireland is operating under the EU state
aid rules. Officials and Invest Northern Ireland, which is the
agency in Northern Ireland that seeks foreign direct investment,
have already highlighted that Northern Ireland could be at a
serious disadvantage in terms of competition between the various
regions and countries of the UK because we are operating under a
completely different set of rules. It is clear that this will
cause confusion and uncertainty for UK public authorities and
businesses. The lines will be drawn. I urge the Minister and the
Government to get on and give us some hope that the position set
out in the Command Paper last July will actually be brought
about, and that Northern Ireland will have Article 10 of the
protocol removed from it.
8.58pm
(Con)
My Lords, I welcome the Bill. Clearly, we need to implement a
much better new system for subsidies post the EU, and the Bill
sets out a policy for the 500 or so public bodies which seek to
give grants and subsidies in the UK. I believe that these amount
to over £13 billion a year, so a huge sum of money. I draw your
Lordships’ attention to my registered interests, in particular
that I am the chairman in the House of Lords of the Campaign for
Economic Growth, which I thank for its help with my remarks, as I
do the ICAEW and Jonathan Branton at the DWF law firm.
A number of us have concerns about subsidies for businesses,
particularly those that, frankly, do not deserve them, but we
appreciate that the flexibility offered is important. My main
concern is to understand where the focus on value for money is.
Proportionate and necessary funding does not necessarily mean
value for money. Can my noble friend the Minister assure us that
value for money will be a key driver for subsidies? How will this
be determined and assessed? The CMA is required to report on the
effectiveness of the Act, but not the value for money of the
subsidies, so who will do that?
There is a lot of nervousness that the principles are so open to
interpretation that in the end it is the courts that will be kept
very busy. So much of the detail will be in secondary
legislation, which we really need to see as soon as possible. I
suspect that many will want to go for CMA clearance well in
advance, so can my noble friend confirm that the CMA will be
resourced to handle this?
On a stand-alone basis, the seven principles proposed seem
reasonable and proportionate, and I am sure that if they were
applied by my noble friend the Minister and his colleagues at
BEIS, all would be well, but this is going to be used by all
sorts of bodies which, frankly, could probably drive a coach and
horses through these words if they had a mind so to do. We have
seen some perverse decisions by some public bodies. I appreciate
it is very difficult, but are Her Majesty’s Government
considering further controls and restraints in situations where
attempts are made to circumvent the intentions of these
principles?
I will focus the rest of my remarks on how the restrictions in
the Bill might affect start-ups and recovery companies. Clauses
19 and 20 refer to an “ailing or insolvent enterprise”. I
congratulate BEIS on using the word “enterprise” rather than
“company”, as in previous legislation. I am concerned, however,
that, as currently worded, these clauses might restrict grants or
subsidies to those businesses which might really need them; that
is, those in trouble. Is my noble friend the Minister able to
amplify what the Government are seeking to avoid in their
determination not to help ailing businesses?
I do not think it is clear what an ailing or insolvent enterprise
is. The helpful Explanatory Notes state:
“An ailing or insolvent enterprise is one that would almost
certainly go out of business in the short to medium term without
subsidy.”
But in Clause 24 ailing companies are defined by three
conditions. In addition to the one I have just mentioned, these
are an inability to pay debts as due—fair enough—and where assets
are below not just liabilities but “contingent and prospective
liabilities”. I need not remind my noble friend the Minister that
under the new accounting rules, so much more needs to be
disclosed as a liability than was ever the case before. I believe
that these definitions are cut and pasted from the Insolvency Act
and I just do not think they are appropriate.
Working out what is a prospective liability and making the
computations required is not easy. What is meant by the “medium
term”? Who is to say how many businesses will be able to look to
the medium term with any certainty? Perhaps we need our old
friend the monitor back, as we have seen in other
legislation.
Clearly, we do not want a terminally ill business to be propped
up artificially as someone’s pet project, but we also do not want
to rule out businesses such as start-ups, which might otherwise
fall foul of these definitions. I am particularly worried about
new businesses that are stretched and have certain challenges.
Although I think that the exemption for the owners of SMEs from
putting money into their businesses is sensible, I can see that
all the accounting requirements might be too much for a small
business which needs help urgently.
I look forward to some helpful clarifications during the passage
of the Bill and to debating these clauses with my noble friend
the Minister, who, I am sure, will be working with Back-Benchers
in his usual collaborative way.
(Con)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend—
Noble Lords
This side!
9.03pm
(LD)
My Lords, the Bill spells trouble—trouble between the nations of
the UK, and because it sets out a series of criteria for
subsidies and limitations on their use which are so vague,
complex and mutually contradictory that it is bound to lead to
repeated legal challenge.
The Bill is the son of the internal market Act, utilising subsidy
powers granted to the UK Government within that Act. The use of
those powers will constantly chip away at long-standing devolved
powers over economic development, agriculture, housing, and so
on. Wales Office Ministers and now Welsh Government Ministers
have held major economic development and financial assistance
powers since the Welsh Development Agency Act 1975. The Bill
dismantles those powers.
I want to concentrate on the inclusion of agricultural subsidies
within the general criteria set out in the Bill. It is usual to
separate out agriculture, as the World Trade Organization and the
EU does, in separate schemes, because the reasons for
agricultural subsidy have long been very different. They are
about the maintenance and supply of food and very different from
the reasons for subsidising, for example, a new engineering
plant. Nowadays, we overlay those reasons with complex
environmental criteria.
Agricultural subsidies do not fit comfortably within a general
framework, and they will be even more difficult to accommodate
because the type of agriculture suited in Scotland and Wales to
that countryside is very different from that practised, for
example, on the plains of East Anglia. The Welsh Government
could, for instance, devise a subsidy scheme to encourage the
continued farming of marginal agricultural land where only sheep
farming is viable. The Secretary of State, however, has such
broad call-in powers that they could be used in this case on the
grounds that it was an unfair competitive advantage to Welsh
sheep farmers over English sheep farmers.
In due course, we will challenge these criteria, as we will
challenge the concentration of power in the hands of the
Secretary of State, who once again will act as Minister for
England at one moment and a UK umpire at the next—an impossible
balance to strike. That problem is exemplified by the additional
scrutiny powers concentrated in the Secretary of State’s hands,
whereby he can call in schemes devised by the Welsh Government,
but Welsh Ministers have no powers to apply similar scrutiny and
control over schemes devised by the Secretary of State for
England.
Finally, we seek clarity as to where the common frameworks
devised by Defra, which create an even-handed approach across the
nations, fit into this. It seems to me that those common
frameworks are incompatible with the Bill, and that the Bill will
need to be amended to accommodate the principles that underlie
them. As the Bill stands, there is no clarity of purpose, no
levelling-up mechanism and no industrial strategy to underpin it.
In the Brexit debate, Wales was promised that we would not lose
money. That was, of course, untrue. Two-thirds of Wales was an
assisted area, and that funding has gone. Without that funding,
the Welsh Government need other powers and mechanisms to attract
investment, and subsidy schemes must be an important part of
that.
This Bill is an embarrassing back-of-the-envelope Bill, and every
nation of the UK deserves much better.
9.08pm
(Con)
My Lords, I apologise to the noble Baroness for my over-eagerness
to speak in this debate, and thank my noble friend the Minister
for introducing this Bill. I declare my interests as stated in
the register.
This Bill fulfils an obligation placed on the Government by the
TCA, and is intended to clarify what our independent state aid
rules will be going forward. The UK is currently bound by its
obligations as a member of the WTO, and those contained in the
TCA and other trade agreements. In general, I welcome the Bill,
which is intended to provide a less cumbersome version of what we
have been subject to as an EU member—although, as my noble friend
Lord Forsyth has already pointed out, we are still ignorant of a
lot of the detail and guidance. Maybe, when we finally receive
that, the Bill may not be quite so uncumbersome as we have
expected.
Under EU law, all subsidies had to be approved by the European
Commission. As your Lordships are aware, as an EU member state
the UK has, rightly, been more sparing in its use of state aid
compared with most other member states, spending around 0.4% of
GDP on state aid—about half the proportion spent by France and
less than one-third of the German figure.
In devising the new regime, the Government have tried to find the
right balance between the need to eliminate scope for political
interference and anti-competitive market distortion, and the
conflicting need to provide a process that is nimble, easy to
negotiate and fair. As long as applications follow the core
principles, public authorities will be empowered to take
decisions which will assist economic recovery and national
strategies, such as levelling up and net zero. Damaging subsidies
which achieve little beyond keeping failing companies alive for
longer than the market would otherwise permit are prohibited.
Members of another place were right to reject the proposed
amendment to principle G, which would have required public
authorities to give too much weight to possible negative effects
of subsidies on the UK’s net-zero commitments. This could have
caused them to look less favourably on subsidies designed to
achieve entirely unrelated objectives, such as high street
regeneration or the provision of training opportunities for young
people.
The seven subsidy control principles are in fact broadly similar
to those under which the EU system operates, and six of them are
derived from the TCA. Principle F is a sensible new addition,
which seeks to minimise any negative effect on competition and on
foreign and domestic investment in the UK’s internal market. It
is crucial that the Bill gives effect to the internal markets
Act, which stipulates that the regulation of state subsidies is a
reserved matter that must be consistently applied across the
whole United Kingdom. The excellent Library briefing covers this
question in some detail.
Several noble Lords have expressed the view that the Bill is
unfair to the devolved Administrations. However, I am struck by
the comment of Mr James Webber, a state aid lawyer, that the Bill
in any event gives the devolved Administrations much greater
freedom to make spending decisions and craft economic
interventions than they would have had if the UK had remained an
EU member state. Can the Minister confirm that the Government’s
policy is that those powers which were held centrally by the EU
should now be held centrally by the UK Government, to avoid an
incoherent and inconsistent approach between the four nations of
the UK? Can he also explain whether a similar approach will be
taken both to subsidies contained in devolved primary legislation
and to those given by public authorities? The Bill introduces, in
Clause 76, the concept of a “promoter” whose views may or may not
correspond to the views of a legislature as a whole.
Lastly, can the Minister tell the House whether the Government
take seriously the concerns about transparency expressed by my
honourable friend John Penrose and others? Surely, he has a point
in suggesting that, without adequate transparency, a lack of
compliance with the subsidy principles might not be spotted until
it is too late, or not at all, and companies could be driven out
of business. At £500,000, surely the threshold for entering
subsidies into the database is much too high. Would not a figure
of £100,000 be more appropriate? I look forward to hearing the
Minister’s views on this and other matters.
9.14pm
(GP)
My Lords, I too would like some clarity on the Bill. For example,
there are some key exemptions in it that cut out important
issues, and some key omissions that mean that the new subsidy
scheme misses a huge opportunity to support levelling up, net
zero or innovation of any kind. I have five questions for the
Minister. I am sure that he will not be able to deal with them
this evening, but I would be happy to have them answered in a
letter.
The Bill contains principles that energy and environment
subsidies must adhere to. Some of these principles are very
welcome—for example, subsidies must not relieve polluters from
their liabilities and caps can be put on maximum CO2 emissions
eligible for electricity generation subsidies. That is all good,
but I do not understand—this is my first question—why these
principles are carved out as applying only to energy and
environment subsidies. Why are environmental principles not being
applied to all subsidy schemes so that we can ensure that all
public money is being used to move towards net zero and tackle
the climate and ecological crises? Every subsidy should increase
the level of environmental protection as compared to a baseline
situation. At the very least, no subsidy should be granted that
will reduce the level of environmental protection as compared to
the baseline.
Secondly, the confusion is further compounded by the absence of
any definitions of what constitutes an energy or environment
subsidy. It is not at all clear when these special principles do
or do not apply. For example, is a scheme for discounted bicycles
an environment subsidy, subject to those extra principles, or
not? Does it depend whether the scheme is intended to get people
to drive less, or drive the same amount but cycle just for fun? I
can see quite a lot of future legal battles over this Bill when
we try to apply it.
Thirdly, we know with certainty, because the Bill tells us in
Clause 51, that nuclear energy is not included in the energy and
environment subsidy scheme. I would really like to know the
Government’s justification for this. Is it because they believe
that nuclear energy will fall foul of the principles, such as
fair and competitive processes or increasing the level of
environmental protection? Nuclear energy subsidies are a huge
amount of money—many billions of pounds—so it is very important
to understand why they are being excluded from the provisions
that apply to all other energy sources, especially renewables. Is
it giving preferential treatment to nuclear? It rather looks like
it. I will probably table an amendment on this in Committee.
Fourthly, another notable carve-out in the Bill which my noble
friend Lady Bennett has raised is that none of the subsidy rules
will apply to the Bank of England’s monetary policy transactions.
I would like to understand why. Greens have long understood that
monetary policy should be a major tool in tackling the
environmental and climate emergencies, such as directing the
Bank’s cheap credit towards environmentally sound lenders or at
the very least cutting out the most environmentally damaging
ones.
Fifthly, I would like to find out more about the community energy
schemes, which I thought were happening a long time ago. They
have environmental and social benefits, and there is a low risk
of distortive effects on competition. Can the noble Lord tell me
what is happening with them? I am likely to table amendments on
all these issues.
I hate agreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, but he is
absolutely right; when the Government bring us a thin Bill such
as this, we will put in a lot of amendments, just to try to
understand what is going on. Of course, we then get the blame for
slowing down the business. Can the Minister be very clear that we
need enough time to debate this properly and not take it late at
night, as is the Government’s usual practice when they want us to
hurry up and stop talking?
This Bill is really lacking that overarching sense of using
monetary and fiscal policy to transform our economy from a dirty,
polluting one to a clean, green, high well-being society. The
mechanisms in this Bill will not achieve that and lack ambition.
I am looking forward to working with noble Lords—even the noble
Lord, Lord Forsyth—in proposing major changes to this Bill so
that we can get back on track to reach net zero.
9.19pm
(LD)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness,
Lady Jones. This has been a really interesting debate and has not
unfolded in the way I had originally anticipated. In trying to
sum up this debate, there is a short sum and a long sum and I am
afraid I am going to give both.
The short sum is that, if the Government table Bills like this,
they are going to need more Committee days than they have so far
allocated. We do not yet know what this Bill is, and we need to
find ways of teasing that out from the Government because clearly
they are not volunteering the information at the moment.
On the longer sum, it is always good to try to work out what the
Government are seeking to cause or trying to cause to happen. I
think we have to look to Schedule 1 for that. Principle A in
Schedule 1 says:
“Subsidies should pursue a specific policy objective in order to
… remedy an identified market failure”—
correct the market, or—
“address an equity rationale (such as social difficulties or
distributional concerns).”
Principle C says:
“Subsidies should be designed to bring about a change of economic
behaviour of the beneficiary.”
All of this sounds very social democratic and very
interventionalist. That might explain some of the concerns voiced
by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, about subsidies. However, it is
still not clear what sway that schedule will have over the actual
behaviours and subsidy behaviours we see. The noble Lord, Lord
Lamont, and, I think, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas,
made the point about how this is policed and whether Schedule 1
is the rule by which this regime is to be judged. This is still
very unclear—in fact, not clear at all.
In the various letters and presentations supporting the Bill, the
Minister carefully painted the picture of a nation handcuffed by
the European Union. However, as we have heard from the noble
Baroness, Lady Blake, and others, the UK has traditionally handed
out less in public funding subsidies than most of the other EU
countries. To date, the UK has chosen not to subsidise economic
activity to the level that it could have done within the EU. Of
course, it was the perfect right of the Government at the time to
make those decisions.
Looking forward, my noble friend Lord Purvis asked how much money
there will be. In the past we have funded less than we could.
There is a good deal of discrepancy about how much money will be
available on a straight like-for-like basis without starting to
include funds such as agriculture. Some profit and
loss—P&L—for this would be quite handy.
However much money there is, the next point lacking clarity is
how the Government will prioritise what is going on. As my noble
friend Lady Sheehan, the noble Lord, , and others said, our
guide to this is vanishingly vague. The industrial strategy was
scrapped, Build Back Better is essentially a colour brochure,
specific plans to reach net zero remain essentially unpublished
and the “levelling up” slogan is wandering the corridors of
Whitehall looking for a purpose. None of this acts as a useful
guide.
Where, unusually, the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, is wrong is
that rather than this avoiding political interference, it creates
a vacuum where political interference can run wild. There are
suspicious people who would say that the actual guide for
allocating taxpayers’ money will have to answer only one key
question: how does the proposed subsidy benefit the electoral
ambitions of the Conservative Party?
I am sure the Minister would not want that sort of thing running
around these corridors. To avoid it, he could start by
circulating the drafts of the guidance. He could start by sending
out the draft of the support to the Bill, the policy statements
and the routes that this Bill will go by. This echoes the point
made by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth.
As we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, the EU has a
long-standing and rigorous programme that aims to benefit the
poorest communities. Rules exist under the EU regional aid scheme
that cause higher aid to go to the least developed areas. This
was largely through the European Regional Development Fund or the
European Social Fund.
We have heard about Wales, but Cornwall received the highest
ERDF/ESF allocation of any English area. Over the last 14 years,
that totalled €1.24 billion. Looking forwards, can the Minister
confirm whether Cornwall will continue to receive this level of
support? The evidence suggests it will not. In fact, subsidy law
experts Jonathan Branton and Alexander Rose note that the Bill
does not propose a preferential system that would lead to
targeted support for disadvantaged regions. They argue that the
consequence of this could be better-off areas receiving support
that would previously have gone to less well-off areas.
It is clear, looking at the role of the CMA, that much clarity is
required. We need to know how enforcement is going to emerge.
Also, the impact assessment says that there will be just 19 new
posts within the CMA. Does the Minister honestly think this
represents sufficient resource to police this whole scheme?
The issue of OneWeb was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont,
and the noble Viscount, , and I have a different
question around that. In order for that investment to happen,
there had to be a letter of direction from the Minister to the
Permanent Secretary, which says quite a lot. In future, how would
a letter of direction be treated by this regime, given that the
Secretary of State is likely to have to refer himself in order to
have this reviewed? It is a special case, and I would like to
know the answer.
The subject of reporting thresholds has been well documented
today and I will not repeat it, except to say that reporting at
£500,000 is absolutely the wrong route to take. In the Commons,
and both proposed
amendments, and we will be working with others across the House
to propose similar amendments here.
The effect on devolution has also been well rehearsed, not least
by my noble friends Lady Humphreys, Lady Randerson and Lord
Bruce, and the noble Lord, , the noble Baroness, Lady
Bryan, and others. I associate myself with them. At the heart of
the problem seems to be a take-it-or-leave-it approach to the
relationship from London. The Minister has set out a roll-call of
meetings with the devolved authorities and their offices, but it
is clear these meetings were not dialogues but show and tell
meetings. Ministers portray this Bill as a permissive move that
empowers local authorities and the devolved authorities, but for
their part, the Scottish and Welsh Governments see it as a now
regular incursion of tanks on to their devolved lawns by
Westminster. We agree with that latter view, and there will have
to be amendments, going forward, to address that.
On Northern Ireland, my noble friend Lord Purvis and others
detailed how conflation of the TCA and the Northern Ireland
protocol will cause problems. The noble Lord, Lord Dodds, also
brought this up. The Minister of State in the Commons sought to
address this to some extent and to dispel the issue of double
jeopardy, but it is clear that he failed to do that. We need to
see, in detail, what legal position and legal advice the
Government have had on double jeopardy, and we need to debate
that in full when we get to Committee.
It seems that the Minister is seeking to play down the issue your
Lordships have had with the Bill, and certainly will have when he
sums up. There are issues from start to finish with it. Further,
it is designed as a shell Bill—another shell Bill. It provides
the Government with the opportunity to fill that shell with
secondary legislation that can, at worst, amend primary
legislation. This, again, is unacceptable. Overall, a lot of work
needs to be done on this Bill before it leaves your Lordships’
House, and the Grand Committee awaits.
9.29pm
(Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Baronesses and Lords who have
participated in this Second Reading. Across the House there is a
wealth of knowledge that can only bode well for the Bill
itself—if not for the Minister. As the noble Lord, , has said, time will be required
in Grand Committee and at other stages to make sure that we can
move forward with it. It is a pleasure to be back on Labour’s
Front Bench, especially for such an important Bill.
I will start with some general remarks and then focus on some
specific issues of concern and, I hope, offer some helpful
solutions, as have many other noble Lords and Baronesses. I
believe that we can use the best endeavours of your Lordships’
House to improve the Bill. In previous dealings that I have had
with the Minister and his department, they have listened to
reason and good arguments, and I am sure that that will
continue.
My first question, which is about the Delegated Powers and
Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House, has been
partly answered by the Minister. If other noble Lords have not
read the committee’s report on the Bill, it is well worth
reading. It is scathing, and the Minister rightly said that he
and his department will be looking at its recommendations. I want
to push him further on that. Will we see some changes and address
some of the issues raised in the DPRRC report in Committee, or
will that happen later? The sooner, the better.
As we have heard, most of the concerns about the Bill are not
ideological or political. Likewise, Labour’s concerns about it
are rooted not in ideological dogma but in a sense of right and
wrong, fairness and transparency. What we have before us is, in
principle, a positive step. The right subsidies can have a
transformative impact on communities across the country. Moving
away from the EU regime for pre-approval is a clear win, but only
if we are transparent and open about all the subsidies.
However, as my noble friend Lady Blake of Leeds has outlined, it
feels like this new flexibility comes at a staggering and,
frankly, unacceptable price: a lack of policy certainty,
transparency and safeguards and, most worryingly, as we have
heard from many today, a lack of proper parliamentary scrutiny.
Some of the debates we will have on the Bill, including on the
treatment of the devolved Administrations, could and should have
been avoided altogether; had the Government learned from their
mistakes during the Brexit process and, more recently, the
passage of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act, we could have
resolved them. The Minister himself is a veteran of both, so he
should not be surprised when he sees the forthcoming amendments
as we move to Committee and Report.
The four main areas, which I will touch on only briefly because
they have been covered well across your Lordships’ House, are
reporting transparency, the devolved Administrations, statutory
oversight and investigations, and subsidies and their use. It
appears from earlier discussions in the other place that Her
Majesty’s Government will argue that the Bill as written delivers
by reducing red tape, reducing administration and protecting
competition. Many—including respected colleagues on the
Minister’s own side such as the noble Lords, Lord Lamont, Lord
Forsyth and Lord Leigh, and many Conservative Members in the
other place—believe that that fundamentally misses the point of
the Bill. Amending it in respect of reporting thresholds, the
quality of the database, the timely manner of reporting and
tighter controls on subsidy schemes could and would make the use
of subsidies more transparent, reducing the possibility of
corruption and shining a light on any cronyism or misuse or abuse
of subsidies. As Her Majesty’s Government’s own analysis shows,
such amendments, especially on the database, could cost as little
as £20,000—a small price to pay to see what is being subsidised
across the UK.
With relatively little transparency and another issue about the
large number of various exemptions in terms of what has to be
publicly recorded, it is not clear that authorities across the
country and the public will have the confidence that public money
is being spent according to the Bill’s seven key principles. Of
course, local, regional and devolved authorities should be free
to establish subsidies in support of their chosen economic
objectives, but so too should neighbouring authorities and
competing businesses have confidence in the process: that the
reporting and regulations are up to speed.
Much like the UK Internal Market Act, the new subsidy regime will
have far-reaching consequences across the UK, not just in the
short term but for many years to come. We believe that the Bill
can be strengthened and enhanced by a number of amendments.
Ensuring that the Secretary of State gains the consent of the
devolved Administrations when making secondary legislation and
issuing guidance on the Bill would be a great start. Secondly,
the Bill should be amended to ensure that the devolved
Administrations are represented on the CMA subsidy advice unit;
thirdly, it should give the devolved Administrations the power to
call in subsidies, as we have already heard; fourthly, it should
ensure that the devolved Administrations are explicitly included
under the definition of “interested party”; and, finally, it
should give the devolved Administrations the power to make their
own streamlined subsidy schemes in order to support their own
national priorities. When responding, could the Minister let your
Lordships’ House know whether his department has given any
consideration to a new UK-wide body—an economic prosperity
council—where the devolved Administrations and the English
regions could be represented?
Turning to statutory oversight and investigations, subsidy
decisions are never going to be purely about competition. That is
clear from the seven principles that public authorities have to
consider. But does the Minister have confidence that the CMA has
the necessary expertise to regulate subsidies, especially as this
is a new area outside its existing remit? Currently, the CMA can
investigate only subsidies that are referred by the Secretary of
State or subsidies of “interest”—if they are volunteered to the
CMA by the granting authority—or subsidies of “particular
interest”. This means that damaging subsidies could go under the
radar and not be investigated. This would be a particular risk
where public authorities get their assessments wrong, conclude
that they are not providing a subsidy or do not even upload them
on to the transparency database. Could the Minister also outline
any plans to open up the oversight process, or does he believe
that the Bill as it is written suffices?
Many noble Lords have touched on the levelling-up agenda. Due to
time, I will not go into detail on that, but the comments made by
the noble Lord, , about the Bill being
silent on disadvantaged regions and having nothing on assisted
areas should be remedied when we go through Committee and
Report.
One of the other areas I would like to question the Minister on
is the freeports policy. How does the Government’s current
freeport policy feed into or work within the Bill as it is
currently written, and how is it represented?
The Minister mentioned net zero three times in his opening
remarks, but, reading through the principles, I did not see the
issues relating specifically to net zero. We believe that the
Bill could and should be used to promote a cleaner and healthier
country.
We will debate the Bill in Committee very soon, but I hope that
the half-term recess will afford the Minister and his officials a
much-needed opportunity to think again on many of the issues that
have been raised this evening and in earlier debates in the other
place, so that we can get right and truly seize the opportunities
before us.
9.40pm
(Con)
I thank all noble Lords for their engagement ahead of today’s
debate and their contributions this evening on this important
Bill. It has been a good debate, despite the relatively late
hour. I apologise to our two Green ladies, but I am not
responsible for the timings, which were primarily driven by the
time that the House dealt with previous business. However, we
have had some informed and thoughtful speeches from all sides,
which have given me much food for thought. I am particularly
fascinated by this emerging unholy alliance between my noble
friend Lord Forsyth and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, who are
at opposite ends of the political spectrum. I look forward to
seeing how long this lasts when confronted with the reality of
politics. It will be fascinating to see, and will no doubt give
great amusement in Committee.
A number of noble Lords raised concerns regarding the role of the
devolved Administrations. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady
Blake of Leeds and Lady Bryan, the noble and learned Lord, , and the noble
Lords, , and , for their
considered contributions. I emphasise that the devolved
Administrations are and will remain responsible for the spending
decisions on devolved subsidies within any subsidy control
system. We have produced a Bill that not only protects but
strengthens our union, through the creation of a single, coherent
framework that empowers public bodies across all four nations to
design subsidies that are tailored to local needs. It is in all
our interests to ensure that the regime works for the whole
United Kingdom and enables the UK’s domestic markets to function
properly and efficiently, which is precisely what this Bill
does.
It is important that I draw attention again to the point that
Ministers and officials have engaged in and continue to engage
extensively with the devolved Administrations on the new regime.
Such discussions have also been paramount in informing the policy
development from the outset. This is not to say that we have
agreed to everything. Clearly, we have not—there are some areas
of disagreement. However, our proposal aligns with their views on
the majority of issues, including the regime’s objectives, their
foundational principles and the need to respect the devolution
settlement and to enable support for levelling up. Therefore, we
hope that the devolved Administrations can understand and support
our approach and that ultimately, they will give their
legislative consent.
A number of noble Lords raised the issue of the Secretary of
State’s powers within this Bill, but they are limited and
appropriate. The regulation of subsidies is a matter reserved to
the UK Parliament, and the Secretary of State therefore has
responsibility to ensure that the new regime is enforced
consistently across the whole of our United Kingdom. The
Secretary of State must also ensure that the UK is compliant with
our international obligations.
A number of noble Lords across the House have also raised
concerns about transparency. I reassure my noble friend Lord
Forsyth and the noble Viscount, , that my department is working
on a programme of improvements to the subsidy database. These
will be completed soon and will address a number of the specific
concerns raised here and in the other place. The Government will
continue to reflect carefully on the points raised today and will
engage further on our findings with parliamentarians in both
Houses as the Bill progresses.
With regard to secondary legislation and the regime’s guidance, I
thank the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, the noble and learned Lord,
Lord Thomas, and other noble Lords for their contributions. To
directly address the point made by my noble friend Lord Forsyth
and the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, around this Bill being a
framework, I draw attention to the testimony provided by the
parliamentary counsel for domestic legislation in the House of
Commons, Daniel Greenberg. He emphasised the need for the Bill to
take the form that it does in order to give the flexibility for
the ongoing relationships between the different powers concerned
by the substance of the Bill.
As I mentioned earlier in response to the intervention by my
noble friend Lord Forsyth—I am sorry if I gave him the impression
that he was not permitted to intervene; he was entirely right to
do so if he wished—and also addressing the point made by the
noble Lord, , we will shortly publish a
package of illustrative products that will set out much more
information on the regime. We have been keen to ensure that
relevant stakeholders have had the appropriate opportunity to
provide input in the development of these regulations and
guidance. They will be published early next week in time to
support the Grand Committee debate of the Bill and will include
draft regulations on subsidies of particular interest and
guidance on the application of the principles. The final guidance
will be made available in advance of the new regime’s
commencement to ensure that public authorities understand it and
can prepare for it.
On the specific request raised by the noble Lord, , on future impact
assessments, I can assure him that we will produce further such
assessments where appropriate, and we will provide more
information on that in due course.
A number of noble Lords raised questions around net zero. I
reassure the House—in particular, the noble Lord, , and the noble Baronesses,
Lady Bennett and Lady Sheehan—that the Bill supports our net-zero
goal. The principles provided under the Bill are common sense and
clearly support the UK’s priorities on net zero and on protecting
the environment. An explicit principle on net zero, in our view,
is therefore not necessary.
A number of noble Lords also commented on levelling up and
disadvantaged areas. I reassure the House that this Bill supports
the Government’s levelling-up agenda. It gives public authorities
the flexibility to grant subsidies where they are best served to
support economic growth in local places, but without the
excessive bureaucracy or pre-approval processes. This directly
addresses the proposal of an assisted area map such as those
under the EU state aid regime, a point made by the noble Lords,
, and Lord McNicol. These maps were
a necessary feature of the EU state aid regime, in which
subsidies were prohibited unless specifically permitted. Assisted
area maps were therefore required to facilitate an exemption for
subsidies addressing regional inequality.
The UK’s domestic regime is fundamentally different, and it is
aligned with the rest of the world. It is a permissive regime
that allows public authorities to assess for themselves whether
their subsidy or scheme can be given by reference to the sets of
principles that I outlined earlier and of prohibitions and
requirements. I can therefore reassure the noble Lord, , and the noble Baroness, Lady
Bennett, that the absence of a dedicated regional aid exemption
does not mean that public authorities are any less able to give
aid or to address regional inequality. As long as a subsidy is
justifiable on policy grounds, such as addressing regional
inequality, and the public authority considers that it is
compliant with the basic set of principles and prohibitions, then
it can indeed be given.
I move on to the vital subject of Northern Ireland and points
raised by my noble friend Lord Forsyth, the noble Lords, Lord
Purvis and Lord Dodds, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. In
relation to the Bill’s interaction with Northern Ireland, I
reiterate that the UK will of course continue to be a responsible
trade partner that respects its international obligations, and
our commitments made under the Northern Ireland protocol are no
exception. There will be no double regulation of subsidies.
Subsidies that are subject to the protocol, which complies with
EU state aid rules, will be exempt from the requirements of this
new domestic regime. Under current arrangements, subsidies within
the scope of the Northern Ireland protocol of the withdrawal
agreement in respect of goods and wholesale electricity markets,
which affect NI-EU trade, will still need to comply with EU state
aid rules. Subsidies for services will ordinarily comply with the
more flexible UK domestic subsidy regime.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, also referred to technical guidance,
noting that in specific circumstances it may be useful for
companies to keep separate accounts. This is one possible way to
demonstrate that a subsidy given in Great Britain is not being
used to cross-subsidise a subsidiary in Northern Ireland, but it
is not a legal requirement and nor is it relevant to all
companies.
I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, that, subject to
negotiation with the EU, the intention is that all types of
subsidy would be within scope of the domestic regime. The
Government will create streamlined routes for public authorities
across the UK to award subsidies that help achieve UK-wide
priorities. We will continue to work closely with the DAs while
developing this policy both at official and ministerial level,
and we are committed to continue our close engagement on this
with the devolved authorities.
(LD)
Sorry to intervene, but to be clear so that I understand: what
the Minister has just said is, I think, that if I have a business
which has an operation in County Antrim and an operation in
Hereford, and they are both technically eligible for a subsidy
for the goods they make, the operation in Hereford would be
eligible for a subsidy under the UK scheme but the operation in
County Antrim would not be. Is that correct?
(Con)
It would depend on a number of factors, and whether the subsidy
complies with the set of basic principles that we outlined
earlier under the UK regime. But under the current system—and
obviously negotiations are ongoing—and if it was for a good, then
the operation in Norther Ireland would be subject to the EU state
aid regime because Northern Ireland is subject to that under the
current terms of the protocol. If my interpretation is not
correct, I will write to the noble Lord.
I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, that devolved
Administrations, as primary public authorities, can also set up
schemes for use by other public authorities where that is within
their existing functions and powers. For example, the Welsh
Government are perfectly within their rights to set up a scheme,
if they wish, that can be used and accessed by all local
authorities in Wales.
I move on to the role of the CMA and the subsidy advice unit. I
agree wholeheartedly with my noble friend Lord Lamont, who noted
the importance of independent oversight and robust scrutiny of
our new regime. The subsidy advice unit will have an important
advisory role for a relatively small number of cases, and an
overall monitoring role for the system as a whole. Most subsidies
granted are low risk, so it is right that the unit’s focus should
be on the small number of subsidies with a greater likelihood of
causing distortion in the market. The subsidy advice unit will
provide advice that is genuinely useful to public authorities in
designing their subsidies and assessing against their regimes’
requirements. This strikes the right balance between improved
freedom for public authorities while providing confidence to
interested parties, investors and the general public.
My noble friend also raised the issue of the Competition Appeal
Tribunal. I can assure him that the regime will be robustly
enforced through this UK judicial system, with the Competition
Appeal Tribunal hearing judicial reviews of the award of a
subsidy or the making of a subsidy scheme. The Competition Appeal
Tribunal is UK-wide, has extensive expertise in the related area
of competition law and is well suited to hearing challenges to
the award of subsidies. In our view, the roles afforded to the
Competition Appeal Tribunal and to the new subsidy advice unit
will foster a regime that is robust, while empowering public
authorities to deliver subsidies more quickly, more easily and
more flexibly if that is what they choose to do.
A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, and Lord Bruce, and the noble
Baroness, Lady Bryan, raised the issue of the inclusion of
agriculture. In our view, the inclusion of agriculture and
fisheries subsidies will help to protect competition and
investment in these sectors in the UK. This position was
supported by the majority of the respondents to the UK
Government’s consultation who answered the question on
agriculture and fisheries. Although agriculture and fisheries
subsidies are not in scope of the subsidy control provisions in
the UK-EU TCA, they are still subject to other international
rules. The proposed approach will provide consistency for
granting authorities while retaining sufficient flexibility for
the devolved Administrations and all public authorities to
deliver support where it is needed and how they see fit, given
their responsibilities.
(LD)
The Minister said that this was supported by the majority across
the UK, but he has not acknowledged that it was not supported by
the agricultural representatives in Scotland or Wales.
(Con)
I do not have a regional breakdown of the responses to the
consultation, but this is a UK-wide system and regime. If there
is a regional breakdown, I will certainly provide it to the noble
Lord.
I will move on to answering the point made by the noble Lord,
Lord McNicol, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, about
the DPRRC report. I am grateful to the committee for the
production of the report; I read it with interest. Of course, I
recognise the strength of feeling in this House; it has come
across today and been conveyed to me by a number of noble Lords,
especially with regard to Clause 47. There is a lot to consider
there in terms of striking the right balance on this and the
other issues raised in the report, but I can commit to reading it
very carefully and considering what policy steps we may take in
response.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, also referred to the
Treasury’s powers. Measures implemented by central banks in
pursuit of monetary policy have always been considered outside
the scope of EU state aid regimes and rules—just as well given
the massive amount of subsidies that it has imposed in recent
years. In the joint declaration on monetary policies and subsidy
control, the EU and the UK confirmed their mutual understanding
that activities conducted by a central bank in pursuit of
monetary policy are outside the scope of the subsidy control
requirements in the trade and co-operation agreement. One of the
Bank of England’s independent statutory functions is to maintain
UK price stability and, subject to that, support the Government’s
economic policy. It is both appropriate and necessary that the
domestic subsidy control regime exempts monetary policy subsidies
and schemes in pursuit of these objectives.
I assure my noble friends Lord Lamont and Lord Trenchard, and the
noble Viscount, , that this Government do not
intend to return to the policies of the past, such as the failed
1970s approach of attempting to run the economy by bailing out
fundamentally unsustainable companies. I suspect that this will
probably not be the subject of a new agreement between the noble
Lord, Lord Forsyth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, but,
nevertheless, that is our policy.
The principles in this Bill make it clear that subsidies need to
address either identified market failure or an equity rationale
as a legitimate objective in order to be awarded. It is important
to note that not every example of government spending is a
subsidy, of course. The Bill sets out a detailed definition: if a
public authority purchases goods or services on market terms,
that is public procurement and not a subsidy. Parliamentary
oversight of spending and managing public money, as well as the
Green Book requirements, will continue to apply and are important
protections against bad government spending decisions.
(LD)
The Minister is being generous in giving way this evening. For
the record, will the Minister say—it was hard to discern from the
comments on the processes—what the geographical area of a market
is? The Bill refers to market failure, and the Minister has
referred to it. He also referred to many public bodies that will
be local authorities. When I emailed the subsidy control email
inquiry, asking, as a resident of the Scottish Borders, whether
Northumberland is a market, in order to discern whether it will
be a market failure, I was told that there is no Northumberland
market. So, what are the geographical areas of a market? The
Government are not going to have the geographical indices for
deprivation, whereas previously, we knew what the markets were in
respect of state aid support.
(Con)
I will reflect on that, speak to officials and write to the noble
Lord about the appropriate definition, is that is okay with
him.
I will respond to the question from my noble friend Lord
Trenchard, the noble Lord, , and others about transparency
thresholds. Regarding thresholds at which subsidies are uploaded
to the database, I listened carefully to the debate in the other
place and the comments from noble Lords this evening. In our
view, the current transparency provisions seek to strike a
balance between reducing the administrative burdens and costs to
public authorities and ensuring that the necessary information on
subsidies is available. In our view, this is vital to ensure that
interested parties are able to challenge potentially harmful
subsidies. However, I accept that there is a legitimate debate
about the level at which those thresholds are placed.
Let me conclude by reaffirming what I said in my opening remarks.
In our view this Bill creates a robust yet agile system that
allows public authorities to provide subsidies where they are
needed most. At the same time, it will allow us to maintain a
competitive free-market economy as we build back better from the
pandemic, and to chart a new course as an independent trading
nation. I look forward to discussing many of these points further
in Committee, but in the meantime, I commend this Bill to the
House.
Bill read a second time and committed to a Grand Committee.
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