Extract from Committee stage (Lords) of the Domestic Abuse Bill - Jan 25
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Amendment 3 Moved by 3: Clause 1, page 2, line 1, at end insert—
“(f) unreasonable prevention or threat of prevention of dissolution
of a religious Jewish marriage via a religious bill of divorce (a
“get”);”Member’s explanatory statement This specifically itemises
one spouse unreasonably preventing the dissolution of a Jewish
religious marriage with a ‘get’ as being within the scope of the
Bill by bringing it under the definition of abusive behaviour.
Baroness Altmann (Con)...Request free
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Amendment 3
Moved by 3: Clause 1, page 2, line 1, at end insert— “(f) unreasonable prevention or threat of prevention of dissolution of a religious Jewish marriage via a religious bill of divorce (a “get”);”Member’s explanatory statement This specifically itemises one spouse unreasonably preventing the dissolution of a Jewish religious marriage with a ‘get’ as being within the scope of the Bill by bringing it under the definition of abusive behaviour. Baroness Altmann (Con) [V] My Lords, I shall speak also to my other amendments in this group—Amendments 5, 168, 169 and 170, which all relate to the same issue. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and the noble Lords, Lord Mendelsohn and Lord Palmer, who have added their names to the amendments, providing cross-party support. I also thank my noble friends the Ministers, who have been so generous with their time in meeting Peers to discuss the amendments and other issues relating to the Bill, and indeed for their passion for, and dedication to, improving the support and recognition of victims of domestic abuse. This set of amendments is designed to address a specific type of abuse that mostly affects religious Jewish women, and I declare an interest as one. This issue has long been of concern to me and to many other religious Jews in this country and worldwide. Our aim with the amendments is to help victims who are unable to leave a failed marriage because their spouse unreasonably decides to prevent them moving on with their life in accordance with Jewish religious law. I stress at the outset that the amendments are specifically designed to refer only to Jewish religious divorce, with no intention of impacting on procedures relevant to any other religion. Jewish law, of course, governs Judaism, and there is no intention to undermine the role of the Jewish courts. The amendments are intended to offer a means of helping those impacted by a particular type of abuse that can arise in some cases in this country under Jewish laws of divorce. I also stress that the majority of Jewish divorces proceed smoothly and British Jewish wives can move on with their lives once their civil divorce is finalised. However, sadly, there are some instances where a husband, sometimes demanding money to improve a divorce settlement agreed in the civil courts, sometimes driven by a desire to punish or control their ex-wife and sometimes to continue emotional abuse that existed in the marriage, unreasonably refuses to grant the get—the Jewish bill of divorce—leaving the wife married to him in the eyes of Jewish law, even if she wishes to be free. The amendments seek to protect and support Jewish women—it is, I am afraid, usually women—whose husbands do not willingly sign the Jewish divorce document, the get. A get can be secured only if a man initiates it and the woman agrees—it cannot be initiated by the woman—so it is intrinsically biased in favour of the husband and is, sadly, open to abuse. This is a Jewish legal document that must be approved by the rabbinical court, known as the beth din, which literally means “House of Judgment”, and it allows a couple to divorce by mutual consent. However, a get is legally valid in Jewish religious law only if approved by the beth din, and this normally requires the rabbinical judges to be satisfied that it has been agreed voluntarily. Those worst affected by an unreasonable refusal to grant a Jewish religious divorce can effectively be kept chained in the marriage for decades as their husbands prevent them being able to marry anyone else or have children accepted under Jewish religious law. As noble Lords can imagine, this situation causes immense distress to the women, who are known as agunot, which can be translated as “chained wives”. Of course, ultimately, it is up to the religious authorities to make decisions about religious Jewish divorce, and there is an entire legal framework governing all aspects of Jewish life which dates back to biblical law. These amendments cannot interfere with the rulings of the religious courts. Nevertheless, with this Bill being such a huge advance for our country and offering our citizens better protection and support against abuse, I hope that my noble friends on the Front Bench will agree that these victims should also be entitled to the protection that will be available. The amendments specifically aim to address the plight of the abuse victims in such circumstances so that these citizens, who are subjected to such unreasonable, coercive and controlling behaviour, can access practical and emotional support, as provided under the Bill. 17:15:00 Amendment 3 would add the unreasonable refusal to grant a get as a recognised form of domestic abuse in British law. It would specifically enshrine in this legislation that a spouse unreasonably preventing the dissolution of a Jewish religious marriage with a get was brought within the scope of the Bill as committing a defined form of abusive behaviour. Amendment 5 stipulates that a spouse impeding the dissolution of a religious Jewish marriage can be considered to be acting in a controlling, coercive, threatening or abusive manner to their partner for the purposes of the Bill. I stress that the amendments are not designed in any way to reduce the ability of the Jewish religious court to apply Jewish law and, in particular, the provisions of the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002, which was a welcome step forward in helping those chained women and had the support of the much-missed Lord Sacks and the London Beth Din. The 2002 Act means that a judge can refuse to grant a decree absolute to a Jewish wife whose husband has not agreed to provide a get, but that has not stopped the problem of chained wives. A civil divorce will not substitute for a get, no matter how long the wife and husband are separated. If their relationship was abusive to begin with, this is a way in which the man can continue that abuse and continue to exert control over his wife with impunity. In Jewish law, any relationship with another man would be considered adultery and any children that this woman had would be considered illegitimate, damaging their lives as religious Jews. Jewish religious women in this position cannot move on with their lives, being forced by their husbands into a situation of limbo and powerlessness for years or decades, even missing out on their child-bearing years. Of course, I hugely regret that this remains an issue which the rabbinical authorities have not been able fully to overcome on behalf of religious Jewish women, but I understand and fully respect that these are difficult points of Torah, Talmudic and Mishnaic law, and would not presume to have the legal knowledge to address the situation. I am also aware that there is huge sympathy among the Jewish rabbinate for those affected. However, I hope that the Bill and our suggested amendments can help to provide support and possibly further encouragement or assistance for Jewish religious women in that position. I shall briefly address the other amendments in this group. Amendment 168 seeks to amend Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. This Act’s introduction of the new criminal offence of coercive and controlling behaviour in intimate family relationships was a very positive step in recognising and responding to this form of abuse, which has a devastating impact on victims’ lives. The amendment would specifically ensure that unreasonably preventing the dissolution of a Jewish religious marriage is included in the definition of that offence. It would add after subsection (5): “For the purposes of subsection (2)(a),” that if parties remain married under Jewish religious law, even if civilly divorced, they should be “regarded as being connected in an intimate personal relationship.” This would apply because they remain legally married under Jewish law and he still holds sway over her, whether or not they live together. Amendment 169 says that the Secretary of State’s guidance relating to Clause 1 of this Domestic Abuse Bill or Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 must recognise “unreasonably preventing dissolution of a religious Jewish marriage” against the wishes of the other partner as “controlling or coercive” behaviour. In these sad cases, coercive control commonly continues post-separation; we wish to ensure that the offence is recognised as extending, even when the couple is not living together. Economic abuse in connection with a get is also a form of coercive control that can be used post-separation, sometimes leaving victims with significant debts from trying to achieve their get, but we believe it should be included as an offence. It is not covered under the other offences such as stalking or harassment. Amendment 170 stipulates that a court must take into account unreasonably impeding religious Jewish marriage dissolution when considering whether this is domestic abuse, and thus whether an offence has been committed under Section 76 or 76A of the Serious Crime Act, or whether domestic abuse support should be provided under Clause 55 of this Bill. I thank the prospective domestic abuse commissioner, whose helpful briefing for Peers ahead of Committee welcomed these proposed amendments, stating the desire to ensure that the rights of Jewish women to end their religious marriage are included as part of the statutory definition on the grounds of domestic abuse by way of controlling and coercive behaviour, psychological abuse and economic abuse, where it is also a factor, as specified in these amendments. I hope that the Government will engage further with us on these amendments to ensure, either by way of the amendments themselves or perhaps by secondary legislation or statutory guidance, that these victims can be included when considering domestic abuse in this country. They are not intended to set any precedent for any other religion’s marriage or divorce procedures; I hope that they will add further encouragement for recalcitrant religious Jewish husbands to free their former wives to continue their lives, and provide recognition of these women’s victimhood as well as support. As legislators, we have a duty to do our utmost to protect those trapped in this way. As well as providing support to the victims, characterising the situation in British law as domestic abuse or criminal behaviour may be of assistance to the rabbinic courts. We hope that they will work with us to find a better resolution to this terrible agunah problem. I beg to move. Baroness Deech (CB) [V] My Lords, like the other stories lying behind the need for this Bill, this set of amendments reveals a shameful story. I am pleased to support this group of amendments and to support the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. There could be as many as 100 women at a time caught in this situation who are known to the religious courts. It is not uncommon for women to secure their release by paying sums extorted from them by acts comparable to blackmail. The grant of the get can be used by the husband as leverage. A recent case involved a woman paying her ex-husband £50,000 for her freedom after 15 years of being chained; others have cost similar five-figure sums. It is reported that more abuse occurs nowadays than previously, perhaps connected to higher divorce rates and higher financial obligations imposed by secular courts. It is true that a religious divorce needs the woman’s agreement as well, but her refusal can be overridden by a religious court whereas a man’s cannot. Noble Lords can imagine what we women think of this and the lack of respect we have for the rabbinic authorities who manage to find all sorts of loopholes in religious law but not in this one. It is embarrassing to have to turn to secular law for relief. The Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 allows parties to ask a judge to delay a decree absolute until a religious divorce is finalised, but this law is ineffective if the husband does not care about getting a civil divorce. Then there is the Serious Crime Act 2015, Section 76, which is referred to in the amendment too. In the circumstances of a get refusal, there have been prosecutions launched against wholly unreasonable and controlling husbands under that section, which created the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship. Withholding the get fits well within that section. It is not, however, retrospective, and a person bringing a private prosecution has to be prepared to foot the bill for their legal costs. The section needs the proof of intent to cause fear of violence or serious distress. The cases about the get brought under this section never came to court because, once the husband had been served with the charge, he caved in. The result is that there is no precedent that this section can in fact be used where a get is withheld. So why will the potential of Section 76 not suffice for the cruel treatment that has been described? The answer is that there would be advantages to dealing with unreasonable withholding of the get in the domestic abuse setting rather that of the Serious Crime Act. The use of a domestic abuse protection notice or order would open the door to a range of support for the victim. It also would mean that, rather than a criminal procedure, the perpetrator—usually, but not always, the husband—will be subject to a civil preventive measure, the notice, not a finding of guilt. A domestic abuse protection order can contain appropriate conditions, and must not conflict with the perpetrator’s religious beliefs. It is important that a domestic abuse order or notice be perceived as less coercive than a criminal conviction under the Serious Crime Act 2015. This is because a strict interpretation of the orthodox Jewish law requires that the husband be not directly coerced into giving the get; it has to be voluntary, as is widely understood. I am not defending this for a moment but, for those for whom the correct religious forms are important, and bearing in mind the impact on their present and future families, a domestic abuse protection notice or order would be a lifeline in secular and religious terms. I support this set of amendments, which define the unreasonable withholding of a get as abusive behaviour; that is, when one spouse acts in a way which is controlling, coercing or threatening, or abusing the other spouse’s normal civil liberty of being able to remarry and have children in accordance with her beliefs. I hope that this House and the Government will extend a helping hand and free these unfortunate women. Lord Polak (Con) My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 3, 5, 168, 169 and 170. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Altmann on her excellent introduction. I am delighted that my Government are putting forward this Bill and its attempt to provide as comprehensive as possible a set of arrangements relating to domestic abuse; it has my strong support. I am particularly grateful to the Ministers, my noble friends Lady Williams of Trafford and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for their willingness to engage. To be clear, as my noble friend Lady Altmann said, the majority of cases of Jewish divorce are completed without too much difficulty; in the Orthodox community, they are handled by a beth din, and the judges—or dayanim—of the beth din ensure that all provisions of Jewish law are fully and appropriately adhered to. However, there are far too many cases where a man with ill intent can frustrate the process with potentially devastating ramifications for his spouse and, of course, his children. These amendments are clearly being proposed to ensure that victims of domestic abuse or coercive behaviour have full access to the provisions of the Bill. The amendments do not reduce the court’s existing ability to allow the religious courts to apply halacha—Jewish law—or, in particular, the provisions of the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002, which had the support of Lord Jakobovits, Lord Sacks and the London Beth Din. As a practising member of the modern orthodox community, let me be absolutely clear: I am not remotely qualified to make statements on behalf of anyone, and certainly not on behalf of the beth din. However, I acknowledge that the beth din of the United Synagogue should be commended on the efforts it has made to limit the number of agunot—chained women. It has recently and rightly taken out adverts in the Jewish press that name and shame Jewish men who have refused to give a get, but sadly there is still so much more to do. However, these are overriding matters for the religious authorities and they should continue their own deliberations, although I believe that there may be scope for the Minister, my noble friend Lord Wolfson, to explore potential opportunities with the beth din going forward. 17:30:00 While the amendments do not create any new provisions that currently cannot be exercised through existing legislation, it can be argued that the reasons for adding these measures to the Bill are that they will make access to its provisions easier and more timely, thus potentially reducing the cost burden, while the agunah—the chained woman—can more speedily gain the ability to remarry or to lead a normal life without the stigma associated with her position. In addition, these women can access sources of support that will be made available by this important Bill. I therefore ask my noble friend the Minister to consider supporting these amendments. They are specific, limited in scope and, as has been said, should not set precedents that relate to any other form of religious marriage or divorce in other religious traditions. I urge my noble friend the Minister to confirm that the Government are willing to engage with the proposers and supporters of these amendments to ensure that such important measures can be addressed, at the very least, in the statutory guidance. Lord Mendelsohn (Lab) [V] My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendments 3, 5, 168, 169 and 170. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for proposing these amendments and I applaud the compelling case that she made in her speech. I also thank all colleagues for their thoughtful comments and support for these measures which, as I say, I strongly support. It is good to see the Minister in his place and ready to respond to the amendments. I am sure he is aware that it was his head of chambers, my noble friend Lord Grabiner, who introduced the Bill that became the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 with the support of the then Government. These amendments come firmly from that tradition and the approach of successive Governments to these matters. The 2002 Act has been valuable, but, alas, the position of so many women who are caught in this situation continues to be a source of great anxiety. These measures would give real benefit and relief, not only to the women who are so chained but to the men who wish to marry them and, most importantly, to the health and well-being of any children caught up in this awful situation. I would like to pay tribute to Jewish Women’s Aid, GETTout and the many legal experts and professionals who have done so much for those too many who have been caught in this awful position. These amendments do not seek to legislate on what I consider to be essentially matters of religious doctrine and custom. They do not seek to involve the civil courts in questions of Jewish religious law. In fact, these provisions would provide greater flexibility for the courts to apply matters so as to ensure a greater appreciation of religious law and those involved in it. Her Majesty’s judges have proved to be able to deal very effectively with these issues, and I am sure that the beth din of today will be able to do so too, as indeed it has since 1866 when the then Government told the Chief Rabbinate that it no longer had the sole or main right to determine marriage or divorce in the United Kingdom. What these measures will do, most importantly, is support the person who in adverse circumstances is the most powerless, vulnerable and likely to be experiencing coercive or abusive behaviour. There has been a tendency in this debate to raise grounds for criticising rabbis for not getting a grip on the problem, but it is important to recognise that religious law is biblical in origin and therefore seen to be immutable. Changes in practice and interpretation are very hard to achieve, most notably in the orthodox and ultra-orthodox communities, especially in the absence of any central parliament and in the context of so many different traditions. In my opinion, their position must be understood. Under our civil law, the process of divorce is straightforward and gender neutral. Neither party can control or manipulate the process, and once the conditions for divorce are satisfied, the divorce is granted. Jewish law is different, because it is gendered and allows the man to control the proceedings. There is a degree of mutuality, but, fundamentally, the process provides for the male to be able to make the final determination and empowers the religious courts with the ability to overrule women. Central to this is the place of the man to be judged as being able to make a decision under religiously defined obligations of “free will” or “free from coercion”. It is a definition absent of responsibilities, or even adherence to common accepted principles of right or wrong. Unfortunately, these established rules of religious law sometimes bring out the worst in people. On these occasions, the giving of the get may be used as a tactical device or a weapon of blackmail in relation to the ancillary arrangements for the children of the marriage and the financial settlement made in connection with the civil divorce. Alternatively, a refusal to deliver a get may be motivated simply by malice or spite that is in turn driven by jealousy or some other, perhaps understandable but nevertheless objectively unreasonable, purpose. We have to place the needs of the victims at the centre and, as with this important Bill, rebalance our approach to deal with the needs of the victim. Of course, the job of the beth din is not straightforward and should be recognised as being complex, and is, I am sure, as sensitive as it is agonising. We must avoid getting involved in its processes and matters that offend religious law and focus on helping the victims. In doing this—and this is why these amendments are so important—I will illustrate the predicament of victims through three real-life examples. The first is of a woman who had been divorced in the civil court, but is still waiting for her get after five years. On finally securing an appointment with the religious court to receive her get, it was made conditional upon her signing to agree a financial settlement of £150,000 less than that awarded by the civil court, and being forced to sign a document relinquishing any ownership of the joint properties. She was encouraged by the beth din to accept the offer as a legitimate way to secure her get, but she did not choose to do so. Another example is of a woman who has been waiting 20 years for her get, and whose estranged husband has left the religious community, so it has no hold over him. This, and the effect of years of emotional and violent abuse during the marriage, continues to blight her life. A third woman’s husband was being prosecuted for the sexual abuse of children. In trying to secure her get, she was asked, including by presiding members of the religious court, to lie to the police and tell them that the accusations had been fabricated, so that she could be given her religious divorce. Additional financial sums were requested. The husband made further demands that were impossible for the wife to fulfil, such as clearing his name of all convictions and expunging references on the internet. The woman had non-molestation and restraining orders against her husband, but, nevertheless, she was subjected to a campaign of harassment at home, in the street and through the posting of offensive and abusive messages on social media. The perpetrators have not been easy to identify, nor has there been any co-operation in the investigations. While the beth din expressed sympathy with her plight, there was no movement on the securing of the get. Not every matter can be resolved easily and not every situation will fall into neat boxes with regard to the roles that either the religious or civil courts can play. It is therefore essential that we take this opportunity to level the playing field and make sure that we give the support to victims that these amendments would provide. Their objective is to enshrine the right of Jewish women to secure their get where it is being withheld by a recalcitrant ex-husband in order to exert control over the woman. Having a specific inclusion for victims of this kind of coercive behaviour, psychological abuse and often economic extortion would be valuable to those women who may have secured a civil divorce but are not considered to be divorced within the Jewish religion. It is in line with the key objective of the Bill, which is to raise awareness and understanding of domestic abuse and its impact on victims. The provisions categorise domestic abuse as conduct whereby one party seeks to compel the other to remain in a marriage against their will and uses an existing religious structure to perpetuate abuse and exert control. There is a provision in law for the withholding of a civil divorce if a husband does not give a get, but in abusive cases, husbands are often in no rush to obtain a civil divorce, and with the bulk of the matrimonial assets and resources often being in their sole name, they are content to remain married without the final separation under way in the civil court. While the Jewish religious courts have introduced communal and social sanctions with some degree of effectiveness, they are severely limited by having weak enforcement capabilities. This is why the law needs to go further to protect victims of this kind of coercive control and mental cruelty. Women in this position must be entitled to the support afforded to other victims of domestic abuse under the Bill, whereby unreasonably refusing to grant a religious divorce means an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape, and regulating their everyday behaviour. That is the absolute definition of coercive control. It is important to bear in mind that for women who experience get refusal, it is highly likely that that is just one of many abusive behaviours perpetrated against them, often escalating over the course of several years. Sustained domestic abuse serves to humiliate, degrade and slowly remove a woman’s sense of self, severely limiting her wherewithal to advocate for herself. Many women in this position have explained the trauma and absolute desperation it creates, and the fact that they have no way of legitimising their concerns. In some cases a man uses the imbalance of power in his favour simply out of spite—perhaps out of dissatisfaction with the way the civil marriage ended, or with the financial settlement afforded him by the courts. In other cases, a man may have mental health issues—commonly a personality disorder. In one example, a young woman, A, converted to Judaism and at 19 married a man, B, who quickly became physically and sexually abusive, as he suffered from bipolar disorder, of which she had been unaware during their short courtship. She left him after less than a year, but six years later remained in limbo, unable to marry within the religion she had chosen. These amendments would provide the opportunity to ensure that the provisions and protections were available to all, and specifically to recognise the plight of these women, removing the shadow of abuse and control. The law cannot restore their right to exercise their faith through their ability to remarry and have children within their faith, but these measures, in this Bill, can provide women with protection through the courts, and give them access to a domestic abuse protection order on the grounds of get prevention. As noble friends have said, beth din-approved gets have been achieved by using the law, and these particular measures, more creatively and assertively, and in tandem with other steps. Nothing in the amendments makes a case for using them in the first instance, or even making them a normal feature of proceedings in Jewish law governing divorces, the overwhelming majority of which, as colleagues have said, pass easily. I am sure that such a prospect, of being urged to be in compliance, would be unnecessary and would raise deep concerns. But these measures need to be more readily available to support victims, so I hope that the Government are willing to support the amendments, as they are in the tradition of their own approach and of the important progress that the Bill offers. Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD) [V] My Lords, I first declare my interests as noted on the register; I think the relevant ones would be as a vice-president of the Jewish Leadership Council and as a long-standing member of the United Synagogue. I have signed all the amendments in this group, and I shall not refer to them individually. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for leading on them. She said that she was speaking as a religious Jewish woman, so I thought it might be appropriate for me to speak as a religious Jewish man. These problems, which mainly affect women, are well known in the Jewish community. Noble Lords will notice that the amendments in this group have been signed by Peers from the Cross Benches, the Conservative and Labour Benches, and by myself on the Liberal Democrat Benches. When I speak in debates, it is not often that I agree with all four of the speakers immediately before me—maybe this is due to my bad nature—but tonight I do, and I pay tribute to the details that they have added to the debate. The questions we are asking are: what is abusive behaviour, and what is coercive behaviour? We are saying that spouses should not unreasonably prevent the dissolution of a Jewish religious marriage. Other noble Lords have mentioned the effects on the children of such marriages, and I shall expand a little on that. Previous amendments have said a lot about parental problems and responsibilities, but if no religious divorce—no get—is given, the children of that marriage cannot live separately with the divorced parent. Worse than that, the children of a marriage that is recognised in the civil courts but not in the Jewish religious courts are treated as illegitimate in the Jewish religion. What we need to do, if we can, is to use UK legislation to help those chained women. Previous speakers have commented on recalcitrant husbands who demand to be paid off in order to give a get. We should do everything we can in UK legislation to give power to the women who have such problems. I would have given some examples, but the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, has already given some graphic ones, which I am sure will be well known to the Minister. 17:45:00 The five amendments in the group all cover the same issue: gittin—the plural of get—for Jewish women. I hope that when the Minister replies, he will say that there is hope that we will make progress on the amendments by Report. They are worthy amendments, and I trust that the Government will help the Jewish women who are, in the main, affected by these restrictions. Lord Moylan (Con) My Lords, I rise with some trepidation—and, I hope, an appropriate degree of sensitivity—to make some brief comments on a subject on which I have no great expertise. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, the Minister, for the time he gave me to discuss this topic last week. The stories recounted by noble Lords can inspire only sympathy for the women caught in this terrible trap; that is completely understandable. However, I have a concern and a question. Although it has been stated several times that the amendments relate only to Jewish marriage and can have no consequences for other belief systems I am concerned that, without some additional wording, the general principle underlying them—that one has an obligation to collaborate in a divorce—might leak out into other systems. such as those in which one spouse may have a conscientious objection to the principle of divorce. I am thinking principally of Roman Catholics, but also of other denominations. If it were to be taken, either by analogy or by legal persuasion, that that principle made it a criminal offence not to collaborate in or expedite a divorce to which one party had a conscientious objection, that would be a matter that needed careful consideration. Although I have every sympathy with the amendments, I believe that they need additional wording and protection, at the very minimum, to ensure that the consequences I have hinted at are not brought about in legal reality. I very much wish to hear what my noble friend the Minister and my noble friend Lady Altmann, who moved the amendment, have to say about that, so that we can be confident that the measures are as precisely focused as she intends. Baroness Wilcox of Newport (Lab) [V] My Lords, I draw attention to my interests as noted in the register. We very much want the Bill to recognise the realities of abuse that different communities face, and to make sure that it will work in practice for victims of all backgrounds, religions, disabilities and so forth. We hope that the Minister will work with the Peers raising issues and look into their concerns. I pay tribute to the noble Lords who tabled the amendments for the very experienced and knowledgeable way in which they have highlighted this matter, to ensure that the rights of Jewish women to end their religious marriages and secure a get are included as part of the statutory definition of domestic abuse. This would be on the grounds of domestic abuse by way of controlling and coercive behaviour and psychological abuse, and of economic abuse where that is a factor. As the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, said in her detailed opening speech, the amendment is intended to help women who are unable to leave a failed marriage, and is specific only to Jewish religious laws; there is no intention to undermine the Jewish courts. Including it in the Bill would provide the opportunity to ensure that its provisions and protections were applicable to all, and that it specifically recognised the plight of those women, removing the shadow of abuse and control, and restoring their right to exercise their faith through their ability to remarry and have children within their faith. That recognition would also offer them other protections under the Act, once the Bill is passed, if they were specifically included. It is in line with a key objective of the Bill to raise awareness and understanding of domestic abuse and its impact on victims. Key is the ability of women to bring a case where they can retain control of the process as the victims, rather than as a witness in a prosecution having criminal sanctions as a civil party. Through tabling such an amendment, the issue can be usefully raised, and seeking legislative change could be ground-breaking for chained women. This group highlights what so many noble Lords have been saying. The Bill must work for all victims, and to do this, it must grapple with the reality of how domestic abuse is experienced in all the different ways that it is by those living with it and those trying to escape it. I sincerely hope that the Minister can work with the noble Lords sponsoring this group of amendments to review this important issue and achieve a positive resolution. Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con) My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments, particularly my noble friend Lady Altmann for her very good introduction. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, that it is not his noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar responding, but I know that he will be listening to every word I say and will correct me where I am wrong. I also thank him for some of the compelling stories that he outlined—some absolutely tragic cases which I know that all noble Lords will sympathise and empathise with. I thank all noble Lords who have engaged with me on this subject. It has been a real education for me, outlining the situations that some women find themselves in. I will take these amendments one by one to address them properly. Amendments 3 and 5 would add a sixth limb to the list of behaviours in Clause 1(3) which count as abusive, namely the unreasonable refusal, or the threat thereof, to agree to the granting of a religious bill of divorce, or a get, which is necessary to dissolve a Jewish religious marriage. I am all too aware of the real hardship suffered by women refused a get by their husbands. As already outlined, such a woman is unable to remarry under the auspices of Orthodox Judaism. Furthermore, as a woman regarded in Jewish law as still being married, any children she goes on to have with another Jewish partner will themselves be severely restricted, as a matter of Jewish law, in who they are later able to marry. The term applied in Jewish law to such a woman, “agunah” or “chained”, is, as my noble friend Lady Altmann pointed out, both apt and tragic. I know that Jewish religious authorities are concerned about the problem, but they have not so far found a solution to it within Jewish religious law. All too often this will be about the exertion of control by one spouse over the other, as noble Lords have pointed out. There could well be situations where the refusal of a get might constitute controlling or coercive behaviour, depending on the facts of an individual case, and this would sit better in the statutory guidance on domestic abuse provided for in Clause 73 than in the Bill. The list of abusive behaviours in Clause 1(3) is deliberately drafted at a high level, to provide a clear and easily understandable summary of what constitutes domestic abuse. Including very specific circumstances in this list could lead to pressure to include other such circumstances, which would make the definition unwieldy. It could also create the impression that there is a hierarchy of abuse, which of course there is not. It is these more specific circumstances that the statutory guidance is designed to address, and I am more than happy to work with noble Lords to discuss what such content might look like. Amendment 169 seeks to ensure that this guidance and the statutory guidance issued under Section 77 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 include in their discussion of controlling or coercive behaviour the unreasonable refusal to grant a get. We wish to avoid, as far as possible, prescribing in statute what statutory guidance must contain, which can arguably defeat the purpose of producing that guidance. My noble friend will be aware that, in response to significant concern from a large number of parties, Clause 73(3) does provide that guidance issued under the Bill must recognise “that the majority of victims of domestic abuse… are female.” However, including the specific issue of Jewish religious divorces similarly in the Bill would lead to pressure for a large number of other topics to be so included—as beautifully illustrated by my noble friend Lord Moylan—which could in practice end up reproducing much of the substance of the guidance in the Bill. My noble friend will have just heard my commitment to referring to this subject in the guidance. Amendment 168 seeks to amend Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 to ensure that the person who unreasonably refuses a get, and their spouse, are regarded as being in an intimate personal relationship with each other, and therefore count as personally connected, which is a prerequisite for the application of the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour, as noble Lords have pointed out. I understand the intention behind this amendment. My noble friend may be aware that in our White Paper on domestic abuse, published in January 2019, the Government committed to undertake a review into the controlling or coercive behaviour offence. That review, which has considered evidence surrounding the effectiveness of that offence, will be published before Report, and the Government will consider their position in relation to that offence after its publication, in the light of the content of the review and any other information brought to our attention. Therefore, my noble friend’s amendment may be slightly premature. Amendment 170 seeks to ensure that the unreasonable refusal to consent to a get be regarded as a significant factor in the consideration of whether a person has suffered domestic abuse, particularly whether the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour has been committed; whether a domestic abuse protection order should be issued; and the production by relevant local authorities of strategies for the provision of domestic abuse support, as required by Clause 55. On the first limb of that, the determination of domestic abuse, my remarks about what it is appropriate to include in the Bill and what to include in guidance apply equally. On the two limbs which refer to court proceedings, it would not be appropriate for the Government to direct the judiciary in this way as to what it might or must consider, and nor is it necessary. The conditions which must be satisfied before a court can make a domestic abuse protection order will already enable a court to make one in relation to this behaviour, if it amounts to abusive behaviour under Clause 1(3). It is therefore unnecessary to make specific provision that a court must consider this sort of behaviour. It would also be the first provision of its type in the Bill, and lead to pressure for other considerations to be included in the Bill as factors courts must consider. On the final limb, relating to local authorities, we are not otherwise specifying what local authorities must consider when drawing up their strategies. Strategies will relate to general provision in the local authority area, and it would be very odd for the only such provision to refer to a situation which relates to a very small number of people at most. However, again, I reassure my noble friend that this issue will be considered in the statutory guidance, to which local authorities will refer. I hope that in the light of this explanation, my noble friend is happy to withdraw her amendment. 18:00:00 Baroness Altmann (Con) [V] My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this brief debate, and I appreciate the excellent contributions from across the House and the very thoughtful way in which this issue is being dealt with. I also thank my noble friend the Minister for her excellent response and my noble friend who is not responding for what appears to be an excellent briefing provided to my noble friend on the Front Bench. I respect the Minister’s concerns about the inclusion of these provisions, and I thank her for her offer to continue discussion and consideration of how this important issue could be included in the statutory guidance at the very least. I take the point that it concerns a small number of people, but it has a dreadful effect on them. I also welcome her confirmation that the review of coercive and controlling behaviour, associated with the Serious Crime Act 2015, will be published before Report. Obviously, I will study that when it is released, and perhaps we can build on it in some way going forward. Of course, I have sympathy with, and am sensitive to, my noble friend Lord Moylan rightly pointing out the potential dangers of reading across from these amendments to other religious reasons for objecting to a divorce. That is why the amendments consistently specify “religious Jewish divorce and “unreasonable” refusal to agree to the dissolution of a Jewish marriage. Most of the most difficult cases are instances of an individual wilfully refusing, or threatening to refuse, a get on the grounds of seeking to abuse their wife by continuing to control her life—or even to coerce her to fulfil unreasonable or extortionate demands, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn. Jewish law specifically facilitates divorce, but it puts the power in husbands’ hands. However, if objections are reasonable, rather than abusive, they would not be covered by these amendments, which were specifically designed for the problem of women in this country not being able to move on with their life due to religious Jewish hold-ups. I thank everyone—all colleagues across the House, my noble friends and the department—who has respectfully and carefully considered these amendments. I hope that we may continue the discussion because it is such an important issue to many noble Lords, it seems. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 3. Amendment 3 withdrawn. |