Policy Exchange: Fixing military strategy to secure post-Brexit Britain
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The UK’s military prowess can be one of the biggest assets in
shaping the ‘Global Britain’ agenda – but only if it is underpinned
by a hard-headed assessment of the changing strategic environment.
In A Question of Power, Policy Exchange sets out the case for
the establishment of a new Office of Net Assessment (ONA), based on
the highly successful US model credited with helping win the Cold
War, to help Britain think competitively again, and enable better
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The UK’s military prowess can be one of the biggest assets in shaping the ‘Global Britain’ agenda – but only if it is underpinned by a hard-headed assessment of the changing strategic environment. In A Question of Power, Policy Exchange sets out the case for the establishment of a new Office of Net Assessment (ONA), based on the highly successful US model credited with helping win the Cold War, to help Britain think competitively again, and enable better informed strategy making across Government. The UK has many great strategic attributes, world class armed forces and deep alliance networks, for example NATO and Commonwealth nations like Australia. But Britain’s capacity for competitive thinking has been tested by adversaries like Russia and Iran who reject the existing international order and sometimes seem to get more “bang for buck” in the military domain. The creation of new Office of Net Assessment would be a major step in correcting that imbalance that sees our adversaries use hybrid forms of war to advance their aims. The ONA would help guide long-term strategic planning and inform decisions on procurement. Now more than ever, British defence strategy needs to be based on a more hard-headed assessment of hard power, measuring nations’ military capabilities in relation to each other. A UK Office of Net Assessment would:
Rt Hon Gavin Williamson CBE MP, the Secretary of State for Defence, said: “Great power competition has returned and it is important UK strategy maximises the contribution that our world-class Armed Forces can make. I’m fully committed to ensuring the MOD plays its part in making a success of Global Britain - this timely Policy Exchange paper is a welcome contribution to the debate on the future of UK strategy-making.”
Former Chief of the Defence Staff General the Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, who has written a foreword to the report, said : "Britain needs to rediscover the mentality that helped to win the Cold War if we are to deal effectively with emerging threats like Russia and Iran. "All too often in recent years, Britain finds itself being caught by surprise by the actions of hostile states, whether it is Russian acts of aggression in Crimea and Ukraine, or Iranian meddling in the affairs of pro-Western Arab countries, such as the Gulf states. “Together with the West as a whole, the United Kingdom is facing a darkening strategic picture. After a post-Cold War interval of hope in a world finally free of great power conflict we in the West must now revisit some of our core assumptions and recalibrate our thinking. We need to be not just clever about our tactical and operational methods and capabilities, but also clear about our strategic approach towards our main potential rivals over the long term, in conjunction with our allies. "By being better prepared, we can mitigate against the "surprise" element of future threats by making sure that both those in government and in the military are properly informed about the rapidly changing threat environment. Establishing a dedicated office that improves Britain's decision-making process on key strategic issues will therefore be a most welcome development." “This Policy Exchange report urges a deeper understanding of both our own and our adversaries’ power as the basis for strategy – and offers a framework for achieving it. I hope this report will be widely read, even though it may make for hard reading in some places. Sound strategy requires a sound basis to proceed from, and A Question of Power is an important step in that direction.”
Senior Defence Fellow Gabriel Elefteriu, author of the report, said: “As Britain pivots back to the world after four decades spent over-concentrating on Europe, it will have to navigate new configurations of rival interests in a time of sharpening global geopolitical competition. With states like Russia launching attacks from cyber space, using chemical weapons and invading other nations, we need to ask if we’re prepared. We should be asking if we are developing the right equipment for the next war, whether our tactics are right for future threats, and whether we can defend our expensive aircraft carriers if space systems are down. “There is a wider problem with Western strategic thinking that has been at play: put simply, after the Cold War we stopped thinking about our adversaries in competitive terms, and switched to a “risk-based” model; they did not. For example, every major Russian initiative in recent years has taken the West by surprise, as did the rise of Islamic State. Rather than relying on a passive, crisis response model where we are simply firefighting the next flare up, net assessment would enable the UK to think more strategically about the international environment.
“Difficult and potentially controversial decisions need to be
made to make UK defence fit for purpose and able to support
Global Britain. Our current strategic drift is unsustainable.
This is why we need an Office of Net Assessment which will be
able to challenge vested interests and conventional wisdoms
within UK defence while evaluating our armed forces in the
context of our alliances and the adversaries they are likely to
face.” Memorandum for the Secretary of State for Defence Establishing a net assessment function within the MoD 1. This memorandum considers the establishment of a net assessment function within the Ministry of Defence. It accompanies a more detailed study published by Policy Exchange, A Question of Power: Toward Better UK Strategy Through Net Assessment. 2. Net assessment is a complex – and unconventional – framework for the strategic analysis of military balances. It measures the hard power of nations in relation to each other, rather than each on its own terms. This kind of analysis, projected over the long-term, helps support more effective defence policies in conditions of military-strategic competition. Such a capability is urgently required today in view of the highly competitive nature of global geopolitics. 3. The model for this proposal is provided by the US Office of Net Assessment (ONA) that has been functioning in the Pentagon for over 45 years. Implementation in a UK context is critical. Net assessment requires particular conditions in order to function properly and thrive. It can easily be confused with something it is not – for example, with horizon scanning or red-teaming – and if misunderstood and implemented in a sub-optimal way it will only lead to a waste of time and resources. Recommendations
a. Independence. A UK ONA should report directly to the Defence Secretary and be co-located with him in the same building. The fundamental purpose of net assessment is to inform high-level decision-making in an independent fashion, including on the shortcomings of our own defence planning and assumptions, and on those of our allies. It cannot perform this function unless it is free from the influence of the wider defence establishment with its competing agendas. High-level political sponsorship is essential. b. Small. Organisationally, it should be a small, civilian-led office. The American equivalent has averaged about a dozen full-time staff; the UK version could do with less than half of that. The personnel should be a mix of non-MoD experts and seconded military officers. The office should be able to commission further work from outside the MoD. c. Diagnostic. Organisational guidelines should make it clear that net assessment would perform a strictly diagnostic function. It should not have any strategy or policy-making responsibilities. In particular it should be kept away from day-to-day policy questions and allowed to concentrate on long-term strategic issues. d. Access. In order to produce accurate analyses – including of the UK’s own military potential – net assessment staff must be able to access highly sensitive information. In the American experience this requirement has often generated considerable friction with other elements of the national security machinery. Yet such access is critical for net assessment success. e. Simplicity. It is all too easy to mistake the vast intellectual complexity inherent in net assessment with a sophisticated problem that must be matched by an equally sophisticated set of analytical tools. Responding to a complex challenge with complex solutions – such as strategic multi-layered assessments – goes against the very nature of net assessment, which is: “model simple, think complex”. f. Flexibility. Net assessment is intellectually eclectic, creative and flexible, and consciously avoids dogma. Its approach is empirical and inductive (proceeding from the general to the particular, and distilling conclusions from large collections of varied information), rather than deductive like other quantitative-oriented methods. The approach to problems is dictated by the problem itself, rather than by pre-set formats or frameworks – which is why net assessments can vary from dozens to many hundreds of pages in volume. g. Elitism. Outreach to academia and other non-MoD consultants is fundamental to the functioning of a net assessment office. It needs to tap into the best expertise available on each subject on the research agenda. But outreach is not an end in itself. Net assessment should not be seen as a new vehicle for “community-building” in Defence. By definition, this would contradict its basic purpose of challenging conventional wisdom. A community of net assessment practitioners will inevitably form over time; but it should retain an elitist outlook in the positive, qualitative sense of the word. The need for net assessment
6. There are Cold War-style military competitions underway both in Europe (US and allies vs Russia), Middle East (US and allies vs Iran) and Asia (US and allies vs China, and separately vs North Korea). They are all driven by the expansion of the conventional and unconventional (including nuclear) military capabilities of these rival nations, and different versions of US-led “containment” policies are now being put in place in each case. 7. The success of Global Britain, however it may be defined, will be inseparable from the course of the competitions described above. Net assessment would be of particular use to the UK today in relation to the competitive challenge from Russia. 8. In terms of the military competition, the economic efficiency of producing military forces (i.e. “bang for the buck”) is a long-term strategic problem, not just a temporary management problem. Net assessment has much to offer to decision-makers in these circumstances – indeed, it was originally conceived to respond precisely to such problems.
Distinguishing features of Net Assessment 9. Power. The question of “power” is central to net assessment. In this context the meaning of “power” goes beyond a mere comparative appreciation of the relevant aggregate resources available to each side in a strategic competition. Rather, net assessment also provides an impression of how available capabilities would perform in the real world against an active opponent. This dialectical approach to strategy, based on complex, recursive calculations of move and countermove, is markedly different from the linear, simplistic “ends-ways-means” mantra pervading contemporary Western strategic discourse. 10. Asymmetries. The competitive approach in net assessment rests on identifying and exploiting asymmetries – comparative differences – between opposing sides. In the process, net assessment will expose their respective strengths and weaknesses. These insights are then used to develop competitive advantages that seek to exploit areas of opportunity in the long run, while taking early action to mitigate one’s own vulnerabilities. In practice, this competitive approach effectively means reorienting defence strategy and policy and military posture in order to steer the overall strategic competition in one’s favour. 11. Defence spending efficiency. The efficiency of expenditure over an extended period of time is a critical factor in defence policy. This fact is often obscured by the immediacy of current funding debates. The strategic question is whether the UK can avoid pricing itself out of the military competition in the long term, considering that adversaries like Russia are expanding their military capabilities at a much lower comparative cost. Trade-offs are increasingly likely to be required in terms of what equipment the UK will buy and how the force will be designed. Net assessment is geared towards understanding the risks involved. 12. RED perspective. Understanding the opponent’s view of the balance – “his net assessment of us”, as Eliot Cohen put it – is the most demanding and most critical aspect of net assessment. It requires immersion into his strategic culture and a deep understanding of his military thought, concepts of operations and philosophy of conflict, an understanding acquired over a long time of persistent observation. The importance of determining how the adversary views his own strengths and weaknesses – rather than how we do – cannot be overstated. This “delta” gap between opposing perspectives is what ultimately leads to conflict. 13. Allied focus. Net assessment also stands out through the importance it attaches to integrating careful political analysis of allies’ power into studies of military balances. Another key problem that arises in wartime conditions is coalition cohesion. As a result, net assessment focuses very much on allies and their perceptions and internal politics, alongside the principal players in the competition. Conclusion 14. For Global Britain, only highly-informed and carefully-calibrated strategic use of UK hard power resources is likely to ensure success in the long run. Approximations – much less ignorance or misunderstanding – of both adversary, allied, or our own strengths and weaknesses will be insufficient, and potentially fatal. Net assessment offers a coherent, sophisticated corpus of principles and approaches for performing the strategic calculations that can inform strategic decisions. 15. The UK should ensure it remains in step with the latest US national security thinking on questions of global strategic competition, because our entire defence concept is based on fighting with allies. A UK Office of Net Assessment would help reinforce the convergence of UK and American perspectives on the widest, most fundamental strategic issues. 16. Finally, net assessment can help lead a revival of British strategic thought from within government, adding to the efforts of academic centres of excellence in this field, and the wider UK national security community. |